





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Vol. 10

Official Edition

THE NEW COMPLETE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

By John Clark Ridpath, LL. D.

Author of Ridpath's History of the World

Volume X

INCLUDING the traditions and speculations of the pre-Columbian voyagers; the discovery and settlement of the New Continent; its development under colonial government and the establishment and progress of the Republic.

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vol. 10



ELLIOTT-MADISON Co.
CHICAGO

THE JONES BROTHERS PUBLISHING CO., CINCINNATI, O.

1912

18,821

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CHAPTER LXXIX.

SECESSION ; ORGANIZATION, AND SUMTER

On the 5th of October, 1860, one month before the national election, Governor Gist of South Carolina prepared and sent to each of the governors of the Cotton States, by special messenger, a confidential letter in which he informed them that a consultation of the leading men of South Carolina was to be held, to see what steps should be taken in case of Lincoln's election. "If a single State secedes," he wrote, "she will follow her. If no other State takes the lead, South Carolina will secede (in my opinion) alone, if she has any assurance that she will be soon followed by another or other States; otherwise it is doubtful." He advised that the Cotton States should all go out together.

1860

Gist's
secession
letter

The answers were neither prompt nor encouraging. The first—from the governor of North Carolina—was not received until October 18. It was to the effect that the governor did not consider Lincoln's election a sufficient cause for disunion, and that no convention of the people to vote upon it would be called. The governor of Alabama wrote October 25, that he thought his State would not secede alone, but might in co-operation with other States. A day later the governor

Answers

1860
Oct.-Nov.

Answers
to Gist's
letter

of Mississippi wrote: "If any State moves, I think Mississippi will go with her." A letter from the governor of Louisiana of the same date said: "I shall not advise the secession of my State, and I do not think the people of Louisiana will ultimately decide in favor of that course." The governor of Georgia was much of the same mind; he deprecated secession, and advised instead retaliatory legislation; he believed the people of his State would prefer to wait until the commission of some overt act. The governor of Florida waited a month, and then wrote that Florida "was ready to wheel into line with the gallant Palmetto State or any other Cotton State or States."

Discour-
aging

Notwithstanding the lukewarm character of most of these replies, the suggestions in the letter of Governor Gist bore fruit. They were taken up by the political leaders and office-holders of the various States, who set themselves to convert hesitancy or opposition into enthusiastic adherence. That like all political leaders, they were but mouth-pieces and organizers of the controlling element of their sections, and expressed its sentiment open or latent, is obvious from the fact that they were such leaders, as well as from the history of the previous decade; but from the nature of Southern society, that element was not a numerical majority, and its purposes in their full development were not altogether known to or shared by the masses. Hence the movement in its earlier stages was on its face a politicians', not a popular one; the people had to be inducted into it and warmed up to

Peculiar-
ities of
Southern
agitation



FRANCIS W. PICKENS.
(South Carolina.)



JOHN W. ELLIS.
(North Carolina.)



JOSEPH E. BROWN.
(Georgia.)

SOUTHERN WAR GOVERNORS.

it where possible, and cowed into docility or quiescence where not.

1860
Oct.-Nov.

That the usual and inevitable measures for organizing a revolution and concentrating its active force were taken, might be assumed: the kindling of popular passion and prejudice by holding public meetings and making inflammatory speeches; by filling the press with articles denouncing the North; the assuring of a free hand and of not being thwarted from within, by overawing all dissentient opinion. There were strong Union minorities in all the Cotton States, but they were largely terrorized into silence by the familiar methods of revolutionary times (even 1775-82), truculence from above and mob law or its threat from below; while the forming and drilling of military companies accomplished the double end of exciting enthusiasm in supporters and furnishing a means of putting down objectors. In the conventions "the voter's personal judgment was obliterated between the dread of proscription and the doctrine of State allegiance." It is significant that only in Texas was the question submitted to a direct vote of the people. It must be said, however, that some of those who have been reputed firebrands were held obstructives in the South at the time, and that the popular feeling never showed any signs of failing to uphold the leaders. It may be that desire of avoiding delay was more dominant than any distrust of the people.

Rousing
Southern
feeling

Coercion
of
minority

In South Carolina, however, the result of the November elections was hailed with jubilation

rather than with anger or regret. There the people had long been convinced that even under a national government of which every branch was controlled by the South, the presence of Northern interests and sentiments made Southern ones insecure; and that only under one which excluded all others could they flourish in safety. But an arguable excuse for withdrawal had been wanting: now it had come. In Charleston the excitement knew no bounds. Business was suspended. The lone-star and palmetto flags were everywhere displayed, and shouts and cheers went up for a Southern Confederacy. The streets for days were thronged with excited crowds, minute-men were enrolled and drilled, speeches were made in the public squares, the newspapers issued inflammatory extras, and the intensity of popular feeling was shown at night by fireworks and illuminations.

1860
Nov.

South
Carolina
glad at
Lincoln's
election

Enthu-
siasm for
secession

Mass-
meeting
in
Charles-
ton

The legislature, instead of the usual adjournment in October, had been kept in session in order to take such action as the situation should demand. Two days after the receipt of the election returns, an enthusiastic meeting of the citizens of Charleston was held, and resolutions were adopted calling upon the legislature for immediate action. In obedience to these, on Saturday, November 10, a bill was unanimously passed providing for a convention of the people of the State, to be held December 17, for the purpose of "considering the relations of the commonwealth with the Northern States and the government of the United States." Immediate action was also taken for putting the

State on a war footing. On the evening of November 12, Institute Hall was crowded with the solid business and professional men of the city, to ratify by speeches and resolutions the action of the legislature.

1860
Nov. 12,
etc.

The people of South Carolina were thoroughly in earnest. It must be remembered that they had been taught by their statesmen, and firmly believed, that they had the right under the Constitution to withdraw from the Union when the conditions became unbearable. There were minor irritating ones, but these were overlooked in their public declarations. The overwhelming and all-impelling cause—dwelt upon by public speakers and the press, by the conventions and at the popular gatherings, by the resolutions that were passed in religious synods and at legislative sessions, and by utterances from the pulpit—was the attitude of the North upon the slavery question. The people of the South had watched with alarm the growth of the anti-slavery sentiment at the North; they had seen the weak beginnings of a party formed on that sentiment develop in a little more than ten years' time into a mighty power that dominated the country, and threatened, as they believed, the invasion of their political rights. They believed slavery to be not only a divine institution, but a local one with which no other State, and not even the national government, had any right to interfere. That this interference was contemplated by the Republican party they professed to have no doubt. The election of Lincoln

South
Caro-
lina's
political
tenets

Slavery
the
all-im-
portant
factor

1860
Oct.-Nov.

South
Caro-
lina's
position

they regarded as an insult and a threat. That their cause was one in which the honor of their State and their political and property rights were involved, they sincerely believed. The time had come when they felt the conditions to be intolerable, and they hailed the opportunity to break away from them as a relief.

Bu-
chanan's
painful
one

Action
vs.
inaction

All this time the government at Washington seemed paralyzed; it was paralyzed, by its doubts of right, its doubts of power, its doubts of general sentiment, the sharing of these doubts even by many of the most advanced Northern leaders, the agonizing conflict between its duties and its sympathies. President Buchanan, though constantly appealed to for some decisive steps, would do nothing either way; with his Congress perhaps he could not—he so declared later, and that if it would have adopted any measures he would have carried them out, but he made no attempt and had no wish to hurry it. He would not do even the proper executive acts for which he needed no congressional sanction; again it is fair to say that under the circumstances, they would have precipitated a conflict which did better to wait, and he would beyond doubt have been held criminally responsible by both North and South.

Strength-
ening
coast
forts

As early as October, General Scott, who foresaw the possibilities of trouble, wrote to him and advised the immediate garrisoning of the nine more important forts on the Southern sea-coasts, so that it would be impossible for any one of them to be taken by surprise. A week later, Colonel

Gardner, then in command of Fort Moultrie, in Charleston harbor, urged the strengthening of that garrison, and that a company of soldiers be sent to Fort Sumter and another to Castle Pinckney. At a Cabinet meeting held November 9, Attorney-General Black recommended that a strong force should be thrown into the forts in Charleston harbor, and Secretary Cass agreed with him. Still the President hesitated. It was absolutely certain that South Carolina would secede, and just as certain that the first act of the new government would be to seize the forts. The excuse for the delay was a doubt as to whether coercion of a State was constitutional. Attorney-General Black was finally appealed to. "Your right," he answered, "to take such measures as may seem to be necessary for the protection of the public property is very clear."

1860
Nov.

Cabinet
on
strengthen-
ing
Charles-
ton forts

Black
decides it
constitu-
tional

Notwithstanding this assurance, the President still vacillated. One day he would determine to send troops, and so announce to his Cabinet; the next he would hesitate to carry out his resolution, in the just fear of precipitating war. A delegation from Charleston waited on him to protest against the reinforcement of the forts. They assured him that the forts would not be attacked, or any decisive step taken, until an understanding should be arrived at between the United States and South Carolina, provided the *status quo* should be preserved; otherwise, such reinforcement would be considered a declaration of war, and be met accordingly. They succeeded in wringing a half

Charles-
ton dele-
gation
protests

1860
Nov.-Dec.

Major
Anderson
desires
reinforce-
ment

promise from the President for delay, a kind of promise he was eager to keep.

In the mean time Major Robert Anderson, a loyal Kentuckian, had been put in command of the forts. November 23 he wrote: "Fort Sumter and Castle Pinckney must be garrisoned immediately, if the government determines to keep command of this harbor. I need not say how anxious I am—indeed, determined, so far as honor will permit—to avoid collision with the citizens of South Carolina. Nothing, however, will be better calculated to prevent bloodshed than our being found in such an attitude that it would be madness and folly to attack us. . . . That there is a settled determination to leave the Union, and to obtain possession of this work, is apparent to all."

Bu-
chanan's
message

Buchanan was then busied with the preparation of his message, which was sent to Congress December 4. It was a curious mixture of patriotism and helplessness, which won for him the contempt of both parties alike; we may soften it to pity. He asserted that Southern discontent was due to the Northern agitation of the slavery question, which was true enough as far as it went. On one point he rose to the occasion. He denied the right of secession. The framers of the government, he declared, "never intended to implant in its bosom the seeds of its own destruction, nor were they at its creation guilty of the absurdity of providing for its own dissolution. Secession is neither more nor less than revolution." And



ROBERT ANDERSON.



FORT SUMTER.

Congress, he declared, had not encroached upon the rights of the South, and the threats to dissolve the Union proceeded from an apprehension of future danger, which was no just cause for revolution; the United States had the unquestioned right of property in the forts, magazines, and arsenals in South Carolina, and the officer in command of the forts in Charleston harbor had received orders to act strictly on the defensive. If, he added, the forts were attacked, "the responsibility for consequences would rightfully rest upon the assailants."

1860
Dec.

Bu-
chanan
on
national
right of
self-
defense

The force of this was negatived, however, by an extended argument to prove that Congress had no right to coerce a State. Seward, in a private letter which soon became public, made the comment upon the message that it "showed conclusively that it is the duty of the President to execute the laws—unless somebody opposes him; and that no State has a right to go out of the Union—unless it wants to."

Except
when
assailed

In the mean time, event had been crowding upon event in South Carolina. Military operations were being pushed in Charleston, which was the great centre of activity. Volunteers were busy drilling in the public squares, and estimates were made as to how many men could be put into the field. The national flag no longer floated from the public buildings. It had everywhere disappeared, and in its stead the palmetto flag was proudly and defiantly displayed. In the Episcopal church services the supplication for the President of the

South
Carolina
prepares
for re-
sistance

1860
Dec.
Ban upon
Northern
publica-
tions

United States was omitted. In the periodical stores a taboo was placed upon Northern papers and magazines. A consignment of *Harper's Weekly* was returned because it contained a portrait of Lincoln. Every link that bound the people with the North was to be severed.

Governor
Pickens

On
Lincoln's
election

On the 14th of December the South Carolina Legislature elected Francis W. Pickens governor of the State. He had always been a believer in the right of secession and nullification, but he was opposed to hasty action and inclined to compromise. He could not resist the tide, however, and was swept along with it. In his inaugural, December 17, he referred to the election of Lincoln as an overt act of the people of the Northern States, based "upon issues of malignant hostility and uncompromising war to be waged upon the rights, the interests, and the peace of half the States of the Union. We have now no alternative left but to interpose our sovereign power as an independent State, to protect the rights and ancient privileges of the people of South Carolina." But he at once abandoned this ground, admitting that his State was determined upon secession and not seeking redress of grievances; rather, regarding the union of essential incompatibles itself the grievance with but one remedy.

On
seces-
sion

"South Carolina," declared Governor Pickens, "is resolved to assert her separate independence; and as she acceded separately to the compact of union, so she will most assuredly secede separately

and alone, be the consequences what they may. And I think it right to say, with no unkind feeling whatever, that *on this point there can be no compromise, let it be offered from where it may.* It is our sincere desire to separate from the States of the North in peace, and leave them to develop their own civilization, according to their own sense of duty and interest. But, if under the guidance of ambition and fanaticism they decide otherwise, be it so. We are prepared for any event, and in humble reliance upon that Providence who presides over the destinies of men and of nations, we will endeavor to do our duty faithfully, bravely, and honestly."

On the day following, December 18, the convention to take action on secession met in Charleston in secret session. No more solemn or important meeting had ever before been held in the State. Among the delegates were the leading men of South Carolina: former members of the United States Congress, past governors of the State, clergymen, railway presidents, bankers, and business men of all kinds—most of them past middle age, and all apparently moved by one common purpose.

As soon as the work of organization was completed, it was "Resolved, that it is the opinion of this Convention that the State of South Carolina should forthwith secede from the Federal Union known as the United States of America." This was offered by Senator Inglis, who remarked that no delay in action was needed, as the matter had

1860
Dec.

South
Carolina
bent on
separa-
tion

Seces-
sion con-
vention
in
Charles-
ton

State
secedes

1860
Dec.

Utter-
ances of
South
Carolina

Seces-
sion long
nursed

been under discussion for many years. Another delegate said it had been culminating for thirty years. Mr. Keitt declared that he had been engaged in the movement ever since he had entered political life. Mr. Rhett, one of the most ardent agitators in the matter, declared, "The secession of South Carolina is not an event of a day. It is not anything produced by Mr. Lincoln's election, or by the non-execution of the Fugitive Slave Law. It is a matter which has been gathering head for thirty years." This, with many similar avowals, completes the otherwise abundant proof that the inception of the revolt was not (as often conceded even by Northern authorities) due to Lincoln's election being held "a definite refusal by the North to enforce the Compromise of 1850"; but was the long matured intention of a part of the Southern leaders, based on what they believed more radical justifications, and using (perhaps causing) the former as an occasion. Indeed, so far from their considering the imputation an injustice, they then considered it a credit to their statesmanlike foresight.

Ordi-
nance of
seces-
sion

On the fourth day of the session, the ordinance of secession was reported. It was brief, and was without any recitation of the causes which had led to its adoption. It read:—

"We, the people of the State of South Carolina in convention assembled, do declare and ordain, and it is hereby declared and ordained, that the ordinance adopted by us in convention on May 23, 1788, whereby the Constitution of the United

States was ratified, and also all acts and parts of acts of the General Assembly of this State ratifying amendments of the said Constitution, are hereby repealed; and that the union now subsisting between South Carolina and other States under the name of the United States of America is hereby dissolved."

1860
Dec. 20

South
Carolina
Ordi-
nance of
Seces-
sion

It was understood that action would be taken on this day, and a vast throng gathered in front of St. Andrew's Hall, where the convention was held. At a quarter past one, December 20, the passage of the ordinance was proclaimed upon the street. The crowd went wild with joy. Bells were rung, cannon fired, and cheer after cheer rent the air. The houses were emptied of their excited occupants, and the streets in the vicinity of the hall were almost impassable. Piles of printed copies of the ordinance, which had been waiting in the *Mercury* office, were distributed broadcast among the crowd. Palmetto flags waved everywhere. The volunteers and minute-men hastened to the armories, and donned their uniforms for parade. Blue was the emblematic color. Women wore blue ribbons and men blue cockades. Even the children seemed to share in the prevailing feeling, and shouted and cheered with the rest. A huge banner was stretched across the street by the *Mercury* office, on which was displayed the picture of an arch formed of blocks of stone, typifying the fifteen slave States, with South Carolina as the keystone; the two sides of the arch resting upon bases labeled Virginia and Texas.

Rejoic-
ings in
Charles-
ton

1860
Dec. 20

At the foot of this arch was a broken heap of blocks bearing the names of the free States. A scroll in the centre bore the inscription, "Southern Republic Built from the Ruins."

Ceremo-
nial over
South
Carolina
secession

The signing of the ordinance by the delegates was arranged for that evening, and it was decided to make it an impressive ceremony. At half-past six o'clock the members of the convention came together at St. Andrew's Hall, where the meeting had been held, and marched in procession to Institute Hall, which had been prepared and decorated for the occasion. Here they were met by the governors and members of the State Legislature. The military companies in full uniform occupied the floor of the hall, while thousands unable to obtain admittance filled the stairways and the street in front. On the platform sat the president of the convention, the governor and members of the two State legislative bodies, the officers clad in their robes of office. A white-haired clergyman invoked the divine blessing upon the act they had met to consummate. The president of the convention then rose and read the ordinance of secession as passed. A storm of cheers followed, which lasted several minutes, even the ladies participating. The signing of the document occupied two hours, but not a person left the hall. When the last name had been placed on the paper, the president held the parchment with the great seal up to the gaze of the people, and said, "The Ordinance of Secession has been signed and ratified, and I proclaim the State of South Carolina

CHARLESTON MERCURY EXTRA:

*Passed unanimously at 1.15 o'clock, P. M., December
20th, 1860.*

AN ORDINANCE

*'To dissolve the Union between the State of South Carolina and
other States united with her under the compact entitled "The
Constitution of the United States of America."*

*We, the People of the State of South Carolina, in Convention assembled, do declare and ordain, and
it is hereby declared and ordained,*

*That the Ordinance adopted by us in Convention, on the twenty-third day of May, in the
year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty-eight, whereby the Constitution of the
United States of America was ratified, and also, all Acts and parts of Acts of the General
Assembly of this State, ratifying amendments of the said Constitution, are hereby repealed;
and that the union now subsisting between South Carolina and other States, under the name of
"The United States of America," is hereby dissolved.*

THE
UNION
IS
DISSOLVED!

SECESSION ISSUE OF CHARLESTON MERCURY.

an independent commonwealth." Another outburst of cheers followed. After the meeting, bonfires were lighted, peals were again rung upon the bells, cannon were fired, fireworks displayed, and dwellings illuminated.

1860
Dec. 20,
etc.

The following days were more quiet. The end of the people had been attained so far as independence was concerned. It now became necessary to show cause for the action taken, and to appeal to the other slaveholding States to follow their example. Four days later the convention, which had not dissolved, adopted "A Declaration of the Immediate Causes which Induce and Justify the Secession of South Carolina from the Federal Union." This document reviewed the past history of the State, the part it had taken in forming the league known as the Articles of Confederation and in the adoption of the Constitution, to prove that the States were sovereign and that the Constitution was merely a compact between them. It claimed that by the passage of the so-called Personal Liberty bills by certain of the non-slaveholding States, the constitutional compact had been broken, and that consequently South Carolina was released from her obligation. It complained that the Northern States had "denounced as sinful the institution of slavery," and elected a president who had openly declared "that this government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free."

South
Caro-
lina's
vindica-
tion for
seces-
sion

Following this declaration, the convention issued an address to the other slaveholding States,

Appeal to
others

1860

New
Orleans
favors
joining
South
Carolina

asserting State sovereignty, declaring that all confidence in the North was lost, defending slavery, and appealing to them to join in forming a confederacy of slaveholding States. The only immediate response in the way of exhibition of popular feeling was in New Orleans, where, when the news was received, outdoor meetings were held and bands played the Marseillaise.

Georgia:
A. H.
Stephens
opposes
secession

The feeling in the other cotton States was in favor of secession, provided their grievances were not redressed by the North. There was a strong union sentiment in Georgia, and that State made a determined fight against disunion under the leadership of Alexander H. Stephens; who, though a believer in the right of secession, could not see that the election of Abraham Lincoln was sufficient cause for a disruption of the Union, and who did not "regard the South as entirely blameless." His speech of November 14 before the Georgia Legislature was a magnificent specimen of oratory; lucid and logical yet on fire with passion and conviction. But for the predetermined resolve of his auditors, it must have compelled at least a delay before action. In an argument it is hard to accredit as the work of a Southerner, he met point by point every charge against the North made by the disunionists, and showed the absolute needlessness and folly of secession.

Cause of
failure

Years after the war, Mr. Stephens said: "The truth is, in my opinion the wavering scale in Georgia was turned by a sentiment, the keynote of which was given in the words, 'We can make

better terms out of the Union than in it.' This one idea did more, in my opinion, in carrying the State out than all the arguments and eloquence of all others combined. Two-thirds, at least, of those who voted for the ordinance of secession did so, I have little doubt, with a view to a more certain reformation of the Union." But it was fighting against odds. On December 3 Stephens wrote to his brother: "I fear it will all come to naught; that it is too late to do anything; that the people are run mad. They are wild with passion and frenzy, doing they know not what."¹

Stephens' speech was published in full in the New York *Tribune* two or three days later, and extracts from it appeared in every paper of note North and South. It exerted a powerful influence in the Border States, and strengthened many wavering minds everywhere, but it did not prevent Georgia withdrawing from the Union three months

1860
Dec.

What
turned
the scale
for seces-
sion

Ste-
phens'
great
speech

¹Lieutenant-General Stephen D. Lee, of the Confederate Army, says in an article contributed to *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, published by the Century Company: "In the month of December, 1860, the South itself had no more realizing sense than the North of the magnitude of events about to be entered into so lightly. Even the Southern leaders did not realize that there could be any obstacle to peaceable secession. Many at the North were willing to let the 'wayward sisters depart in peace.' Only a few on either side believed that blood would be shed. When, in the first Confederate Congress at Montgomery, one prudent debater exclaimed, 'What if we really have a war?' the general response was, 'There will be no war.' 'But,' he persisted, 'if there is a war, what are our resources?' and when one man in reply expressed his conviction that if the worst came, the South could put 50,000 men into the field, he was looked upon as an enthusiast. The expectation of peaceable secession was the delusion that precipitated matters in the South; and it was upon this expectation, when the crisis came, that South Carolina seceded. Her first step was to organize troops and assert the sovereignty in which she believed, by the occupation of her territory."

1860

later, carrying, alas! the orator with her. Lincoln was so impressed by it that he wrote to Stephens. In the course of his letter he said:—

Lincoln's
letter to
Stephens

“Do the people of the South really entertain fears that a Republican administration would directly or indirectly interfere with their slaves, or with them about their slaves? If they do, I wish to assure you . . . that there is no cause for such fears. The South would be in no more danger in this respect than it was in the days of Washington. I suppose, however, that this does not meet the case. You think slavery is right, and ought to be extended, while we think it is wrong, and ought to be restricted. That, I suppose, is the rub. It certainly is the only substantial difference between us.”

It was thought by some of the prominent Republican leaders that, when Lincoln came to form his Cabinet, it would have an important effect if he should call two or three Southern men of reputation and ability, who had been his political opponents. This, it was argued, would show that neither the President nor his party were inimical to the South or Southern interests, a charge that had been made throughout the campaign. A serious but unsuccessful attempt was made to secure such men, yet had they been found their influence must have been unavailing. Of the men finally chosen, Seward and Cameron were for conciliation and compromise, while Chase, whom Seward's friends sought to exclude, was unalterably opposed.

It became necessary at last to pay some heed to the repeated demands of Major Anderson for instructions and reinforcements. The latter were not sent for fear of precipitating hostilities, yet how could hostilities be avoided without recognizing the total independence of the seceding States? True, a considerable delay might strengthen the spirit of compromise, but it would strengthen almost equally the spirit of resistance and revolt in the South. The instructions to Anderson were borne verbally by Assistant Adjutant-General Don Carlos Buell, and were to the same purpose. No expectation of an immediate attack to obtain possession of the public works was entertained, or better, was not openly expressed, yet there was that undefinable feeling which induces caution. The commandant of the fort was warned against a possible surprise and was told—

1860
Dec.

War
Depart-
ment on
Charles-
ton forts

“—as the counsel and acts of rash and impulsive persons may possibly disappoint the expectation of the government, the Secretary of War deems it proper that you should be prepared with instructions to meet so unhappy a contingency. . . . You are to carefully avoid every act that would needlessly tend to provoke aggression; and for that reason you are not, without evident and imminent necessity, to take up any position which could be construed into the assumption of a hostile attitude. But you are to hold possession of the forts in this harbor, and if attacked, you are to defend yourself to the last extremity. The smallness of your force will not permit you, perhaps to occupy more than one of the three forts; but an attack on or an attempt to take possession of any one of them will be regarded as an act of hostility, and you may then put your command into either of them which you may deem most proper to increase your power of resistance,

1860
Dec. You are also authorized to take similar steps whenever you have tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act."

Buchan-
an on
Charles-
ton These orders emanated solely from the War Department. As soon as they came to the knowledge of the President, he hastened off a supplementary order, as follows:—

"It is neither expected nor desired that you should expose your own life or that of your men in a hopeless conflict in defense of these forts. If they are invested or attacked by a force so superior that resistance would, in your judgment, be a useless waste of life, it will be your duty to yield to necessity, and make the best terms in your power."

Might
have-
beens It has been often thought that prompt and decisive action on the part of Buchanan might have saved the nation the long and bloody war that followed; that had he, with Jacksonian determination, thrown a thousand men into the forts, showing his purpose to protect the public property at all hazards, it would have been a serious bar to the success of the secessionists, and that it is doubtful whether the other cotton States would have followed the example of South Carolina as unanimously as they afterwards did. It may be so; but it is hard to believe that a revolt preparing for a generation was contingent on the possession of one fort. The vigorous policy of which this would have been the first step, however, might well have forced South Carolina to wait, and thus postponed the war, and shortened it by making the South fight under greater disadvantages.

Charles-
ton forts:
Question
of
policies

Major Anderson, stationed at Fort Moultrie, realized that no dependence could be placed upon

the President for help, and determined to act for himself. On the night of the 26th of December he shifted the garrison to Fort Sumter, dismantling Moultrie as far as possible, spiking the guns and burning the gun-carriages. So quietly was the whole accomplished that it was not known in Charleston until the following day. The city was wild with rage and excitement. Governor Pickens sent one of his aides, Colonel Pettigrew, to inform Major Anderson that he had an agreement with the President that no change should be made in the conditions in the harbor without his consent, and demanded, "courteously but peremptorily," that he return to Fort Moultrie.

1860
Dec. 26-7

Anderson
removes
from
Moultrie
to
Sumter

State au-
thorities
order him
to return

Anderson with some warmth answered: "I know nothing of an agreement between the President and the governor. My position was threatened every night by the troops of the State. One hundred riflemen on the sand-hills which commanded the fort would make it impossible for my men to serve their guns. To prevent this, I removed on my own responsibility. Being in command of all the forts in the harbor, I had the right to transfer my force from Moultrie to Sumter. In this controversy my sympathies are entirely with the South. But my sense of duty to my trust is first with me, and this rules my action. Make my compliments to the governor, and say to him that I decline to accede to his request: I cannot and I will not go back."

Refusal

On receiving Anderson's reply, Governor Pickens ordered his troops to take immediate

1860
Dec.
27-29

South
Carolina
seizes
other
forts

possession of Fort Moultrie and Castle Pinckney. On the same day, December 27, the palmetto flag was raised over the custom-house, the collector receiving funds in the name of South Carolina. Three days later the arsenal and its contents were seized in the name of the State.

Cabinet
debate
over
them

As soon as the news reached Washington, Jefferson Davis and Senator Hunter hastened to the White House and charged the President with having broken his word, and urged him to recall Anderson at once by telegraph. Buchanan hesitated, but finally said he must consult his Cabinet. A meeting was at once called (December 27), and it proved a heated one. Floyd, the Secretary of War, declared that no instructions given to Anderson justified him in making the move; and the President was inclined to agree with him until the Buell memorandum was brought up, when he reversed his opinion, and agreed with Attorney-General Black that Anderson was fully authorized to take the disputed step. At the evening session Floyd became aggressive and overbearing, and addressed a note to the President in which he said: "It is in vain now to hope for confidence on the part of the people of South Carolina in any further pledges as to the action of the military. One remedy is left, and that is to withdraw the garrison from the harbor of Charleston. I hope the President will allow me to make that order at once." The recommendation was rejected, and Floyd resigned on the 29th. His resignation had been demanded by the President

Floyd's
resig-
nation

on the 23d for alleged malversation in office;¹ but he had delayed it until a more dignified pretext of retirement could be found. Postmaster-General Joseph Holt, of Kentucky, an ardent and outspoken Union man, was at once appointed in his stead *ad interim*; and in our criticisms of Buchanan's weakness and his reluctance to antagonize at once his Northern party and the South,

1860
Dec. 23-9

Floyd
replaced
by Holt

¹He had accepted nearly \$7,000,000 in drafts of a firm of army contractors in advance of earnings; he knew the impropriety of this, for the President had ordered it discontinued long before and he had promised to do so. Their impending bankruptcy despite the advances, which would involve his disgrace and expulsion from the Cabinet, led a kinsman of his in the department to abstract and turn over to them \$870,000 of Indian trust bonds. Floyd was indicted, but escaped on a technicality. None of the money came into his hands, however; and those most competent to judge believed that he was ignorant of the theft, and guilty of nothing worse than utter incapacity for business and weak good-nature, so far as these are excuse for assuming public trusts without competency or effort to discharge them. At best he is not a creditable feature of Buchanan's administration. He boasted, and his friends and the Southern press (as the *Mobile Advertiser* in detail) repeated the boast on his word, that he had transferred enormous quantities of arms and ammunition from Northern to Southern arsenals during 1860, in preparation for the coming struggle. The evidence seems conclusive, however, that he was romancing to gain credit at home, and had not executed nor apparently thought of any such performance; having merely stored a lot of condemned muskets in the South, and failed to give it the quota of new ones to which it was entitled. Indeed, forethought of any kind was far from him; he was not a secessionist till after Lincoln's election; and the very point of our previous narrative is that the South generally had to be worked up to that pitch even then, and as a body had not been making any effort to arm themselves. The unfinished state of several great fortifications, as Galveston and Ship Island, points to the same conclusion. Floyd incurred further suspicion by having, just before his dismissal, ordered 121 pieces of heavy artillery shipped from the Allegheny arsenal to those places, which aroused such public anger that Buchanan countermanded the order; but if ill meant it was equally ill judged, as the ordnance could have not been used for many months. The defection in February of General David Twiggs, who turned over to Texas his entire army corps with ordnance, transport, and other stores valued at \$1,200,000, also discredited the Secretary who had sent him there.

1860
Dec.
29-31

let us not forget that with the ground crumbling under his feet, defection and disloyalty all around him, he voluntarily turned to such men to give him strength and heart, and help preserve the Union to which he was sincerely devoted.

South
Carolina
commis-
sioners

Two days afterward, three commissioners appointed by the Legislature of South Carolina arrived in Washington, accredited to the United States government, and sent through the usual channels the following communication, addressed to the President:—

WASHINGTON, December 29, 1860.

Their
letter

SIR,—We have the honor to transmit to you a copy of the full powers from the convention of the people from South Carolina, under which we are authorized and empowered to treat with the government of the United States for the delivery of the forts, magazines, lighthouses, and other real estate, with their appurtenances, in the limits of South Carolina, and also for an apportionment of the public debt, and for a division of all other property held by the government of the United States as agent for the confederated States, of which South Carolina was recently a member, and generally to negotiate as to all other measures and arrangements proper to be made and adopted in the existing relation of the parties, and for the continuance of peace and amity between the commonwealth and the government at Washington.

In the execution of this trust, it is our duty to furnish you, as we now do, with an official copy of the Ordinance of Secession, by which the State of South Carolina has resumed the powers she delegated to the government of the United States, and has declared her perfect sovereignty and independence.

It would also have been our duty to have informed you that we were ready to negotiate with you upon all such questions as are necessarily raised by the adoption of this Ordinance, and that we were prepared to enter upon this

negotiation with the earnest desire to avoid all unnecessary and hostile collision, and so to inaugurate our new relations as to secure mutual respect, general advantage, and a future good-will and harmony beneficial to all the parties concerned.

But the events of the last twenty-four hours render such an assurance impossible. We came here, the representatives of an authority which could at any time within the past sixty days have taken possession of the forts in Charleston harbor, but which, upon pledges given in a manner that we cannot doubt, determined to trust to your honor rather than to its own power. Since our arrival here, an officer of the United States, acting, as we are assured, not only without but against your orders, has dismantled one fort and occupied another, thus altering to a most important extent the condition of affairs under which we came.

Until these circumstances are explained in a manner which relieves us of all doubt as to the spirit in which these negotiations shall be conducted, we are forced to suspend all discussion as to any arrangement by which our mutual interests may be amicably adjusted.

And, in conclusion, we would urge upon you the immediate withdrawal of the troops from the harbor of Charleston. Under the present circumstances they are a standing menace, which renders negotiation impossible, and, as our present experience shows, threatens speedily to bring to a bloody issue questions which ought to be settled with temperance and judgment.

We have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servants,

R. W. BARNWELL,
J. H. ADAMS,
JAS. L. ORR,
Commissioners.

The President drew up a reply so craven that it drove Judge Black, now Secretary of State, to present his resignation in case it should be sent; which would have been shared by Edwin M. Stanton, his successor as Attorney-General, and

1860
Dec.
29-31

Letter of
South
Carolina
commis-
sioners

Buchan-
an's
proposed
reply

1861

Jan.

Buchan-
an grows
firmer

most probably by Holt. Buchanan reluctantly held it back while the Secretary wrote a memorandum answering categorically the statements of the commissioners, and showing the President's duty in unmistakable terms. The latter, having chosen his side, put his legal training into an answer somewhat milder than Black would have had him, but still firmly and with spirit denying the commissioners' request.

Reply to
South
Carolina
commis-
sioners

"Before any step could have possibly been taken with regard to Major Anderson's action," he said, "we received information that the palmetto flag floated out to the breeze at Castle Pinckney, and a large military force went over last night to Fort Moultrie. Thus, the authorities of South Carolina, without waiting or asking for any explanations, and doubtless believing, as you have expressed it, that the officer had acted not only without but against my orders, on the very next day after the night when the removal was made, seized by military force two of the Federal forts in the harbor of Charleston, and have covered them with their own flag instead of that of the United States. On the very day that possession of these two forts was taken, the palmetto flag was raised over the Federal custom-house and post-office in Charleston, and on the same day every officer of the customs resigned their offices. In the harbor of Charleston we now find three forts confronting each other, over all of which the Federal flag floated only four days ago, but now over two of them this flag has been supplanted and the palmetto flag has been substituted in its stead. It is under all these circumstances that I am urged immediately to withdraw these troops from the harbor of Charleston, and am informed that without this, negotiation is impossible. This I cannot do; this I will not do. Such an idea was never thought of by me under any possible contingency."

This brought out a letter from the commissioners in reply, so offensive in matter and style,

that Buchanan indorsed it on the back with his own hand, "This paper, presented to the President, is of such a character that he refuses to receive it," and ordered it to be returned to the writers.

1861
Jan.

Another Cabinet officer of whom there was most pressing need at this time was a competent Secretary of the Treasury. Howell Cobb's successor, P. F. Thomas of Maryland, had not commanded the confidence of the world of capital, and the finances of the country were in a deplorable condition. On his resignation early in January, owing to an attempt to reinforce Fort Sumter to be mentioned later, the government looked to the financiers of New York for help; and the Attorney-General in a public letter appealed to their patriotism at this critical period in the nation's history. A deputation of capitalists of that city immediately sought a conference with the President, and informed him of their willingness to assist, but that in the event of their so doing, the Treasury Department must be placed in charge of one in whom they had the utmost confidence. They suggested John A. Dix, then postmaster of the city of New York, who was at once appointed.

Treasury
headship

Vacated

The three strong men of the Cabinet were Stanton, Holt, and Dix. Without them, in those days when every department was crippled by open or undermined by secret disloyalty, it is difficult to see how Washington could have been saved. Equally uncompromising in their patriotism, they had in common that quality above all things necessary to men in their position, backbone. Sound

Pillars of
Union in
Cabinet

1861
Jan.

Holt
prevents
capture
of Wash-
ington

Resent-
ment of
South-
erners

in judgment, quick to recognize the shifting conditions of the time, and prompt in action, they inspired strength and confidence in others, and thus conserved Union strength at the national capital sufficient to carry it safe through the crisis which threatened its existence as such. In the early days of 1861, there was a conspiracy for the seizure of Washington by the armed troops of the Confederacy. This movement was checked by the quick action of Holt, who, as Secretary of War, garrisoned the city with Federal troops, and made preparations that would render any such attempt futile. This unexpected act aroused great anger among the Southern Congressmen who had not yet resigned, and a demand for explanation of the crisis which threatened its existence. In his report sent in reply, Secretary Holt characterized the Southern revolution as "a history of surprises and treacheries," capture and garrisoning of United States forts and seizure of its arsenals, confiscation of over half a million dollars found in the mint at New Orleans, etc.; and continued:

Holt on
the plot

"The earnest endeavors made by men known to be devoted to the revolution to hurry Virginia and Maryland out of the Union were regarded as preliminary steps for the subjugation of Washington. . . . My conviction [as to this intent] rested not only upon facts already alluded to, but upon information, some of which was of the most conclusive character. Superadded to these proofs were the oft-repeated declarations of men in high political positions here, and who were known to have intimate affiliations with the revolution, if indeed they did not hold its reins in their hands, to the effect that Mr. Lincoln would not and should not be inaugurated in

Washington. Simultaneously with these prophetic warnings, a Southern journal of large circulation and influence, and which is published near the city of Washington, advocated its seizure as a possible political necessity."¹

1861
Jan.

He went on to show that the troops were offensive only to those who wished the capital to follow the forts and arsenals.

Attempt
to
prevent
guarding
Wash-
ington

Notwithstanding this, a member from North Carolina, supported by other Southern members, offered the following resolution in the House:

Resolved, That the quartering of troops of the regular army in the District of Columbia and around the Capitol, when not necessary for their protection from a hostile enemy and during the session of Congress, is impolitic and offensive, and, if permitted, may be destructive of civil liberty, and, in the opinion of this House, the regular troops now in this city ought forthwith to be removed therefrom.

A day or two later another member in the House and Mason of Virginia in the Senate moved

Motion
to rec-
ognize
Con-
federacy

¹ Aside from the conspiracy,—which seems to have been to blow up or burn the chief public buildings and kidnap the officers of state, not to attempt holding the city,—a movement of Beauregard's army on Washington was seriously considered, and strongly urged by the Southern press. The Richmond *Enquirer* of April 13 made the following notice: "Attention, Volunteers! Nothing is more probable than that President Davis will soon march an army through North Carolina and Virginia to Washington. Those of our volunteers who desire to join the Southern army as it shall pass through our borders had better organize at once for the purpose." April 20 the Richmond *Examiner* declared: "Washington is to be the seat of war. Washington is the great prize in dispute, and if Southerners will rush instantly upon it the war will soon be ended." Three days later it said: "The entire population pant for the onset. There never was half the unanimity amongst the people before, nor a tithe of the zeal upon any subject that is now manifested to take Washington and drive from it every Black Republican who is a dweller there. Our people can take it—they will take it—and Scott, the arch-traitor, and Lincoln, the beast, combined, cannot prevent it."

1861
Feb.

on the same day for a recognition of the Southern Confederacy.

Report on
scattered
navy

In answer to an inquiry of the House as to the state of the navy, the Committee on Naval Affairs, February 21, 1861, reported that the entire naval force available for the defense of the whole Atlantic coast consisted of the steamship *Brooklyn*, twenty-five guns, and the steamship *Relief*, two guns; that the former was of too great a draft to allow her to enter Charleston harbor, and the latter was under orders to the coast of Africa with stores for the African squadron.

“To the committee,” said the report, “the disposition of the naval force at this critical time seems most extraordinary. The permitting of vessels to depart for distant seas after these unhappy difficulties had broken out at home, the omission to put in repair and commission, ready for orders, a single one of the twenty-eight ships dismantled and unfit for orders in our own ports, and that, too, while \$643,639 of the appropriation for repairs in the navy in the present year remain unexpended, were, in the opinion of the committee, grave errors in the administration of the Navy Department, the consequences of which have been manifest in the many acts of lawless violence to which they have called attention. The committee are of opinion that the Secretary had it in his power, with the present naval force of the country at his command, and without materially impairing the efficiency of the service abroad, at any time after the settled purpose of overthrowing the government had become manifest, and before that purpose had developed itself in overt acts of violence, to station at anchor, within reach of his own orders, a force equal to the protection of all the property and all the rights of the government and the citizens, as well as the flag of the country, from any outrage or insult at any point on the whole Atlantic seaboard. The failure to do this is without justification or excuse.”

It had not generally been believed at the North that South Carolina would carry out her threat; but the resignations of the Congressmen from that State, and the preparations for forcible resistance to the national government, finally convinced the most skeptical that she was in earnest. In some of the Northern cities there was a revulsion of feeling, and men who had voted for Lincoln openly confessed that they believed it to have been a mistake. They had regarded the Southern threats as another form of that imperious conduct which had so long magnified that section in the councils of the nation. The question which now presented itself to the Republican leaders was, How can secession be prevented? There could be no doubt as to the validity of the election. The choice of President had been obtained in the Constitutional mode, and constitutionally it was the duty of the South to accept it as uncomplainingly and loyally as the North had accepted the many previous defeats in Congress and at the polls.

The vital question was whether in this case the legal form masked an administrative purpose involving ruin to the industries, or overthrow of the rights, of a certain section; such as under the Embargo had driven New England to the verge of secession, such as under the Fugitive Slave Law had lately goaded a free State to threaten secession. Such questions necessarily supersede those of formal law, and upon this there was irreconcilable division. The problem was met in various ways.

1860

Plan for
pre-
venting
secessionSouthern
right or
wrong

1860
 Extreme
 Union
 party

Many insisted that acquiescence on the part of the South was a moral and political obligation; and that refusal, accompanied by violence, was treason and should be punished as treason.

Greeley
 favors
 non-
 coercion

Another phase of opinion was represented by Horace Greeley through the *Tribune*, which at that time had the largest circulation and perhaps the greatest influence of any paper in the country. On November 9 it said: "If the fifteen slave States, or even the eight cotton States alone, shall quietly, decisively, say to the rest, 'We prefer to be henceforth separate from you,' we shall insist that they be permitted to go in peace. War is a hideous necessity at best; and a civil conflict, a war of estranged and embittered fellow-countrymen, is the most hideous of all wars." And again, November 30, he said: "If the cotton States generally unite with South Carolina in seceding, we insist that they cannot be prevented, and that the attempt must not be made. Five millions of people, more than half of these of the dominant race, of whom at least half a million are able and willing to shoulder muskets, can never be subdued while fighting around and over their own hearthstones. Those who think to salve over the widening chasm between the free and the cotton States are utterly unaware of the seriousness of the matter in issue." This view obtained at first with a vast number of people, but disappeared suddenly and entirely with the firing on Sumter.

Another theory of settling the difficulty was that of compromise. Its most prominent North-



JOHN J. CRITTENDEN.



HORACE GREELEY.



THURLOW WEED.

ern advocate was Thurlow Weed of New York, an astute politician, and at times almost a statesman; the owner and editor of the *Albany Evening Journal*, a paper which exerted a powerful influence throughout the Middle States. His plan was, that "the vindictive Fugitive Slave law" should be replaced by one which would provide for the payment for rescued slaves by the counties in which the violation of the law had taken place, and that the Missouri Compromise should be restored. This plan had a strong following. It was proposed further that the so-called Personal Liberty bills, enacted by several of the Northern States, should be repealed. Several States did repeal or modify them, even Massachusetts; but at the opening of Congress it was soon made apparent that it would be of no avail. Said Senator Iverson of Georgia, "You talk of repealing the Personal Liberty bills as a concession to the South. Repeal them all together, and it would not stop the progress of this revolution." And that voiced the general opinion of the Southern members. Nor indeed can we fairly say that it should have mattered. Laws or no laws, Northern sentiment would have continued to obstruct the execution of the Fugitive Slave Law just the same; and the deeper issues would not have been affected.

At this juncture, Senator John J. Crittenden of Kentucky came forward with another series of "compromise" propositions, the most famous of all, and most promising of success. They were introduced in the Senate, with a supporting

1860

Weed's
compro-
mise
scheme

Repeal of
Personal
Liberty
laws
useless

Critten-
den com-
promise

1860

speech, December 18. Crittenden proposed six constitutional amendments, which were in effect as follows:—

Crittenden compromise

1. That in all the territory of the United States then held, or hereafter acquired, situated north of latitude $36^{\circ} 30'$, slavery should be prohibited, and that in all the territory south of said line of latitude slavery should be recognized as existing, and should not be interfered with by Congress, but should be protected as property by all departments of the territorial governments during its continuance. States to be admitted from the territory either north or south of that line, with or without slavery, as their constitutions might provide.

2. That Congress should have no power to abolish slavery in places under its exclusive jurisdiction, and situate within the limits of States that permitted the holding of slaves [forts, reservations, etc.].

3. That Congress should have no power to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia without compensation, and without the consent of its inhabitants, *and also* of Virginia and Maryland [which were openly and bitterly hostile to it].

4. That Congress should have no power to prohibit or hinder the transportation of slaves between slaveholding States and Territories [*i. e.*, through free States].

5. That a provision for the payment of the owners of rescued fugitive slaves should be made by the government.

6. That no future amendment of the Constitution should affect these provisions, and that no amendment should be made to the Constitution which should authorize or give to Congress any power to abolish or interfere with slavery in any of the States by whose laws it was or might be allowed or permitted.

Analysis

In a word, it removed from the slave system the benefits of the Dred Scott decision so far as concerned new States north of the Missouri Compromise line, but fortified it for all time south of that line, and enabled a slaveholder to take his

slaves where he would in the free States while "traveling." The consensus of opinion among the ablest Northern leaders was, that if put to a popular vote it would have been carried in that section by a large majority. Nothing can prove more decisively that if the South had forborne to push the system into all the previously free districts, it could have buttressed it almost beyond possibility of disturbance in the rest and its old seats, with general Northern relief and good-will, in the horror of civil war.¹

Douglas made a powerful speech in behalf of the resolutions. He said:

I hold that the election of any man, no matter who, by the American people, according to the Constitution, furnishes no cause, no justification, for the dissolution of the Union.

1860
Dec.

The
North
favors
Crittenden com-
promise

¹ While the radical Republican leaders opposed any form of compromise, there was a strong and rapidly increasing feeling throughout the North in favor of adopting some methods for the avoidance of war. Greeley, in his *Recollections of a Busy Life*, said: "If a popular vote could have been had on the Crittenden compromise, it would have prevailed by an overwhelming majority. Very few Republicans would have voted for it, but very many would have refrained from voting at all, while their adversaries would have brought their every man to the polls and carried it by hundreds of thousands." Henry Wilson, in the *Rise and Fall of the Slave Power*, declared that "many Northern men, even some Republicans, were willing to vote for the Crittenden compromise." In the *Life of Crittenden* is printed a list of the petitions received from the Northern and Border States in favor of the compromise, which covers nine pages. Among these was one made up of signers from 182 towns of Massachusetts, signed by 22,315 names; another from the Boston Common Council; one was signed by 14,000 women. Senator Seward presented two petitions signed by 63,000 citizens of New York. The New York Democratic State Convention endorsed it. The Richmond *Whig* said: "We have never had the slightest doubt that if the voice of the people could be fairly heard in this time of our trouble, there would be a satisfactory and permanent settlement of existing differences between the two sections in less than thirty days."

1860
Dec.

Douglas
speaks
for
Crittenden
com-
promise

But we cannot close our eyes to the fact that the Southern people have received the result of that election as affording conclusive evidence that the dominant party of the North, which is soon to take possession of the Federal government under that election, are determined to invade and destroy their constitutional rights. Believing that their domestic institutions, their hearthstones and their family altars, are all to be assailed, at least by indirect means, and that the Federal government is to be used for the inauguration of a line of policy which shall have for its object the ultimate extinction of slavery in all the States, old as well as new, South as well as North, the Southern people are prepared to rush wildly, madly as I think, into revolution, disunion, war, and defy the consequences, whatever they may be, rather than to wait for the development of events, or submit tamely to what they think is a fatal blow impending over them and over all they hold dear on earth. . . . I do not believe the South will materially suffer under the administration of Mr. Lincoln. We are told that secession is wrong, and that South Carolina had no right to secede. I agree that it is wrong, unlawful, unconstitutional, criminal. But she has done it. . . . Are we prepared for war? I do not mean that kind of preparation which consists of armies and navies and supplies and munitions of war, but are we prepared in our hearts for war with our own brethren and kindred? I confess I am not. I prefer compromise to war. . . . Why not allow the people to pass upon these suggestions? If the people reject them, theirs will be the responsibility. If they accept them, the country will be safe and at peace. The political party which shall refuse to allow the people to determine for themselves at the ballot-box the issues between revolution and war on the one side, and obstinate adherence to a party platform on the other, will assume a fearful responsibility. A war upon a political issue, waged by the people of eighteen States against the people and institutions of fifteen sister States, is a fearful and revolting thought."

Following Crittenden on the same day, Senator Powell of Kentucky offered a resolution for the appointment of a special committee of thirteen

“to consider the grievances between the slaveholding and the non-slaveholding States,” and suggest a remedy. This was adopted, and the following Senators were appointed,—three of the members being from the border slave States, two from the cotton States, three Northern Democrats and five Republicans:—Powell of Kentucky, Hunter of Virginia, Crittenden of Kentucky, Seward of New York, Toombs of Georgia, Douglas of Illinois, Collamer of Vermont, Davis of Mississippi, Wade of Ohio, Bigler of Pennsylvania, Rice of Minnesota, Doolittle of Wisconsin, and Grimes of Iowa.

1860
Dec.

Committee on compromises appointed

Senate committee on compromises

The committee first came together December 21, the day after South Carolina had unanimously adopted the ordinance of secession. It was agreed, on motion of Senator Davis, that no report should be adopted unless it had the assent of a majority of the Republican members of the committee. The Crittenden resolutions were then brought forward. The vote on the first (by far the most important) of the proposed amendments stood seven to six for its rejection; the members from the border slave States and the Northern Democrats voting for it, and the Senators from the cotton States and the Republicans against it. All the Republican members of the committee voted solidly against the other articles of the compromise.

Crittenden compromise rejected

A different result had been hoped for by the Northern Democracy. General John A. Dix—who will always be remembered for his famous order

Disappointment

1860
Dec.

Northern
regrets
over
Crittenden com-
promise

after the breaking out of the war, "If any one attempts to haul down the American flag, shoot him on the spot"—wrote to Crittenden during the sessions of the committee: "There is nothing in your resolutions for which I would not cheerfully vote, if their adoption as amendments to the Constitution would save us from disunion, and what I consider its necessary consequences,—civil war, anarchy, desolation at home, the loss of all respectability and influence abroad, and finally, military despotism." Edward Everett wrote: "I saw with great satisfaction your patriotic movement, and I wish from the bottom of my heart that it may succeed." Even many leading Republicans at the North were in favor of the resolutions when confronted by the alternative of a compromise with peace, or disunion with its inevitable consequent, a long and bloody war.

The Crittenden compromise having been defeated, the Republicans submitted the three following propositions:

Republi-
can sub-
stitutes

1. That the Constitution should never be altered so as to authorize Congress to abolish or interfere with slavery in the United States.

2. That the Fugitive Slave law should be amended by granting a jury trial to the alleged fugitive.

3. That Congress recommend the repeal by the States of their Personal Liberty acts which contravene the Constitution or the laws.

Only the first of these propositions was accepted by the committee.

Senator Seward then offered a resolution that "Congress should pass an efficient law for the punishment of all persons engaged in the armed invasion of any State from another," which was amended and defeated. Other propositions were laid before the committee, which were discussed, and one by one rejected. It was evident that no agreement could be reached, and, after a week's continuous session, a resolution was adopted by the committee and reported to the Senate that it had not been able to agree upon any plan of adjustment.

1860
Dec.

Com-
promise
motions
in Con-
gress

Prior to this, on December 6, the House of Representatives had appointed a select committee of thirty-three on the crisis. This committee a week later adopted by a very large majority the following resolution:

Commit-
tee of 33

Resolved, That in the opinion of this committee the existing discontents among the Southern people, and the growing hostility among them to the Federal government, are greatly to be regretted; and whether such discontents and hostility are without just cause or not, any reasonable, proper, and constitutional remedies, and additional and more specific guarantees of the peculiar rights and interests as recognized by the Constitution, necessary to preserve the peace of the country and the perpetuation of the Union, should be promptly and cheerfully granted.

Its
report

This resolution was reported to the House and adopted, and important results were hoped from it; but on the day following, a meeting of Southern Congressmen was held at the rooms of Jefferson Davis, and an address to their constituents prepared, in which it was declared: "The argument

Southern
Congress-
men re-
solve on
secession

1860
Dec.
Southern
Congress-
men re-
solve on
secession

is exhausted. . . . In our judgment the Republicans are resolute in the purpose to grant nothing that will or ought to satisfy the South. We are satisfied that the honor, safety, and independence of the Southern people require the organization of a Southern Confederacy—a result to be obtained only by separate State secession.”

No com-
promise
enough
for
South

Lincoln
against
any

It was clearly evident that the leaders had made up their minds for secession, no matter what temptation in the way of compromise might be offered them. To be fair, it was equally evident that any great compromise whatever,—that is, any status of slavery short of legal recognition and enforcement in every quarter of the Union,—was thought by them insufficient to make their interests secure. Lincoln, anxious as he was to avoid trouble, would not consider the Crittenden plan for a moment. On February 1 he wrote to Seward: “On the Territorial question—that is, the question of extending slavery under the national auspices—I am inflexible. I am for no compromise which assists or permits the extension of this institution on soil owned by the nation. Any trick by which the nation is to acquire territory, and then allow some local authority to spread slavery over it, is as obnoxious as any other. I take it, to effect some such result as this, and to put us again on the high-road to a slave empire, is the object of all these compromises. I am against it.”

Another proposition laid before Congress was that for the gradual, compensated emancipation

of the slaves in the Border States, and colonizing them in Siberia and Hayti. It did not include the seven cotton States, as they had either gone out or were preparing to go. The New York *Tribune* warmly commended the project, and urged that the cost would be less than that of a single year of war. The resolution was approved by McKean, a Republican member from New York, in the House of Representatives. It was assigned to the consideration of a special committee of five, and was never heard of again. The truth was, the colonization scheme had been thoroughly discredited for many years, on the word of Southern organs themselves that it was merely a means of strengthening slavery and raising the price of slaves by reducing their numbers and weeding out the inefficient.

1860
Dec.

Coloniza-
tion plan

An
exposed
sham

On December 8 Howell Cobb of Georgia, Secretary of the Treasury, resigned his position in the Cabinet, "from a sense of duty to the State of Georgia." A week afterwards Lewis Cass, Secretary of State, tendered his resignation for the reasons that the President had refused to reinforce the forts in Charleston harbor; that he had declined to send an armed vessel to collect the revenue and aid in the defense of United States property; and that he had refused to remove the custom-house at Charleston to one of the forts in the harbor, and failed to make arrangements to compel the payment of duties when the collector then in office should give up his position. These two resignations, for exactly

Cabinet
resig-
nations
for
opposite
reasons

1860-1
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opposite reasons, made the situation more acute by barring out middle courses.

Scott
urges re-
inforcing
forts

General Scott hurried from his sick-bed in New York to Washington, to once more entreat the President to strengthen the garrisons in the forts along the Southern coast. It was not too late to repair past mistakes. Scott's suggestions were warmly supported by a majority of the Cabinet, but Buchanan was obstinate. He would neither listen nor act. Jacob Thompson, Secretary of the Interior, openly declared himself in favor of secession, and left his duties to go to North Carolina to deliver secession speeches; yet Buchanan allowed him to remain in the Cabinet, to the scandal of friends and foes alike. Floyd's case we have mentioned. Buchanan's vacillation at the most critical periods, his quibbling over unimportant points, his weakness and obstinacy each at the wrong times, and his inability to rise to the occasion, had ranked him with Dante's denizens of the Inferno "hateful alike to God and to God's enemies" for lack of decision. We may now modify this by pity for a painful position. The insult of the commissioners, however, touched his personal pride, and a change in his policy at once became evident.

Scandal
of
Thomp-
son and
Floyd

Buchan-
an's in-
eptitude

Firmer
action

His rehabilitated Cabinet was a strong one, and under its advice he determined to send the *Brooklyn* man-of-war with men and provisions to Sumter. General Scott, however, feared that the *Brooklyn* might come to trouble in crossing Charleston bar; and it was then fully decided to send

a fast merchant steamer, the *Star of the West*, instead. Two hundred men, with arms and ammunition and a supply of provisions, were taken on board, and she sailed from New York on January 5. Three days later she reached Charleston. Her coming had been announced by Senator Wigfall, and a guard steamer had been stationed low down in the harbor waiting for her. When about two miles from the fort, fire was opened upon her from a masked battery on Morris Island. The *Star of the West* immediately hoisted the American flag, which was repeatedly fired upon. As she was not armed, and as she would have had to pass directly under the walls of Fort Moultrie to reach Sumter, she retreated and returned to New York. This event proved fortunate in one respect, as it led to the withdrawal of Thompson the disloyal Secretary of the Interior, and Thomas the inefficient Secretary of the Treasury.

Meantime the secession of the cotton States and the seizure of national property went on undisturbed. Mississippi went out January 9. Florida seceded January 10 and Alabama the 11th, the two jointly seizing the navy yard at Pensacola, Fort Barrancas, and Fort McRae, and Alabama the arsenal at Mobile and Fort Morgan. Georgia went out on the 19th, taking possession of the arsenal at Augusta, and of Forts Pulaski and Jackson. Louisiana seceded January 26, on the same day seizing the arsenal at Baton Rouge, the United States Mint, the custom-house at New Orleans, Forts Jackson, St. Philip, and Pike.

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Dec.-Jan.

"Star of
the
West"

Fired on

States
secede
and
seize
public
property

1861
Jan.

The Border States did not take action until later. By the first of February nearly every fort and arsenal in the cotton States were in the hands of the secessionists.

Fort
Pickens

There was one exception, however, and that a most important one. The navy yard at Pensacola, in Florida, was seized before that State had declared for secession. Fort Pickens, the largest and most powerful work on the Atlantic coast, was yet unoccupied, and was regarded as an easy prey. It occupied a position on the extreme western point of Santa Rosa island, and dominated the passage between Pensacola Bay and the Gulf of Mexico. Exactly opposite on the west was a water battery called Fort McRae; while almost due north, on the bend of the passage, was Fort Barrancas, an old Spanish work, adjoining the navy yard. Barrancas was garrisoned by Lieutenant Adam Slemmer and forty-six men, who were compelled to retire to Fort McRae, where they were joined by thirty ordinary seamen from the navy yard. Slemmer, recognizing the impossibility of holding his new position, repeated the strategy of Anderson: in the early morning of January 10, with his little command he crossed the bay and took possession of Pickens, which he bravely held against a force of Florida, Mississippi, and Alabama troops until he received provisions and ample reinforcements. The fort never fell into the hands of the revolutionists.

Saved
from
Seces-
sionists

The secession feeling seemed to sweep through the South like an epidemic. It was in the air;

but that fact proves that the mental attitude of the masses was thoroughly prepared for it. People who denounced the idea one day became infected with the mania the next. The press, whose life is sensation and exaggeration, naturally teemed with the wildest and most inflammatory distortions of truth. Vice-President Hamlin was a negro; the North was made up of "mudsills and greasy mechanics"; one Southern soldier was equal to five Yankees; the North hated the South "on account of her superior civilization and virtues and the purer and more pious life of her society." Every possible appeal was of course made to the passions and emotions.

Chaos, political and social, reigned in Washington. It was like Paris in the days of the Terror. Families were divided against themselves, and no one knew whom to trust. We quote Draper's vivid and truthful account; premising that his judgment upon the actors is his own, and that all doubtless believed themselves doing legitimate service to the rightful cause. "All Washington," he says, "was converted into a whispering gallery; what was uttered in secrecy in its council chamber was instantly reverberated in Montgomery. Senators who had sworn to support the Constitution of the United States were intriguing for its overthrow. Representatives were holding their seats in Congress merely to embarrass legislation, and be of service to the insurgents. It was a state of things which recalled the old times when conspirators against Rome were treasonably

1861
Jan.

Spread of
secession
feeling

News-
paper
incen-
diarism

Wash-
ington an
enemy's
camp

1861
Jan.
Chaos in
Wash-
ington

establishing a camp in Etruria, and Catiline was meeting with the Senate in the Temple of Jupiter Stator. Conclaves were held under the very shadow of the Capitol for the seizure of forts, arsenals, and custom-houses, and for the organization of conventions to insure secession in the distant States. The telegraph and the post-office were tampered with. Officers, forgetful of the honor of a soldier, surrendered their commissions—nay, more, surrendered the army; sailors were surrendering ships. . . . The public offices were swarming with disloyal men; and even of many of those who were loyal, the wives and daughters were not to be trusted. Nothing could be hidden from the female spies who pervaded society in Washington through and through.”

Deser-
tions

Bresh-
wood's
treason

The spirit of desertion was especially rampant in the navy. A striking exemplification of this was the act of Captain Breshwood, in command of the revenue cutter at New Orleans, who voluntarily surrendered his vessel to the State of Louisiana. At that time Louisiana had not seceded, and Virginia, of which State Breshwood was a native, did not go out until May 23. The government immediately dispatched a special agent ordering the captain to bring the vessel to New York. In answer this note was received:

Insolent
letter

SIR,—Your letter, with one of the 19th of January from the honorable Secretary of the Treasury, I have duly received, and in reply I refuse to obey the order.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

JOHN G. BRESHWOOD, Captain.

Received Sept 1861
Jan. 29, 1861



GENERAL JOHN A. DIX.

Tell Lieut. Caldwell to assist
Capt. Woodward, assume command
of the battery and obey the order of your
through you. If Capt. Woodward
after most undertake his to interfere
with the command of the battery, tell
Lieut. Caldwell to consider him
as a mutineer & treat him accord-
ingly. If any one attempts to haul
down the American flag, shoot
him on the spot. -

Edw. S. Hart
Secretary of the Treasury

LETTER OF JOHN A. DIX.

In reply the following telegram was promptly dispatched to the agent at New Orleans:

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Jan.-Feb.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT, January 29, 1861.

W. HEMPHILL JONES, New Orleans: Tell Lieutenant Caldwell to arrest Captain Breshwood, assume command of the cutter, and obey the order, through you. If Captain Breshwood, after arrest, undertakes to interfere with the command of the cutter, tell Lieutenant Caldwell to consider him as a mutineer and treat him accordingly. If any one attempts to haul down the American flag, shoot him on the spot.

Dix's
famous
letter

JOHN A. DIX, Secretary of the Treasury.

On the night of January 5, 1861, a secret meeting—the last of several—was held at Washington at the rooms of one of the Southern Senators, at which all of the Southern leaders were present. At this meeting it was arranged that the remaining cotton States should secede without further delay, and that each should choose delegates who should meet at Montgomery, Alabama, not later than February 15, for the purpose of organizing a confederacy. It was further arranged that Southern Senators and Representatives should not resign until then, but should remain in Congress to obstruct coercive legislation. A committee of three, consisting of Jefferson Davis, Mallory, and Slidell, was appointed to carry out these arrangements. Everything went as it was planned, and more quickly than had been anticipated. The last of the cotton States went out January 26, and the delegates met at Montgomery on February 4. A provisional Congress was organized, and four days later a provisional government was adopted, to

Secret
meetings
to com-
plete
seces-
sions

Southern
Confed-
eracy
organized

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Feb.

be known as the Confederate States of America. A constitution was adopted, and on the following day, February 9, Jefferson Davis of Mississippi was elected President and Alexander H. Stephens of Georgia Vice-President of the newly-formed government.

Jefferson
Davis

The choice of Mr. Davis was rather in the nature of a "dark horse," as he had by no means enjoyed so exceptional a position before; the deadlock between more powerful leaders was largely accountable for it. Nevertheless it was a selection from the upper ranks of Southern leadership, sound and politic. He was the "favorite son" of his State, and had been prominent enough to be a candidate for the Presidency; an ardent Calhounist, advocate of State Rights in its most extreme form, and an open champion of secession when he came to believe in its necessity. He was of unblemished character and unwavering principle and resolution. He had won distinction in the Mexican War, been Senator, Pierce's Secretary of War, and again Senator, having resigned January 24; he was thoroughly familiar with the machinery of government. But there were others who held themselves greater men, as did Seward, Chase, and others with Lincoln, and were less willing to accept the subordinate status; and their insubordination, and the factions they formed against him within the government, aided largely to cripple his administration from within, and increase the difficulties of the armies in the field. Stephens we know: his election was not only good

His diffi-
culties

politics, to placate the important State of Georgia which had expected the Presidency, but was a just tribute to his personal position and ability.

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Feb.

When Davis rose for the last time in his seat in the Senate, he showed considerable emotion. His devotion to the doctrine of State Rights, he declared, was such that he must follow the destinies of Mississippi, whether she had cause for leaving the Union or not. "I carry with me," he said, "no hostile remembrance. Whatever offense I have given which has not been redressed, or for which satisfaction has not been demanded, I have at this hour of parting to offer you my apology for any pain which in the heat of discussion I may have inflicted. It only remains for me to bid you a final adieu." He expressed deep regret that his State should be compelled to surrender the benefits of the Union, and sever the close and enduring ties of affection that bound her to it, but he could see no other way. His inaugural message, however, hardly comported with these sentimentalities. Its excessive bitterness makes it unpleasant to revive, but it would be unfair to the South not to give what its head regarded as its equitable justification.

Davis'
farewell
speech
in the
Senate

"The climate of the Northern States being unpropitious to slave labor, they sold their slaves to the South, and then prohibited slavery in their own limits. The South purchased this property willingly, not suspecting that quiet possession of it was to be disturbed by those who not only were in want of constitutional authority, but prevented by good faith as vendors from disquieting a title emanating from themselves. This done, and as soon as the Northern States had gained a

Inaugu-
ral
message

1861
Feb.

Davis' in-
augural
message

control in Congress, they commenced an organized system of hostile measures against the institution. They devised plans for making slave property insecure; they supplied fanatical organizations with money to excite the slaves to discontent and revolt; they enticed them to abscond; they neutralized and denounced the Fugitive Slave Law; they mobbed and murdered slave-owners in pursuit of their fugitive slaves; they passed laws punishing by fine and imprisonment Southern citizens seeking the recovery of their property; they sent Senators and Representatives to Congress whose chief title to that distinction was their ultra-fanaticism, and whose business was to awaken the bitterest hatred against the South by violent denunciations of its institutions. A great party was then organized for obtaining the administration of the government, its object being to exclude the slave States from the public domain, to surround them by States in which slavery should be prohibited, and thereby annihilate slave property worth thousands of millions of dollars. This party succeeded in November last in the election of its candidate for the Presidency of the United States."

On Fort
Sumter

He denounced the attempt to provision Fort Sumter as a "treacherous manœuvre," and declared that "the crooked paths of diplomacy can scarcely furnish an example so wanting in courtesy, in candor and directness, as was the course of the United States government toward the Confederate commissioners."

Virginia
calls
peace
conven-
tion

All this time, although the Border States were strongly stirred, no step had been taken by any one of them in the direction of secession. Early in February the General Assembly of Virginia passed joint resolutions inviting the other States, free and slave, to send delegates to meet in convention at Washington on February 4, for an attempt at adjustment; and named ex-President



Jefferson Davis



Alexander Stephens

John Tyler as the head of its own delegation. Twenty-one States responded to the invitation, and met at a Peace Convention on the same day the seceded States met at Montgomery to form a new government. After a session of nineteen days, the convention recommended to Congress a constitutional amendment as a plan of adjustment, which, when brought to vote, received only seven yeas. But little had been hoped from it by those familiar with the situation.

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Feb.

Virginia
calls
peace
conven-
tion

Still one more important attempt was made to stay the tide by Congress. Although it had rejected the Crittenden resolutions, there was an evident willingness on the part of many Northern members to make concessions if they did not exact too much. On the second day of March, Congress, by a two-thirds vote of each House, recommended to the States a constitutional amendment, which read: "No amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will give to Congress the power to abolish or interfere, within any State, with the domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons held to labor or service by the laws of said State." This was approved by Lincoln in his inaugural address; but was deemed insufficient by some of the Border States, and dropped.

Northern
con-
cessions

In carrying out the plan of secession, conventions were called by the governor or legislature. Delegates to these conventions were chosen by popular vote, the electors being instructed that their representatives were to vote either for immediate secession or for delay. That the people

Secession
con-
ventions

1861
Feb. were not all eager for immediate secession is shown by the results. In Georgia the popular vote stood, for secession, 50,243; for delay, 39,123. A violent storm on election day cost the conservative party, in the opinion of Stephens, 10,000 votes; but this is familiar politics—the weather always favors the party ardent enough to defy it. In the conventions held in Mississippi, Georgia, Alabama, and Louisiana, resolutions were introduced to submit the question to a popular vote, but were rejected.

Seces-
sion
vote in
Georgia

Division
in
Alabama In northern Alabama there was a strong Union sentiment, as was shown by the vote in the convention—61 for and 39 against secession. W. L. Yancey made a sensation in the convention by denouncing the people of that section of the State as traitors and rebels, who should be coerced into submission to the will of the majority. Davis, a delegate from Huntsville, answered that if such an attempt were made, the people of northern Alabama would meet their attempted subjugation at the foot of their mountains, and dispute the question at the point of the bayonet. Motions were made in each of these conventions for further attempts to obtain redress of their grievances within the Union, but all such motions failed of passage.

Stephens
tries
to hold
back
secession Stephens did not despair of preventing secession until the very last moment. In conjunction with Herschel V. Johnson, he had prepared a substitute for the ordinance of secession which he had hoped to carry through. It provided for a

convention of the slave States and "the independent republics of South Carolina, Florida, and Mississippi," to be held at Atlanta February 16, "to consider their relations with the Federal government, and adopt the course that their safety and interests might require." In this, the special grievance of Georgia was set forth as the Personal Liberty acts which had been passed by several of the Northern States; which, it was declared, were unconstitutional and interfered with the rights of the South. If these were repealed, it was intimated that Georgia would no longer have cause for withdrawal from the Union. As two or three of the States had already repealed or emasculated these laws, and others were on the point of doing so, there was strong hope that Georgia might yet be saved.

"My judgment," said Stephens, in a speech upon the resolution before the convention, "is against secession for existing causes. I have not lost hope of securing our rights in the Union and under the Constitution. I have been and still am opposed to secession as a remedy against anticipated aggressions on the part of the Federal executive or Congress. I have held and do now hold that the point of resistance should be the point of aggression." The substitute failed, however, the vote standing 164 to 133 against it. The final vote for secession, after four days' discussion, was 208 to 89.

The Mississippi convention on the third day decided for secession by a vote of 84 to 15; in

1861
Feb.-
March

Georgia's
griev-
ance

Stephens
against
secession

Georgia
secedes

1861
March

Texas'
popular
vote

Florida, on the sixth day, by a vote of 62 to 7; in Louisiana, on the fourth day, by a vote of 113 to 17; in Texas, on the ninth day, by a vote of 166 to 7. The vote in Texas was invalidated by some irregularity in the proceedings, and the convention submitted the ordinance to the people, the only instance; the returns showed, for secession 34,794, for delay 11,235.

Davis'
Cabinet

Immediately upon taking his seat, President Davis selected the following Cabinet: Robert Toombs of Georgia, Secretary of State; C. G. Memminger of South Carolina, Secretary of the Treasury; L. P. Walker of Alabama, Secretary of War; S. R. Mallory of Florida, Secretary of the Navy; J. H. Reagan of Texas, Postmaster-General; Judah P. Benjamin of Louisiana, Attorney-General. The latter, "the brains of the Confederacy," became successively its Secretary of War and of State.

First
proceed-
ings of
Confed-
erate
Congress

At the first meeting of the provisional Congress, with the possibility of a war with the United States in view, acts were passed providing military means. It was also decided that "immediate steps should be taken to obtain Forts Sumter and Pickens, either by negotiations or force," and the President was authorized to carry this resolution into effect. A resolution was also passed for the appointment, by the President, of three commissioners to negotiate at Washington a treaty of amity with the Federal government. Stephens was named chairman, but declined to serve. The commission, as finally constituted, was as follows:



FIRST CONFEDERATE CABINET.

A. B. Roman of Louisiana, Martin J. Crawford of Georgia, and John Forsyth of Alabama. P. T. Beauregard, formerly a major of engineers in the United States service, was made brigadier-general and sent to command the forces at Charleston. Companies from the various States had been sent there, and were in camp awaiting the breaking out of hostilities.

1861
March

Confed-
erate
officers

On the 4th of March, the day of the inauguration of Lincoln, the first Confederate flag was raised over the capitol building at Montgomery. Davis had wished to retain the old flag, but was overruled, and the stars and bars became its substitute. Its second appearance was two days later, over the custom-house at Charleston. The Congress remained in session from February 4 until March 16. Its more important acts, in addition to those already mentioned, were the issue of \$1,000,000 in treasury notes bearing interest of one cent a day per \$100, redeemable after one year; authorizing the raising of 100,000 volunteers to serve for twelve months, and the organization of a navy, post-office department, and courts. A commission was also appointed, with Yancey at the head, to visit Europe for the obtaining of recognition and treaties of amity and commerce for the new government.

Confed-
erate flag

Confed-
erate
Congress

The Confederate constitution was based upon that of the United States, but there were certain essential differences. It asserted the sovereignty of the States; it expressly affirmed the right of property in slaves, and made the recognition

Confed-
erate
consti-
tution

1861
March

Stephens
lauds
Confed-
erate
consti-
tution

and protection of slavery in any new territory acquired mandatory on Congress; it prohibited the reopening of the African slave trade; and it forbade levying any duty on foreign importations for the purpose of fostering any branch of industry. Alexander H. Stephens, now enlisted on its side, said of it:

“The new constitution has put at rest forever all the agitating questions relating to our peculiar institution, African slavery as it exists amongst us, the proper status of the negro in our form of civilization. This was the immediate cause of the late rupture and present revolution. The prevailing ideas entertained by Jefferson and most of the leading statesmen at the time of the formation of the old Constitution were, that the enslavement of the African was in violation of the laws of nature; that it was wrong in principle socially, morally, and politically. Our new government is founded upon exactly the opposite idea; its foundations are laid, its corner-stone rests upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery—subordination to the superior race—is his natural and normal condition. This, our new government, is the first in the history of the world based upon this great physical, philosophical, and moral truth.”

Not de-
ceived as
to war

Stephens, his State having seceded, could under his principles do naught save go with it; but he was under no illusion as to what the step was to cost. He saw—as indeed did Davis—a long and bloody war in the future; but it was too late

to recede, and he solaced himself with a belief in final success. He argued that because the population and area of the seceding territory exceeded those of the thirteen original colonies, the success of the Confederacy was a foregone conclusion. "If they," he asked, "with a less population, dared maintain their independence against the greatest power on earth, shall we have any apprehension of maintaining ours now?"

Even since, Southern generals of that war have maintained not only that the prospects were excellent then, but that the South would have been certain of victory had not civil mismanagement and feud neutralized military skill and force. The truth was, however, as the abler civil rulers well knew, the resources of the North were so incomparably superior that if at all persistently used, they must wear out those of the South.¹

1861
March

Ste-
phens'
faith in
Confed-
erate
success

South
over-
matched

¹"The militia force in the Free States was more than double that in the Slave. The entire wealth in the Free States was at least two thousand millions more than that of the Slave. The ship-tonnage of the Free States was more than fivefold that of the Slave. The value of annual products in the Free States was at least sixfold that of the Slave. The machine power of the Free States, fully developed, was actually incalculable. If from material power we turn to intellectual influences, the number of schools in the Free States was fourfold that of the Slave; the number of scholars in the Free States was sixfold that of the Slave; the number of newspapers in the Free States was five times as great as in the Slave; the number of patents issued to the Free States was sevenfold that to the Slave. If we consider the population, of the many millions of adult males in the Free States, all, as the event proved, were certain to uphold the government: in the Slave States there were only 346,000 persons who were actually owners of slaves; and as to the slaves themselves, they must necessarily be altogether unreliable for operations against armies coming to set them free. What prospect, then, was there of a triumphant issue to a war in support of slavery, if the North should be found determined to use its tremendous power?"—Draper's *American Civil War*.

1861 The real hopes of the latter, long held and abandoned late and with heart-sickened reluctance, were—first, that the North as a money-loving industrial society was wholly unwarlike, and unwilling either to fight or to spend money for fighting, would enlist slenderly and be heavily beaten; secondly, that the hearts of the Northern masses were not in the war, that the great Democratic element would enlist slackly and fight slackly when it did, and that those at home would withhold supplies from the war and soon compel the government to desist; lastly, that the cotton trade was of such vital importance to foreign nations that its interruption would soon lead them to intervene and compel the North to make peace.

Real hope

Only
hopes for
Southern
success

However, nothing could daunt or restrain the impetuous leaders then guiding the destinies of the South. “Mere abstractions” had been magnified into real grievances, which could no longer be endured and could only be put away by separation. Yet to the clear-minded among the people separation meant war, and war meant the end of that peculiar institution which they vainly hoped to preserve by secession. On the Supreme Bench there was but one Republican, and that party was in the minority in Senate and House.

Abroad the intemperate language of the campaign and the eager haste with which secession was urged forward, produced the natural criticism that the dissolution of a government had been complete in less time than would be taken to dissolve a mercantile partnership.

On the 11th of February, two days before the official declaration of the electoral vote, the President-elect started for Washington by special train, accompanied by his family and several distinguished citizens of Illinois. Messages had been received from the mayors of the various cities through which the train was to pass, offering the hospitalities of their homes. Everywhere there was a desire to see the man who had taken up a burden such as no President before him, not even Washington, had been called upon to assume. As a consequence frequent stops were made. At every place Mr. Lincoln was received with unbounded enthusiasm, and his briefest speeches were warmly applauded. In Independence Hall at Philadelphia he announced the attitude of the administration in the words: "There will be no bloodshed unless it be forced upon the government." His happiest utterance on the tour was at Indianapolis, where an immense throng had gathered to welcome him. Referring to the threatening conditions of the time, he said:

"I wish you to remember now and forever that it is your business and not mine; that if the union of these States and the liberties of this people shall be lost, it is but little to any one man fifty-two years of age, but a great deal to thirty millions of people who inhabit these United States, and to their posterity in all coming time. It is your business to rise up and preserve the Union and liberty for yourselves and not for me. I appeal to you again to constantly bear in mind that

1861

Lincoln
leaves
for Wash-
ingtonIndian-
apolis
speech

1861
Feb.

not with politicians, not with presidents, not with office-seekers, but with you, is the question, 'Shall the Union and shall the liberties of this country be preserved to the latest generations?' "

Lincoln's
speeches
on the
way to
Wash-
ington

At Columbus he spoke before the Legislature of Ohio; at Albany before that of New York; at Trenton before that of New Jersey; and at Harrisburg before that of Pennsylvania. It had been the intention to proceed at once from Harrisburg to Washington; but a conspiracy to assassinate the President while passing through Baltimore was discovered by the detectives, and a change was made in the programme. Mr. Lincoln, though urgently protesting, took an earlier train, and reached Washington in advance of his party.

Remark-
able
career

There was intense curiosity everywhere to see and hear this remarkable man, the story of whose strange career had filled the papers of the country during the campaign. It was known that he was neither well born nor gently bred. In his youth he had had none of those advantages that fall to the lot of the well-to-do. He could point to no college as his alma mater. His education was mainly that of observation. The people among whom he was thrown were of the rough, uneducated type, and he had been compelled to adjust himself to his surroundings. And this man, self-taught, and without the graces of the popular speaker or politician, had met and vanquished on the public platform the most famous political orator of the day, the "Little Giant," Stephen A. Douglas. He had shown such a masterly grasp



ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

(From painting owned by the Chicago Historical Society.)

of the great questions which were agitating the public mind, and such supreme skill in their treatment, that even his enemies admitted his ability, and awaited with the keenest anxiety the announcement of his policy. They had not long to wait.

1861
March 4

On the 4th of March, 1861, Abraham Lincoln was formally inaugurated President of the United States. Gathered around him on the platform on the east portico of the Capitol were the principal men of his party. A vast multitude filled the grounds and streets adjacent; but there was no disturbance, and the ceremony passed off quietly and without special incident. There had been many threats and warnings of trouble, but ample precautions had been taken to meet it by the outgoing administration. Prominent among the figures on the platform was Stephen A. Douglas, until then the lifelong political opponent of Lincoln. He had fought steadily for yielding the larger part of the Southern demands up to the very day of the secession of South Carolina, and the disunionists had counted upon his still further support. Now he openly gave notice to his followers, and the country at large, that he was henceforth to be considered a supporter of the incoming administration. When the President rose to read his inaugural, Douglas rendered him a touching personal service.

Inauguration
ceremonies
and
speech

Douglas
at his
side

The address was satisfactory alike to all grades of Republicans, and to the Douglas Democrats as well. It was conservative and firm in tone, and

1861
March 4

Lincoln's
inaugural
speech

yet conciliatory. The President assured the Southern people that during his administration there would be no violation of their rights on the subject of slavery. In regard to the action taken by the States which had withdrawn from the Union, he asserted that it rested upon a theory at variance with any defensible view of the American government.

“In contemplation of universal law and of the Constitution,” he declared, “the union of these States is perpetual. No State upon its own mere motion can lawfully get out of the Union. Resolves and ordinances to that effect are legally void; and acts of violence within any State or States, against the authority of the United States, are insurrectionary or revolutionary according to circumstances. To the extent of my ability I shall take care, as the Constitution especially enjoins upon me, that the laws of the Union be faithfully executed in all the States. . . . In doing this there need be no bloodshed or violence; and there shall be none unless it be forced upon the national authority. The power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the government, and to collect the duties and imposts; but beyond what may be necessary for these objects, there will be no invasion, no using of force against or among the people anywhere. The mails, unless repelled, will continue to be furnished in all parts of the Union. . . . One section of our country believes slavery is right and ought to be extended, while the other believes it is wrong and ought not to be extended. This is the only substantial dispute. . . . Physically speaking, we cannot separate. . . . In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen, and not in mine, is the momentous issue of civil war. The government will not assail you. You can have no conflict without being yourselves the aggressors. . . . We are not enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies. Though passion may have strained, it must not break our bonds of affection. The mystic cords of memory, stretching from every

battlefield and patriot grave to every living heart and hearthstone all over this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of the Union when again touched, as they surely will be, by the better angels of our nature.”

1861
March

The oath of office was administered by Chief Justice Taney. At the conclusion of the ceremony, President Lincoln, accompanied by Mr. Buchanan, drove to the White House, which was to be his home thenceforward until his death. His Cabinet, like all such, had to represent fairly the different sections and interests of the country; but in this case it was of necessity confined to the North, West, and Border, and must not represent the Peace Democracy. Its prime function was to consolidate Union feeling throughout the country, and the selections were made more from that point of view than for the absolute fitness of certain members. As completed, it consisted of four Democrats and three Whigs, as follows: Secretary of State, William H. Seward of New York; Secretary of the Treasury, Salmon P. Chase of Ohio; Secretary of War, Simon Cameron of Pennsylvania; Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles of Connecticut; Secretary of the Interior, Caleb B. Smith of Indiana; Postmaster-General, Montgomery Blair of Maryland; Attorney-General, Edward Bates of Missouri.

Lincoln
forms his
Cabinet

No sooner was this choice made public than a furious factional fight broke out over Seward, Blair, Chase, and Cameron. The Pennsylvania Republicans insisted that Chase was unsound on the tariff question. There was enmity likewise

Bitterly
fought

1861
March

Fight
over
Cameron

between Chase and Seward, and the friends of the latter did all they could to prevent the confirmation of the former. The bitterest contest was waged over Simon Cameron, whose reputation both political and personal was involved in grave scandals; but for purely political reasons he was strongly supported by Seward and Thurlow Weed. Seward was so hotly assailed for this, that two days before the inauguration he withdrew his acceptance of the Secretaryship of State; but he was persuaded to reconsider his decision.

Lincoln's
dreadful
task

Secession
triumph-
ant

At no time in the history of the country had there been so disheartening a condition of affairs as that which confronted the new President. The Treasury was empty. The current resources of the government, as well as arms and army, were heavily insufficient for the immense new expenditures called for by the crisis. The few regular soldiers were scattered among the forts on the border, and the ships of the navy had been dispatched to foreign seas. Seven of the States had withdrawn from the Union and were drilling armed forces in their capitals. Nearly all the forts and arsenals in the seceded States were in the hands of the secessionists; many prominent officers of both the army and navy had thrown up their commissions and gone with their States. The Border States were on the verge of rebellion. In the North, people were yet divided. Compromises and peace conferences were still in the air. The situation seemed desperate; but Lincoln faced it with no weak heart. Still he was determined

that when the looming hostilities began, the South should strike first. This was no secret diplomatic intention: it was plainly enunciated in his inaugural address. He was determined to avert the blow if possible, to meet it if he must.

1861
March

It is doubtful whether Lincoln fully realized the gravity of the situation until after his arrival in Washington. Seward had persistently minimized the danger in his talks with the President. He asserted that the secession movement had already spent its force, and that the quiet evacuation of Sumter, with a display of kind feeling toward the aggrieved States, would strengthen the Union sentiment in the South and lead to a restoration of former conditions. "Let the wayward sisters go in peace," he advised, and then call a convention of the States and invite them to come back. The President, however, did not share the Secretary's optimism. He took every means, through trusted agents in all parts of the South, to ascertain the state of public feeling. The result was not encouraging. Revolution was seething in the Border States, and any misstep on the part of the government would, it was certain, precipitate an outbreak. All reports were to the same effect. Every act of the seceded States was that of menace, and the more important of the Border States were already taking on a defiant air.

Seward's
optimism

Not
justified

The conditions would have crushed a weaker man; they seemed to inspire the President with strength. When it was suggested by Seward in the Cabinet that some amicable arrangement

1861
March

Lincoln's
firmness

might be made with the seceded States, he exclaimed, "I will suffer death before I will consent, or advise my friends to consent, to any concession or compromise which looks like buying the privilege of taking possession of the government to which we have a constitutional right; because, whatever I might think of the merit of the various propositions before Congress, I should consider any concession in the face of menace as the destruction of the government itself, and a consent on all hands that our system shall be brought down to a level with the disorganized state of affairs in Mexico."

Confederacy
sends
commission

Refused
reception
by
Seward

A week after the inauguration, two commissioners from the Confederate government, Forsyth of Alabama and Crawford of Georgia, reached Washington from Montgomery. They announced themselves as representatives of the Confederate government, empowered to treat with the government of the United States on all questions in dispute, and asked an opportunity to present their credentials to the President. Their letter was addressed to the Secretary of State. Mr. Seward declined to receive them. He replied that he could not recognize in the late events an accomplished revolution or an independent nation; that he could not admit that the States referred to had withdrawn, or could withdraw, from the Union without the consent of the people of the United States; that he could not regard, or in any way admit, the so-called Confederate States as a foreign power with whom diplomatic

relations ought to be established; that his duties as Secretary of State confined him to the conducting of the foreign relations of the country, and did not embrace domestic questions; that he had no authority to recognize them as diplomatic agents, or hold any communication with them; and finally that he had submitted their request to the President, who sanctioned his decision in declining all official intercourse with them.

To this answer a long and magniloquent reply was sent by the commissioners, in which they informed the Secretary that "the old Union was broken up," and that "its disintegration had begun." They advised him to "dismiss all hopes that the people of the Confederate States would ever be brought to submit to the authority of the United States government," and that he would "awake to find these dreams as unreal and unsubstantial as others in which he had recently indulged." The refusal of the government to receive them, and its evident intention to reinforce Fort Sumter, they declared were accepted by them, and the world would accept them, as a declaration of war against the Confederate States. They, therefore, "in behalf of their government and people, accept the gage of battle thus thrown down to them, and, appealing to God and the judgment of mankind, as to the righteousness of their cause, the people of the Confederate States will defend their liberties to the last against this flagrant and open attempt at their subjugation to sectional power."

1861
March

Seward
refuses to
receive
commis-
sioners

Letter-
mani-
festo

1861
March-
April

Seceded
States
preparing
for war

All this time, while the United States government had made no military movement and was trying in all ways to avoid any color of hostilities, the seceding States were straining every nerve in their preparations for war. Defensive works were constructed wherever attack was thought likely. A large force under Beauregard was busied in planting batteries all about Charleston harbor. It was forbidden to supply fuel, provisions, or water to any vessel of the United States. The State of Florida actually passed a law punishing with death any of its citizens who should hold office under the United States government after a collision should have taken place.

Govern-
ment at a
disad-
vantage

Lincoln and his councillors had waited and hoped for some means to avoid war; that this policy had given the Confederates the advantage of time for preparation, was necessarily involved in the government's being able to justify itself to its constituents as not having "provoked" the war. Now, when it was found that war was inevitable, the President determined to strengthen Sumter. But the golden opportunity was past. Even General Scott, who had been so anxious for its occupation by a larger force, now declared that it would take an army of 20,000 men to accomplish the task. Still the President insisted. A plan was submitted by Captain G. V. Fox of the navy (afterwards Assistant Secretary of the Navy), which, after discussion by the Cabinet, was thought feasible; but through the injudicious action of Seward the plan failed.

Abortive
plan to
reinforce
Sumter

President Lincoln, in accordance with a promise given that he would notify Governor Pickens if it was decided to provision the fort, had telegraphed his decision when he believed it was to be carried out. The message was at once sent to President Davis at Montgomery, with a request for instructions. It was laid before the Confederate Cabinet, and made the subject of long and serious discussion. Toombs, who had been one of the most fervent promoters of the secession movement, opposed attacking the fort. "The firing upon that fort," he declared, "will inaugurate a civil war greater than any the world has yet seen. I do not feel competent to advise you. At this time it is suicide—murder—and will lose us every friend at the North. You will wantonly strike a hornets' nest which extends from mountain to ocean, and legions now quiet will swarm out and sting us to death. It is unnecessary; it puts us in the wrong. It is fatal."

1861
April

Confed-
erate
Cabinet
debate on
Sumter

Toombs
opposes
assailing
it

Nevertheless Davis telegraphed to Beauregard to demand the surrender of the fort, and in case of refusal to reduce it. In accordance with these instructions, Beauregard sent on April 11 three officers of his staff to make the demand. Major Anderson refused to surrender; but the officers learned through a chance remark that the garrison was on the point of being starved out. This fact was telegraphed to the Confederate Secretary of War, who sent word not to bombard Fort Sumter needlessly; if Anderson would name a time when he would evacuate the fort, to wait

Davis
orders it
reduced

To be
starved
out

1861
April

Beau-
regard
will not
wait
Sumter's
evacua-
tion

until that time, and so avoid unnecessary bloodshed. To this suggestion Anderson sent reply that he would leave the fort at noon on April 15, providing that no controlling instructions were received from his government, or additional supplies. Beauregard refused to agree to these terms, and notified Major Anderson that he should open fire on the fort in an hour.

Charles-
ton
rejoices
over
assault

Word ran through the city like wild-fire, and excited crowds of men, women, and children thronged the wharves and the Battery. Women were mostly in evidence, gaily dressed and in the highest spirits. Not one of them realized the terrible significance of what was about to take place, or dreamed of the consequences which were to follow. It was a gala day for them; they laughed and jested, and when the first shell made its hissing way through the air to the doomed fort, they waved their handkerchiefs and cheered.

Bombard-
ment

At half-past four o'clock in the early morning of April 12, the signal was given from Fort Johnson on the south side of the harbor, and a well-aimed shell rose high in air, descending and bursting immediately above the fort. In half an hour's time all the forts and batteries were pouring shells and solid shot into the fort. The firing was incessant. For two hours not a shot was heard in reply. At seven o'clock the fort opened fire from the twenty guns in the casemates. It was impossible, on account of their exposure, to make use of the large number of guns *en barbette*. The entire garrison of Sumter consisted of 128 men,

including officers, musicians, and forty-two non-combatant workmen. Their rations for two or three days had been simply pork and water. The Confederates numbered, according to their own statement, over seven thousand men. The bombardment was kept up for nearly two days, when a conflagration caused by bursting shells threatened to destroy both fort and garrison, and compelled a surrender. At 12 o'clock, April 14, Major Anderson, after an impressive ceremony of prayer and salute, caused the flag to be reverently lowered, and evacuated Fort Sumter.¹

1861
April
12-14

Fort
Sumter
forced to
sur-
render

In Charleston the people gave themselves up to the most extravagant expressions of joy. The *London Times* correspondent, Russell, describing the conditions, which lasted several days, said: "The streets of Charleston present some such aspect as those in Paris in the last Revolution. Crowds of armed men singing and promenading the streets, the battle blood running through their veins; that hot oxygen which is called 'the flush of victory' on the cheek; restaurants full; reveling in bar-rooms; club-rooms crowded; orgies and

Charles-
ton cele-
brates

¹The story of the evacuation is thus tersely told by Major Anderson in his report written on the steamer *Baltic*, on his way from Charleston to New York: "Having defended Fort Sumter for thirty-four hours, until the quarters were entirely burned, the main gates destroyed by fire, the gorge walls seriously injured, the magazine surrounded by flames and its door closed from the effects of heat, four barrels and three cartridges of powder only being available, and no provisions remaining but pork, I accepted terms of evacuation offered by General Beauregard, and marched out of the fort Sunday afternoon, the 14th instant, with colors flying and drums beating, bringing away company and private property and saluting my flag with fifty guns."

1861
April

Charles-
ton cele-
brates
capture
of
Sumter

carousings in tavern and private house, in tap-room, from cabaret, down narrow alleys, in the broad highway. Sumter has set them distraught. Never was such a victory; never such brave lads; never such a fight! It is a bloodless Waterloo or Solferino." The churches were crowded. The Te Deum was celebrated with great pomp at the Catholic cathedral. At St. Philip's the venerable Episcopal bishop attributed "this signal and bloodless victory" to "the infinite mercy of God, who especially interposed his hand in behalf of their righteous cause."

Entire
South
joins

The whole South was jubilant. Bells were rung, cannon were fired, and the secession flag floated everywhere. "The fervor of a fanatical crusade transfused the whole Southern population; and their motley array of palmetto banners, rattlesnake flags, and almost as eccentric varieties of stars and bars, became . . . the symbols of a holy deliverance." Walker, the Confederate Secretary of War, in a speech at Montgomery on the receipt of the news, declared that "the flag which now flaunts the breeze here will float over the dome of the old Capitol at Washington before the first of May." So stood affairs on the 14th of April, 1861.

CHAPTER LXXX.

NORTHERN UPRISING AND BORDER STATES

The news of the bombardment and evacuation of Sumter reached Washington Sunday, April 14. The President called the Cabinet together, and after a brief consultation,—for all were of one mind,—he drafted with his own hand the following proclamation, which was at once telegraphed over the whole country, to the governors of the different States and to the press:

1861
April 14

Lincoln's
war
procla-
mation

PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

WHEREAS, The laws of the United States have been for some time past, and are now, opposed and the execution thereof obstructed in the States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the marshals by law; now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, in virtue of the power in me vested by the Constitution and by the laws, have thought fit to call forth and hereby do call forth the militia of the several States of the Union, to the aggregate number of seventy-five thousand, in order to suppress said combinations, and to cause the laws to be duly executed.

The details for this object will immediately be communicated to the State authorities through the War Department. I appeal to all loyal citizens to favor, facilitate, and aid this effort to maintain the honor, the integrity, and existence of our national union, and the perpetuity of popular government, and to redress wrongs already long enough endured. I deem it proper to say that the first service assigned to the

1861
April 14
et seq.

Lincoln's
war
procla-
mation

forces hereby called forth will probably be to repossess the forts, places, and property which have been seized from the Union; and in every event the utmost care will be observed, consistently with the objects aforesaid, to avoid any devastation, any destruction of or interference with property, or any disturbance of peaceful citizens in any part of the country; and I hereby command the persons composing the combinations aforesaid to disperse and retire peaceably to their respective abodes within twenty days from this date.

Deeming that the present condition of public affairs presents an extraordinary occasion, I do hereby, in virtue of the power vested in me by the Constitution, convene both Houses of Congress. Senators and Representatives are therefore summoned to assemble at their respective chambers at twelve o'clock, noon, on Thursday, the fourth day of July next, then and there to consider and determine such measures as in their wisdom the public safety and interest may seem to demand.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the City of Washington this fifteenth day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-one, and of the independence of the United States the eighty-fifth.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

By the President.

WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State.

Effect in
the North

The effect through the North was electrical. All political differences were at once forgotten; all talk of peace conferences and compromises was swept to the winds. The people rose as one man. They realized that the time for peaceful settlement was past; that no act of Congress, no convention, no resort to the ballot-box was any longer of avail, and that deeds must take the place of words. The pulpit, the press, and the platform echoed the President's call. Men thronged from

the fields, the shops, and the counting-houses to don the uniform of the nation; the colleges gave their quota, and there was not a calling or profession but had its representatives in the ranks. Money was poured out like water. Wealthy men raised and equipped regiments at their own expense. There was a magnificent energy everywhere. Said Emerson: "At the darkest moment in the history of the Republic, when it looked as if the nation would be dismembered, pulverized into its original elements, the attack on Fort Sumter crystallized the North into a unit, and the hope of mankind was saved."

1861
April

The
North
suddenly
rises

The South viewed this sudden Northern unanimity with amazement and dismay. We have already stated its reliance on discord and unmanliness there. The more sanguine of the leaders had counted on the political and moral support of the representative Northerners who fought so hard for compromise, and had shown evidences of more than kindly feeling for the South, both in Congress and the press. They had recalled the utterances of Everett, of Fillmore, of Caleb Cushing, of Butler, of Thurlow Weed, of John A. Dix, of Winthrop, Black, Bigler, of ex-President Buchanan with his great following, of present Attorney-General Stanton who had supported the Kansas outrages and voted for Breckinridge, and a score of others of weight and influence; and were astounded when they all, without exception, proclaimed themselves for the Union and the hearty support of the President. They saw man after

Southern
disap-
point-
ment

Their
Northern
cham-
pions
turn
against
them

1861
April

man of those they had confidently counted on, change in a single day from a sympathetic friend to an active enemy. The attack on the flag had welded the people into one.¹

New
York's
old
Southern
leanings

Nowhere in the North was the feeling of loyalty more emphatically expressed than in New York City. For months previously there had been strong evidences of disloyalty in certain quarters. The mayor, Fernando Wood, had proposed that in event of disunion, New York should constitute itself a free city, retaining its business with North and South alike; and he undoubtedly had many supporters. A large number of the merchants and business men of New York who had extensive dealings with the South were silent for fear of breaking their connections, and from that fact the secession leaders relied upon them for support. With the attack upon Sumter, however, the situation was at once reversed. The New

Rallies
for the
Union

¹"We are told," said the *Richmond Examiner* of April 22, "the whole North is rallying as one man: Douglas, as ever, veering with the popular breeze, conferring cheek by jowl with Lincoln; Buchanan lifting a treacherous and time-serving voice of encouragement from the icy atmosphere at Wheatland; well-fed and well-paid Fillmore, eating up all his past words of indignation for Southern injuries, and joining in the popular hue and cry against his special benefactors; and even poor old Cass, with a better heart than all, but with a mind spent by age, doting over recollections of Jackson and the Force Bill, mistaking the Baboon of '61 for the Lion of '32, and shouting the hurrahs of thirty years ago." Disappointment, fear, old hate, and a conscious purpose, as Toombs declared, to "sprinkle blood in the face of the South," combined to make the utterances of the Southern press almost incredibly virulent. No good purpose could be subserved by reviving the language, but one charge incessantly repeated may be noticed—that the war-cry of the Northern soldiers was "beauty and booty," and that wherever the Yankee army penetrated, no woman would be safe from insult and outrage.

York Stock Exchange went wild in cheering over Major Anderson, and the merchants rushed to the platform and poured money without stint into funds for the Union cause. Every man had to show his hand, and any backwardness in so doing was generally attended with unpleasant results. The flag was displayed everywhere. When the Seventh Regiment passed down Broadway on the 19th on its way to Washington, it was through a crowd of half a million people which cheered itself hoarse all along the two miles' march. Two or three days later, a grand patriotic demonstration was held in Union Square in the presence of more than 200,000 people, Democrats and Republicans, conservatives and radicals, Catholics and Protestants, natives and foreigners, each vying with the other in their expressions of devotion to the Constitution, the government, and the Union.

One of the first expressions of sympathy and assurance of support which came to the President at this critical time was from Douglas. Hardly was the ink dry upon the proclamation, when he called upon the President and pledged himself to stand shoulder to shoulder with him in fighting the rebellion. In a letter given to the press the next day, he called upon the million men who had voted for him for President in the last campaign to follow his lead, declaring that "every man must be either for the Union or against it; there can be no neutrals in this war—only patriots and traitors." Buchanan, now freed from the pressure of responsibility, declared that "the North will

1861
April

Union
enthusi-
asm in
NewYork

Weight of
Douglas
in Union
scale

Of Bu-
chanan

1861
April-
June
Everett
for the
Union

sustain the administration almost to a man, and it ought to be sustained at all hazards." Edward Everett, who had been a fast friend of the South, and an earnest advocate of compromise even at some cost of principle, charged South Carolina with "acts of treason and rebellion," that her firing on Fort Sumter was "an unutterable outrage on the flag of the Union," and that she had inaugurated "the unprovoked and unrighteous war." There was hardly a prominent man in the North whose voice was not publicly heard in defense of the Union.

Border
States
defy
procla-
mation

The Border States met the President's call with insult and defiance. Governor Letcher of Virginia refused to send a man; Governor Ellis of North Carolina sent a defiant message, and called a special session of the State Legislature, which decided for immediate secession and voted men and money for the war. A proposition to submit the question to the people was refused. The State went out May 20. The governor of Tennessee peremptorily refused to "furnish a man for the purpose of coercion." On May 8 the Legislature of that State, in secret session, made an offensive and defensive military league with the Southern Confederacy. It also adopted a declaration of independence, and passed an ordinance ratifying the Constitution of the provisional government of the Confederacy, subject to the result of their submission to a popular vote. The State seceded June 8. Governor Magoffin of Kentucky telegraphed the President, "Kentucky

will furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern States," and called a meeting of the Legislature for May 6. When that body met, it decided upon neutrality; a policy which was soon found to be impossible, and later Kentucky came out actively for the Union.

1861
April-
June

Missouri a month before had declared in convention against secession, by a vote of 89 to 1. But this was only by abstinence from voting of the element which had thrust out Benton and overturned the rights of Kansas, and formed a large and aggressive minority including a great part of the political leaders. Governor Jackson was one of this minority, and in response to the call he telegraphed, "Your requisition, in my judgment, is illegal, unconstitutional, and revolutionary in its object, inhuman and diabolical, and cannot be complied with." That decision, however, was of no practical effect. The strongest Republican leader in Missouri was Francis P. Blair, Jr., of St. Louis, a man of the highest character, of undaunted courage, and popular throughout the State. When the governor's answer became known, he rose to the occasion and took matters into his own hands. In conjunction with Captain Nathaniel Lyon, he had already organized four regiments as a home guard. Another regiment was quickly raised, and the five were offered to the Secretary of War as the quota of Missouri; Captain Lyon was promptly commissioned as their commander. Arkansas refused to comply with the call, and seceded May 6.

Missouri
sharply
divided

The
governor
Seces-
sionist

Blair and
Lyon
keep it
safe

Arkansas
secedes

1861
April
7-9

Massa-
chusetts

The
Sixth
starts

The answer to the President's call from the Free States was immediate and decisive. Within a week, more than double the number of men asked for tendered their service; within forty-eight hours armed regiments of volunteers were on the road to the capital. Massachusetts was the only Northern State whose volunteer militia was armed and equipped ready to answer an immediate call. Governor John A. Andrew had from the first regarded war as inevitable, and had lost no time in making ready for it. The proclamation was received in Boston on Tuesday, April 17. At 12 o'clock the next day the Sixth Massachusetts regiment reported on Boston Common, armed and equipped, and ready to start for Washington and war.

Pennsyl-
vania
troops
first at
Washing-
ton

Massa-
chusetts
Sixth in
Balti-
more

On the evening of April 18 four hundred Pennsylvania soldiers reached Washington; the first in answer to the President's call. On the morning of the 19th the Massachusetts Sixth reached Baltimore. In marching from the Camden to the Washington railway station, the rear company was assaulted by a mob armed with clubs, pistols, stones, and brickbats. One burly fellow tore the gun from one of the soldiers, a boy of nineteen, and shot him dead. This was the signal for a volley from the company, by which eleven of the crowd were killed and many wounded. Before the station was reached, three of the soldiers were killed and eight wounded. The mob followed the cars as they moved from the station, smashing the windows, and provoking a



ANDREW G. CURTIN.
(Pennsylvania.)



JOHN A. ANDREW.
(Massachusetts.)



O. P. MORTON.
(Indiana.)



RICHARD YATES.
(Illinois.)

N O R T H E R N W A R G O V E R N O R S .

parting volley which killed and disabled an unknown number.

1861
April
19-20

All the rest of the day the city was in the hands of the mob. Liquor saloons were raided, stores broken into, property of Union citizens was destroyed, and all sorts of unbridled acts perpetrated. At four o'clock in the afternoon a mass-meeting was held in Monument Square, where the State flag was displayed and secession harangues were made. At night the mayor issued secret orders to the police to burn the railroad bridges on the roads that led into the three States. One of these parties was led by the chief of police. By morning the bridges at Melvale, Relay House, and Cockeysville on the Harrisburg road, and those over the Brush and Gunpowder rivers and Harris Creek on the Philadelphia road, were destroyed, completely cutting off railroad communication with the North. City Marshal Kane telegraphed to a Virginia sympathizer: "Send expresses over the mountains and valleys of Maryland and Virginia for the riflemen to come without delay. Fresh hordes will be down upon us tomorrow (the 20th). We will fight them and whip them or die."

Balti-
more mob
in control

Officials
destroy
commu-
nication

Appeals
to
Virginia

The next day the telegraph lines were seized. Washington was entirely cut off from the outside world, and had no means of knowing what was being done at the North for her safety and preservation. Business was suspended; the public buildings were barricaded; sentinels were posted everywhere; swarms of Southern department clerks

Tele-
graph
lines
seized

1861
April
19-21
Washing-
ton in a
panic

and minor officials fled the city; the hotels were deserted, and the wildest and most insane rumors filled the air. The chambers of the Senate and House of Representatives were turned into barracks, and a company of the Sixth Massachusetts, acting as the President's body-guard, was encamped in the east room of the White House.

Balti-
more
Y.M.C.A.
asks Lin-
coln not
to fight

His
answer

On the 21st came a deputation from the Young Men's Christian Association of Baltimore, to ask the President to send no more troops through Maryland, and to "recognize the independence of the Southern States." The President answered, "You express great horror of bloodshed, and yet would not lay a straw in the way of those who are organizing in Virginia and elsewhere to capture this city;" and added with reference to the suggestion that he surrender the government to conspirators, "There is no Washington in that—there is no Jackson in that; there is no honor nor manhood in that. I have no desire to invade the South, but I must have troops to defend this capital. Geographically it lies surrounded by the soil of Maryland, and mathematically the necessity exists that they should come over her territory. Our men are not moles, and cannot dig under the earth; they are not birds, and cannot fly through the air. . . . Go home and tell your people that if they will not attack us we will not attack them; but if they do attack us, we will return it, and that severely."

The leaders of Baltimore sent hurried requests to Richmond for arms and assistance, and Governor Letcher responded with a consignment of

muskets and words of cheer. Davis telegraphed to Letcher from Montgomery, "Sustain Baltimore if practicable. We reinforce you," and ordered the concentration of thirteen regiments in Virginia, which were partly made up by requisitions on some of the Border States not yet seceded. A part of this force marched upon Harper's Ferry to seize the United States arsenal; but Lieutenant Jones, who was in command with a small force of forty-five men, became apprised of its approach, burned the buildings and 15,000 Springfield muskets, damaged the machinery as much as was possible in the limited time left him, and retreated into Pennsylvania with the enemy close upon his heels. From this point the Confederates kept up communication with Baltimore, and for some days help was confidently expected from them.

On the same day that the Sixth was attacked in Baltimore, the Eighth Massachusetts, under General Butler, passed through New York, where it received an ovation second only to that which greeted the Sixth. On reaching Philadelphia, it was found that the destruction of the bridges would prevent the passage of the troops through Baltimore. Proceeding by rail to Perryville, the regiment embarked for Annapolis, the seat of the United States Naval Academy, arriving in the night, and taking the town by surprise.

There had been a meeting of the disunionists, who were waiting the arrival of a party from Baltimore: the plan being to take possession of the frigate *Constitution*, then in use as a school-ship

1861
April
19-21

Seizure of
Harper's
Ferry

Eighth
Massa-
chusetts
goes to
Annapo-
lis

1861
April
20-24

"Old
Iron-
sides"
saved

at the Academy, and fit her out as a war vessel for the Confederacy. The patriotism of the New England soldiers rebelled at this proposed desecration of Old Ironsides. "Is there a man in this regiment who knows how to sail a ship?" asked General Butler. Fifty-three men responded. The ship was at once manned, the anchor weighed, the sails spread, and that same day the gallant old craft sailed proudly down the Chesapeake on her way to New York, at which port she safely arrived a day or two later.

Restor-
ing
commu-
nications
with
Washing-
ton

The New York Seventh, commanded by Colonel Lefferts, made up of the flower of the best and wealthiest families of the city, closely followed the Eighth Massachusetts, taking, however, a different route. They met at Annapolis, and feeling strong enough to take all probable risks, their commanders decided to push on to Annapolis Junction, a distance of twenty miles. The conspirators had torn up the track in a score of places, throwing the rails into the river or hiding them in the bushes. General Butler recognized the importance of holding this line of communication, and he at once seized the railway station and rolling stock. The latter consisted of a disabled engine and several freight cars. The ranks of the Eighth contained skillful mechanics and machinists, among them one who had helped build the locomotive, and the repairs were soon completed.

The two regiments moved slowly in the hot sun along the railroad tracks, replacing the rails and rebuilding the burned bridges as they proceeded.

Theodore Winthrop, the brilliant young novelist, who died in battle a few weeks later, wrote a stirring account of the march—in which he participated—which appeared in the *Atlantic Monthly* for June, 1861. Annapolis Junction was reached on the morning of April 25, the engine and freight cars having served to carry the baggage, supplies, the howitzers of the Seventh, and the ammunition. At that point the Seventh Regiment took the train for Washington, while General Butler remained to keep the Annapolis Railroad open and prevent further trouble. For several days this was the only available route for Northern troops to Washington.

1861
April
25-26

Annapo-
lis
railroad
opened

Impatient at what he considered a humiliating condition of things, General Butler determined to re-assert and re-establish the right of the American citizen and the American soldier to travel over the national highways without let or hindrance. Accordingly, one stormy night with a strong force he took possession of Federal Hill, a height from which any point could be reached by his guns. The secessionist part of the population was infuriated but helpless. The bridges which had been destroyed were rapidly rebuilt, and in a week's time trains were running regularly between New York and Washington.

Washing-
ton line
to New
York
opened

The active secession movement in Maryland was of short duration. Governor Hicks, who was thoroughly loyal to the Union, convened the Legislature on April 26, which met at Frederick City instead of the capital, the latter being occupied by

Mary-
land's
action

1861
April-
May

Mary-
land for
the
Union

the Federal soldiers. It was decided by that body that it had no constitutional power to pass an ordinance of secession, and a policy of neutrality was adopted. At the same time it protested against the war, and declared that Maryland was in favor of the recognition of the Confederacy. Day by day the Union sentiment grew stronger, and within a month from the time of the attack on the Massachusetts Sixth in Baltimore, the State was openly and actively on the side of the Union. At the election for members of Congress in June, each of the six districts sent Union men. When the governor asked for four regiments as the quota of the State under the President's call, prompt response was made, and from that time the loyalty of Maryland was active and undoubted.

Virginia
secedes

Joins
Confed-
eracy

Virginia withdrew from the Union on the 17th of April, though agreeing to submit the question to popular vote May 23. The decision was made in secret session; the vote standing 88 for secession and 55 against, 9 not voting. This convention, in addition, adopted the constitution of the provisional government at Montgomery, and also an agreement giving to that government the whole military resources of the State, and turning over to it whatever public property Virginia might seize from the United States. It was also enacted that any Virginian holding office under the United States after the 31st of July, 1861, should be banished from the State and declared an alien enemy; and that any Virginian undertaking to represent the State in the Congress of the United States

should, in addition to the above penalties, be considered guilty of treason, and his property should be liable to confiscation.

1861
April 27

These votes were not passed without a strong minority opposition. The delegates from West Virginia were almost to a man opposed to the action of the convention. Their section of the State held comparatively few slaves, and as a whole had no sympathy with the institution. The people of West Virginia sprang from that class which made the great West,—hunters, tillers of the soil with their own hands, lumbermen, and pioneers of industry,—hardy, industrious men, inspired with the spirit of personal and political freedom. They had for years chafed under the yoke of the East Virginia politicians, who represented the slaveholding and aristocratic class. When the ordinance was passed, one of the delegates from beyond the Blue Ridge offered the following resolutions:

West
Virginia
opposes
secession

Resolved, That the right of secession can be exercised as well by a portion of the citizens of a State against their State government as it can be exercised by the whole people of a State against their Federal government; and

Resolved, That any change of the relation Virginia now sustains to the Federal government, against the wishes of even a respectable minority of her people, would be such an act of injustice perpetrated upon the rights of that minority as to justify them in changing their relation to the State government, by separating themselves from that section of the State that had thus wantonly disregarded their interests and defied their will.

The chairman refused to entertain the resolutions.

1861
May-
June

West
Virginia
secedes
from
Virginia

Drives
out
Virginia
militia

The delegate was a faithful representative of the feeling of his section, however. No sooner had the convention closed than movements were set on foot in every county of West Virginia looking to a division of the State. An appeal was made to the President, who promised countenance and support. On May 13, twenty-five counties sent delegates to a convention at Wheeling to consider the steps to be taken. May 23, the day appointed by the convention for the people of the State to vote on the question of secession, West Virginia repudiated the action of that body by an overwhelming vote. Notwithstanding, Governor Letcher endeavored to force the raising of troops in that section by sending a military force to overawe the people, and at the same time to cripple the Baltimore and Ohio railroad by burning its bridges. This force, under Colonel Porterfield, was ingloriously routed and chased out of the region by four hastily formed West Virginia regiments.

Repudi-
ates
Virginia
con-
vention

On June 11 a formal convention was held at Wheeling, forty counties being represented by regularly appointed delegates. Its first act was to pass a resolution pronouncing the proceedings of the Richmond convention as without authority and void, and condemning the acts of Governor Letcher as unwarranted and treasonable. It also declared vacated all executive, legislative, and judicial offices in the State held by those "who adhere to said convention and executive." Following, it adopted an ordinance reorganizing the

State government. On the 20th the convention appointed F. H. Pierpoint governor, with an advisory council of five, to wield executive authority. July 1 a Legislature was convened at Wheeling, at which such enactments as were deemed necessary for State restoration were passed, and two United States senators were chosen, who immediately took their places in the national body.

1861
April-
August

West
Virginia
favors
new gov-
ernment

Up to this time, the work accomplished was the establishment of a new government of the whole State in place of that transferred to the Confederacy. The main object of the movement was not lost sight of, however. The Wheeling convention reassembled in August, and on the 20th of that month passed an ordinance creating the State of Kanawha, which was ratified by a vote of the people in October. Two years later, in 1863, the new State was admitted to the Union under the title of West Virginia.

Becomes
State of
Kanawha

By the middle of April there were at least 50,000 Confederate soldiers in Virginia, many of them from the cotton States; undisciplined, but eager for action. By the seizure of Harper's Ferry the secessionists had not only come into possession of a strategic point of importance, but they had captured a large amount of government property which the retreating United States forces had failed to destroy. The more valuable of this was the machinery for the manufacture of arms, which was removed to Richmond, and was of untold importance to the Confederate government during the war. But a greater and more highly

Confed-
erate
force in
Virginia

1861
April
Gosport
navy-
yard

coveted prize was the Gosport navy-yard, perhaps the most important naval station in the United States, just across the river from Norfolk; and immediate measures were instituted for its capture, which would entail immeasurable loss upon the Federal government, while its possession by the Confederates would not only give them a vast amount of war material for immediate use, but a vantage-point whose importance could not be over-estimated.


Contents

The yard contained a great stone dock spacious enough to admit the largest ships ever built in the country, buildings for the construction of vessels, machine shops, foundries, rope-walks, and storehouses, beside a vast amount of ammunition, shot and shell, naval stores, and over two thousand heavy cannon, ready for use. Anchored there were the frigate *Cumberland* and the sloop-of-war *Germantown*, ready for sea; the frigates *United States* (the captor of the *Macedonian*), *Columbia*, and *Raritan*; the ships-of-the-line *Pennsylvania*, *Delaware*, and *Columbus*; the steam-frigate *Mer-rimac* of 40 guns, the sloop-of-war *Plymouth*, the brig *Dolphin*, and the frigate *New York*, which was still on the stocks. Most of these were laid up for repairs.

Ships

The officer in command was Captain McCauley, of the navy, whose instructions were to "put the shipping and public property in a condition to be moved and placed beyond danger, but in doing so to take no steps that would give needless alarm." Threats had been made that if any action were

Instruc-
tions to
com-
mander



BURNING OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP, PENNSYLVANIA.

taken by the government for the protection of the yard, it would be at once attacked. On the 12th of April peremptory orders were sent to Captain McCauley from the Navy Department to remove the *Merrimac* instantly to Philadelphia, the chief engineer being sent down for the purpose; but after all preparations had been made and steam was up, Captain McCauley was persuaded by some of the junior officers of the ship to hold her, ostensibly to prevent a seizure of the yard. Two or three days later, having accomplished their purpose of preventing the sailing of the *Merrimac*, these officers, all of them from the slave States, resigned and went over to the enemy.

1861
April
12-19

McCauley
tricked

When the real condition of things at last became apparent to the commandant, it was too late. Had he been a man of determination he might have saved the situation, even then, by threatening both Norfolk and Portsmouth with the guns of the *Merrimac* and *Cumberland*; but his weakness and indecision cost the government over \$10,000,000 in material and stores. On the 19th he began to make preparations for evacuating the yard. All the ships, including the *Merrimac*, then the finest craft in the United States navy, were ordered scuttled, the only exceptions being the *Cumberland*, of 24 guns. Meantime the Navy Department, hearing nothing from Captain McCauley, sent Captain Hiram Paulding on the frigate *Pawnee* to take command of the yard. He arrived too late to save the ships. As a large force of Confederates had by that time reached Norfolk,

Evacuates yard
and destroys
ships

1861
April 19
et seq.

Confed-
erate
salvage
at
Gosport

it was determined to complete the work of destruction. Everything inflammable was set on fire; ships and storehouses shops, officers' quarters, and the unlaunched frigate *New York*, all were in a few hours reduced to ashes. But the cannon, with many tons of shot and shell, and much valuable machinery, fell into the hands of the Confederates. The *Merrimac* was soon after raised and converted into an iron-clad ram, which inflicted immense loss upon the United States navy.

A commissioner of Virginia, authorized by the government at Montgomery to take an inventory of the property seized, said in his report:

Priceless
value to
them

"I had purposed some remarks upon the vast importance to Virginia and to the entire South of the timely acquisition of this extensive naval depot, with its immense supplies of munitions of war, and to notice briefly the damaging effects of its loss to the government at Washington. But I deem it unnecessary, since the presence at almost every exposed point on the whole Southern coast, and at numerous inland intrenched camps in the several States of heavy pieces of ordnance with their equipments and fixed ammunition, all supplied from this establishment, fully attests the one; while the unwillingness of the enemy to attempt demonstrations at any point, from which he is obviously deterred by the knowledge of its well-fortified condition, abundantly proves the other,—especially when it is considered that both he and we are wholly indebted for our means of resistance to his loss and our acquisition of the Gosport navy-yard."

Popular
wrath

A wave of indignation swept over the country when the facts of the surrender became known. Many hot speeches were made in Congress, in which the weakness of Buchanan, the incompetency of McCauley, and the dilatoriness of

President Lincoln in strengthening the yard, were strongly denounced. A special committee was appointed by the Senate, which censured all three in its report, and also Captain Paulding "for ordering the property to be burned and the yard abandoned before taking proper means to satisfy himself that any necessity for such acts existed." The fact that the *Pawnee* remained for two days at the navy-yard unmolested, and left, taking the *Cumberland* with her, without encountering any hostile demonstration, was proof that the *Merri-mac* and most of the other vessels of the fleet could have been saved. The *Pawnee* had brought a thousand men to reinforce the yard and man the ships, who were all taken back without having been landed. The whole affair was an exhibition of bad judgment, timidity, and irresolution. It provided the enemy at once with the sinews of war, without which it would have had hard work to achieve its victories, and thus paved the way for a series of unnecessary disasters to the Federal arms.

In the mean time, regiments from the Free States had been pouring into Washington, which presented every appearance of a besieged city. The public buildings had been turned into barracks, and the streets were filled with soldiers who wandered about anxious and impatient for some forward movement. It was evident to the government that there would be no lack of men to carry on the war, but who was to be their commander? Out of those who remained true to

1861
April 20
et seq.

Discred-
itable
Gosport
business

Soldiers
flock to
Washing-
ton

1861
April
14-19

the Union cause, who was there who with "head, heart, and hand" would be competent to handle and direct as supreme commander the vast forces gathering for the country's defense? General Scott was too old for active service, and in a state of chronic ill health; though his judgment was as clear and his military insight as remarkable as ever. In an interview with the President, he strongly recommended Colonel Robert E. Lee, who had just been promoted to the command of the First Cavalry, as his successor.

Scott
recom-
mends
Lee for
national
com-
mander

Lee's
character
and
opinions

No better choice could have been suggested. Lee, who was at that time fifty-four years old, was undoubtedly the ablest officer in the army. Physically and morally he was the highest example of manhood. He believed slavery as an institution "a moral and political evil," he was devoted to the flag, and though a believer in Southern rights, did not believe that conditions were such as to resort to secession. Still, he wrote three months before the secession of Virginia, "If the Union is dissolved and the government disrupted, I shall return to my native State and share the miseries of my people, and, save in defense, will draw my sword no more."

Offered
the place
and
refuses

Lee was summoned to Washington, and in an informal interview with the elder Francis P. Blair of Missouri, authorized by the President, the active command of the army was virtually offered him. After brief consideration he refused. He could not lead an army of invasion into his native State. He recognized at once the

impossibility of his remaining in the Federal army, and the next day, April 20, he resigned his commission and retired to his home in Virginia. On the 23d of April he was summoned to Richmond, and accepted the command of the State forces.¹ There is little doubt that if Virginia had decided to remain in the Union, Lee would have accepted command of the Federal forces, and the war would have been of short duration. It was loyalty to his State, and not to the Confederacy, which decided his choice; and it must be remembered that when he first drew his sword, it was in the defense of the former and not in obedience to the demand of the latter. It has been denied by some

1861

Lee takes
com-
mand of
Virginia
troops

¹Some years after the war, in 1871, Francis Preston Blair, of Missouri, made the following statement: "In the beginning of the war Secretary Cameron asked me to sound General Robert E. Lee, to know whether his feelings would justify him in taking command of our army. His cousin, John Lee, sent him a note at my suggestion. Lee came. I told him what President Lincoln wanted him to do. He wanted him to take command of the army. Lee said that he was devoted to the Union. He said, among other things, that he would do everything in his power to save it, and that if he owned all the negroes in the South, he would be willing to give them up and make the sacrifice of the value of every one of them to save the Union. . . . He said he could not decide without seeing his friend General Scott. He said he could not, under any circumstances, supersede his old commander. . . . He . . . was soon after met by a committee from Richmond. He went with them, as I understood from some friends afterwards, to consult the Virginia convention as to some mode of settling the difficulty. I never saw him afterwards. The matter was talked over by President Lincoln and myself for some hours on two or three different occasions. Secretary Cameron and myself talked some hours on the same subject. The President and Secretary Cameron expressed themselves as anxious to give the command of our army to Robert E. Lee. I considered myself authorized to inform General Lee of that fact." General Lee himself wrote to Reverdy Johnson in 1868: "I never intimated to any one that I desired the command of the United States army, nor did I ever have a conversation but with one gentleman, Mr. Francis Preston Blair, on the subject, which was at his invitation, and, as I understood, at the

writers that Lee was ever offered the position, but the proof of it is absolute.¹

Among the border States, Missouri and Kentucky were of the first importance, by reason of their geographical location and their influence over

instance of President Lincoln. After listening to his remarks, I declined the offer he made me to take command of the army that was to be brought into the field, stating, as candidly and courteously as I could, that though opposed to secession and deprecating war, I could take no part in an invasion of the Southern States. I went directly from the interview with Mr. Blair to the office of General Scott—told him of the proposition that had been made me, and my decision. Upon reflection, after returning home, I concluded that I ought no longer to retain any commission I held in the United States army, and on the second morning thereafter I forwarded my resignation to General Scott. At the same time I hoped that peace would have been preserved—that some way would be found to save the country from the calamities of war, and I then had no other intention than to pass the remainder of my life as a private citizen. Two days afterwards, on the invitation of the governor of Virginia, I repaired to Richmond, found that the convention then in session had passed the ordinance withdrawing the State from the Union, and accepted the commission as commander of its forces which was tendered me. These are the simple facts of the case.”

¹“Northern men may regret that Lee did not see his duty in the same light as did two other Virginians, Scott and Thomas, but censure’s voice upon the action of such a noble soul is hushed. A careful survey of his character and life must lead the student of men and affairs to see that the course he took was from his point of view, and judged by his inexorable and pure conscience, the path of duty to which a high sense of honor called him. . . . Surely, as the years go on we shall see that such a life can be judged by no partisan measure, and we shall come to look upon him as the English of our day regard Washington, whom, little more than a century ago, they delighted to call a rebel. Indeed, in all essential characteristics Lee resembled Washington; and had the great work of his life been crowned with success, or had he chosen the winning side, the world would have acknowledged that Virginia could in a century produce two men who were the embodiment of public and private virtue. The contemplation of Lee’s course at the parting of the ways has another lesson for us of the North. It should teach us to regard with the uttermost charity other officers in the army, and men in civil life, who either did not believe in the constitutional right of secession or in the expediency of exercising it, yet who deemed it the path of duty to follow the fortunes of their States.”—Rhodes’ *History of the United States*, Vol. iii.

the southern parts of Indiana and Illinois. Public sentiment in Missouri was not wholly committed to the support of slavery, but the ties which bound the State to the South were those of a common origin, of similar political thought finding similar methods of expression, and finally close social relationships. In the northern part of the State, and particularly in St. Louis, there were many Germans, some of whom had fought in the German Revolution of 1848 and, their efforts failing, had chosen to come to America. These men were, almost without exception, opposed to slavery and secession.

The new governor, Claiborne F. Jackson, for years the leading Democratic politician of the State, warmly espoused the cause of the South, and took immediate measures to have Missouri wheel into line with South Carolina. The State General Assembly met at Jefferson City December 31, 1860; and in accordance with the expressed will of the governor, passed a resolution to call a convention,—the governor meanwhile issuing a proclamation calling upon the people to elect none but those who were in full sympathy with the secession movement. Bills were passed to organize and equip the militia, and the government was warned that any attempt to coerce South Carolina or other States that might follow her would be resented by Missouri, who would “resist the invaders to the last extremity.” But Jackson reckoned without his host. The Union men of the State rallied under the lead of Francis P.

1860

Public
senti-
ment in
Missouri
divided

Governor
Jackson
works for
secession

Blair's
counter
work

1861 Blair, Jr.; and when the convention met on February 18, 1861, but one vote for secession out of ninety was cast—partly because the secessionists had judged best not to attend. This did not daunt the governor, however. There were two national arsenals in the State, one at Liberty and the other at St. Louis, and he determined to seize them. The former, insufficiently guarded, easily fell into the possession of the disunionists. To obtain control of the more important one at St. Louis was a more difficult matter.

Feb.-
April

One of
two
State
arsenals
seized

Lyon
defends
the other

Before the meeting of the convention, Jackson and his sympathizers had formed a plan for taking the arsenal by winning over the officer in command. This would throw into their hands several thousand muskets, cannon, and a large amount of war material. General Scott had foreseen trouble in the West, and sent a detachment of regular troops to guard the arsenal under the command of Captain Nathaniel Lyon, of the Second United States Infantry. It arrived just in time to balk the plans of the conspirators. There were only 80 men in the detachment; but within ten days, over 400 able and enthusiastic recruits made it a force to be respected.

Jackson
plans
attack
on it

Jackson was furious at his disappointment, but was firm in his determination to seize the arsenal. He sent private messengers to Richmond, and asking the government for arms and ammunition. In reply President Davis wrote: "After learning as well as I could, from the gentlemen accredited to me, what was most



CLAIBORNE F. JACKSON.



NATHANIEL LYON.

needful for the attack on the arsenal, I have directed that Captains Green and Duke should be furnished with two twelve-pound howitzers and two siege guns, with the proper ammunition for each. These, from the commanding hills, will be effective both against the garrison, and to breach the enclosing walls of the place."

1861

April-
MayArtillery
sent to
seces-
sionists

Following this action, the governor gave orders for all the organized and equipped companies of militia in the State to assemble in a camp of instruction at St. Louis. On May 2 the Legislature, which was in full sympathy with the governor, met in special session. The militia had already begun gathering at the camp, which in honor of the governor was named "Camp Jackson." Ostensibly the bringing out of the troops was for the customary militia instruction. The soldiers themselves were ignorant of the real intent of the call. Some of the companies were pervaded by a strong Union sentiment, but the majority were secession sympathizers. The Union Safety Committee fully understood the governor's intentions, and was kept informed of every movement both in the secret sessions of the Legislature and at the camp. On the 8th of May, boxes containing the artillery, muskets, and ammunition sent by Davis were landed at one of the wharves from a steamer, and immediately hauled out to the camp. They were marked "marble," but the agents of the committee ascertained their character, and within an hour the Union leaders determined upon instant action on their own part.

Missouri
militia

1861
May 8
et seq.

Lyon
captures
Camp
Jackson

Soldiers
mobbed

Sterling
Price
goes
over to
secession

Twenty-four hours later, Captain Lyon with his regular army battalions, and six volunteer regiments, accompanied by a battery of six guns, made a swift march to the camp-ground, planted his guns, and gave the officer in command half an hour to surrender. There was nothing else to do, and at the expiration of the allotted time the camp laid down its arms. A great crowd had followed the soldiers out to the camp from the city, a large portion of which was made up of secession sympathizers. Naturally there was a strong exhibition of feeling on their part. The soldiers were assailed with stones and various kinds of missiles, accompanied by threatening and abusive language, and finally pistols were discharged. One company, which had been made the special target of attack, suddenly and without order fired a volley into the crowd, killing and wounding several; among whom were the usual women and children, so necessary and proper in a mob engaged in performing and provoking violence.

This unauthorized act of nervous panic aroused intense indignation even among Unionists, by whom it was unanimously condemned. It had the natural effect of furnishing at least the happiest of pretexts for many to desert the Union cause; among them Sterling Price, who up to that time had ranked himself with the conservative Unionists. Price was a man of wide influence, and in the State convention, of which he was president, had earnestly opposed the secession movement; but he just as earnestly opposed

the coercion of the South by the Federal government, and any military act by it whatever in Missouri must have been the signal for his withdrawal. As it was, Lyon's act in seizing the camp of State militia, and firing on unarmed citizens (of which as commander he bore the responsibility), he denounced as an "unparalleled insult and wrong to the State," which it was the duty of the State to resent; and at once offered his services to Governor Jackson, who appointed him general-in-chief of the State militia.

1861
May

The news of the capture of the camp and the parole of the prisoners was at once telegraphed to the governor, who was at Jefferson City in attendance on the Legislature. Fearful that Lyon would make an attack upon the capital, he ordered one of the railroad bridges between that city and St. Louis to be burned, and took other means for defense. The Legislature, under the stress of fear and excitement, hurriedly passed during an all-night session a series of acts providing for the secession of the State; and later a military bill, which invested the governor with the most sweeping dictatorial powers without right of appeal.

State
authori-
ties
vote to
secede

General William S. Harney, who was at the head of the Department of the West, was absent during this exciting episode, and returned the following day to find the city in a dangerous state of excitement. Crowds were gathered in the streets and public places discussing the situation. Bands of armed men with secession flags marched

Harney
returns

1861
May

St. Louis
surging

Harney
denoun-
ces
secession
move-
ment

up and down cursing the soldiers and trying to stir the people up to violence. Several gun stores had been broken into and the arms distributed among the mob. The theatres closed their doors, and by order of the mayor the restaurants and drinking saloons were shut. Many private dwellings had their doors and windows boarded up. The situation was critical. General Harney immediately issued a proclamation, calling upon the citizens to obey the laws. He justified Lyon's action, denounced the military bill, and declared his determination to uphold the government of the United States at all times and under all circumstances.

Is duped
into
giving it
full sway

In the mean time, Governor Jackson proceeded to exercise to the fullest extent the powers conferred upon him by the Legislature. Notwithstanding Harney's patriotic intentions and declarations, he was easily influenced. Price, who was much his superior in every way, found him as wax in his hands, and on May 21 induced him to sign an agreement which in effect tied the hands of the Union men of the State, and left the governor free to carry out his schemes at will. The agreement read as follows:

One-
sided
agree-
ment

"General Price, having by commission full authority over the militia of the State of Missouri, undertakes, with the sanction of the governor of the State already declared, to direct the whole power of the State officers to maintain order within the State among the people thereof; and General Harney publicly declares that, this object being thus assured, he can have no occasion, as he has no wish, to make military

movements which might otherwise create excitements and jealousies, which he most earnestly desires to avoid."

1861
May

By signing this document, it will be seen that Harney divested himself of every shred of the power which the government had sent him to Missouri to exercise. Hardly had it been executed when open preparations for secession were made in different parts of the State. Union men were terrorized, property destroyed, and the formation of bodies of secession troops carried on. Harney's complaints were ignored or his charges denied, and in a week's time it seemed almost certain that Missouri would be forced out of the Union. One thing that complicated matters and rendered the situation more critical was the unfortunate division in the Union party, particularly at St. Louis, the two factions of which were bitterly opposed to each other as both were to the secessionists. They represented respectively the radical and conservative wings of the party. The first was led by Blair and Lyon, and represented a strong anti-slavery sentiment. This included almost the entire German population. The conservative wing was made up of the wealthy and mercantile classes, whose Unionism had little to do with the slavery question, and who deprecated force so long as there was an opportunity for the use of any other means. This lamentable condition of things made concerted action impossible. Could the two factions have come together, sinking their personal and minor differences, the status of Missouri would have been settled in short order,

Seces-
sionists
gaining
upper
hand

Union-
ists
divided

1861
May-
June

Lyon
super-
sedes
Harney

and with little effusion of blood, but the very genesis of Border State politics forbade it.

Lincoln, who was meanwhile keeping a watchful eye upon affairs, intrusted Frank P. Blair, Jr., with a discretionary order for the removal of Harney, whenever the exigencies of the case should seem to demand it. On the 31st of May Harney was removed and Lyon placed in command. Governor Jackson and his adherents at once recognized the fact that the crisis had arrived. They asked for a consultation with the Union commander, to see if an agreement might be made by which Missouri could remain a neutral State. The interview was granted. It was useless, of course. The governor's suggestion was, that he should disband the Home Guard on his part, while the United States government should withdraw its troops from the State, and not permit them to take part in any operations within its borders. Lyon demanded that the Missouri militia, gathered with hostile intent, should be disbanded, and that Union forces should have full liberty of movement throughout the State. The interview of four hours was ended when General Lyon said:

Refuses
compro-
mise with
secession

"I will see every man, woman, and child in Missouri under the sod before I will consent that the State shall dictate to the United States government as to the movement of troops within its limits. This means war. One of my officers will conduct you out of my lines in an hour."

The governor and General Price hurried back to Jefferson City, burning the railroad bridges

behind them to stop pursuit; and on the following day, June 12, a proclamation was issued calling for 50,000 troops to "repel invasion." Lyon, on his part, lost no time. On that very afternoon Generals Thomas W. Sweeny and Franz Sigel were dispatched with several regiments to the southwest, to intercept any force under Price which might try to join Ben McCulloch in northwestern Arkansas, where a force was forming for the invasion of Missouri. Lyon himself, with 2000 men, embarked on swift river steamers for Jefferson City, which they reached on the 15th, to find that the governor had fled to Boonville, fifty miles further up the river. Waiting only long enough to raise the flag over the State House, the expedition pushed on to Boonville, where a landing was made without opposition. Advancing toward the town, Lyon found himself confronted by a large but undisciplined force under Price, which opened fire upon him from behind hastily thrown-up breastworks. A few volleys, with a round or two from the battery, sent the enemy flying in wild disorder. Many prisoners were captured and paroled; two six-pounders, ammunition, and supplies were among the spoils. Jackson escaped with several hundred men, never again to come into prominence during the war. Price managed to get to Lexington, far west on the river toward Kansas, where several thousand of the militia had assembled; and from there made his way to the Arkansas border, where he joined McCulloch.

1861
June

Sweeny
and Sigel
cut off
McCul-
loch's re-
inforce-
ments

Lyon
disperses
Price's
troops
at Boon-
ville

Price
joins Mc-
Culloch

1861 June- Aug.	Colonel Thomas L. Snead, Jackson's chief of staff, commenting (after the war) on this brief campaign, says: "From a military standpoint the affair at Boonville was a very insignificant thing; but it did in fact deal a stunning blow to the Southern-rights men of Missouri, and one which weakened the Confederacy during all of its brief existence. It was indeed the consummation of Blair's statesmanlike effort to make it impossible for Missouri to secede, or out of her great resources to contribute liberally of men and material to the South, as she would have done could her people have had their own way. It was also the most brilliant achievement of Lyon's well-conceived campaign. The capture of Jackson had disarmed the State, and completed the conquest of St. Louis and all the adjacent counties. The advance upon Jefferson had put the State government to flight, and taken away from the governor the prestige which sustains established and recognized authority. The dispersion of the volunteers that were flocking to Boonville, to fight under Price for Missouri and the South, extended Lyon's conquest at once to the borders of Iowa, closed all the avenues by which the Southern men of North Missouri could get to Price and Jackson, made the Missouri River a Federal highway from its source to its mouth, and put an end to Price's hopes of holding the rich and friendly counties in the vicinity of Lexington till the Confederacy could send an army to his support, and arms and supplies for the men he
Import- ance of battle of Boon- ville	
Gains Missouri for the Union	

was concentrating there." These supplies could not be improvised to hold West Missouri.

1861
July 8-
Aug.

Lyon, after strengthening his forces, and making preparations for an active campaign, in the early part of August moved on Springfield, which he was afraid would fall into the hands of the Confederates. His forces amounted to about 5000 men, who were encamped just outside the city. Meantime the Confederate army, consisting of the combined forces of Price, McCulloch, and Pearce, numbering between 7000 and 8000 men, marched on Springfield; and on August 10, while in camp at Wilson's Creek near that city, were vigorously attacked on the north by Lyon and on the south by Sigel. The battle that ensued was one of the most stubbornly contested of the war. At a critical moment, when Lyon was leading his men to a charge, he was shot through the heart, and fell dead into the arms of his orderly. The effect of his death was immediate. The fighting slackened, and the Federals retreated. They were not pursued. On the Union side the loss was about 1200 killed and wounded; on that of the Confederates nearly 3000. This battle ended the summer campaign of 1861 in Missouri.

Lyon
moves
farther

Battle of
Wilson's
Creek

Lyon
killed

The flight of Governor Jackson, and the defection of some of the State officials, had left the State without a local government. A call was issued for a convention to fill the vacant offices, which met on the 22d of July. Its first act was to declare the State offices vacant; its next was to

1861
July
Missouri
saved
for the
Union

abrogate the Military Bill and other treasonable legislation, and provide for new elections. On the 31st of July Hamilton R. Gamble, a Conservative Unionist, was made governor, and a provisional government established with St. Louis as its official headquarters, and thence forward Missouri was on the side of the North.

CHAPTER LXXXI.

MISSOURI AND ARKANSAS

On the 1st of July, 1861, on advice of the Blairs, the President commissioned John C. Frémont a major-general, and placed him in command of the Department of the West, with headquarters at St. Louis.¹ Frémont enjoyed the prestige of having been the first Presidential candidate of the Republican party, was radical in his political ideas, and from his repute for energy, resource, decision, and leadership, was credited with probable military ability; but the political aim of

1861

Frémont
sent to
Missouri

¹ John C. Frémont, of French parentage, was born at Savannah, Georgia, January 21, 1813. After leaving college he followed the profession of teaching for several years. He then joined a body of civil engineers in the employ of the government, and assisted in the survey of the frontier of the State of Missouri and the South Pass of the Rocky Mountains. With four men he ascended the highest peak of the Wind River Mountains, which was afterwards named for him, Frémont Peak. In 1843 he headed an exploring party to the Great Salt Lake region, and later, visited the country along the Columbian and Sacramento rivers. In 1845 he led an expedition to California. He was governor of the Territory after it came into possession of the United States, and when it was admitted into the Union he was chosen one of its United States Senators. In 1853 he crossed the plains with a party to find a safe and direct route to California, which he succeeded in doing. This gave him the popular title of The Pathfinder. In 1856 he was nominated for President by the Republican party, but failed of election. He was commissioned major-general at the beginning of the war. In July 1862, after one year of service, he refused to serve under Pope, who was his junior, and resigned. In 1878 he was made governor of Arizona Territory.

1861
July
Frémont
as com-
mander
in the
West

pleasing the radical wing of the Republicans was predominant. Unfortunately, Frémont understood this fact only too well, and presumed on it. The position to which he was suddenly lifted was second in importance only to that of the Department of the Potomac. It called for a man of clear head and sound judgment, quick to see and prompt to act; a man, withal, of military skill and experience. In some of these requisites Frémont, when weighed in the balance, was found wanting. His patriotism was unquestioned; but his deficiency in judgment, and his lack of appreciation that his functions were primarily military and not political, led him to the commission of acts which embarrassed the government and alienated his best friends. He could not seem to realize that there was an authority higher than his own, or at least that he had responsibilities toward it. Personally honest, his ignorance of men and his love of flattery made him an easy victim to the wiles of swindling contractors, schemers, and military and political adventurers; defects which made his later civil career sadly inglorious.

Partial
unfitness

Difficul-
ties

It must be acknowledged that his position was a difficult one, and surrounded by unusual conditions. When he reached St. Louis on the 25th of July, 1861, he found matters in a chaotic state. The two Union factions in that city were at swords' points, and the secessionists were using all possible means to influence popular opinion. The governor was disloyal, and there were signs



BATTLE AT WILSON'S CREEK, MO.

of disaffection in all parts of the State. It needed the utmost tact and discretion to manage the situation. Frémont had neither.

1861
August

On the 30th of August he startled the country by issuing a proclamation confiscating the property of all persons in the State of Missouri "who shall take up arms against the United States, or who shall be directly proven to have taken an active part with their enemies in the field;" furthermore, martial law was declared, under which all unauthorized persons taken within the Union lines with arms in their hands might be shot. Also, the slaves of all persons in the State who had joined the Rebellion were declared free. He then opened an office and issued deeds of manumission. "I did it," he wrote, "without consultation or advice with any one." As he had taken no counsel with Lincoln before this action, which was in utter defiance of law, so he did not report it until he was called to account. It was an act of sheer insubordination, perpetrated without a knowledge of the political conditions of the country at large, and with a sublime indifference as to the mischief it might cause.

Frémont
issues a
far-
reaching
procla-
mation

Frees
slaves
whole-
sale

The President first knew of it through the newspapers, and wrote Frémont immediately. He was obliged to be politic, for he knew the hold Frémont had upon the Radical Unionists, and he could take no risks. In his letter he said: "I think there is great danger that the closing paragraph, in relation to the confiscation of property and the liberating slaves of traitorous owners,

Lincoln
remon-
strates

1861
Aug.-
Sept.

Lincoln
disallows
Fré-
mont's
emanci-
pation
decree

will alarm our Southern Union friends and turn them against us,—perhaps ruin our rather fair prospects in Kentucky. Allow me, therefore, to ask that you will, as of your own motion, modify that paragraph so as to conform to the Confiscation Act of Congress, approved August 6.” Frémont objected to making any change unless absolutely ordered by the President. The order was issued, and that part of the proclamation was in consequence withdrawn.

Its
harmful
effect in
Kentucky

Aside from Frémont's unwarranted assumption of powers which belonged by right only to the President, his act, as Lincoln saw, threatened the loyal conditions of Kentucky. Garrett Davis wrote from the Legislature at Frankfort: “The proclamation of General Frémont reached here yesterday, and is most inopportune for the Union party. It fell amongst us with pretty much the effect of a bombshell; . . . we should have passed all our measures but for it.” Joseph Holt, acting Secretary of War before Stanton, in a letter to Lincoln said: “The Union-loving citizens of Kentucky have read the proclamation with alarm and consternation;” and added that approval of it by the administration “would chill the power and fervor of the loyalty of Kentucky.” On the contrary, the Radical Unionists were furious at its cancellation. Some of them suggested the formation of a party to carry on the war under Frémont without reference to the President, who, they declared, should be impeached. There was also a wide sympathy with Frémont at the North,

Its revo-
cation
angers
the
radicals

among those who could not see below the surface, and did not understand the critical character of the situation. Just how critical can be judged from these words of Lincoln, in a letter to Senator Browning of Illinois: "I think to lose Kentucky is nearly the same as to lose the whole game. Kentucky gone, we cannot hold Missouri, nor, as I think, Maryland. These all against us, and the job on our hands is too large for us. We would as well consent to separation at once, including the surrender of this capital."

1861
Aug.-
Sept.

Kentucky
holds
balance
of power

About the middle of August, news came to Frémont that Leonidas Polk was planning a campaign into Missouri. On the 28th of that month General Grant, who was in command at Jefferson City, was assigned to the Department of Southwest Missouri, and ordered to proceed with all haste to Cape Girardeau, on the Mississippi just above Cairo; which, from its advantages as an offensive position, would naturally be an objective point for the Confederates. He was to see it properly garrisoned, and then to take immediate measures for strengthening Cairo. Grant responded promptly. When he reached Cairo September 2, he learned that Polk had abandoned his original plan, and instead of attempting to "liberate" Missouri, had invaded Kentucky and seized Columbus. Grant saw, with the eye of a strategist, that the next move would probably be to get possession of Paducah, on the Kentucky side of the Ohio, a point of importance. He notified Frémont, and asked permission to

Frémont
sends
Grant to
Cairo

Polk
seizes
Colum-
bus, Ky

1861
Sept.-
Nov.

forestall the movement; but without waiting for an answer he embarked two regiments on a steamer, and reached Paducah just in time to prevent its occupation by the Confederates. General C. F. Smith was put in command, and Grant returned to Cairo. September 10 he asked permission to attack Columbus, but his request was ignored. All the while Polk was strengthening his defenses and mounting heavy guns.

Grant
saves
Paducah

Moves
down the
river
toward
Colum-
bus

Grant, however, had general orders to make demonstrations at points along the river where the Confederates were intrenching. On November 5, news came that Polk was sending reinforcements to Price, who was on the verge of an offensive movement in Missouri. It was important to check this at once. A force of 3500 men was dispatched under Colonel Oglesby to reinforce Colonel Caslin, at Pilot Knob; and on the 6th Grant started down the river on transports, with four Illinois regiments, one Iowa regiment, Taylor's Chicago battery, and two companies of cavalry. The infantry was divided into two brigades, under the command respectively of General John A. McClernand, and Colonel H. Dougherty of the 22d Illinois. Two gunboats, under command of Captain Walke, acted as convoy of the expedition. At the same time Smith was ordered to march from Paducah with a detachment toward Columbus.

Object

It was not Grant's original intention to bring on a battle, but to make a demonstration in such force as to prevent any more Confederate troops being sent into Missouri. Columbus was situated

on a high bluff at a bend in the Mississippi, and was strongly fortified, the works commanding the river in front and the country on both sides. They mounted 142 guns, mostly 32- and 64-pounders. On the opposite side of the river and on low ground lay Belmont, a cluster of three or four houses and outbuildings. The land was thickly timbered, but a space of several hundred acres had been cleared, and afforded an excellent place for military drill. A camp of observation had been formed here, consisting of a regiment of infantry, a battery, and a company of cavalry. The garrison at Columbus numbered between 10,000 and 12,000 men. On the morning of the 8th Grant changed his mind, and determined to turn the demonstration into an attack; not upon Columbus, however, but upon Belmont. Instead of proceeding to Belmont, he landed his forces five miles above, and pushed rapidly through the woods and over the uneven ground to the cleared space where the camp was located.

Polk, who was apprised of this movement by scouts, hurried General Gideon J. Pillow with five regiments across the river, which, with those in camp, formed into line of battle to receive the onset. Most of the men on both sides were raw and undisciplined, and under fire for the first time; but they fought like seasoned soldiers. At length Pillow's line was broken, and his men fled in disorder. The Federal troops, having the field in their possession, lost all discipline and began looting the camp. General Grant describes the disgraceful

1861
Nov. 6-8

Grant
moves on
Colum-
bus

Marches
on
Belmont
instead

Defeats
Pillow's
force

1861
Nov. 8

scene in his Memoirs:¹ it was inexcusable, and led to final defeat when a substantial victory might have been won.

Battle of
Belmont

The battle lasted, with intervals, from half-past ten in the morning until sunset. Before its close, General Polk himself, with General B. F. Cheatham, crossed the river with three more regiments, but were not able to intercept the Federals' retreat. The loss on the Union side was 79 killed,

¹“The moment the camp was reached, the men laid down their arms and commenced rummaging the tents to pick up trophies. Some of the higher officers were little better than the privates. They galloped about from one cluster of men to another, and at every halt delivered a short eulogy on the Union cause and the achievement of the command. All this time the troops we had been engaged with for four hours lay crouched under cover of the river bank, ready to come up and surrender if summoned to do so; but finding they were not pursued, they worked their way up the river and came upon the bank between us and our transports. I saw at the same time two steamers coming from the Columbus side toward the west shore, above us, black or gray, with soldiers from boiler-deck to roof. Some of my men were engaged in firing from captured guns at empty steamers down the river, out of reach, cheering at every shot. I tried to get them to turn their guns upon the loaded steamers above, and not so far away. My efforts were in vain. At last I directed my staff officers to set fire to the camps. This drew the fire of the enemy's guns located on the heights of Columbus. They had abstained from firing before, probably because they were afraid of hitting their own men; or they may have supposed, until the camp was on fire, that it was still in possession of their own friends. About this time, too, the men we had driven over the bank were seen in line up the river between us and our transports. The alarm ‘Surrounded!’ was given. The guns of the enemy, and the report of being surrounded, brought officers and men completely under control. At first the officers seemed to think that to be surrounded was to be placed in a helpless position, where there was nothing to do but surrender. But when I announced that we had cut our way in and could cut our way out just as well, it seemed a new revelation to officers and soldiers. They formed line rapidly, and we started back to our boats with men deployed as skirmishers, as they had been on entering camp. The enemy was soon encountered, but his resistance was feeble.”—Grant's *Personal Memoirs*.

289 wounded, and 117 missing. Many of these last, however, managed later to reach Cairo. The Confederate loss was 105 killed, 419 wounded, and 118 missing. The affair decided nothing.

1861
Sept.-
Nov.

Late in September, Frémont with 38,000 men took the field against Price; who, after the capture of Lexington, had crossed the Osage and marched with his forces to Neosho, where McCulloch was encamped with 5000. Frémont's army consisted of five divisions, commanded respectively by David Hunter, John Pope, Franz Sigel, A. S. Asboth, and Justus McKinstry. The plan of the campaign was comprehensive. Frémont proposed to defeat Price, and seize Little Rock, the capital of Arkansas; which would cut off supplies from that part of the Confederacy from Polk, Hardee, and Pillow. Having accomplished that, he proposed, with the help of the gunboats then in course of construction at St. Louis, to capture Memphis, move down the river with the fleet, and capture New Orleans. It was known that Price had evacuated Springfield; but before reaching there, Frémont sent forward a body of scouts to reconnoitre. This body consisted of 300 cavalrymen under the command of Major Zagonyi, a Hungarian officer who had seen service in his own country. On entering the city, Zagonyi found himself confronted by a force of 1200 men, 500 of whom were cavalry, drawn up to meet him. In spite of a sharp infantry fire he called upon his men to charge, and dashed upon the enemy sword in hand. The Confederate troops broke and fled. Zagonyi took 27

Fré-
mont's
campaign
against
Price

To sweep
the Mis-
sissippi

Zagonyi
takes
Spring-
field

1861
Oct.-Nov.

prisoners, released 70 Union men lately seized by Price's cavalry, and retired to the main force without opposition. The fight, though short, was severe, the Union loss being 85 and the Confederate 100 in killed and wounded.

Frémont-
Price
argument

Price's army, after leaving Springfield, had retired to Wilson's Creek, the battle-ground of a few weeks before. Frémont reached Springfield November 1, and made preparations for an immediate attack. And now occurred one of the most extraordinary episodes of the war. The day before the proposed attack, the two opposing generals met and drew up an agreement as to how the battle should be conducted. This agreement, which was duly signed by both parties, stipulated: 1st, for an exchange of prisoners (which had hitherto been refused by the government because it would constitute a recognition of the Confederacy as an independent power); 2d, that guerrilla fighting should be suppressed, the war being confined to the organized armies in the field; and 3d, that there should be no arrests for opinion, the preservation of order to be left to the courts. It was arranged that the battle should take place on the following day. Late that night, General David Hunter appeared on the scene with an order from Lincoln relieving Frémont and making Hunter his successor. According to instructions, Hunter did not give battle, but withdrew his forces to Rolla, instead of holding Springfield; a fatal military blunder, the reason for which was never understood outside the one who made it. It threw

Hunter
super-
sedes
Frémont

Abandons
Spring-
field

open once more the whole of southern Missouri to Confederate invasion, and the whole campaign had to be fought over again later.

The removal of Frémont created intense excitement in St. Louis, when he had many admirers and supporters. It was impossible, for reasons of policy, to make public the real causes for his removal, and it was assumed and asserted by his friends that it was because of his emancipation proclamation. The German element was especially favorable to Frémont on account of his radical anti-slavery views, and a violent outbreak by the leaders was threatened and feared. A secret-service agent of the government wrote from St. Louis to Secretary Chase: "In thirty years of participation in popular commotions, I have never seen such desperate and deadly feeling. The headquarters were thronged with committees of inquiry and opposition to his removal; great numbers of officers were preparing to resign; companies threw down their arms or dashed them to pieces. Mass-meetings were extemporized, and a general revolt seemed inevitable." Fortunately this feeling was of brief duration; and its results were made less serious by giving Frémont a new position, that of commander of the Mountain Department in Virginia.¹

¹"Frémont, who was appointed solely to placate the Radical Republicans, was, in view of the military and administrative incompetence shown in his egregious failure in Missouri, a choice blameworthy in a high degree. The negotiations between Lincoln and Frémont at the time of his assignment to this command are a travesty of military business. They would have seemed appropriate in the appointment of a collector of the port of New York or Boston. Having

1861
Nov.

Fré-
mont's
removal
misun-
derstood

Tremen-
dous ex-
citement

Frémont
reas-
signed

1861
Charges
against
Frémont

Many charges brought against Frémont doubtless had no foundation in fact. Excitement ran high, and little restriction was placed upon speech. Among other things, it was charged that he refused to send reinforcements to Lyon before the battle of Wilson's Creek; but there is no evidence that such was the case. For the capture of Colonel Mulligan's command at Lexington, Sept. 20, Frémont was severely blamed. He declared that all possible efforts were made to relieve Mulligan, but the concentration of troops was made too late, the sending them was baffled by absolute lack of transportation, and by river obstructions. The capture of Lexington, coming as it did at the very beginning of the war, was a great blow to the Unionists. The loss was 160 killed and wounded, with 3500 prisoners, 5 pieces of artillery, 2 mortars, 3000 muskets, a large number of sabres, 750 horses, cavalry equipments, ammunition, and \$700,000 of commissary stores. A scapegoat in any disaster, private or national, is always necessary; and

yielded to the solicitation of the friends of the 'Pathfinder' that a place be made for him, the President was then subjected to strong pressure to increase his army to a size commensurate with his dignity. The force in the Mountain Department was supposed to be 25,000. Unable to resist the influence, Lincoln detached Blenker's division of 10,000 from McClellan and gave it to Frémont. As a consideration, Frémont had promised to undertake a campaign which involved a long march over the mountains, and had in view the seizure of the railroad at or near Knoxville and the relief of the Unionists of East Tennessee. Frémont made no serious attempt to execute it; and the mischief of the plan was that it kept a small army in western Virginia, where only two or three brigades were actually required, when these troops were imperatively needed in the Shenandoah Valley as a reinforcement to Banks."—Rhodes' *History of the United States*, Vol. iv., page 11.

Frémont was surely censurable. It was asserted that he surrounded himself—if so, it must have been unknowingly, for it is absurd to suspect his Republicanism—with dishonest and disloyal men, some of whom were on his staff; that he maintained the state of a European monarch (burlesqued in the *Orpheus C. Kerr Papers*); and that while he kept high military officers and prominent Union civilians waiting for hours, in his ante-room, his intimates passed in and out at their pleasure. It was charged, also, that he was recklessly extravagant with the government moneys, that his officers were interested in contracts, and that “the Department of Missouri seemed to be managed rather for the making of private fortunes than for the country’s weal.”

These accusations would have had no effect had they been loosely made, but unfortunately some of them were susceptible of proof. Before Frémont had been a month in command, charges of corruption and mismanagement in his department had been made, too direct and definite to be ignored. Francis P. Blair, Jr., who had been instrumental in securing Frémont’s appointment, and who at the beginning was one of his strongest adherents, at last became convinced that a change should be made, and wrote to that effect to his brother Montgomery Blair, in the Cabinet at Washington. The President wished to be convinced beyond a doubt that the charges had solid foundation, and sent the Postmaster-General, and Quartermaster General Meigs to St. Louis to

1861

Charges
against
FrémontScandals
become
intoler-
ableF. P.
Blair
turns
against
him

1861
Oct.

Frémont
investi-
gation
shows
badly

make investigation. Their report was confirmatory of the complaints made; but the President still clung to the hope that things might not be so bad as they were represented; and sent Secretary Cameron and Adjutant-General Lorenzo Thomas to go over the ground and make a thorough examination of the state of affairs.

Report of
General
Thomas

On the 21st of October they returned to Washington, and General Thomas made an official report saying that he had interviewed prominent Union officers and civilians in St. Louis; that General Curtis deemed General Frémont unequal to the command of an army, and said that "he was no more bound by law than by the winds"; General Hunter fully agreed with General Curtis, and expressed his opinion that General Frémont was "incompetent and unfit for his extensive and important command," and that it was believed that he had around him on his staff persons directly and indirectly concerned in furnishing supplies. Elihu B. Washburne, chairman of the sub-committee on government contracts, spent two weeks in an investigation of this last charge, and wrote October 31 to Secretary Chase as follows:

Letter
of E. B.
Wash-
burne

"I was on the point of writing to you from St. Louis several times; but the situation here was so terrible, and the frauds so shocking, I did not know where to begin or where to end. And then again it appeared that everything communicated by our best men there, in regard to Frémont and the condition of matters in the city and State, was utterly disregarded. Our committee labored for two weeks, and our disclosures will astound the world and disgrace us as a nation. Such robbery, fraud, extravagance, peculation, as has

been developed in Frémont's department can hardly be conceived of. There has been an organized system of pillage, right under the eye of Frémont. Governor Chase, what does the Administration mean by permitting this state of things to exist in the Western Department? It cannot be ignorant of what the situation of matters is. Frémont has really set up an authority over the government, and bids defiance to its commands. The government, in failing to strike at Frémont and his horde of pirates, acknowledges itself a failure. The credit of the government is ruined. Everybody knows that there has been such an extent of swindling that payment ought not to be made, and people are now afraid to trust any body who acts for the government."

1861

Under these circumstances the government could do nothing else but displace him. Twenty-five years after the close of the war General Frémont wrote an article in which he gave his version of affairs, and set forth in detail the record of his services to the country, performed during the three months he was in active command of the Department of the West.¹ It conflicts in some

Fré-
mont's
defense

¹ "There was a wide difference between the situation in Missouri and that at Washington. The Army of the East was organized under the eye of the President and Congress, in the midst of loyal surroundings and loyal advisers, where there was no need to go outside of prescribed military usage, or to assume responsibilities. But in Missouri all operations had to be initiated in the midst of upturned and revolutionary conditions and a rebellious people, where all laws were set at defiance. In addition to the armed bodies that swarmed over the South a Confederate force of nearly 50,000 men was already on the southern frontier: Pillow with 12,000 advancing upon Cairo; Thompson with 5000, upon Girardeau; Hardee with 8000, upon Ironton; and Price with an estimated force of 25,000, upon Lyon at Springfield. Their movement was intended to overcome Missouri, and, supported by a friendly population of over a million, to seize upon St. Louis and make that city a centre of operations for the invasion of the loyal States. To meet this advancing force I had 23,000 men of all arms. Of this only some 15,000 were available, the rest being three-months men, whose terms were expiring." After recounting the steps taken to meet the

1861
Nov.-Dec.

instances with the statements of other officers and with the official records, but no man can be expected to remember with exactness every detail of matters of a quarter of a century before.

Halleck
and
Pope in
Missouri

November 9 an order came from Washington for General Henry W. Halleck¹ to take command of the newly created Department of Missouri, which included that part of Kentucky west of the Cumberland River. At the same time General Pope was placed in command of the district of central Missouri, his headquarters being at Sedalia. Price in the mean time had pushed forward as far as Osceola. December 15, Pope suddenly advanced on his camp. That night pickets were captured, and from them it was learned that a

exigencies of the situation, he makes out a vague reference to the charges brought against him, answering them broadly as follows: "The correctness of the operations in this campaign, to meet the intended movements of the enemy, have all been corroborated and proved by subsequent information. My expenditures to raise and equip this army were vindicated and sustained by decisions of the United States courts. The establishment of martial law at St. Louis, which was denounced as arbitrary and unnecessary, was maintained and acted upon by all my successors until peace was declared; and the fortifications of that city, upon which all lines of defense rested, aided in its enforcement and made the dyke between the Northwest and the South. The taking of Paducah, for which I was censured, has been since made the pivot of success to others. And the gunboats, for the preparation of which also I was censured, the work being countermanded as a 'useless extravagance,' became historic in the progress of the war."—Frémont's "In Comment on Missouri," *Century War Book*, Vol. i., page 278.

¹Henry Wager Halleck was born at Watertown, N. Y., January 15, 1815, graduated from West Point in 1839, and was sent in 1845 to examine the forts and study the army systems of Europe. In 1854 he resigned from the army to become president of a railroad. In 1861 he was commissioned major-general and commander of the Union Army in the Mississippi Valley. From July 1862 to March 1864 he was commander-in-chief of all the armies of the United States, when he was superseded by Grant. He died at Louisville, Ky., January 9, 1872.

force of 3200 was on the march from Lexington to join Price. Without delay a flying column was sent out to meet it under Lieutenant-Colonel Brown. He came upon the camp about midnight, drove out the command, dispersing the men all over the country, returning to the main force on the 18th with 150 prisoners and sixteen wagons of army supplies. Simultaneously Pope had sent out another detachment under Major Hubbard, which captured an entire company of cavalry with its tents and wagons. The same day it was ascertained that a considerable body of Confederate troops, on its way to join Price, was encamped a few miles distant. Immediate means were taken to check its advance. A strong force in two columns was sent out, the camp surrounded, and the entire detachment captured—two regiments of infantry and three companies of cavalry, numbering 1300 officers and men, with wagon trains and supplies. Price hastily broke up his camp at Osceola and fell back to Springfield, where he remained for nearly two months undisturbed.

On the 27th of December, General Samuel R. Curtis, who had been appointed to take command of the Army of the Southwest, arrived at Rolla, superseding General Sigel. This army consisted of four divisions, commanded respectively by General Sigel, General Asboth, Colonel J. C. Davis, and Colonel E. A. Carr, making altogether about 12,000 men and fifty pieces of artillery.

The weather was severe, the roads muddy, and the streams swollen by rains. Starting from Rolla

1861-2
Dec.-Jan.

Price's re-
inforce-
ments
dispersed

He
retreats

Curtis su-
persedes
Sigel

1862
Jan.-
March

on January 23, General Curtis halted a week at Lebanon, where he completed the organization of his troops. With considerable skirmishing along the route, he reached Springfield on the morning of February 15, to find that General Price had evacuated the city in the night. Instant pursuit was made, the Federal advance keeping in continual touch with Price's rear-guard. At Sugar Creek, across the border-line of Arkansas, a small fight took place on February 20, and the Confederates were finally driven from what was called Boston Mountains. Here Price was joined by Ben McCulloch and J. M. McIntosh, the combined forces largely outnumbering that of General Curtis. The latter now fell back to Fayetteville, in Sugar Creek valley.

To the north of this valley ran a spur of the Ozark Mountains called Pea Ridge, where he went into camp. While there, he learned that the Confederates commanded by Price, with the forces of McCulloch and McIntosh, with the Indian division,¹ consisting of Choctaws, Cherokees, and

¹It is estimated that about 7000 Indians were enlisted into the Federal and Confederate armies during the war, the proportion being about equal. The tribes represented were the Choctaws, Chickasaws, Cherokees, Creeks, and Seminoles. All these had passed the semi-civilized stage, and most of them had settled down peaceably as agriculturists. The Cherokees had churches, schools, and newspapers of their own, and there were among them men of more than ordinary ability. At the breaking out of the war they wished to hold a neutral position, but in December 1861, Colonel Douglas H. Cooper of the Confederate army marched a force into the Indian country, and attempted to force the chiefs into service. Two battles were fought, in which the Indians were defeated. Many of them fled into Kansas, while others joined the Confederate army, with the understanding that they should not be called upon to serve outside of the Indian Territory, an

Chickasaws, commanded by General Albert Pike of Arkansas, were marching to attack him.† The Confederate force numbered a little more than 20,000 men, while Curtis' available troops were about half that number.

1862
Feb.-
March

Although they had been obliged to support each other, there was a strong personal feeling existing between Price and McCulloch. The two men differed in almost every important particular. McCulloch was a typical frontiersman. As a youth he had had none of the advantages of education; had hunted and trapped on the border; had served under Samuel Houston during the Texas troubles, and was a captain of a company of Texas rangers. He was energetic, courageous, a good organizer, and took good care of his men. His interest in the war was largely confined to the defense of Arkansas and the Indian Territory. For aggressive movements beyond their borders he had little care. Price, on the contrary, was an educated and cultivated gentleman, of irreproachable habits and personal character. He had had military experience, had held high political position, and his devotion to the Confederate cause was not limited to State lines. In the matter of leadership

Price and
McCul-
loch at
odds

agreement broken as soon as made. They were organized and commanded by General Albert Pike. In the spring of 1863 the United States government dispatched a force of 5000 men, under Colonel William Wear of the 10th Kansas, to drive Pike and Cooper out of the Indian Territory and allow the refugee Indians to return to their homes. This task was accomplished before the close of July. The loyal Indians of the Cherokee, Creek, and Seminole Nations were then organized into three regiments of 1000 strong each, largely officered by their own men. This brigade was commanded by Colonel William A. Phillips, and took part in several engagements during the war.

neither was willing to acknowledge the supremacy of the other.

1862
Feb. -
March

Van Dorn

Marches
on Curtis

Sigel
evades
capture

Van Dorn
gains
Federal
rear

To settle the continual dissension between the two, General Albert Sidney Johnston appointed General Earl Van Dorn to command west of the Mississippi. Van Dorn was a West Point graduate, had served in the Mexican War as lieutenant of infantry, and at the breaking out of the war was a major in the regular army. He early joined the Confederacy, and had already made his mark as an able and efficient soldier. On his appointment, Van Dorn hastened to Boston Mountains, and with characteristic promptness and energy planned an immediate and rapid march on the Federal camp. General Sigel's division was encamped at some distance from the main body, and an advanced detachment of Confederate troops nearly succeeded in cutting him off. Sigel, however, succeeded in making his way through the enemy's cavalry with a loss of eighty men, fifty of whom were taken prisoners. On the next night, Van Dorn made a complete circuit of the Federal camp, and reached its rear at a place called Elk Horn Tavern. This movement was made with the hope of capturing the entire Federal army; the position, if held, cutting off Curtis' supplies as well as all chances of escape into Missouri.

The face of the country about Pea Ridge was broken with high ridges and deep ravines, and in some places was covered with brush and fallen timber. Curtis had expected a front attack, and had raised earth-works and fortified his line in

front with trees, felled so as to form an abatis; but when he found that the enemy had arranged to attack him in the rear, he had to abandon his strong position, and take a new one which afforded him no other protection than that assured by the natural formation of the ground.

On the night before the battle, the respective positions of the Union forces were as follows: General Asboth's division held the extreme right, on the entrance to the Bentonville road; Colonel Osterhaus's was on his left, Colonel Davis' in the centre, and Colonel Carr's on the extreme left. Asboth's division faced west and southwest; the other division faced south. It was from this last direction that Curtis expected an attack. Opposite Carr's division was Price's corps, while Davis and Osterhaus were confronted by McCulloch and McIntosh. At dawn the next morning it was seen that Van Dorn was making ready to attack; and to make ready to meet it, Carr was obliged to deploy his division and form a line facing to the west. To block the enemy's advance during this operation, a regiment of cavalry and a flying battery were sent out; but they were driven back, and Carr was obliged to go into line under fire. It was at this point that some of the hardest fighting of the day was done. Van Dorn personally directed the operations of Price's division; and under his directions, Carr was forced back step by step from his position. Word was sent to Curtis that the defense could not last much longer. Several guns had been lost, some of the regiments were out of

1862
March
6-8

Pea
Ridge:
Curtis'
works
useless

Dispo-
sition of
Union
army

March 7,
opening
of battle

1862
March
7, 8

Battle
of Pea
Ridge

Confed-
erate
right
repulsed

Contest
renewed
next day

ammunition, many had been killed or wounded, yet their retreat was made inch by inch, to the woods in the rear. Here they re-formed, and waited for final attack.

Asboth's division now appeared upon the scene, and relieved the worn-out but not disheartened troops. In the mean time the combined forces of McIntosh and McCulloch had made a furious attack upon Davis and Osterhaus on the left, which was repulsed, both McCulloch and McIntosh being among the slain; while General Hebert and a number of his officers and men were captured by a company of Illinois cavalry. These losses threw the whole of the Confederate right into disorder, and it fell back without further fighting to Elkhorn Tavern. It had now become dark, and the firing on both sides ceased.

It was evident to General Curtis that Van Dorn was throwing his whole strength against the position held by Carr. He therefore took advantage of the night to re-form the line, placing Davis and Osterhaus on Carr's left, with Sigel as support. It was expected that Van Dorn would make an early attack, but at sunrise no movement on his part was apparent. About seven o'clock fire began from the Union batteries, which was quickly responded to. By eight o'clock the battle had become general. The attacks of the Union troops were several times repulsed; but at last, after some skillful manœuvring, General Sigel managed to gain positions for batteries on elevated ground which cross-swept the whole field. By eleven o'clock

nearly every one of the fifty Confederate guns was silenced, and a shower of shot and shrapnel was now poured upon the infantry and cavalry regiments. Under this fire the entire Confederate force was soon swept from the field, and took refuge in the ravines in its rear. The Arkansas troops scattered in all directions. Van Dorn, with what was left of Price's corps, escaped through an outlet in the ravine leading to the south, and went into camp ten miles away. Later he sent in a flag of truce to bury his dead.

1862
March
et seq.

Battle
of Pea
Ridge:
Confed-
erates
routed

The Union loss was 203 killed, 972 wounded, and 176 missing. Van Dorn's loss was much larger, but the dispersion of his command prevented full reports. Van Dorn was able to save nearly all his artillery and baggage, and made a safe retreat to Corinth, where General Johnston was assembling his army. Most of the Federal troops which had been taking part in campaigns in that State were now sent to General Grant, at Cairo, from which point they took part in the expedition against Fort Henry and Fort Donelson.

Van Dorn
joins A. S.
Johnston

In commenting upon this battle and its results, General Sigel says: "In no other State of the North was greater activity shown, or more undertaken, endured, and accomplished than Missouri. There were regiments which traversed the State three times in eight months, forward and backward, a distance of over 1200 miles; and this, especially in the first few months, with the most miserable outfit—without tents, without knapsacks and other accoutrements, the men carrying their cartridges

1862 in their pockets, and sleeping on the bare ground,
Results braving hunger and disease. The battle of Pea
of Pea Ridge was not a great battle, like that of Gettys-
Ridge burg or Chattanooga; it was not of such prepon-
derating national importance; it did not break the
backbone of the rebellion, but it virtually cleared
the Southwest of the enemy, gave peace to the
people of Missouri, at least for the next two years,
and made it possible for our veterans to reinforce
the armies under Buell, Rosecrans, Grant, and
Sherman."

CHAPTER LXXXII.

BULL RUN AND McCLELLAN

From the first, one cardinal condition of the contest was the defense of the capital; a political necessity of the first order, not only from the effect its capture would have on Northern sentiment, but the pretext it would afford for foreign recognition of the Confederacy. No important movement during the war was made by the Army of the Potomac without taking this into consideration. Now, notwithstanding the large number of troops gathered in Washington, the Confederates were pressing nearer and nearer. The secession flag could be seen flying on the other side of the Potomac, and with a field-glass one could see the Confederate engineers selecting places to plant batteries and erect defensive works. The capitol was only three and a half miles from Arlington Heights, on the Virginia side of the river; the White House and department buildings a mile less than that distance, and Georgetown still nearer. The Confederates held Alexandria. There were 10,000 men within a day's march of the Potomac, who might any night take possession of Arlington Heights, throw up intrenchments, erect batteries, and hold the city and its crowded camps at their mercy. Lincoln

1861
May

Defense
of Wash-
ington
impera-
tive

Almost
cannon-
aded by
Con-
federates

1861
May

had all along been averse to crossing the boundary line; he did not wish to incur the responsibility of invading Virginia. But it came to the point at last that he must either take that responsibility or be driven ignominiously from the city.

Virginia
invaded
to protect
Washing-
ton


Colonel
Ells-
worth

His
death

Arrangements were carefully and quietly made, and early on the morning of May 24 a force of 15,000 men crossed the Potomac and threw up a line of strong earthworks on and near Arlington Heights, amply sufficient, with their mounted guns, to insure the safety of the city. In addition to this force, a regiment—the famous Ellsworth's Zouaves—embarked on the frigate *Pawnee*, and dropped down the river to Alexandria. Here a small detachment of Confederate cavalry was captured, the remainder of the camp taking flight. For weeks a secession flag had been flying from one of the hotels, the Marshall House, in full view of the capital; and Colonel Ellsworth, with all the heated enthusiasm of youth, determined to tear it down with his own hands. He mounted to the roof with a couple of soldiers, cut the halliards, and started down the narrow stairway. At the second landing the proprietor of the house, a man named Jackson, suddenly opened a door and discharged the contents of a double-barreled shot-gun full in Ellsworth's breast. A moment later a bayonet thrust laid the slayer dead beside his victim. Ellsworth's body was borne back to Washington, and was buried with solemn ceremonies from the east room of the White House; the President, Cabinet, and



COLONEL ELMER E. ELLSWORTH.



THE MARSHALL HOUSE.

high government officials acting as attendants. He was the first conspicuous victim of the war, and his death roused intense emotion throughout the land.

1861
May-
June

The time of the regiments enlisted under the three months' call was fast passing, and an incessant demand was made from all parts of the country for a forward movement. Passive resistance availed nothing. All the enemy had to do was to sit behind their intrenchments and wait until the time of enlistment had expired, when they could attack without meeting with more than nominal resistance. The cry of the Northern press, which had no conception of the real conditions, was "On to Richmond!" Greeley, in the *Tribune* of June 26, fairly shouted in the editorial columns, "Forward to Richmond! Forward to Richmond! *The Rebel Congress must not be allowed to meet there on the 20th of July!* BY THAT DATE THE PLACE MUST BE HELD BY THE NATIONAL ARMY." This feeling of impatience at the delay of action became almost universal at the North, and the government was at last forced to give heed to it.

Forward
move-
ment
called for

More or less skirmishing had been going on for several weeks in West Virginia; the movements of the Union forces being directed by Captain George B. McClellan, now also major-general of volunteers and in command of the Department of Ohio (then including Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana, and later West Virginia). Mention has already been made of Porterfield's attempt to destroy

McClel-
lan in
West
Virginia

1861
June

West
Virginia
communi-
cations
aimed at

the tracks and bridges of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, and his ignominious defeat. It was now determined by General Lee to make a second attempt to accomplish that task, the special point of attack being the great bridge crossing Cheat River. The destruction of that, wrote Lee to General Richard S. Garnett, "would be worth to us an army." Garnett with his force reached Cheat River Valley late in June, and opened the campaign with vigor. With five regiments he went into camp at Laurel Hill, leaving a detachment at Beverly, and a regiment with six guns under Colonel William J. Pegram at Rich Mountain pass.

By Cheat
River and
B. & O.
R. R.

McClel-
lan inter-
poses

These positions were well chosen, and commanded important points. The enemy was playing for high stakes,—the occupancy of Cheat River Valley with its important passes to East Virginia, and the possession of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad. It was probable that Garnett would wait for reinforcements before making any offensive movement; and McClellan, who appreciated the dangers of the situation, determined to strike at once and drive him from the valley before assistance could reach him. To General William S. Rosecrans was assigned the duty of attacking Pegram, while McClellan himself was to move upon Garnett's main body at Laurel Hill.

A swift march was made; Rosecrans charged Pegram's force, which broke and fled only to run into another Union brigade, and the entire force,

with the guns and camp equipage, was captured. The following day McClellan attacked Garnett, drove him from his position, captured his guns, wagon train, and colors, and took many prisoners. Garnett was killed, and those of his force who escaped capture fled in utter rout. No affair of note took place in West Virginia after that during the war. The effect of the campaign was to elevate McClellan into a popular hero, and later to make him commander-in-chief of the armies of the United States.

1861
June

McClel-
lan
clears
West
Virginia

These successes in West Virginia made the demand for action on the part of the Army of the Potomac more peremptory; and on the 29th of June the President called a council of war at the White House, at which the Cabinet and leading military men then in Washington were present. The whole matter was carefully considered, and by request of the President General Irvin McDowell, a graduate of West Point,¹ who had had practical experience in the Mexican War and was regarded as a high military authority,

Army of
Potomac
to do
some-
thing

¹ "Major Irvin McDowell was appointed brigadier-general May 14. He was forty-three years of age, of unexceptionable habits and great physical powers. His education, begun in France, was continued at the United States Military Academy, from which he was graduated in 1838. Always a close student, he was well informed outside as well as inside his profession. Distinguished in the Mexican War, full of energy and patriotism, intensely Union in his sentiments, outspoken in his opinions, highly esteemed by General Scott, on whose staff he had served, he at once secured the confidence of the President and the Secretary of War, under whose observation he was serving in Washington. Without political antecedents or acquaintances, he was chosen for advancement on account of his record, his ability, and his vigor."—Major-General Fry, in *Century War Book*.

1861
June

submitted a plan of attack on Beauregard, who was encamped at Manassas Junction with a force of 22,000 men.

Confeder-
ates in
North
Virginia

To gain a clear idea of the then existing geographical and military conditions, some explanation is necessary. Manassas Junction, a most important point, lies thirty-five miles due west from the city of Alexandria, on the direct line of railroad leading to Richmond, and at the junction of the Shenandoah Valley Railroad. Here the main Confederate army was established. Its right rested upon the Potomac below Alexandria, and held the river batteries. Its left, numbering about 9000 men, under the command of General Joseph E. Johnston, lay at Winchester, in the Shenandoah Valley, at the terminus of a short railroad from Harper's Ferry. The strategic value of the position can easily be seen. The centre and left, one at Manassas and one at Winchester, could readily co-operate and concentrate upon the one point or the other. The commander-in-chief, Pierre G. T. Beauregard, had been an efficient engineer in the United States service; but it was an error to transfer him to direct military command, for which he had neither intuitive nor acquired capacities of any large amount. He early excited the distrust of his government by the submission of plans for the capture of Washington, and the destruction of the Union armies. They were summarily turned down by President Davis, who drily remarked that his plans were "based upon the

Beaure-
gard

Plans
scouted

supposition that the enemy was to await everywhere, isolated and motionless, until our forces could effect junctions to attack them in detail."

1861
June

Under Johnston were Colonels Thomas Jonathan Jackson and James E. B. Stuart, both famous generals later. Besides these armies there was an unimportant force under the command of Colonel John B. Magruder, a Virginian who, like Lee, had resigned from the United States army to follow the fortunes of his State. This was stationed near Hampton for the purpose of watching the movements of the Federal troops under General Butler, who had been ordered from Baltimore to Fortress Monroe to take command of the Department of Eastern Virginia.

Confederate
officers

The failure to seize Fortress Monroe was a great disappointment to the Confederates, but they still had hopes to gain its possession by stratagem or assault. It was by far the strongest and most important military work in the United States. It was built on a peninsula at Old Point Comfort, Virginia, with solid granite walls of great thickness, and mounted over 400 guns. Its inside area was over seventy-five acres, and it required for complete service a garrison of 3000 men. It was here that General Butler made his famous decision that slaves were contraband of war. This decision was made on the ground that they were used to build fortifications for the Confederates, and in so doing, were "aids in warfare." Butler's act was indorsed by the government, and after that all runaway slaves who

Fortress
Monroe

Slaves
"contra-
band"

1861
Historic
spot for
slavery

sought Federal protection were known as "contrabands." It is a curious fact that this first practical blow at slavery was struck upon the very spot where the first cargo of slaves was landed on Virginia soil by Argall's vessel two hundred and forty-two years before.

Butler's
covering
forces at
Fortress
Monroe

Bad error
at Little
Bethel

Battle
of Big
Bethel

In addition to the garrison of the fortress General Butler established two camps: one at Newport News, a point (properly the haven there) jutting into the James River at its junction with Hampton Roads, and the other at Hampton, only three miles distant, and within reach of the guns of the fort. Some eight miles north of Newport News, at a place called Little Bethel, was stationed a company of Confederate cavalry, which was in the habit of making night descents upon the camp at Newport News, firing at the pickets and stray soldiers, but making no serious attack. On the night of June 9, General Butler sent a detachment of several hundred men to scatter or capture the force, with orders to divide so as to attack in rear and front at the same time. In the darkness these two divisions mistook each other for the enemy and opened fire both with musketry and field pieces, killing and wounding several. The Confederates at once fell back on the main force at Big Bethel, which was well fortified and defended by eleven hundred men, with several howitzers, under the command of Colonel D. H. Hill. The attacking party was hardly half that strength, and after a brief action was repulsed. Among the Union killed were

Major Theodore Winthrop, the young New York lawyer-novelist; and Lieutenant John T. Greble, commanding the battery, the first regular army officer to fall in the Civil War.

1861
June-
July

Opposed to the Confederate forces in Virginia, McDowell had in front of Washington about 45,000 men, the line extending from Chain Bridge to Alexandria, a distance of nine miles. At Martinsburg, west of Harper's Ferry on the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, and facing Johnston's army at Winchester twenty miles south, was General Robert Patterson with a force of 18,000.

McDow-
ell and
Patter-
son

McDowell's plan was to attack Beauregard in force, while Patterson should engage Johnston and prevent his reinforcing the army at Manassas. General Scott assured him that Patterson could be depended upon. Preparations were immediately begun, and on the afternoon of the 16th of July four of the five divisions of the Army of the Potomac were ready for the march. The organization was as follows:

Plan for
advance

First Division, commanded by General Daniel Tyler, 9936 men; divided into four brigades, respectively under Generals Erasmus D. Keyes, Robert C. Schenck, William T. Sherman, and Israel B. Richardson.

Organi-
zation of
Army of
Potomac

Second Division, commanded by General David Hunter, 2648 men; divided into two brigades, under Generals Andrew Porter and Ambrose E. Burnside.

Third Division, commanded by General Samuel P. Heintzelman, 9777 men; three brigades,

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July

Army of
tombac

under Generals William B. Franklin, Orlando B. Wilcox, and Oliver O. Howard.

Fifth Division, commanded by General Dixon S. Miles, 6207 men; two brigades, under Generals Louis Blenker and Thomas A. Davies.

The Fourth Division, Runyon's, 5752 men, was left behind to guard the defenses; so that the actual moving column consisted at the start of 28,568 men, including artillery, 49 guns, and a single battalion of cavalry.

Not well
dis-
ciplined

Its
advance

There had been little or no drilling or enforcement of military discipline in Washington; and though there was no wilful spirit of insubordination, the Union army as it moved along the way was hardly more than a military mob. Untrained and undisciplined, glad to be freed from their cramped quarters in the city, and rejoicing in the free air and sunlight of the open country once more, the men straggled along rather than marched, stopping to pick berries or fill their canteens at the country wells, singing and joking, most of them apparently without a thought of the serious business in which they were engaged.

Johnston
rein-
forces
Beaure-
gard

Meantime Beauregard had received full information of the movement and of McDowell's plans, and had sent in swift haste to Richmond for reinforcements. Johnston was telegraphed to hurry with his entire force to Manassas, which he did without the slightest hindrance from Patterson, who, on the very day he was expected to make a demonstration toward Winchester, marched to Charlestown, twenty-two miles away.

The blame seems not to have been his alone. He had moved his troops on the 5th directly towards and within nine miles of Johnston. Reports had been brought him that the enemy had been strongly reinforced and numbered 35,000. He had, however, determined to risk a battle on the following day; and an order to that effect was given to his assistant adjutant-general, Fitz-John Porter, who tried to discourage him, and urged a council with his brigade commanders, Abercrombie and Thomas. This was held; the result being that Patterson was over-persuaded, and instead of pushing on to Winchester according to his original intention, he hurried out of a purely imaginary danger, giving time and opportunity to the enemy for the needed move.¹

1861
July

Patter-
son to bar
John-
ston's
march

Fright-
ened off

Johnston received at two o'clock on the morning of the 18th the dispatch ordering him to Manassas. At six his scouts brought him news of Patterson's retreat. At twelve his whole force of 9,000 men was on the march. Passing through Ashley's Gap, he reached Piedmont, the nearest station on the Manassas Gap railroad, at eight the following morning. Seven regiments—all that could be accommodated—were packed on the

Johnston
at Pied-
mont

¹Patterson was nearly seventy; but in his readiness to believe exaggerated rumors about the enemy's strength, without taking proper means to ascertain their truth, he was no worse than many younger Union officers in the early part of the war. The expansion of Falstaff's men in buckram was hardly in excess of the degree to which Confederate armies multiplied themselves in the timorous imaginations of their foes from McClellan down—even of West-Pointers steeped in actual warfare and whose nerves might be supposed to have become indurated.

1861 July Johnston joins Beau- regard	train and reached Beauregard's camp that afternoon; two more, with Johnston himself, arrived the next noon; the remainder reached the battleground on Sunday afternoon, just in time to save the day for the Confederates.
Beaure- gard's position	McDowell's plan of attack had been based upon the supposition that the enemy's stand would be made at Manassas, where earthworks had been thrown up; but Beauregard, with an engineer's instinct, recognized certain weaknesses of the position, and withdrew his entire army to the west side of Bull Run, a deep and crooked stream, whose rocky and wooded banks furnished an admirable defense against any attack in front. Beauregard's line extended eight miles along this stream. In that distance were seven fords, at each of which was posted a strong force with artillery. Neither McDowell nor his generals had an effective knowledge of the country, nor had one of them a map which would serve as a guide to strategical points. It was like feeling in the dark. Two days were spent in making reconnoissances. The first plan, after the impracticability of a frontal attack had been recognized, was to turn the Confederate right, which rested upon Union Mills ford, near the Alexandria & Richmond Railroad. The character of the country, however, it was soon found, would make the attempt both difficult and dangerous; and it was finally decided to make an attempt to turn the left, at what was known as the Stone Bridge, on the Warrenton turnpike, near Centreville—a little
Union ig- norance of country	
To turn Con- federate left	

village on a hill, occupied by McDowell as his headquarters.

1861
July 20

It was planned to make the attack on the 20th, but a combination of untoward circumstances rendered it impossible. The inexperience of officers and men alike caused delays, and there was a failure of receiving supplies from Washington. Worst of all, on the morning of the battle the Fourth Pennsylvania regiment and Varian's New York battery refused to go forward or take part in it because their term of enlistment had expired—which recalls the Revolutionary War. In his official report McDowell said, "On the next morning, when the army went forward into battle these troops moved to the rear to the sound of the enemy's cannon." Had they remained, the fortunes of the day might have been entirely changed.

Cause of
delays

Shirkers

On the night of the 20th, McDowell held a council of his officers and explained to them his plan of battle. As has been said, Stone Bridge formed the extreme left of the Confederate line. Three miles north of this, in the woods, was Sudley's Ford, reached only by country paths, and almost inaccessible to artillery. This, it was found, was quite unguarded. It was planned that Tyler, who had the heaviest division, should make a feigned attack on Stone Bridge to attract the attention of the enemy, while Hunter and Heintzelman should make a circuitous night march, cross the run at Sudley's Ford, make a rapid descent and take the batteries at Stone

McDow-
ell's plan

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July
20-21
Bull Run: Bridge, enabling Tyler's division to make a crossing, the two columns then taking the Confederates in flank. Miles was to remain at Centreville with his division in reserve, while Richardson's brigade was to threaten the enemy's centre at Blackburn's ford. Much depended upon the timely combination of the first two divisions.

Con-
federate
plans
Changed
by Union
attack
Meanwhile the Confederates were laying their own plans, which involved something more than mere defense. From the five principal fords along their line, well-traveled roads led to Centreville. It was proposed to make a simultaneous attack over these roads the following morning, upon the Federal army encamped there. Johnston, who had taken over the command from Beauregard on his arrival, approved the plan, and orders were immediately issued for it. Half an hour later the sound of cannon at Stone Bridge was heard. It was at once realized that McDowell had taken the offensive. The plans were at once changed. It was decided that an attack should be made from the right against Centreville, while a strong reinforcement should be sent to dispute the passage of the bridge.

McDow-
ell's
advance
McDowell's forward movement began at midnight on the 20th. At that time the whole army was astir. Properly the divisions of Hunter and Heintzelman should have had two or three hours' start; as it was five miles to Sudley's Ford, and three from there back to Stone Bridge, while Tyler's division, which they were to meet there, had only three and a half miles to march. But

instead, Tyler took the advance and caused a delay on their part of nearly three hours. The bridge was defended by Colonel George Evans of Georgia, with about 100 men. At first he took Tyler's attack as an earnest attempt at crossing; but when he saw Hunter's division emerging from woods some distance away, he realized the condition of things and sent for reinforcements. Burnside's brigade was the first to gain the open fields, closely followed by Porter's, and Charles Griffin's battery.

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July 21

Attack
on Stone
Bridge

The battle at once opened. Evans was soon reinforced by General Bernard E. Bee and six guns of Captain J. D. Imboden and John S. Richardson. Burnside was now in danger; and Major George Sykes' regulars were sent him from Porter on the right. At this juncture General Hunter was wounded by a shell and the command fell upon Burnside. Porter's brigade was sent into the fields to the right of the Sudley road, where Griffin's battery could get a fair chance at Imboden, who was doing much mischief; and at the same time Heintzelman reached the ground with one or two advance regiments and James B. Ricketts' battery. The fight grew hot; the lines of the Confederates finally broke, and the soldiers retreated down the hill, and attempted to make a stand behind a stone house at the intersection of the Warrenton and Sudley roads. They were quickly driven from this position, and their whole formation was pushed back half a mile to the south. While this was going on, Tyler had crossed

Battle
opened

Con-
federates
driven
back

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 July 21
 Bull Run:
 Con-
 federate
 left
 routed

with two brigades, those of Sherman and Keyes, and made a junction with Hunter. By noon McDowell had successfully carried out the first part of his programme. He had turned his antagonist's left, he had driven him from the Warrenton turnpike and uncovered the Stone Bridge. Several regiments opposed to him had become thoroughly demoralized, thrown down their arms and fled. General Bee's brigade of five regiments had shrunk to four companies.

Line of
 retreat

Half a mile below the Stone Bridge, a small stream called Young's Creek empties into Bull Run. The fight which had already taken place was on a hill, which sloped into the valley through which this creek made its way. On the opposite or southern side of the creek, another slope rose for a hundred feet to a plateau a mile long and half a mile wide, running from the northeast to the southwest. The Sudley road runs along its western side through a belt of oaks. The eastern and southern parts of the plateau were covered with a heavy growth of pines. It was up this slope and beyond that the flying troops sought refuge. As Bee's shattered ranks reached the top, they found Jackson with five fresh regiments and two batteries. With a shout of relief, Bee cried to his men, "See! there's Jackson standing like a stone wall!" and from that moment the great Confederate soldier knew no other name than "Stone-wall."

"Stone-
 wall"
 Jackson

Up to eleven o'clock neither Johnston nor Beauregard had appeared upon the scene. They

believed that the mass of the Union troops was still at Centreville, and were preparing for an attack upon that point, when the stream of fugitives from the battlefield came upon them with dire tales of defeat. They immediately ordered every available man forward and galloped to the front. The retreat had had one advantage,—it had concentrated the scattered Confederate forces. It had also brought together all the available artillery, some twenty-two guns. The number of men holding the slope at the beginning of the afternoon's fight was between 10,000 and 12,000.

And now, instead of marching straight for Manassas and fortifying, as most military authorities insist that he should have done, McDowell made the mistake (but the mistake of a brave soldier) of continuing the battle, and giving the beaten enemy a second chance. Hot with the excitement of battle, he determined to take the position they had occupied, and rapidly prepared for the attack. Porter's brigade of Hunter's division was placed on the right; Franklin and Wilcox, of Heintzelman's division, in the centre, with Ricketts', Griffin's, and Richard Arnold's batteries; the left was held by Sherman and Keyes of Tyler's division; Howard's brigade was stationed on the banks of the Run; Burnside lacked ammunition, and was out of the fight; Schenck was at the east side of Stone Bridge, ready to cross. In all there were 13,000 men and 16 guns. The conditions were now changed in favor of the Confederates. In numbers, the men were about

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July 21

Con-
federates
concen-
trate to
stop rout.

McDow-
ell tries
to
complete
victory

Unfavor-
able
chances

1861
July 21

Bull Run;
Con-
federate
vantage
in second
position

equal, while in everything else the Confederates had the advantage. They held higher ground, with which they were thoroughly familiar; they were screened from view by the thick woods and undergrowth along the ridge of the plateau; the troops brought up by Jackson, and the regiments constantly arriving, constituted a fresh army eager to avenge the morning's defeat. On the other hand, the Federals were obliged to fight in the open; they had been under arms since midnight, and most of them had marched ten or twelve miles in the sweltering July heat, burdened with muskets and knapsacks; they had had four hours of steady fighting, and though flushed with victory, were exhausted and faint with hunger.

Union
troops
move
forward

Heavy
slaughter

At half-past two, Griffin's and Ricketts' batteries, which had occupied a commanding position on an elevation known as Dogan's Heights north of Young's Creek, were ordered to move across the valley to the top of the hill opposite, on the Sudley road, near the Henry house, where Jackson had his headquarters. This was the extreme point of the enemy's left. For several minutes there had been a lull in the fighting, and McDowell believed the position was being vacated. Not a shot came from the Confederate side as the two batteries with their supporting regiments moved down the road and up the hill. Hardly had they reached the designated spot, however, when the silence was broken by the crack of a thousand Confederate muskets. Horses and men fell thickly before the shots from the invisible

foe, yet the survivors held their post with desperate courage.

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July 21

Then the whole Confederate artillery came in play against the eleven Union guns, the annihilation of whose defenders seemed certain. Suddenly Griffin saw through the smoke a full regiment moving toward him, a hundred yards away. Instantly he ordered the gunners to charge with canister and train their guns on it. "Hold!" shouted Major William F. Barry, the chief of artillery, who stood by his side. "It is your battery support!" Griffin immediately called to the men not to fire. By this time the Confederate regiment—for such it was—had approached within pistol-shot, and fired a volley which killed or wounded nearly every man of the batteries. The horses, such as were not disabled, could not be held, but tore down the hill, dragging the caissons, and throwing into wild disorder the approaching lines of troops. Ricketts was badly wounded and made prisoner.

Terrible
Union
mistake

The Confederates now swarmed from their concealment, confident of having won the day, and seized the unprotected guns; but were compelled to relinquish them by a charge of two Union brigades, Sherman's and Franklin's, which had gained the plateau. Three times they were recovered and again lost. In the mean time Arnold's battery had attempted to gain the summit, but was driven back. The Rhode Island battery, which still occupied its original position north of Young's Creek, did what service it could in shelling the woods on

Fight
over
Griffin's
battery

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Bull Run:

the crest. Both Wilcox's and Howard's brigades were brought forward and charged up the hill. Howard's force had been held in reserve, and with that called into action the Union reinforcements were exhausted.

Stubborn
fight in
second
position

The Union right, in an endeavor to outflank and envelop the enemy's left, had changed its position so that its lines were nearly parallel to the Sudley road, and open to attack in the rear from the west. All this time the Confederates were being reinforced. Nine regiments had been hurried from the lower fords and were at once thrown into the fight. At half-past two, by a bayonet charge of Jackson's brigade, the Union line was broken and forced out of the open ground to the edge of the slope. At three o'clock a counter-charge was made, the ground recovered, and the Confederate troops driven from the plateau out of sight, disorganized and believing the battle to be lost. The Union forces were jubilant.

Con-
federates
driven
from it

Con-
federate
reserves
brought
up

Suddenly cheers were heard in the distance, and across the field came rushing 2300 fresh troops, Arnold Elzey's brigade, the last instalment of Johnston's army from Winchester, led by Kirby Smith. They struck the Union line full on its flank, and just at the same time McDowell discovered that Jubal A. Early's brigade with Beckham's battery had got in his rear. The Federals had not known that they had been fighting the larger part of Johnston's army all day in addition to Beauregard's force, and believed that they were now attacked by a fresh army of eight

or ten thousand men. They gave way, and rushed down the hill in a panic, in spite of McDowell's efforts to restrain them, many of them throwing away their arms and equipments in their mad attempts to escape danger.

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July 21

Union
panic

The *morale* of the army was lost. Demoralization had been going on all day. Men had lost their regiments and become mixed with others, and there was general confusion in regard to commands. Thousands who did not recognize any responsible commander fought as individuals. A prominent officer stated afterwards that "at four o'clock on the 21st, there were more than 12,000 volunteers on the battle-field of Bull Run who had entirely lost their regimental organization. They could no longer be handled as troops, for the officers and men were not together. Men and officers mingled together promiscuously; and it is worthy of remark that this disorganization did not result from defeat or fear."

Among
bodies
already
in con-
fusion

General
dis
organiza-
tion

McDowell, who had never before had experience as commander of raw militia or volunteer soldiery, could not understand the sudden panic of men who had for hours faced death so valiantly. He had made provision for an orderly retreat if necessary, as all good commanders would do, but he had not believed in that necessity. Burnside's brigade, after a four hours' rest, was now ready for efficient service; Keyes' brigade on the extreme right, and Schenck's brigade at Stone Bridge, were fresh and as yet had taken no part in the fight, and Miles' brigade,

Panic
needless

1861
July 21
Bull Run:
Partial
panic

left as a reserve at Centreville, could be drawn upon. Within a mile from the battle-ground were half a dozen good defensive positions. These facts, however, being unknown to the men, had no effect in restraining the impulse of escape. Once started, it could not be stopped.

McDow-
ell lashes
it in good
order

It is not to be supposed, however, that this impulse was universal. It was confined at first to that part of the army which received the impact of Elzey's brigade. It soon became evident that the feeling was infectious; the commander yielded to necessity and ordered a retreat, with instructions to the brigade commanders to concentrate at Centreville, where he proposed to reorganize his scattered forces for a renewal of the struggle. Except for the two or three thousand who fled from the field in disorder, the Union regiments retreated in orderly fashion; and were so well covered that a battalion of cavalry under Stuart, sent in pursuit, was unable to do any damage. Another battalion under Radford was sent after the brigades of Sherman, Keyes, and Schenck, but dared not make an attack. Two Confederate brigades, Milledge L. Bonham's and James Longstreet's, were ordered to attack those of Blenker, Richardson, and Davies, at Centreville; but after feeling their position, declined and returned to their camps across the Run.

Con-
federates
dare not
attack

Cub Run

Half a mile from Stone Bridge and four miles from Centreville, a small stream called Cub Run crosses the Warrenton turnpike at right angles. On the afternoon of the battle a long train of army



GENERAL IRVIN McDOWELL.



GENERAL P. G. T. BEAUREGARD.

wagons had been sent from Centreville to Stone Bridge. Mingled with these were ambulances, with private vehicles which had been driven out from Washington and intermediate points by non-combatants; some—the larger part, perhaps—drawn thither by curiosity to witness a battle, some who had friends in the ranks, Senators, public officials, and newspaper correspondents.

When the retreat began, the army train attempted to return to headquarters. The heavy wagons, turning in the narrow road, became inextricably mixed with the light carriages, and impeded for a time all forward movement. The rush of the retreating troops along the turnpike made the situation still more difficult. When at last Cub Run was reached, it was found that a Confederate battery of six guns had made a detour and established itself where it commanded the bridge over the stream. Just as one of the foremost of the teams had reached the middle of the bridge, a volley from the battery killed the horses and overturned the wagon, rendering passage impossible. For half a mile in the rear the road was crowded with a compact mass of artillery wagons, carriages, and ambulances. A steady fire soon reduced these to ruin. Three Union batteries—the Rhode Island, Arnold's, and Carlisle's—were in the jam, and could not be extricated to do service. Their carriages and caissons were wrecked, and the guns had to be abandoned.

And here began the disgraceful panic and flight, the story of which is too humiliating to

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Bull Run:
The army
train

Partial
blockade
on the
road

Entire
one at
Cub Run

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Bull Run:
General
panic

McDow-
ell
unable
to check
it

Two
brigades
keep
order

Davis on
the field

write in detail. The blockade in front, the sound of the enemy's guns in the rear, the increasing tide of fugitives, and the fear that the retreat would be cut off, started a general stampede, in which officers and men alike seemed to lose their heads. Everything which hindered flight was abandoned; even ambulances filled with wounded soldiers were left in the road; regiments which began the return march in perfect order dissolved and fled, each man for himself; discarded muskets, knapsacks, haversacks, and superfluous pieces of clothing strewn the way from the battle-field for miles. McDowell tried in vain to make a stand at Centreville, and again at Fairfax Court House. From the latter place he telegraphed to the President, "The larger part of the men are a confused mob, entirely demoralized. They are pouring through this place in a state of utter disorganization." It was a disorderly flight for the shelter of the capital, from where the most exaggerated and sensational accounts were telegraphed to all parts of the country. Two brigades, however, Richardson's and Blenker's, marched in orderly retreat, forming an efficient rear-guard, from Centreville to the forts on the Potomac.

Jefferson Davis had left Richmond the morning of the battle for Beauregard's headquarters, where he arrived about four o'clock. At that point he was told that the Confederates had suffered defeat, and rode immediately to the front, where he found Johnston and Beauregard regarding with amazement the Union retreat, a

movement which they themselves had just been considering. Pursuit was immediately ordered, but it was conducted in as disorderly a manner as the retreat. The Union loss in the battle was 487 killed, 1011 wounded, and 1460 prisoners; that of the Confederates 378 killed and 1489 wounded.¹

In his report to the President, McDowell said: "The condition of our artillery and its ammunition, and the want of food for the men, who had generally abandoned or thrown away all that had been issued the day before, and the utter disorganization and consequent demoralization of the mass of the army, seemed to all who were near enough to be consulted—division and brigade commanders and staff—to admit of no alternative but to fall back." A more conclusive reason, which he also referred to, was the fact that the enlistment period of many of the regiments was about to expire, and it would be impossible for him to carry out any plan of campaign under conditions which might cripple him at any moment. "In the next few days," he added in his report, "day by day I should have lost ten thousand of

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et seq.

Losses at
Bull Run

McDow-
ell's
report

Time-
expired
regi-
ments

¹ "These simple figures prove the engagement to have been well contested and fought with equal courage and persistence by both sides. Greatly ridiculed and denounced when it occurred, the Battle of Bull Run is gradually finding its vindication. General Sherman says 'it was one of the best planned battles of the war, but one of the worst fought,' and that 'both armies were fairly defeated.' General Johnston says, 'If the tactics of the Federals had been equal to their strategy, we should have been defeated.' To the military student, Bull Run, with its extended field of strategy, its quick changes of plan, its fluctuating chances and combinations, and its rapidly shifting incidents and accidents, is a most interesting, and likely to become a typical, game of war between volunteer armies."—Nicolay's *Outbreak of the Rebellion*.

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et seq.

the best armed, drilled, officered, and disciplined troops in the army.”

After
Bull Run

Why Con-
federates
did not
advance

The jubilation at the South was tempered by the reflection that the Confederate forces had not pushed on and seized the national capital, and Johnston was severely condemned for incompetency and lack of energy. Like a true soldier, he made no answer to this criticism while the war lasted. He did not forget it, however; and after peace was declared, he made a statement which is of the utmost importance as showing the real condition of things after the battle, as recognized by the commander-in-chief of the Confederate forces. In the course of his article he said:—

John-
ston's
state-
ment

“The Confederate army was more disorganized by victory than that of the United States by defeat. The Southern volunteers believed that the objects of the war had been accomplished by their victory, and that they had achieved all that their country required of them. Many of them, therefore, in ignorance of their military obligations, left the army, not to return. Some hastened home to exhibit the trophies picked up on the field; others left their regiments without ceremony to attend to wounded friends, frequently accompanying them to hospitals in distant towns. Such were the reports of general and staff officers and railroad officials. Exaggerated ideas of victory prevailing among our troops cost us more men than the Federal army lost by defeat.

“The pursuit was not continued because the Confederate cavalry, a very small force, was driven back by the solid resistance of the United States infantry. Its rear-guard was an entire division, which had not been engaged, and was twelve or fifteen times more numerous than our two little bodies of cavalry. Expectations and hopes of the capture of Washington were not expressed by military men who understood the state of affairs. A pursuit would have been fruitless.

We could not have carried the entrenchments before Washington by assault, and had none of the means to besiege them. Our assault would have been repulsed, and the enemy, then the victorious party, would have resumed their march to Richmond. And even if we had captured their intrenchments, a river a mile wide lay between them and Washington, commanded by the heavy guns of a Federal fleet. We could not have brought 20,000 men to the banks of the Potomac. Our troops believed that their victory had established the independence of the South; that the war had ended and their military obligations been fulfilled. They therefore left the army in crowds to return to their homes. The exultation of victory cost us more than our antagonists lost by defeat. The Federal troops south of the Potomac were not a rabble. Mansfield's, Miles', and Runyon's divisions, a larger force than we could have brought against them, had neither been beaten nor engaged; and the reports of the commanders of the brigades engaged show that they entered the intrenchments organized, except those who fled individually from the field. Those latter undoubtedly gave an exaggerated idea of the rout to the people of Washington, as those from our ranks met by President Davis before he reached Manassas, on his way to the field, convinced him that our army had been defeated."

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et seq.

Bull Run
had not
laid open
Wash-
ington

Con-
federate
troops
scatter

Volume
of Union
rout
exag-
gerated

North
not dis-
mayed

The Confederate military leaders even at the time knew that the victory was due not so much to the soldiers' heroism and their own skillful tactics, conspicuous as were both, as to a panic of their opponents, which could not again be expected. As to the Northern people at large, it merely angered them against the runaways and moved them to greater efforts. On the day after the battle, while the more timorous of the inhabitants of Washington were on the watch for the approaching hosts of the victorious Confederates, the House of Representatives passed this resolution:—

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North
braces
itself

“That the maintenance of the Constitution, the preservation of the Union, and the enforcement of the laws are sacred trusts which must be executed; that no disaster shall discourage us from the most ample performance of this high duty; and that we pledge to the country and the world the employment of every resource, national and individual, for the suppression, overthrow, and punishment of rebels in arms.”

Indis-
pensa-
bles for
success

The President acted promptly. Scarcely had the last fugitive reached Washington, when he called his Cabinet together to consult as to the best means of retrieving the disaster. Three things were recognized as of absolute necessity before another forward movement was begun,—a larger and well-disciplined army, the ablest commander to be had, and a knowledge of the country in which the forces were to operate. The War Department took the last in hand; for the second was chosen the winner of the one considerable Union success to date, General McClellan; to meet the first requirement, the President turned to Congress, then in special session, and asked for the passage of an act authorizing the raising of 400,000 men and the appropriation of \$400,000,000 for war purposes. Said he:

Lincoln's
plea for
men and
money

“The number of men is about one-tenth of those of proper age within the regions where apparently all are willing to engage; and the sum is less than a twenty-third part of the money value owned by the men who seem ready to devote the whole. . . . The issue embraces more than the fate of these United States. It presents to the whole family of man the question whether a constitutional republic or democracy—a government of the people by the same people—can or can not maintain its territorial integrity against its own domestic

foes. . . . Our popular government has often been called an experiment. Two points in it our people have already settled,—the successful establishing and the successful administering of it. One still remains,—its successful maintenance against a formidable attempt to overturn it.”

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July 22
et seq.

Other points in the message were a strong argument against State sovereignty; and a note of the fact that while many officers of the army and navy had turned their training against the country which had furnished it, not a single common sailor or soldier had deserted the flag.

Lincoln's
message

Following its reading in the House, Representative McClernand, a Democrat, offered a resolution that “the House pledge itself to vote for any amount of money and any amount of men which may be necessary to insure a speedy and effectual suppression of the rebellion.” There were only five nays; the President's request was not only granted without debate, but the number asked was increased to 500,000, for three years' service, and the regular army was augmented. Another resolution was unanimously adopted, which declared that the war was “not waged for conquest or subjugation, or to overthrow or interfere with the rights or established institutions of the Southern States, but to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution and to preserve the Union.” An act was also passed confiscating all property used in aid of the rebellion. One section of it provided that the claims of owners to those slaves whom they should require to take up arms against the United States, or to labor on forts and fortifications or in intrenchments, or whom they

Half a
million
men
voted

Object of
war

Confis-
cation
as a
means

1861
June-
July

should employ in any military or naval service whatsoever against the national government, should be forfeited.

Southern
Congressmen
hamper
Union
action

In this special session of thirty-three days the two houses of Congress accomplished a large amount of important work, but not without encountering strenuous opposition. There still remained a strong rear-guard of the State-rights element in Congress, which however was weakened before the session closed by the expulsion of a number of those most outspoken in resisting the passage of acts for the preservation of the Union. Resolutions were offered in both the House and Senate by this contingent, condemning as unconstitutional the legislation providing for the increase of the army, the blockade of the Southern ports, the seizure of telegraphic dispatches, and the arrest of persons suspected of treason.

In the
interest
of State
rights
and
slavery

When the army appropriation bill was under discussion, an attempted amendment was made, to the effect "that no part of the money hereby appropriated shall be employed in subjecting or holding as a conquered province any Southern State now or lately one of the United States, nor in abolishing or interfering with African slavery in any of the States." Another amendment was proposed by Senator Breckenridge, afterwards a general in the Confederate service, "that the army and navy shall not be employed for the purpose of subjecting any State, or reducing it to the condition of a territory, or province, or to abolish slavery therein."

When this amendment was proposed, with an accompanying fling at the President, Senator Baker of Oregon, who a little later fell at the battle of Ball's Bluff, rose to his feet and closed an impassioned speech as follows: "I propose to put the whole power of this country, arms, men, money, into the hands of the President. He has asked for \$400,000,000: we will give him \$500,000,000. He has asked for 400,000 men: we will give him 500,000."

1861
June-
July

Baker's
fiery ut-
terance

In its brief session Congress had approved and legalized the acts and orders of the President; it had authorized him to accept half a million of volunteers; it had added eleven regiments to the regular army; it had raised the pay of the soldier to \$13 a month, with a bounty of one hundred acres at the close of the war; it had authorized the purchase or building and arming of as many ships as might be found requisite; it had appointed a committee to take charge of the construction of iron-clads and floating batteries; it had facilitated the importing of arms from abroad by the loyal States, voted \$10,000,000 for the purchase of arms, and undertaken to indemnify the States for all expenses they might incur in raising, paying, subsisting, and transporting troops. It had authorized the President to close the ports of entry at his discretion, to declare any community to be in a state of insurrection, and to prohibit commercial intercourse with it. It had provided that, after proclamation by him, all property used or intended to be used in aid of the insurrection should be

War
measures
of the
special
session

1861
Summer

War
measures
of the
special
session

seized and confiscated; and specially, that if the owner of any slave should require or permit such slave to be in any way employed in military or naval service against the United States, all claim to him or his services should be forfeited by such owner. It had appropriated \$227,938,000 for the army, and \$42,938,000 for the navy. It had made provision for these appropriations by imposts and taxation, and authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to borrow \$250,000,000.

Moral
effect of
Bull Run

The unanimity over these acts and resolutions showed that Congress at last understood the gravity of the conditions with which the country was now face to face. The lost battle had stunned the people for a moment; but not dismayed them. It brought to the minds of millions for the first time a realization of the magnitude of this struggle, and the danger which threatened the nation.

Criti-
cism of
Lincoln's
war
measures

It was charged by some that the President, in certain of his acts, exceeded his powers as a constitutional ruler. This criticism he accepted, but he took the responsibility. Unprecedented and unlooked-for conditions had arisen, and they had to be met promptly and in the most effective way. The safety of the country was the first thing to be considered; that of the individual was secondary, but it was always to be respected when the two did not conflict. War measures were sometimes severe, but a patriotic people never complained when their necessity became apparent. Public sentiment sustained the President, although there were instances in the way of arbitrary

Public
sustains
him



GEORGE B. McCLELLAN.

arrest where such action seemed uncalled-for. The orders in these cases emanated from the War Department, and not from the President direct.

1861
July 27,
etc.

The day after Bull Run, General McClellan was ordered to turn over his command to General Rosecrans and report to Washington; on the 27th of July he reached it, and at once assumed control of the army theretofore commanded by McDowell. He was now thirty-five, having been born in Philadelphia December 3, 1826. A graduate of West Point in 1846, he had served for a year in the Mexican War, and was brevetted captain for distinguished services. After the war he was in the active employ of the government as chief engineer, and in 1855 was appointed one of the three members of a military commission to observe the operations in the Crimea. Two years later he resigned from the army to accept the position of chief engineer of the Illinois Central Railroad, of which he later became vice-president. In 1860 he was made president of the eastern division of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad, with headquarters in Cincinnati.

George B.
McClel-
lan :
previous
career

At the breaking out of the war, Governor Denison of Ohio turned to him for advice and counsel, which were so freely and willingly given, and were of such practical value, that the governor appointed him major-general of the Ohio militia volunteers. Within a few weeks he had put them on a war footing. His West Virginia campaign we have noted. It was on a limited scale, but he had conducted it with a skill, energy, and success,

1861
July 27
et seq.

McClel-
lan wel-
comed

a strong contrast to operations elsewhere, which had been at best but marking time, and had involved much apparent incapacity, obvious irresolution, and one huge disaster. He was also strongly recommended by General Scott, under whom he had served, and whose encomiums were fully justified by the impression he made upon the President and Cabinet at his first appearance in Washington. His universally winning manners and courteous demeanor inspired, says Nicolay, "a remarkable affection and regard in every one, from the President to the humblest orderly who waited at his door."

First
functions

His first duty was to ascertain the full strength of the troops in the city and at the fortifications on the Virginia side, together with the general military conditions. The returns of the brigade and regiment commanders showed that the entire Union forces numbered about 50,000 infantry, 1000 cavalry, 650 artillerymen, 9 field batteries of 30 pieces and 400 horses. McClellan himself thus describes the status of the army and of the defenses:

His
descrip-
tion of
military
con-
ditions

"On the Virginia bank of the Potomac the brigade organization of General McDowell still existed, and the troops were stationed at and in rear of Forts Corcoran, Arlington, and Fort Albany, at Fort Runyan, Roach's Mills, Cole's Mills, and in the vicinity of Fort Ellsworth, with a detachment at the Theological Seminary, near Alexandria. There were no troops south of Hunting Creek, and many of the regiments were encamped on the low grounds bordering the Potomac; seldom in the best positions for defense, and entirely inadequate in numbers and condition to defend the long

line from Fort Corcoran to Alexandria. On the Maryland side of the river, upon the heights overlooking the Chain Bridge, two regiments were stationed, whose commanders were independent of each other. There were no troops on the important Tenallytown road, or on the roads entering the city from the south. The camps were located without regard to purposes of defense or instruction; the roads were not picketed, and there was no attempt at an organization into brigades.

"In no quarters were the dispositions for defense such as to offer a vigorous resistance to a respectable body of the enemy, either in the position or numbers of the troops, or the number and character of the defensive works. Earthworks in the nature of *têtes-de-pont* looked upon the approaches to the Georgetown aqueduct and ferry, the Long Bridge and Alexandria, by the Little River Turnpike, and some simple defensive arrangements were made at the Chain Bridge. With the latter exception, not a single defensive work had been constructed on the Maryland side. There was nothing to prevent the enemy from shelling the city from the opposite heights, which were within easy range, and which would have been occupied by a hostile column almost without resistance. Many soldiers had deserted, and the streets of Washington were crowded with straggling officers and men, absent from their stations without authority, whose behavior indicated the general want of discipline and organization."

Making allowance for the natural tendency of the new broom to magnify the need of its services, —McDowell would probably not have worded his report in just that way,—the conditions were doubtless bad enough; and McClellan set at work to remedy them without delay. He appointed his general staff, formulated his plans of organization, laid out a system of fortifications, and brought order in a brief time out of seeming chaos. As fast as the new regiments arrived, they were formed into provisional brigades and assigned to

1861
July 27
et seq.

McClel-
lan on
military
con-
ditions

His
reforms

1861
July
et seq.

Drilling
the
Union
troops

Their
numbers

Univer-
sal aid
to Mc-
Clellan

camp for instruction and discipline. General Fitz John Porter was first assigned to the charge of the infantry brigades, succeeded by General Burnside. He in turn was succeeded by General Silas Casey of Rhode Island, a worthy compatriot of Greene as a patient and skillful tactician and drill-master, who continued in charge of the constantly arriving regiments until the beginning of the Peninsular Campaign in March 1862; and whose inestimable services in disciplining and educating the troops have perhaps not had fair recognition, as an element in the final success. In three months McClellan officially reported to the Secretary of War that there were present for duty 147,695 men, with an aggregate strength of 168,318. Allowing for the manning of the defenses, there were 76,285 ready for active service in the field, with an artillery force of 228 guns, requiring 112 more pieces to bring this arm up to full strength.

The whole country acted as McClellan's staff. He had the assistance to the fullest extent of every government official from the President down, the War Department, his subordinate generals, the governors of the loyal States, and hosts of unrecognized official and private workers in them all. No commander ever had more unstinted, ungrudging, and docile co-operation from his civil government and the people at large, or a freer hand to carry out all his plans, than did McClellan for months after his accession to a virtual military dictatorship. The early Union disasters had at

least this redeeming benefit, that they sobered most of the people and press alike out of that impatience for constant action which has led to so many calamities, and ended so many promising careers in disgrace.

1861
July
et seq.

Bless-
ings in
disguise

There was some fretting; but on the whole the country accepted the judgment of their trusted chief, "the Young Napoleon" as they were fond of calling him and he was fond of being called, that they must wait. Wait they did, with a large force lying idle, with appalling expenses piling up and foreign governments growing more and more threatening, and still received only the assurance that they must wait an indefinite time longer, till the imaginary hosts of the Confederacy should be overwhelmingly outnumbered. The general had been enabled to put into working condition as fine a body of soldiery as of like numbers has ever been brought together in the world. But he dared not use it, in fear of defeat by an enemy whose superiority existed only in his own imagination, and was constantly discredited not only by a host of trustworthy reports, but by the sound and accurate judgment of his superior Scott, himself a Southerner and knowing what were the real resources of the South.

McClel-
lan un-
willing
to move

From
timidity

There can be no doubt also that the eager alacrity of the rest of the world to help and serve him, the deference paid him by the highest officers of state, the flattery unceasingly lavished on him by the press, the attentions shown him by the society leaders of Washington, the pictures for

Grows
spoiled

1861
July
et seq.

McClel-
lan's
megaloma-
mania

which he sat to exhibit in the shop windows and sell, had an unfortunate effect on him. He became unwilling to recognize the right of the country to ask for some result from its sacrifice and labor, seemed to feel that the years were before him, certainly did feel that advice or suggestion from outside was impertinent, and grew impatient of the forms of subordination or even the courtesies of a fellow-worker to his military superior General Scott and his civil superior President Lincoln. On one occasion, when Lincoln went to call upon him in the evening, he kept the President waiting for an hour, and then sent word that he had gone to bed.

McClel-
lan as
politician

Wishes
concilia-
tion in
place
of war

Still worse, he wished to subordinate the general to the politician. He was a Democrat, disbelieved in the good policy of coercing the South, was convinced that a compromise could still recall the seceded States without a war, was adverse to a victorious one as giving dominance to the radical Republican element which he detested, and like so many in the Revolutionary War, kept dabbling in schemes to be a mediator, though with the highest motives and most sincere patriotism. He had conferences with well-known disunionists at his headquarters; and at one time Lincoln was compelled to wait for a long time at the door, until a coterie of these gentlemen had finished their call. Yet Lincoln, the least vain or touchy of men, anxious only for the good of the country, trusted his essential rectitude and bore with his manners.

It was McClellan's duty to report daily to General Scott, the commander-in-chief. This after four or five days' time he failed to do. On August 9, two weeks after his arrival in Washington, he wrote a letter to General Scott, highly offensive in tone, which was warmly resented. The answer was addressed to the Secretary of War. Said General Scott:

1861
July
et seq.

McClel-
lan's
neglect of
Scott

I received yesterday from Major-General McClellan a letter of that date to which I design this as my only reply.

Had General McClellan presented the same views in person, they would have been freely entertained and discussed. All my military views and opinions had been so presented to him without eliciting much remark, in our few meetings, which I have in vain sought to multiply. He has stood on his guard, and now places himself on record. Let him make the most of his unenvied advantages.

Scott
resents
McClel-
lan's
conduct

Major-General McClellan has propagated in high quarters the idea in the letter before me that Washington was not only "insecure," but "in imminent danger."

Relying on our numbers, on our forts, and the Potomac River, I am confident in the opposite opinion; and considering the stream of new regiments that is now pouring in upon us, I have not the slightest apprehension for the safety of the government here.

Scouts
idea of
danger to
Washing-
ton

In closing, he asked to be placed on the retired list, to give way to a younger commander.

This brought out an apology from McClellan, which the commander-in-chief, in a letter to the President, declined to accept, for the following reasons:

Asks to
be
relieved

1. The original offense given to me by Major-General McClellan seems to have been the result of deliberation between him and some of the members of the Cabinet, by whom

1861
July-Oct.

Refuses
McClel-
lan's
apology

all the greater war questions are to be settled, without resort to or consultation with me, the nominal General-in-Chief of the Army. In further proof of this neglect, although it is unofficially known that in the last week (or six days) many regiments have arrived, and others have changed their position, some to a considerable distance, not one of these movements has been reported to me (or anything else) by Major-General McClellan; while it is believed, and, I may add, known, that he is in frequent communications with portions of the Cabinet, and on matters appertaining to me. That freedom of access and consultation have very naturally deduced the younger general into a feeling of indifference toward his senior.

Scott
vs. Mc-
Clellan

2. With such supports on his part, it would be idle for me, as it would be against the dignity of my years, to be filing daily complaints against the ambitious junior, who, independent of the extrinsic advantages alluded to, has unquestionably very high qualifications for military command. I trust they may achieve crowning victories in behalf of the Union.

McClel-
lan sup-
plants
Scott

The breach was never healed. General Scott resigned on the 31st of October, and on the 1st of November General McClellan was appointed General-in-Chief of the Armies of the United States.

Ball's
Bluff

Previous to this, in October, there were several minor skirmishes along the upper Potomac, with results each time in favor of the Northern troops. On the 21st of that month, however, a disaster occurred to the Union arms which sent a thrill through the whole country. The left wing of the Confederate army, 4000 strong, rested on Leesburg on the Potomac; commanded by General Evans, who had distinguished himself at the battle of Bull Run. Opposite on the Maryland side, at Poolesville, were stationed three Union

brigades under the command of General Charles P. Stone. About twenty miles down the river at Dranesville, Virginia, was a Union division under General McCall. October 20, McClellan telegraphed General Stone to ascertain whether the enemy had moved from Leesburg; adding, "Perhaps a slight demonstration would have the effect to move them."

1861
Oct. 20-1

McClel-
lan sug-
gests
move-
ment to
Stone

To carry out this last suggestion, the next day General Stone gave Colonel (formerly Senator) Edward D. Baker discretionary authority to retire a small detachment of Union troops at Ball's Bluff, or send over his brigade to support it. Baker at once crossed over and posted his command, about 1700 men. Gorman's brigade crossed a little later, higher up. The Confederate commander, grasping the situation, withdrew all his forces from Gorman's front, with the exception of one regiment, and made a sudden and vigorous assault upon Baker's brigade, which had been badly posted, without room to shift position or retreat. In the fight Colonel Baker was killed. The whole affair was a sad blunder, due to inexperience and ignorance of the enemy's strength.¹

Baker
over-
whelmed

And
killed

¹ Colonel Baker had only a few weeks before withdrawn from the Senate, where he was regarded as one of the most patriotic and eloquent of its members, to give his active services to the country. His loss was deeply deplored, and with the universal lament was mingled, as usual in such cases, the demand for a victim. The whole burden fell upon General Stone, who was charged with incompetency, treason, neglect of duty, misbehavior before the enemy, and most atrocious of all, with having deliberately placed his forces where they could be captured or destroyed. The Committee on the Conduct of the War—all of them Baker's friends—listened and gave credence to these

1861
Oct.-Dec.

McClel-
lan's
inaction

He grows
out of
favor

As the year drew toward a close, the President and the country alike became anxious for a forward movement. It was thought certain, now that the thorough organization of the army had been officially announced, that the campaign would open at once; but weeks passed in inaction without any apparent reason. Even Ball's Bluff did not stir the general's placidity. The newspaper correspondents, long fulsome in their praises, began to cool towards him. He was nicknamed "Mac the Unready," and "The Little Corporal of Unfought Fields." One of the keenest of American satirists, in a series of pretended letters from Washington, held him up to ridicule as the "General of the Mackerel [*i. e.* "little Mac," his pet nickname with the soldiers] Brigade." On the 27th of October McClellan reported an effective force of 135,285; on the same date Johnston, at

charges, putting out of sight the invaluable services of General Stone as Inspector-General of the District of Columbia in the first days of the war, and the fact that up to that time his loyalty, ability, and patriotic energy had never been questioned. On the 9th of February, 1862, the Secretary of War, by request of the committee, ordered his arrest. He was sent to Fort Lafayette in New York harbor, where he remained 189 days, and was then released under the requirements of an act of Congress which forbids the detention of any army officer or soldier more than thirty days without charges. A statement of these charges was repeatedly asked for by General Stone, and as often promised, but never made. Says Assistant-Adjutant-General Irwin: "No charges were ever preferred against him. No cause for his arrest has ever been shown. It has even been disputed upon whose initiative it was ordered. The vague and loose 'evidence,' and the floating suspicions engendered by it, that formed the groundwork of his arrest, never admitted of being condensed into an accusation, simply because there was nothing in them to condense." McClellan, to his credit, stood manfully by Stone; who, after his release, was appointed chief of staff to General Banks, and served afterward as brigadier-general under Grant in the Fifth Army Corps.

Manassas, had 41,000 men "capable of going into battle." One month later, McClellan's army was swollen to 198,000 fit and ready for active service, while Johnston's forces had been increased only to 47,200 men. The weather was propitious, the roads were in fine condition, and the army was eager for the word to go forward. But it did not come. Although McClellan had ample means of knowing the enemy's strength through his intelligence department, he insisted that Johnston had 150,000 men behind intrenchments, and declined to move until he had received further reinforcements.¹

Meantime he was writing private letters assailing the President and the heads of departments. In one he says: "I am concealed at Stanton's to dodge all enemies in shape of browsing Presidents, etc. I have a set of men to deal with unscrupulous and false. . . . I am thwarted and deceived by these incapables at every turn." To Halleck, then in the West, he wrote that he was "pursued with undying hatred." To his wife he

1861
Oct.-Dec.

Immense
superior-
ity of
Union
forces

Not
utilized

McClel-
lan
fancies
conspira-
cies
against
him

¹Major-General Alexander S. Webb, Chief of Staff of the Army of the Potomac, in his work *The Peninsula*, says: "During all the time the rebel army lay at Centreville, insolently menacing Washington, and frightening our civil and military authorities into the concentration of an enormous force around the city, it never presented an effective force of 50,000 men. With more than thrice that number, McClellan remained inactive for many precious weeks, under the delusion that he was confronted by a force very nearly his own. It is astonishing that neither the General, nor the President, nor the Searching Committee of Congress, nor the exacting Secretary of War, should have been able to ascertain the truth in the case during this long period. The only sources of intelligence upon which estimates seem to have been made were the reports of deserters, contrabands, and country people who came into our lines."

1861
Nov.-Dec.

McClellan
unhinged
by his
position

Snubs
Lincoln

had written August 9, that to save the country he was willing to accept the dictatorship; he wrote in November, that recognizing "the weakness and unfitness of the poor beings who control the destinies of this great country," he felt it his duty to give the President and Secretary of State advice on a grave diplomatic question. Count Gurowski in his *Diary*, under date of November, says: "Officers of McClellan's staff tell me that almost daily Mr. Lincoln comes into McClellan's library and sits there almost unnoticed. On several occasions McClellan let the President wait in the room together with other common mortals." To Lincoln these personal slights were of little moment. In regard to one peculiarly gross he said, "Never mind: I will hold McClellan's horse if he will only bring us success."

Growing
popular
dis-
content

All this time the feeling of dissatisfaction was increasing, swelled to indignation by this lack of the courtesies due to the people's chosen heads. Bluff old Ben Wade said to General McDowell, "It is awful, and we are endeavoring to see if there is any way in God's world to get rid of the capital besieged, while Europe is looking down upon us almost as a conquered people." A prominent American wrote home from abroad, "When are we to stop hearing of the great things our army and navy and our Young Napoleon are going to do, and hear of what they have done?" McClellan had as yet presented no plan of campaign; he kept his own counsel and consulted with only one or two of his favorite officers. Spurred

by public opinion, and the constant urging of the President to "feel the enemy," he finally announced that he would be ready to move by December 15; but just before that date he was taken ill, and was confined to his house for three weeks. The expenses of the government were meanwhile, according to Secretary Chase, \$1,750,000 a day.

1861
Dec.-Jan.

McClellan
promises
to move

Chafing at the intolerable situation, irritated at the delay, and desirous of exact information, which it had never been able to obtain, early in December Congress appointed a joint committee to inquire into the conduct of the war. This consisted of Benjamin F. Wade of Ohio, Zachariah Chandler of Michigan, and Andrew Johnson of Tennessee, from the Senate; and Daniel W. Gooch of Massachusetts, John Covode of Pennsylvania, George W. Julian of Indiana, and Moses F. Odell of New York, from the House of Representatives. The consultations were held in conjunction with the President and Cabinet, and many officers were summoned before the committee to testify as to past events and present conditions.

Committee on
conduct
of the
war

Unfortunately the records of these meetings were not preserved. There was no disagreement among the members, however, as to the necessity of an immediate change in the situation. Indignation was expressed that the blockade of the Potomac should have been suffered to exist so long, and a demand was made of the Secretary of War that it should be raised at once. The blame for its continuance was laid upon McClellan, in

Unanimous
movement

1862
Jan.

Lincoln
forms
army
corps

his presence; he shifted it to the navy. The committee, after examining the older and more competent officers as to the advisability of organizing the army into corps, and finding them without exception in favor of the idea, pressed the matter upon the President, who promulgated an order to divide the army into four corps, commanded by McDowell, Edwin V. Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes. This action was contrary to the wishes of McClellan, who preferred that it should not take place until the beginning of active operations. The committee further took counsel with the army leaders as to the best line of attack upon the enemy's lines. The majority of these suggested a direct advance upon Centreville.

Lincoln
wants to
borrow
army
from Mc-
Clellan

One day the President called a council at the White House, at which Generals McDowell and Franklin with Chase, Seward, and the Assistant Secretary of War, were present. McClellan was not able, through illness, to be present. Mr. Lincoln said, "I am in great distress. If something is not done soon the bottom will be out of the whole affair; and if General McClellan does not want to use the army I would like to borrow it, provided I could see how it could be made to do something." Turning to McDowell he asked, "What can be done with the army soon?" McDowell believed a successful attack could be made at Manassas, and gave his reasons, verbally outlining a plan; saying, in answer to a question by the President, that the army ought to be ready to move in a week. At a subsequent meeting, a day or two later,

McDow-
ell for
speedy
action

McClellan seemed to resent this, objecting to the proposed plan and setting forth new difficulties. At last Chase, whose irritation had become extreme, bluntly asked what he intended doing with his army, and when he intended doing it. After a considerable silence, McClellan said that he was unwilling to develop his plans until he was prepared to act. The President then asked if he had determined upon any special time to move. He replied that he had, and gave the impression that it was to be immediate.

1862
Jan.

McClel-
lan hangs
off

Finding that the President and committee were strongly in favor of McDowell's plan, he at last unfolded his own. He proposed to descend the Potomac to Chesapeake Bay, enter the Rappahannock, land the army at Urbana on the western bank, push across the country to West Point, at the head of York River, and threaten Richmond from that direction before Johnston could reach him from Centreville. "It is by no means certain that we can beat them at Manassas," he argued. "On the other line I regard success as certain by all the chances of war. We demoralize the enemy by forcing him to abandon his prepared position for one we have chosen, in which all is in our favor, and where success must produce immense results."

McClel-
lan's
Peninsu-
lar plan

The plan of the administration, which was indorsed by the committee, the Secretary of War, and many of the officers, was to attack the enemy at Manassas. It was argued in its defense that it kept the army between Washington and the

Adminis-
tration's
Manas-
sas plan

1862
Jan.-
March

Lincoln
yields
to Mc-
Clellan

enemy, and rendered a counter-attack upon the city impossible. It also involved a less expenditure of time and money, and in case of disaster, retreat could be effected with less difficulty. But McClellan insisted; and after many conferences, the President against his better judgment yielded. Subsequent events showed that had the Manassas plan been promptly carried out, the Confederate army at that place would have been scattered or annihilated, and the road cleared for an unopposed march to Richmond.

Then
orders
move-
ment by
Manas-
sas

McClel-
lan gains
his own
way

Two weeks passed, and there was no indication of a movement. Out of patience at last, on the 27th of January President Lincoln issued his War Order No. 1, ordering that the 22d day of February, 1862 (seven months after McClellan's accession), be the day for a general movement of the land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgent forces. This was followed by a special war order, which directed that "all the disposable force of the Army of the Potomac . . . be formed into an expedition for the immediate object of seizing Manassas Junction." But the delay continued, with more consultations and a second council of war, at which the majority finally agreed with McClellan's plan of campaign by way of the lower Chesapeake and up the peninsula. On March 8 the President issued a war order naming March 18 as the day for the opening of the campaign.

There is not the least doubt that all the Union plans were disclosed to the Confederates as fast

as they were made. At any rate, twenty-four hours later Johnston's army left Manassas and pushed forward toward Richmond, taking up a strong position on the south bank of the Rappahannock. As soon as news of this movement reached McClellan, he gave orders—for what purpose cannot be conceived—for the immediate occupation of Centreville and Manassas. A whole army corps crossed the Potomac, to find both camps deserted. At Munson's Hill, from whose fortifications a grim row of 100-pound Parrott guns had all winter bid defiance to the Union army, it was found that the works were a sham, and that the cannon—which still frowned from the embrasures—were Quaker guns; logs of wood with a round black spot on the end to represent the muzzles. From this place, in full view of the White House, the Confederate flag had floated undisturbed for months, defended only by these wooden make-believes. The same kind of artillery was found at Manassas. After these discoveries, the disappointed army faced about and marched back to Washington. Hawthorne, who was in Washington at the time, wrote a stinging account of this episode.¹ It was more humiliating

1862
March

Johnston
blocks
McClellan's
plan

How McClellan
had been
fooled

¹“On the very day of our arrival, 60,000 men had crossed the Potomac on their march toward Manassas; and almost with their first step into Virginia mud, the phantasmagoria of countless hosts and impregnable ramparts, before which they had remained quiescent, dissolved quite away. It was as if General McClellan had thrust his sword into a gigantic enemy, and beholding him suddenly collapse, had discovered to himself and the world that he had merely punctured an enormously swollen bladder. The whole business, though connected with the destinies of a nation, takes inevitably a tinge of the

1862
March

than the battle of Bull Run, and added to the popular disenchantment with McClellan.

Prepar-
ing for
campaign
against
Rich-
mond

On March 11, 1862, the President relieved McClellan of further performance of his duties of general-in-chief, that he might devote his whole attention to the Richmond campaign. This led to a salutary change of leadership in the West, where Halleck was raised to department command. The retreat of Johnston and his new defense behind the Rappahanock necessitated a change of base, and Fortress Monroe was decided upon, instead of Urbana. The objective point of the Union army was of course the Confederate capital. To capture that and at the same time protect the national one was the task that devolved upon McClellan. It was stipulated that "Washington should be left entirely secure," that 50,000 troops should be reserved for the defence, leaving McClellan 108,000 with which to open his campaign.

ludicrous. The vast preparation of men and warlike material—the majestic patience and docility with which the people waited through those weary and dreary months—the martial skill, courage, and caution with which our movement was ultimately made—and at last the tremendous shock with which we were suddenly brought up against nothing at all! The Southerners show little sense of humor nowadays, but I think they must have meant to provoke a laugh at our expense when they planted those Quaker guns. At all events, no other rebel artillery has played upon us with such overwhelming effect." And he adds: "There was and is a most bitter outcry and detraction, high and low, against General McClellan, accusing him of sloth, imbecility, cowardice, treasonable purposes, and, in short, utterly denying his ability as a soldier, and questioning his integrity as a man. Nor was this to be wondered at; for where before in all history do we find a general in command of half a million of men, and in presence of an enemy inferior in numbers and no better disciplined than his own troops, leaving it still debatable after the better part of a year, whether he is a soldier or no?"

But after the embarkation of troops from Alexandria had begun, the President found that the understanding had been practically ignored, and nearly the entire army had been ordered to the Peninsula. McDowell's corps had not yet started, and by order of the War Department, was detained. This brought out a protest from McClellan, who complained that his plans were being interfered with, and that he could not carry out his original idea of attack for lack of men. This complaint would be more respectfully treated by history if it were not stereotyped with him, and if the Confederate myriads had had any existence. Stanton once declared that "if McClellan had a million men he would swear the enemy had two millions, and then he would sit down in the mud and yell for three." The President answered McClellan's protest in the following vigorous letter, which is drawn from the government archives:

WASHINGTON, April 9, 1862.

MY DEAR SIR: Your dispatches claiming that you are not properly sustained, while they do not offend me, do pain me very much. . . . After you left, I ascertained that less than 20,000 unorganized men, without a single field battery, were all you designed to have left for the defense of Washington and Manassas Junction, and part of this, even, was to go to General Hooker's old position. General Banks' corps, once designed for Manassas Junction, was diverted and tied up on the line of Winchester and Strasburg, and could not leave it without again exposing the upper Potomac and the Baltimore & Ohio railroad. This presented, or would present when McDowell and Sumner should be gone, a great temptation

1862
April

McClel-
lan vs.
the
Execu-
tive De-
partment

Lincoln
answers
his
protest

1862
April

Lincoln
justifies
himself

to the enemy to turn back from the Rappahannock and sack Washington. My explicit order that Washington should, by the judgment of all the commanders of army corps, be left entirely secure, had been neglected. It was precisely this that drove me to detain McDowell. . . . Allow me to ask, do you really think I should permit the line from Richmond via Manassas Junction, to this city, to be entirely open except what resistance could be presented by less than 20,000 unorganized troops? This is a question which the country will not allow me to evade.

Insists
upon
action

There is a curious mystery about the number of troops now with you. When I telegraphed you on the 6th, saying you had over 100,000 with you, I had just obtained from the Secretary of War a statement taken, as he said, from your own returns, making 108,000 then with you and *en route* to you. You now say you will have but 85,000 when all *en route* to you shall have reached you. How can this discrepancy of 23,000 be accounted for? . . . I suppose the whole force which has gone forward for you is with you by this time, and, if so, I think it is the precise time for you to strike a blow. By delay the enemy will relatively gain upon you—that is, he will gain faster by fortifications and reinforcements than you can by reinforcements alone. And once more let me tell you, it is indispensable to you to strike a blow. I am powerless to help this. You will do me the justice to remember I always insisted that going down the bay in search of a field instead of fighting at or near Manassas was only shifting and not surmounting a difficulty; that we would find the same enemy, and the same or equal intrenchments at either place. The country will not fail to note—is now noting, that the present hesitation to move upon an entrenched enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated.

I beg to assure you that I have never written you or spoken to you in greater kindness of feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose to sustain you, so far as in my most anxious judgment I consistently can. *But you must act.*

A. LINCOLN.

During the latter days of March, nearly four hundred steamboats, schooners, and barges were busy in conveying troops from Alexandria to Fortress Monroe. By the 2d of April they had landed 120,000 men, with many thousands of horses and mules, with wagons, ambulances, baggage, forty-four batteries, and an immense amount of supplies. The Confederate batteries which had lined the Potomac so long had been withdrawn in the mean time, and the guns taken to the defenses around Richmond. One of McClellan's plans had been to utilize the forces at Fortress Monroe under General Wool; but this the President forbade. He had also planned an important movement for McDowell's corps, of which as has been shown, he had been deprived. This, according to him, cut his army down to 85,000, a force which he claimed was utterly inadequate to make an attack. The first Confederate line of defense across the peninsula was at Yorktown, where General Bankhead Magruder was posted with only 11,000 men. McClellan with his overpowering force could easily have swept the enemy out of existence, and continued his march toward Richmond. Instead of doing this, he called upon the President for "every available man," and sat down to deliberately besiege Yorktown in the regular scientific way, giving meanwhile the scattered bodies of the Confederates an opportunity to concentrate about Richmond.

March 19 McClellan wrote to Secretary Stanton that "the navy should at once concentrate

1862
March-
April

McClel-
lan
concen-
trates at
Fortress
Monroe

McDow-
ell's
pivotal
corps

Magru-
der at
York-
town

McClel-
lan
begins a
siege


1862
March-
April

McClel-
lan asks
naval co-
operation


upon the York River all their available and most powerful batteries for the reduction of Yorktown. That accomplished, a strong force could be pushed up the York, under cover of the navy, directly upon West Point, immediately upon the fall of Yorktown, and we could at once establish our new base of operations at a distance of some twenty-five miles from Richmond, with every facility for bringing into play the whole of our available force on either or both banks of the James. It is impossible to urge too strongly the absolute necessity of the full co-operation of the navy as a part of this programme."

Not
specific
enough

The suggestion was apparently a good one. McClellan also telegraphed to the Secretary of the Navy, who, he said, gave him assurances that his wishes would be complied with. But there seemed to be a fatal misunderstanding about this, as about many other things connected with the campaign. The naval authorities, while agreeing that in a general way they expected to assist in the operations of the army, declared that they had received no intimation that any special service was required of them. For the Assistant Secretary of the Navy testified that he never heard that the navy was expected to engage the batteries at Yorktown, and that wooden vessels could not have done so with any chance of success. They were too high, and beyond the reach of naval guns. He had understood that General McClellan never expected any attack to be made upon them by the navy.



PONTOON BRIDGE ACROSS THE JAMES RIVER.



VIEW OF THE JAMES RIVER.

Admiral Goldsborough said: 'With regard to that campaign, no naval authority whatever, to my knowledge, was ever consulted until after a considerable part of the army got down there. The whole matter was arranged here in Washington by officers of the army, as I understood. I believe they never said a word, even, to the Secretary of the Navy. Certainly, nothing was said to me about it until the eleventh hour. Then it was I heard that the navy was expected to co-operate with them. The Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. Watson, came down to see me in behalf, he said, of the Secretary of War and the President. He told me of the great anxiety felt in Washington in regard to the *Merrimac*; that they were apprehensive she might get up the York River and entirely disconcert all the movements of the army. I told Mr. Watson that he might make his mind perfectly easy about the *Merrimac* going up York River; that she never could get there, for I had ample means to prevent that.'

1862
March-
April

Dispute
as to
naval co-
operation

Admiral
Golds-
borough

The admiral declared, besides, that he did everything the general requested of him,—detailing seven gunboats for his purposes, being all he wanted; and added that upon the day of his arrival at Fortress Monroe, the general came on board his ship to consult with him as to the best plan of attacking Yorktown. This plan was to make a flank attack by way of Severn River upon the Gloucester works, on the fall of which the gunboats could run by Yorktown and render that position untenable. These statements answered

Also by
McClel-
lan

1862
March-
April

McClellan's charge that the failure of the navy to co-operate with him caused a serious disarrangement of his plans and contributed to the failure of the campaign.

McClel-
lan's
igno-
rance of
York-
town

The mistake which McClellan made in selecting the peninsula as a route to Richmond became painfully obvious at the very outset. He had no precise topographical information as to the country in advance. There were no maps, and no dependence could be placed on the statements of the inhabitants. In his official report to the President, he says:

His
report

"Reconnaissances made under fire determined that the sources of the Warwick River were near Yorktown, commanded by its guns, while that stream, for some distance from its mouth on the James, was controlled by the Confederate gunboats; that the fords had been destroyed by dams, the approaches to which were generally through dense forests and dead swamps, and defended by extensive and formidable works; that timber felled for defensive purposes, and the flooding of the roads caused by the dams, had made these works apparently inaccessible and impossible to turn; that Yorktown was strongly fortified, armed, and garrisoned, and connected with the defenses at Warwick by forts and intrenchments, the ground in front of which was swept by the guns of Yorktown. Heavy rains made the road to Fort Monroe impassable, and delayed the arrival of troops, ammunition, and supplies; while storms prevented for several days the sailing of transports from Hampton Roads, and the establishment of depots on the creeks of York River near the army. As to the force and position of the enemy, the information then in our possession was vague and untrustworthy."

To show beyond doubt the weakness of the enemy's line at Yorktown at the time of the attack

on April 5, it is only necessary to quote from General Magruder's official report of the action:

1862
April-
May

Magru-
der's
report on
York-
town

I was compelled to place at Gloucester Point, Yorktown, and Mulberry Island, fixed garrisons amounting to 6000 men, my whole force being 11,000; so that it will be seen that the balance of the line, embracing a length of thirteen miles, was defended by about 5000 men. After two reconnoissances in great force from Fort Monroe and Newport News, the enemy on April 3 advanced and took possession of Harwood's Mill. He advanced in two heavy columns, one along the old York road, and the other along the Warwick road, and on April 5 appeared simultaneously along the whole front of our line from Minor's Farm to Yorktown. I have no accurate data upon which to base an exact statement of his forces; but from various sources of information I was satisfied that I had before me the enemy's Army of the Potomac, under the command of General McClellan, with the exception of the two *corps d'armée* of Banks and McDowell, respectively, forming an aggregate number of not less than 100,000, since ascertained to be 120,000. On every portion of my lines he attacked us with a furious cannonading and musketry, which was responded to with effect by our batteries and troops of the line. His skirmishers were also well thrown forward on this and the succeeding day, and energetically felt our whole line, but were everywhere repulsed by the steadiness of our troops. Thus, with 5000 men, exclusive of the garrisons, we held in check over 100,000 of the enemy. Every preparation was made in anticipation of another attack by the enemy. The men slept in the trenches and under arms; but to my utter surprise, he permitted day after day to go by without an assault. In a few days the object of his delay was apparent. In every direction in front of our lines, through the intervening woods and along the open fields, earthworks began to appear. Through the energetic action of the government, reinforcements began to pour in, until all anxiety passed from my mind as to the result of an attack upon us."

100,000
men held
at bay by .
5000

Preparations were made to open fire on the works at Yorktown May 6; but on the night of

1862
May

Confed-
erates
fall back
to Will-
iams-
burg

May 3 they were quietly evacuated, and the Confederate forces fell back to their second line of defense at Williamsburg. General Johnston had been summoned to the command on the peninsula, and had brought with him some 40,000 men. He saw that McClellan was mounting heavy siege guns, while those at Yorktown were only old-fashioned smooth-bore cannon, incapable of much resistance; and he wisely retreated, believing if the same delay took place at Williamsburg that he would have time to collect still larger forces. The Confederate government had just passed a conscription act, and within a month he could count on at least 50,000 additional men.

Confed-
erates
attacked
at Will-
iams-
burg

Johnston's retreating army was closely followed by General George Stoneman's division of cavalry, followed by the infantry corps of Hooker and Kearny, and later by the entire army. At the Williamsburg line of defense the pursuit was checked. On the morning of May 5 the battle opened by a charge of Hooker's division upon Longstreet's forces, which were concentrated in his front for attack. McClellan, for some reason, had remained at Yorktown and had divided the command between Sumner and Heintzelman, while Joseph E. Hooker was fighting independently of either. The result was a failure to accomplish what should have been accomplished. There was no concerted action on the part of the different commanders, and the Confederate army was enabled to withdraw to the opposite side of the Chickahominy to a safe retreat, with all their

Vainly

baggage, supplies, and guns. The Union loss was 2000, with no compensating result.

1862
Spring

In the month of December, Rosecrans, who had succeeded McClellan as commander of the Department of Ohio, had moved from western Virginia to the Shenandoah Valley for the better protection of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, and proposed to make his headquarters at Winchester. His plan, however, was foiled by Jackson, who a few days in advance occupied Winchester in force. At this juncture Rosecrans was succeeded by General Frederick W. Lander, who simply remained on the defensive, watching Jackson. In March Nathaniel P. Banks' forces drove Jackson from Winchester to Woodstock, forty miles south. General James Shields had been stationed at Strasburg, but withdrew, and was closely followed by Jackson, who was joined by Turner Ashby's cavalry. Shields had gone into camp at Kernstown, near Winchester, and here he was attacked at three o'clock in the morning of March 23 by the united forces of the Confederate commanders. Shields, though taken by surprise, made a stubborn fight and finally turned the tables upon the enemy, inflicting a loss of two guns, 200 prisoners, and 500 killed and wounded. Banks joined Shields and chased Jackson back to Swift Run Gap, where he held a very strong position.

Rose-
crans in
the Shen-
andoah
Valley

Suc-
ceeded by
Lander

Battle of
Kerns-
town

This last movement was coincident with the embarkment of the Union troops for the peninsular campaign. On the 1st of May, while McClellan was before Yorktown, the Federal forces

2186
May-
June

Troops
in the
Shenan-
doah
Valley

Banks
defeated

in Virginia were distributed as follows: McDowell, who had started in accordance with Stanton's plan, to threaten Richmond and assist McClellan, was at Fredericksburg with 41,000 men; Banks' corps of 20,000 at Harrisonburg; Schenck's and Robert H. Milroy's brigades were near Staunton, and John C. Frémont, with a force of 10,000, was marching to join them. Jackson made a sudden dash for Staunton, and attacked and defeated Milroy and Schenck before reinforcements could reach them; and then, joined by Richard S. Ewell, turned upon Banks, who retreated in disorder to Winchester, where he vainly attempted to make a stand. He was overwhelmed by numbers, however, and forced back across the Potomac, leaving 2000 prisoners in the enemy's hands.

McDow-
ell
ordered
thither

Jackson
defeats
Frémont
and
Shields

The news of Banks' reverse threw Washington into the wildest excitement. An attack on the city was feared. McDowell was ordered to leave 20,000 men in the forts, and proceed with his other 20,000 to the Shenandoah Valley to join Shields, and intercept Jackson if possible. He was too late, however. Both Shields and Frémont pursued Jackson; who, watching his opportunity when the two forces had separated, turned suddenly and repulsed Frémont at Cross Keys, June 7, the next day defeated Shields at Port Republic, capturing his artillery and many prisoners. Having accomplished his purpose, which was to prevent reinforcements being sent to the army of the Potomac. Jackson's way was open to Richmond.

CHAPTER LXXXIII.

KENTUCKY AND TENNESSEE

Affairs in Virginia and Missouri had caused a feeling of unrest in both Kentucky and Tennessee, which day by day increased and threatened trouble. In the former there was an overwhelming undercurrent of Union sentiment, but yet the work and talk of an active minority of disunionists gave matters a very doubtful look. Governor Magoffin, who had answered the President's call for troops with an insulting and defiant message of refusal, worked hard to commit the State to the cause of the South. He applied to Arkansas and Louisiana for arms, but without success. He then attempted to borrow money from the State banks to purchase arms for the Home Guard, but was refused. As a last resort he called a special session of the Legislature to meet May 2, 1861. In his message he denounced the President's defense of the government as "extraordinary usurpation"; the patriotism of the loyal States was stigmatized as "the frenzy of fanaticism," and the "late American Union" was declared dissolved. He asked the Legislature to call a convention to take action on the withdrawal of the State from the Union, and also to appropriate money for the organization and arming of the militia. At the same time, and

1861

Governor
of
Kentucky
works for
secession

His
message

1861

Governor
Magoffin
urges
States to
enforce
truce

on his own account, he sent private messengers to the governors of Indiana and Missouri, asking them to unite with him "in an effort to bring about a truce between the general government and the seceded States." Governor Morton—"the great war governor" of Indiana—promptly replied that he did "not recognize the right of any State to act as mediator between the Federal government and a rebellious State."

Kentucky
wishes
neutral-
ity

Many even of the Unionists nursed the dream of neutrality, and a resolution committing the State to that policy was passed by the Legislature. It was peculiarly hard for the people of Kentucky to commit themselves without reservation to either side. Yet there were many who did. It was a fight between duty and sentiment. The impassioned words of Clay still rang in their ears, and they caught at any means which would allow them to remain in the Union without being compelled to raise their hands against their brethren of the South.

Votes ar-
mament
to sup-
port it

The governor's request for a convention was ignored. A bill was passed, however, authorizing a loan of \$1,000,000 to purchase arms and munitions of war, with the provision that a controlling Board of Commissioners, composed of Union men, should be associated with the governor in its disbursement, and that the arms should not be used against the national government nor against the Confederate States, except to repel invasion. The raising of Home and State guards was authorized, but the bill required that both officers

and men of either organization should swear to support the Constitution of the United States and Kentucky.

Pleasant as neutrality was to think of, it very soon became evident that it was practically impossible. Hundreds of zealous sympathizers with the South left the State, and enlisted at one or another Confederate camp in Missouri or Tennessee; while Union men flocked across the river to the recruiting stations in Ohio. By the 10th of May, the leaders who had been most ardent supporters of the policy of neutrality recognized its futility; and so informed the President, who quickly supplied them with arms for the several Union companies which were being formed at various points. The State elections took place in June, when nine out of ten anti-secessionists were elected, the Union majority being nearly 55,000. Two months later, in August, a strong Legislature was elected, one of whose first acts was to order the United States flag raised over the capitol at Frankfort. Early in July, Lieutenant (afterwards General) William Nelson had established a camp and enlisting station—"Camp Dick Robinson"—in central Kentucky, which afforded a rallying-place for the loyal soldiers of the State. Governor Magoffin wrote to the President and demanded the removal of this and other Union camps from the State. In reply, Lincoln said that the men at these camps were exclusively Kentuckians, defending their own homes; and that in accordance with the evident popular sentiment

1861

Neutral-
ity un-
popular
on both
sides

Elections
go
heavily
Unionist

Governor
vs.
President
on Union
camps

1861 of the whole State, he must decline to order them away.

Union sweep of the Mississippi feared

One of the great fears of the Confederate government was, that Scott's plan of a prompt military expedition down the Mississippi valley would be carried out. If that were successfully done, the Confederacy would be cut in twain and its cause irretrievably lost. General Pillow, recognizing the probability of such a movement and the importance of checking it if possible, warned Jefferson Davis of the impending danger. His plan was to fortify different points along the river with heavy batteries, to prevent the passage of a Union fleet. Through March and April he was hard at work surrounding Memphis with earth-works, and putting guns in position. Early in May he reported that the works were finished, but that there was danger of the Federals landing troops at Columbus, Kentucky; from which place a strong column might turn his works, attack him in reverse, crush his force, capture the guns, and open the river. "I have asked Governor Magoffin," he wrote to Davis, "for permission to fortify Columbus. If he should withhold his consent, my present impression is that I shall go forward and occupy the work upon the ground of its necessity for protecting Tennessee." The scheme was postponed, Davis fearing that such action might strengthen Union sentiment in Kentucky.

Pillow fortifies Memphis

Debate over fortifying Columbus, Ky.

Leonidas Polk, a graduate of West Point, at the opening of the war was Protestant Episcopal bishop of the diocese of Louisiana; but being

offered a major-generalship in the Confederate army, he put off his gown and took up the sword. He was specially intrusted with the charge of the Mississippi River valley between the Arkansas River and Kentucky. At the same time, the Confederate General W. J. Hardee assumed command of the Department of Upper Arkansas, with his headquarters at Pocahontas, where also was stationed General Jeff. Thompson, with an independent force. General Polk, as well as General Pillow, recognized the importance of some strong point which would dominate the passage of the river. The place of all places was Cairo, but that was held by a strong Union force. There were two other available places,—New Madrid, Missouri, and Columbus, Kentucky,—both between Cairo and Memphis. By order of General Polk, Pillow occupied the former place July 27, with a force of 6000 men. The plan was to combine the two armies of Pillow and Hardee, which would aggregate about 15,000 men, and take possession of Cape Girardeau, a high bluff on the Missouri side of the river a hundred miles below St. Louis. Meanwhile, General Polk was to land a strong force on the Illinois side, and together they were to attack Cairo, whose capture was regarded as certain.

These plans were suddenly changed, however, and those suggested by Pillow three months before adopted. On the 1st of September, General Polk started from Memphis with a force of 7000 men; and, joined by Pillow's forces at New Madrid, moved upon Columbus, which place he

1861

Confederate
com-
mands in
Missis-
sippi
Valley

Plan to
dominate
it

Capture
of Cairo
mooted

Changed
for Co-
lumbus

reached September 4 and immediately began to fortify. On the 9th he formally notified Governor Magoffin of his action, and the reasons therefor. Coincident with this move, General Simon B. Buckner, formerly a government official and an able soldier, was gathering a force in northern Tennessee for the invasion of his native State; while General Felix K. Zollicoffer in eastern Tennessee was watching for an opportunity to invade Kentucky through Cumberland Gap. The Legislature was in session when the governor received the communication from Polk. It was at once turned over to that body. The indignity was resented. Resolutions were at once passed instructing the governor to demand the unconditional withdrawal of the Southern forces from Kentucky, and calling upon General Anderson, commander of the newly made Department of the Cumberland, to enter at once upon the defense of the State. The Legislature also declared enlistment under the Confederate flag to be a misdemeanor, and the invasion of Kentucky by Confederate soldiers felony. The raising of 40,000 soldiers to "repel invasion" was authorized, providing they should be mustered into the service of the United States, to serve under like conditions with the soldiers of the other loyal States."

As an example of the curious conditions existing at this period in the State, on account of the understanding as to neutrality, it was no uncommon sight in Louisville to see a squad of recruits for the Union service marching up one

1861
Sept.

Kentucky
trebly
menaced
by Con-
federates

Polk's
seizure of
Colum-
bus
treated
as
invasion

Loyal
army
voted

Amicable
division
of re-
cruiting

side of a street, while a squad recruited for the Confederacy was moving down the other. In the interior, a train bearing a company for Camp Dick Robinson might at the next station take up another bound for Camp Boone; the two, of course, occupying separate cars.

1861
Aug.-
Sept.

Tolerant
Kentucky
factions

As soon as the August elections were over, the recruits began to pour into Nelson's camp; and in two weeks four full Kentucky regiments had been formed, with nearly 2000 East-Tennesseans, enlisted by Lieutenant S. P. Carter. In Greensburg, W. T. Ward, a prominent lawyer, recruited a brigade of twenty-two companies. In Christian County Colonel J. F. Buckner, a wealthy planter, raised a regiment, and went into camp at Hopkinsville, a few miles from Camp Boone. With the single exception of Nelson's regiments, none of these bodies were organized or at all properly armed.

Tennes-
see
Union
recruits

About the middle of September, General Albert Sidney Johnston¹ was assigned to the command of the Confederate forces in the West.

A. S.
Johnston

¹Albert Sidney Johnston, one of the most beloved and honored of all the Southern commanders, was born in Mason County, Kentucky, in 1803. He was a graduate of West Point, and served in the Black Hawk War. He left the army for several years, but when the war broke out between Mexico and Texas he enlisted in the army of the latter as a private; but showed so much knowledge of military affairs, and such personal bravery, that he was made commander-in-chief of the Texan army. In 1846 he fought in the Mexican war. In 1857 he led an expedition against the Mormons, and was for some time in command of the military district of Utah. At the time of the breaking out of the war, he was serving as colonel of the Second United States Cavalry; he resigned that position to take the command in the Confederate army of the Department of the West, a position he held until his untimely death at Shiloh.

1861
 Sept.
 Nov.
 Buckner
 raids
 Kentucky

Louisville
 strength-
 ened

Sherman
 succeeds
 Anderson

His first move was to order General Simon B. Buckner to occupy Bowling Green with 5000 men. This was done, and a detachment was sent along the railroad toward Louisville to seize the rolling stock and burn the bridges. The Union forces were unable to offer any resistance. General Robert Anderson the defender of Fort Sumter, who was in command of the department, had anticipated the movement, and notified Governor O. P. Morton of Indiana that he might need assistance. Several regiments were immediately forwarded to Louisville; while the entire force of Home Guards, numbering 1800 men, were called out. General Rousseau, who was in camp on the Illinois side of the river, furnished 1200 men. All these hastily gathered forces were placed under the command of General William T. Sherman,¹ who a few days later succeeded General Anderson as commander of the Department of the Cumberland; that officer, on account of feeble health, being unable to fulfill the duties of active service.

S. B.
 Buckner
 defeats
 J. F.
 Buckner

While Sherman was organizing his forces, Buckner destroyed the locks on Green River, and then advanced upon the camp of his namesake at Hopkinsville. The men all made their escape, but

¹ William Tecumseh Sherman, next to Grant the ablest general in the Union army, was a native of Lancaster, Ohio. He was born February 8, 1820; was a graduate of West Point, and served until 1853, when he resigned. In April 1861 he re-entered the army, was made a general, and was a prominent figure during the war. In 1866 he was made a lieutenant-general; and when Grant became President in 1869, he succeeded him as commander-in-chief of the armies of the United States.

their leader was made prisoner. A week or two previous, Colonel J. S. Williams had begun to gather a Confederate force at Prestonburg in eastern Kentucky, with the intention of taking possession of Lexington and Danville. General Nelson made a sudden attack upon him, and drove him out through Pound Gap into Virginia.

1861
Nov.

Wilson
clears
East
Kentucky

November 15 General Don Carlos Buell,¹ a West Point graduate and Mexican veteran, was appointed to the Department of the Ohio, which was now made to include the States of Ohio, Michigan, and Indiana, that part of Kentucky east of the Cumberland River, and the State of Tennessee. At the same time General George H. Thomas² was placed in command of Camp Dick Robinson, relieving General Nelson from active service. In the latter part of November a force

Buell

Thomas

¹ Don Carlos Buell was a graduate of West Point, and had been in the army all his life. He was a thoroughly trained soldier, with great pride in his profession, a man of great integrity, with abilities of the first order, animated by high principles. As an organizer he was the equal of McClellan. He was constant in his endeavors for the comfort of his troops, and insisted on their camps being well placed and well drained. His highest aim was to make good soldiers of his command: straggling, pillaging, and disobedience of orders, he regarded as unworthy of a soldier, and deserving prompt and stern punishment. In the war with Mexico he twice received promotion for gallant conduct, and was severely wounded in battle. He was appointed brigadier-general of volunteers May 27, 1861. He incurred the enmity of Halleck, who ordered him to make a campaign in Tennessee which every officer familiar with the country declared impossible. Buell objected, and was promptly removed from the command of the Department of the Ohio, General Rosecrans taking his place.

² George Henry Thomas was born in Southampton County, Virginia, July 31, 1816; graduated from West Point in 1836, served in the Mexican War, and was for three years an instructor at West Point. In 1868 he declined the office of lieutenant-general. Died at San Francisco, March 28, 1870.

1861-2
Nov.-Jan.

Garfield
drives
out Hum-
phrey
Marshall

East
Kentucky
finally
rescued

South-
Kentuck-
ians
attempt
secession

of 5000 Confederates under General Humphrey Marshall,¹ a native Kentuckian and a West-Pointer, entered the State through Pound Gap to attack Buell's army and prevent its entering Tennessee. Colonel James A. Garfield (afterwards President), who was at a camp of instruction near Columbus, Ohio, was summoned by General Buell, placed in command of the Eighteenth Brigade of the Army of the Ohio, and ordered to drive Marshall out of the State. This he did January 10, after a sharp fight of nearly four hours at Middle Creek, near Prestonburg, in the valley of the Big Sandy. The Confederates set fire to their stores, abandoned their supply trains, and fled in disorder back into Virginia. For his services in this brief but effective campaign, Garfield was commissioned Brigadier-General. East Kentucky was now free from Confederate troops, and the Union inhabitants were relieved from the depredations committed upon them by roving and irresponsible bands of Confederate soldiers and sympathizers.

Nearly two months before, the secessionists of southern Kentucky had declared a separate government at Russellville; and on November 20 a convention was held there which passed an

¹ General Humphrey Marshall stands quite alone among Southern leaders as advocating a departure from the rules of civilized warfare. [Official Records (Confederate), Series i., Vol. X., page 468.] Of course the Confederacy, like all states, is to be judged by its actions, not by the talk of its hot-heads. He was a lawyer, and a man of ability in his profession; but arrogant, bombastic, and of little account in war. A satirist of the time made him heir to Falstaff, in bulk, boastfulness, and other qualities.

ordinance of secession. Bowling Green was made the capital, and in December the State was formally received into the Confederacy. It was a farcical proceeding, and even the Richmond government did not take it seriously.

In November, General George B. Crittenden, a native of Kentucky and a graduate of West Point, was placed in command of the Confederate forces in Tennessee, with headquarters at Knoxville. At the same time General Zollicoffer, who had been encamped near Bowling Green, was ordered by Johnston to proceed to Mill Springs to watch the movements of the Federals and be in readiness to co-operate with Crittenden in case the latter should enter Kentucky. To check these moves, Buell ordered General Thomas to throw himself in front of Zollicoffer with a strong force, and prevent his crossing the Cumberland. In spite of all his precautions, however, the crossing was made, and a strong line of intrenchments thrown up, the river forming the rear defense. It was a dangerous position, and as soon as Crittenden heard of it he sent orders to recross at once. It was too late, however; Thomas's forces were in front of him, and there was nothing to do but to fight. Crittenden hastened to the rescue. On his arrival he found that the Union forces were scattered. A consultation was held, and it was determined to make a night attack on Thomas's command before the other forces could reach him. With Thomas at Logan's Cross Roads, ten miles from Mill Springs, were the 9th Ohio, the 2d

1861-2
Nov.-Jan.

South
Kentucky
votes to
secede

G. B.
Crittenden

Zollicoffer to co-
operate

Crosses
Cumberland in
face of
Thomas

Plans
attack
with Crittenden

1862
Jan.
18-19

Minnesota, the 10th Indiana, Kenny's battery, and a battalion of Walford's cavalry. Some miles away, delayed by the bad roads, were the 4th and 10th Kentucky, the 14th Ohio, Wetmore's battery, and the 18th regulars. At Fishing Creek was General Schoepf, with the 12th Kentucky and the 1st and 2d East Tennessee regiments, with Standart's battery.

Critten-
den and
Zolli-
coffer
attack
Thomas

Battle of
Mill
Springs

Zolli-
coffer's
ruse or
mistake

At midnight on the 18th of January, in a storm of rain and sleet, the Confederate forces set out on their toilsome march of ten miles. Their total strength was about 10,000, made up of Zollicoffer's brigade of two cavalry companies, a Mississippi regiment, six Tennessee regiments, two batteries, an Alabama regiment, and two regiments of cavalry, the latter intended as a reserve. At six o'clock the Union pickets met the advance and gave the alarm. The men fell in instantly. The Confederates made a vigorous attack which was as vigorously repelled. Colonel Speed S. Fry, of the 4th Kentucky, was conspicuous for his bravery. The woods were filled with smoke, and it was difficult to see clearly. Colonel Fry, who was on horseback, rode a little in advance of his regiment to get a clear idea of the ground and disposition of the enemy, when he met with a mounted officer whose uniform was hidden by a waterproof coat. "Don't fire on those men!" he cried. "Those are our men," pointing to a Confederate regiment. "Certainly not," replied Fry. At the same moment a Confederate cavalryman dashed out of the woods and fired a pistol at

him. Fry at once fired at the officer who had accosted him, and shot him through the heart. As he fell from his horse his Confederate uniform was displayed, and a moment later it was discovered that it was Zollicoffer. His death caused two of his regiments to retreat in disorder. The Confederates fought with desperate courage, and for a time the issue seemed doubtful. At last the 9th Ohio made a sudden bayonet charge against the enemy's left, and the whole line gave way in confusion, retreating in disorder to the intrenchments they had left a few hours before. They were closely followed by Thomas, who gave them no time to make a stand. All along the line of retreat the ground was covered with abandoned baggage, haversacks, and arms. It was a repetition of the Bull Run panic on the other side.

1862
Jan. 19

Zolli-
coffer
killed,
his force
routed

It was expected that Crittenden would defend his works at Mill Springs, which he reached at midnight; but the morning found him gone. The army had crossed the river and destroyed their boats, so that immediate pursuit was impossible. In the intrenchments were found eleven pieces of artillery with their caissons, battery wagons, and forges, 150 army wagons, and over 1000 horses and mules. Besides these there was a large amount of ammunition, commissary stores, intrenching tools, camp and garrison equipage and muskets, and five stands of colors. The Union loss was 39 killed and 207 wounded; that of the Confederates, 125 killed, and 408 wounded and missing.

Critten-
den's
fight

1862
Jan. 19
et seq.

Critten-
den's
force
disperse

Result
of Mill
Springs

Other
Kentucky
opera-
tions

In his report Crittenden said: "From Mill Springs and on the first steps of my march, officers and men, frightened by false rumors of the enemy, shamefully deserted; and stealing horses and mules to ride, fled to Knoxville, Nashville, and other places in Tennessee. Of one cavalry battalion all deserted but 25." General Johnston, speaking of Crittenden's retreat, said: "During his retreat his army became much demoralized; and two regiments whose homes were in that neighborhood almost entirely abandoned their organization, and went every man to his own house. A multitude deserted, and the tide of fugitives filled the country with dismay." The result of the battle was a heavy blow to the Confederacy. It was the first great Federal success of the war, the immediate effect of which was to strengthen Union sentiment in both Kentucky and Tennessee. In addition to that, Johnston found his line broken, and an army demolished on which he had counted. He was compelled to evacuate Bowling Green, one of his most important points, and retreat into Tennessee. Immediately after the battle, Thomas was ordered with his division to Nashville, where concentration for an important movement was taking place.

While Thomas was pushing his campaign, other plans for clearing Kentucky of the Confederates were under consideration. The possession of Bowling Green was considered indispensable, as well as the unobstructed passage of the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers. The importance of

Bowling Green from a military point of view can best be understood by reference to the map. Whichever side held it held the gateway from the North to the South. The only railroad in the State running between these two points of compass was that from Louisville to Nashville, and no body of troops or supplies of one side could be run over it if held by the other. On the Mississippi, the great water artery of travel, the passage was controlled by the works at Columbus. To break this line of obstruction became a matter of discussion among the military commanders of the West, and many plans were suggested. Halleck suggested a gunboat movement up the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers; McClellan, who was then in Washington, making ready for his Richmond campaign, objected to the idea. "My own general plans for the prosecution of the war," he wrote, "make the speedy occupation of East Tennessee and its lines of railway matters of absolute necessity. Bowling Green and Nashville are in that connection of very secondary importance at the present moment."

On the two rivers the Confederates had erected powerful forts, Fort Henry on the Tennessee and Fort Donelson on the Cumberland. General Grant believed they should be taken before they were made impregnable, and begged permission of Halleck to make the attempt. This was at first peremptorily refused, with the brusqueness and apparent arrogance which made that commander so unpopular among his subordinates. Grant

1862
Jan.

Bowling
Green the
land key
to Ten-
nessee

Colum-
bus the
water
key

McClel-
lan op-
poses
campaign
there

Forts
Henry
and
Donelson

1862
Jan.-Feb.

persisted, however, and at last persuaded Commodore Foote to write to Halleck to say that he concurred in Grant's opinion, and would co-operate with him. Finally, on January 30, Halleck telegraphed from St. Louis giving his consent, and sending him an official order to proceed.

Fort
Henry

At the points where the two forts were situated, the rivers were only twelve miles apart, a comparatively easy distance. It was decided to move against Fort Henry first. With singular shortsightedness, the engineers who had laid out and constructed this work had placed it on low ground, where it was liable to be overflowed at high water. It was a solidly constructed fortification of earth, with five bastions, mounting twelve guns facing the river and five facing the land, and was commanded by General Lloyd Tilghman, who had as a garrison 3500 men.

Grant
assails it

On the 2d day of February, Grant started up the river with 17,000 men on transports, accompanied by the iron-clads *Essex*, *Cincinnati*, *Carondelet*, and *St. Louis*, and the smaller gunboats *Conestoga*, *Tyler*, and *Lexington*, all under the command of Commodore Foote. Tilghman had telegraphed for reinforcements; but finding they could not be obtained, he sent away all his soldiers to Fort Donelson, retaining only a company of artillerists, just sufficient to work the guns. On the 6th the iron-clads opened a terrific fire upon the fort, which was promptly returned. Meantime Grant had landed his troops, several brigades under McClernand marching to the rear of the

fort to cut off the retreat, and others being placed in position to storm the works if necessary. The fight lasted three hours, when the Confederate flag was hauled down and the Federal troops entered the fort. Only two men were killed in the fleet. Nine were wounded, and twenty were scalded on the *Essex* from a shot entering the boiler. In the fort, things were more serious. A 24-pound rifled gun exploded, disabling all the artillerists; a shell struck the muzzle of another gun, breaking it, and killing or wounding all the men serving it; a premature explosion of another gun killed three men and wounded a number of others. Many of the gunners, seeing the uselessness of holding out, refused to fight longer and escaped from the fort. A large amount of supplies was captured, and taken by the transports to Cairo. Some of these supplies—flour, sugar, coffee, and rice—fell into the hands of the officers of certain regiments and were sold surreptitiously to the settlers, who resold them to the soldiers at exorbitant prices. This fact, and a laxity of discipline which prevailed after the return to Cairo, led to a letter of reprimand to Grant from General Halleck.

But important as was the capture of Fort Henry, the work would be regarded as but half completed without the seizure of Fort Donelson on the Cumberland. General Johnston had felt that one of the objective points of the Federal army would be Nashville, and was convinced that any move against it would be by way of the river.

1862
Feb. 6
et seq.

Capture
of Fort
Henry

Corrupt
Union
officers

Fort
Donelson

1861-2
Nov.-Feb.

Fort
Donelson

As early as November 1861, he had ordered the construction of the two forts. Particular attention had been given to that of Fort Donelson, which of the two was of far greater strength and more advantageously situated. It was a bastioned earth-work, erected on a bluff a hundred feet above the water, between two creeks that emptied into the river. Back of the bluff there were deep ravines worn by brooks at high water; and beyond, the ground descended into bottom-lands covered by water in the wet season. These conditions made a land attack extremely difficult. In front of the fort, half-way down the fall of the bluff, were two water batteries, the lower and larger one containing nine 32-pounder guns and one 10-inch Columbiad; the other, a Columbiad bored and rifled as a 32-pounder, and two 32-pound carronades. Landward, the fort was encircled for two and a half miles by a line of earth-works, the right and left touching the creeks below and above. This was strengthened at the weakest points by trees felled outwardly, so that the tangle of limbs and branches was almost impenetrable for a charging body of troops under fire. In the fort itself were eight heavy guns.

Its
garrison

The garrison consisted of twenty-eight regiments of infantry: thirteen from Tennessee, two from Kentucky, six from Mississippi, one from Texas, two from Alabama, and four from Virginia. Added to these were two independent battalions, a regiment of cavalry, artillerymen for six light batteries and seventeen heavy guns,—in

all above 18,000 men. General Floyd was in nominal command of the fort; but Pillow seems to have had control a portion of the time, and later, at the time of surrender, Buckner.

1862
Feb. 6-12

On the same day that Fort Henry was taken, February 6, Grant telegraphed to General Halleck, "I shall take and destroy Fort Donelson on the 8th and return to Fort Henry." But he had not taken into account the conditions of the country about him. Had the way been clear he could easily have carried out his intention, as neither Floyd's nor Buckner's reinforcements arrived at the fort until the 11th, nor had the rifle-pits on the bluff been completed. There had been heavy rains, the low lands were covered, and for two miles inland from Fort Henry the country was under water. Delays, therefore, were inevitable. February 11 Grant moved most of his troops out on solid ground, some miles from Fort Henry. General Lew Wallace was left in charge of that fort with 2500 men. The Union forces available for the movement were 15,000 men and eight field batteries, organized into two divisions: the first under General McClernand, consisting of three brigades, mostly of Illinois troops; the second commanded by General C. F. Smith, whose four brigades were made up of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, and Missouri troops. McClernand's division took the lead, preceded by the Fourth Illinois cavalry; and came in sight of Donelson about noon of the 12th. Skirmish lines were thrown out, and the rest of the day was spent in feeling through the

Move-
ment
against
Fort
Donelson

Union
forces

1862
Feb.
12-14

woods and ravines and acquiring an idea of the formation of the ground.

Attack
on Fort
Donelson

"Caron-
delet"
bom-
bards it

Grant expected to find Foote's iron-clads waiting for him in the stream; but only the *Carondelet*, Commander Walke, was in sight. The men were wet and hungry, and many had had nothing to eat since morning. They were ready to fight, however, and bivouacked in line of battle. Early the next day, operations were begun by an attack on the Confederate right; but it was soon discovered that the line was too strongly defended, and the forces were withdrawn. Grant expected reinforcements on transports accompanying Commodore Foote's fleet, and besides had sent orders for General Wallace to join him from Fort Henry. Without waiting for Foote, Rear-Admiral Walke, at General Grant's request, opened fire on the fort. All the enemy's available guns were turned upon the gunboat; and after a good deal of wild firing, a solid 128-pound shot struck the corner of her port broadside casemate, passed through it, and wounded a dozen men. The working of the boat was not interfered with, however, and the bombardment was continued until dusk.

Suffer-
ings of
Union
forces

The weather, which in the morning was warm and springlike, turned bitterly cold toward night, and a drizzling storm of snow and sleet set in. Several of the regiments had left their blankets behind; they had no shelter tents, and fires would discover their positions to the enemy. To keep from freezing, they had to sit up all night; and their wet garments were so stiffened from the cold,

when they went into the fight the next morning, that they could march with difficulty. Some of the wounded between the lines were found frozen to death the next day.

1862
Feb. 14

It was a welcome sight to Grant when, early on the morning of the 14th, the fleet of the iron-clads with the expected transports made its appearance steaming up the river. A land attack could not be made with any surety of success without the co-operation of the water forces, and the men were becoming impatient. Commodore Foote, with the *St. Louis* as his flag-ship, led the way, followed by the iron-clads *Louisville*, *Pittsburg*, and *Carondelet*, and the two wooden gunboats, the *Tyler* and *Conestoga*. At three o'clock in the afternoon they took position and opened fire. The river being narrow at the bend where the fort was located, only twelve of the guns of the entire fleet could be brought to bear on the works, while all those of the fortifications and water batteries could be concentrated by the enemy on any one or all the Union ships. Their special target seemed to be the *Carondelet*, which had made the original attack. Her plating was smashed or torn off in half a dozen places, the anchor struck and broken, and the smoke-stacks, flagstaff, and boat davits shot away. Two shots entered the bow ports, killing and wounding several men, and at one time the boat was on fire. She was struck fifty-four times, and her losses were twice as great as those of the rest of the gunboats together.

Union
fleet
appears

Bombard-
ment
under
awkward
con-
ditions

"Caron-
delet"
badly
hurt

1862
Feb. 14

Union
fleet
shattered

With-
draws
from
before
Fort
Donelson

In the midst of the fight a solid shot passed through the pilot-house of the *St. Louis* and carried away the wheel, killing the pilot and severely wounding Commodore Foote. A little later the tiller-ropes of the *Louisville* were disabled, and both boats floated helplessly down-stream, turning about in the current like drifting logs. It was no longer possible to continue the bombardment. The boats drew off, and on the following day withdrew to Cairo to repair damages. The result was a double defeat for the Federals. The day before, their attack upon the intrenchments had been repulsed, and now the power of the fleet on which they had depended had been shattered. The inmates of the fort were jubilant, and cheer after cheer rent the air as the crippled vessels withdrew from the line of fire. Fifty-four, officers and men, had been killed or wounded on the fleet, while the losses of the garrison had been slight.

Floyd
wishes to
break
through
Union
lines

Early on the morning of that day General Floyd had called a council of his brigade and division commanders, and stated it as his belief that the post could not be held with any less force than 50,000 men. He called attention to the fact that the Federals were constantly receiving reinforcements, which might exceed that number, and recommended an immediate attack on their right so as to open a line of retreat to Nashville. The battle with the iron-clads delayed the carrying out of this plan. Another council was held that night, and the same decision was arrived at. It was arranged that Pillow should move with his whole

division at dawn and attack the Federal right, while Buckner was to assail the centre, and in case of success to act as rear-guard in the retreat.

1862
Feb. 15

The plan was at the beginning successfully carried out. The Union troops were nearly taken by surprise, but met the onslaught like veterans. Then began one of the hardest fought battles of the war. Charge after charge was bloodily repulsed, with occasional gain of ground on both sides. The roar of the muskets and batteries never slackened. By ten o'clock the ammunition began to fail, and the brigades of Wallace, Oglesby, and Ransom were forced to retire. An hour later Pillow had the road open for retreat, and the entire Confederate forces could have escaped. But just here Pillow lost his head. He assumed that Grant's forces had been driven from the field and were fleeing in disorder to Fort Henry; and without consulting Floyd, the real commander, sent off a telegram to General Johnston, announcing "on the honor of a soldier" that a great victory had been won.

Union
right
forced
back

At this juncture Grant, who had been in consultation with Foote on the *St. Louis*, arrived upon the scene, and was told of the disaster on the right. "Gentlemen, the position on the right must be retaken," was his response; and with grim determination imprinted on his face, he turned his horse and galloped in that direction. General C. F. Smith, who was in command on the left, was ordered to assault the outworks opposite his position. He chose for this service the 25th and 52d

Grant
orders
position
retaken

1862
Feb. 15

Confed-
erates
driven
into Fort
Donelson

Indiana, the 2d, 7th, and 14th Iowa regiments. Putting his cap on the point of his sword, he called out, "No flinching now, my lads! Here! this is the way! Come on!" The 2d Iowa led, with General Smith in the centre. In the face of a deadly cross-fire the troops pushed forward, sprang over the outer breastworks, and pushed the enemy back to a second line on lower ground. Half a dozen regiments with a battery were sent to dislodge them; but General Smith was reinforced by Cooke's brigade and two 10-pound Parrott guns, and held the position. In this charge four of the regiments lost 61 killed and 321 wounded. The 2d Iowa alone lost 41 killed and 157 wounded.

Following his instructions to General Smith, Grant ordered General Lew Wallace to seize the ridge on the Confederate left, for which McClermand had been battling all day. The order was promptly obeyed. The advance was led by the 8th Missouri and 11th Indiana, under Colonel Morgan L. Smith; followed by the 17th and 49th Illinois and the 20th Ohio, under Colonel Ross of the first-named regiment, together with Craft's brigade. The attack was made with a rush, the hill cleared, and the entire Confederate forces were compelled to retreat to their intrenchments.

Evacua-
tion de-
cided on

That night a long and heated discussion was held at Pillow's headquarters as to what should be done. It was finally decided to evacuate the works immediately, and march out over the road which had been opened in the morning. An order was issued by Pillow to burn the commissary stores

at half-past five the next morning, after the troops had left. Scouts were sent out to see if the way was clear. They soon returned with the information that a strong Federal force was in possession of the ground. Pillow wanted to hold the fort a day longer, and Floyd declared he would die sooner than be surrounded. Buckner, with more sense than either of them, said that further resistance against such odds was shedding blood wantonly; there was no alternative but surrender.¹ Pillow and Floyd declared their determination to leave. Two Confederate steamers were made ready during the night, and before light the next morning Floyd embarked with his brigade, taking Pillow with him, and a few hours later reached Nashville in safety. Forrest, who had asked Pillow for leave to cut his way out, did not have to do so; but collecting his own men, he told them he intended at whatever risk to escape from the fort, and asked them to follow him. Not a man held

1862
Feb. 15

Divided
counsels
in Fort
Donelson

Part
of the
forces
escape

¹General M. F. Force, in his book *From Fort Henry to Corinth*, gives the following account of the conversation: "Buckner said if he were in command, he would surrender and share the fate of the garrison. Floyd inquired of Buckner, 'If the command devolved upon you, would you permit me to take out my brigade?' To which Buckner replied, 'Yes, if you leave before the terms of capitulation are agreed upon.' Forrest asked, 'Gentlemen, have I leave to cut my way out?' Pillow answered, 'Yes, sir, cut your way out'; and asked, 'Is there anything wrong in my leaving?' Floyd replied, 'Every person must judge for himself of that.' Whereupon General Pillow said, 'Then I shall leave this place.' General Floyd turned to General Pillow and said, 'General Pillow, I turn the command over, sir.' General Pillow said, 'I pass it.' General Buckner said, 'And I assume it,' and countermanded the order for the destruction of the commissary and quartermaster's stores, and ordered white flags to be prepared, and a bugler to report to him."

1862
Feb. 16

back. In single file they silently moved out on their horses, the chief at the head; and after wading for half a mile through the backwater on the marshes from two to three feet deep, reached solid land outside the line of Federal pickets.

Buckner
asks
Grant
for terms

General Buckner ordered the remaining troops back to their respective positions, and the next morning sent out a white flag, with a message to General Grant, asking what terms would be granted in case of surrender. To this the following answer was returned:

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY IN THE FIELD.

CAMP NEAR DONELSON, Feb'y 16, 1862.

GEN. S. B. BUCKNER, Confederate Army:

Grant
refuses

Sir—Yours of this date, proposing armistice and appointment of commissioners to settle terms of capitulation, is just received. No terms except an unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT, Brig.-Gen.

Buckner
surren-
ders Fort
Donelson

Buckner had no choice, and submitted as became a soldier. The number of prisoners taken was 13,500. A few hours after the surrender a detachment of 1500 Tennessee troops, ignorant of what had happened, marched into the fort to find themselves in a trap, and were added to the number already captured. Altogether the prisoners numbered about 15,000. Among the spoils were 3000 horses and mules, seven large siege guns, forty-eight field guns, many thousand small arms, and an immense quantity of army stores. On Sunday



CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON.



FORT ON ST. CLOUD HILL, NASHVILLE, TENN.

1862
Feb. 16

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CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON.



FORT ON ST. CLOUD HILL, NASHVILLE, TENN.

morning, February 17, the Union troops made a triumphal entry into the fort, with flags floating, drums beating, and bands playing. The transports were adorned with flags and streamers, and their decks were crowded with watching and cheering men.

1862
Feb.
17-18

The news of the surrender reached Nashville by telegraph on the same morning, while papers were being sold upon the streets announcing a great victory. Just after the beginning of the morning service, word of the disaster was brought into the churches and passed from pew to pew. As soon as it was fairly understood, the congregations poured into the streets and the ministers left their pulpits. Everywhere was the wildest excitement, which was increased when Johnston's army began to cross the river and pass through the city on its retreat toward Murfreesboro. The governor and Legislature fled to Memphis; the trains were crowded with frightened citizens; and wagons loaded with goods and valuables, whose drivers were trying to find a place of security for them, filled the streets.

News of
surren-
der in
Nashville

Legisla-
ture and
others
abandon
it

General Johnston had ordered Floyd and Pillow to remain behind to see to the removal of the Confederate stores and provisions. Monday morning there was a rumor that the Federal gunboats were coming up the river, and Floyd ordered that the stores should be thrown open to the poor instead of burning them. The result was the gathering of an uncontrollable mob, which began a general sack not only of military but of private

Disorder
in the
city

1862
Feb. 18
et seq.

Nash-
ville
occupied

property, and was only kept in control by Forrest's cavalry, which had several times to charge them. Many straggling soldiers and deserters joined with the mob in the wanton destruction of property. Two steamers which were being converted into gunboats were burned, cannon were spiked, and the great bridges over the Cumberland were destroyed.

Andrew
Johnson
military
governor

Three days later a detachment of Buell's army entered Nashville; and before the close of the week, the *Conestoga* arrived with transports bringing several thousand troops, which had formed part of Grant's forces at Fort Donelson. As the governor and heads of departments had fled, the State government was no longer in existence. The exigency was met by the appointment, by President Lincoln, of Andrew Johnson as military governor of Tennessee.

Western
depart-
ments re-
organized

All through the Northern States were joy and jubilation, while the South was correspondingly cast down. Floyd and Pillow were denounced and blamed without stint, and both were relieved from their commands by the government at Richmond. President Lincoln at once appointed Grant major-general. Later, in March, the same rank was conferred upon Buell, Pope, C. F. Smith, McClelland, and Lew Wallace. February 15 Grant was assigned to the command of the military District of Tennessee, and General W. T. Sherman succeeded to the command of the District of Cairo. March 11 Halleck, having telegraphed McClellan, "I must have command of the armies in the

West," was assigned to the Department of the Mississippi.

1862
Feb.

The capture of Donelson was one of the most important events of the war. It was achieved under difficulties that seemed almost insuperable. The Confederates fought bravely, but they fought behind intrenchments, with plenty of ammunition, and were well provisioned and protected. On the other hand, thousands of the Union troops were for two days without food; they were thinly clad and without blankets, and for two nights were unable to sleep on account of the bitter cold. Two or three times when victory seemed certain, their ammunition failed and they were compelled to retreat. But their bravery and dogged determination won at last.

Hard
task at
Donelson

It was evident to Polk that Columbus could not be held much longer; and a few days later he evacuated his works at that point, spiked all the guns he could not take away, burned the buildings, and retreated to Corinth, Mississippi, leaving about 5000 men to defend Island No. 10 and the batteries opposite. A few days later, General Johnston marched his army of 23,000 men from Murfreesboro over the mud roads to join forces with Polk. His arrival swelled the Confederate forces at that point to about 50,000 men. As always with a defeated leader, Johnston was denounced as a coward and a traitor, though he had only done what he was compelled to do, and what any commander of judgment must have done in his place. Appeals were made to President Davis by furious civilians

Polk
evac-
uates Co-
lumbus

A. S.
Johnston
joins him
at
Corinth

And is de-
nounced

1862
Feb.-
March

to displace him.¹ To a committee of Congressmen who visited Richmond for that purpose, Davis replied, "If Sidney Johnston is not a general, I have none."

Kentucky
and inner
Ten-
nessee
in Union
hands

By the retreat of Johnston and Polk, the destruction of the combined forces of Floyd, Pillow, and Buckner, and the breaking up of Humphrey Marshall's forces, Kentucky as well as a large part of Tennessee was lost to the Confederacy, and the way opened for the advance farther South of the armies of the Union.

Memphis
the new
key

After the evacuation of Columbus, and the breaking down of the defenses on the Cumberland and the Tennessee, the Confederate commander recognized the impossibility of forming a new line of defense north of Memphis. The extensive works which were begun by Polk, to defend that city, had not been finished. The decision to fortify Island No. 10, and the fort at New Madrid, was

¹As an example of this feeling, the following letter to President Davis is quoted:

"I have been with and near General Johnston's army ever since he was assigned command; have been his admirer and defender; still admire him as a man, but in my judgment his errors of omission, commission, and delay have been greater than any general who ever preceded him in any country; inexcusably and culpably lost us unnecessarily an army of 12,000 men, the Mississippi valley, comparatively all provision stores, by one dash of the enemy. This is the almost unanimous judgment of officers, soldiers, and citizens. Neither is it mere opinion, but is demonstrable by dates, facts, figures, and disastrous results. He never can reorganize or reinforce his army with any confidence. . . . If your presence is impossible, for God's sake give the immediate command to Beauregard, Bragg, or Breckenridge, or all will be irretrievably lost."—E. M. Bruce, M. C., 9th Ky. Dist., *Official Records*, March 11, 1862.

General Johnston was killed in battle at Corinth just one month after the date of this letter.

largely to give time for their completion. Rapid progress was made in constructing earth-works and throwing up batteries at both places. By the 12th of March, four batteries, almost on the water level, were completed on the island and armed with twenty-four guns. A few days later a fifth battery was added. On the Missouri shore at New Madrid, an earth-work called Fort Thompson, mounting fourteen guns, stood below the town; while another earth-work with seven guns, called Fort Bankhead, had been built just above. Infantry entrenchments connected these works. There was a field battery of six pieces attached to the armament of the upper fort; while on the bluffs at New Madrid, a chain of forts extended for four miles along the shore. Besides these land defenses, there were for river defense eight Confederate gunboats, under the command of Commodore Hollins of the Confederate navy.

The windings, twists, and turns in the Mississippi between Columbus and Memphis can hardly be imagined. Starting at the former point, in the first sixty miles the course of the river describes the following points of compass: southwest, south, northwest, southwest, west, north, west, south, southeast, southwest. Island No. 10 lies midway of the stream at the foot of a long loop, like the letter U, the river running almost due south on the right hand of the loop; then, bending about the island, it flows north ten or twelve miles, where it makes a second bend to the south. At the top of the loop, and on the northern side of the river, was

1862
March

Works at
New
Madrid
and
Island
No. 10

Windings
of the
river

1862

Feb.

Works
at New
Madrid

New Madrid, with its fortifications just outside the town. The peninsula formed inside this loop, running south to the bank opposite the island, is a vast swamp. The peninsula running to the north, formed by the second bend to the south of the river, is formed by what is called Madrid Bend. Its width is about five miles. For miles along the eastern shore below New Madrid heavy batteries were planted. Below these was a small village called Tiptonville, where a brigade of Union troops landed on the day of the evacuation of the island, and cut off the flying regiments.

Pope's
army
moving
on it

On the 28th of February General Pope, with a carefully organized army of 20,000 men, marched upon New Madrid. It comprised five divisions, under the command respectively of General D. S. Stanley, General Schuyler Hamilton, General J. M. Palmer, Colonel J. D. Morgan, and General J. B. Plummer. All these divisions were composed of Western troops. Besides the infantry, there was a cavalry division commanded by General Gordon Granger, comprising the 2d and 3d Michigan cavalry; also an artillery division commanded by Major W. L. Lothrop, comprising the following batteries: 2d Iowa, 3d Michigan, Company F, United States artillery, Houghtaling's Ottawa artillery, the 5th, 6th, and 7th batteries of the 1st Wisconsin artillery, and De Golyer's battery, afterwards Company H of the 1st Michigan artillery. Added to these was a command under Colonel J. W. Bissell, called the Engineers' Regiment of the West, comprising the 15th Wisconsin

and 22d Missouri infantry, the 2d Iowa cavalry, a company of the 4th U. S. cavalry, a company of the 1st U. S. infantry, and a battalion of the 2d Illinois cavalry. Nearly all the commanders were graduates of West Point.

1862
Feb.-
March

General Jeff Thompson, in command at New Madrid, undertook to oppose the advance with a small body of infantry and a battery. The 7th Illinois cavalry charged the detachment, captured the two guns, took several officers and enlisted men prisoners, and drove Thompson, with his command, back to the outer works of New Madrid. Hamilton's division, which was in advance, pushed forward upon the town, chased the pickets into the intrenchments, and drew the enemy's fire. The move was in the character of a reconnaissance, and developed the fact that the works could be carried by assault, but could not be held, as the Confederate gunboats could sweep the whole interior of the fort. It was decided by General Pope to send to Cairo for heavy artillery and settle down to a regular siege.

Recon-
naissance
of New
Madrid

Unten-
able in
face of
gunboats

While this was being done, General Plummer of the Fifth Division was sent, with the 11th Missouri, and 26th and 47th Illinois infantry, the 1st Missouri light artillery, and a company of engineer troops, with two companies of cavalry, to Point Pleasant, about eight miles below the enemy's position. The object was to stop the passage of transport steamers up and down the river. General Plummer on March 5 marched by a circuitous route to within three or four miles

Plummer
moves to
the Cum-
berland
river

1862
March

Works
below
New
Madrid

Siege
guns
placed

New
Madrid
evacu
ated
March 13

In great
haste

of the town. Here the infantry and engineers succeeded in digging a series of rifle-pits, and also excavated places near the shore for the artillery. When this battery was discovered, the gunboats began a furious assault upon it; but the guns were so shielded that they were not reached by the fire. The steamers which had been used for transportation were now no longer able to pass up or down the river. Four heavy siege guns were forwarded to Pope; and on the night of March 12 they were placed in position within half a mile of Fort Thompson. At daylight the guns were in position, and a cannonade was at once begun on the boats and on Fort Thompson.

The fight continued all day. Several of the gunboats were disabled, and the Union lines drew nearer and nearer to the works. At last the Confederate commander, General McCullum, recognizing the danger of capture, evacuated the place in the night, removing his troops to Island No. 10. The next morning the Union troops entered the works. They were found to be of remarkable strength. An immense amount of property was abandoned by the retreating force: thirty-three pieces of cannon, a number of thousand muskets, large quantities of army stores, tents sufficient for 10,000 men, and a large number of horses and mules. As an evidence of the haste in which the evacuation was made, candles were left burning in many of the tents, suppers were left untasted, the men had left behind their knapsacks, and the officers their private baggage.

Hamilton's division was immediately moved into the works. Work was at once begun in placing batteries along the river, the captured siege guns being placed in position in them. When this work was completed, General Pope's line extended seventeen miles along the river, cutting off the enemy alike from retreat, reinforcements, and supplies. Five of the Confederate gunboats made an attack upon one of the batteries on the morning of the 15th. Within two hours one of them was sunk, while the others were so badly damaged that they were obliged to withdraw.

On the same day, Commodore Foote moved his gunboats and mortar-boats to available places in the neighborhood of Island No. 10, and on the following day, five of the gunboats and four of the mortar-boats made a combined attack on the upper batteries of the island.

On March 15 the Union flotilla, consisting of the flag steamer *Benton*, the *Cincinnati*, *St. Louis*, *Mound City*, *Carondelet*, and *Pittsburg*, reached Island No. 10 about nine in the morning. Two days later an attack was made on the upper battery by all the iron-clads and mortar-boats. During the action one of the guns of the *St. Louis* exploded, killing and wounding several men. From March 17 to the 4th of April the bombardment was kept up, but with little effect. The mortar-boats did effective work, however, and were kept in constant action, it having become evident that a reduction of the works could not be effected by the gunboats alone. In the mean

1892

Missis-
sippi
domin-
ated from
New
Madrid

Island
No. 10
attacked

Fleet
arrives
and joins

1862
March-
April

time, General Pope, with his entire command, was on the Missouri side of the river, just below the island, to cut off any chance of escape.

Canal
dug from
New
Madrid to
Island
No. 10

On the 16th of March, General Halleck telegraphed to General Pope to construct a road, if possible, from New Madrid through the swamp, across the peninsula to a point on the river above, as a cut-off for the passage of troops from the fleet, and also to secure a position where batteries could be erected to aid the fleet in the bombardments of the island. Colonel Bissell of the engineer corps was directed to make investigations; and if it were found impossible to construct such a road, to see if it were possible to dig a canal from New Madrid to some point above the island, connecting the two parts of the river at the shortest distance between the bends, and forming a channel through which the transports and light boats could pass. The roadway was found impossible to construct; but it was ascertained that a channel could be cut through the swamp, though under extreme difficulties. Under direction of Colonel Bissell, four small steamers, with the proper tools and implements, were sent for; and men were set at work to cut and dredge a channel, which had to be fifty feet wide and four and a half feet deep. This necessitated the sawing through trunks of large trees four or five feet under the surface of the cold water. Shallow places along the channel had to be excavated. The distance between the two points was twelve miles; but by April 4 a way was opened, and on the

5th steamers and small barges were able to pass through it.

1862
April

It became known to the enemy that this cut-off across the peninsula was being made, but in the mean time the Confederate engineers were not idle. They lined the river shore with powerful batteries, sufficient to prevent the passage of any unarmed steamer. General Pope sent urgent requests to Commodore Foote for one or two gunboats to be sent down the river some dark night, to reduce the works below New Madrid. Foote refused, however, declaring that he was not willing to risk his boats in the passage along the front of miles of heavy guns. Obligated to rely on his own means, Pope planned a number of floating batteries. Each was constructed of three heavy barges, securely lashed together. The middle barge was surrounded by a bulkhead four feet thick of solid timbers; and on it three heavy guns were mounted, protected by traverses of sand-bags. Each of the outside barges had empty water-tight barrels in its bottom; these were covered first with layers of dry cottonwood rails, on the top of which cotton bales were closely packed, so that the shot would have to pass through twenty feet of rails and cotton before reaching the middle one. These barges, each of which contained eighty sharpshooters beside the gunners, were towed by steamers to New Madrid. At that point, they were to be cut loose from the steamers, and allowed to float down-stream to the point where the landing was to be made. When

Con-
federate
batteries
on the
Missis-
sippi

Pope con-
structs
floating
batteries

1862
March-
April

reaching the batteries, they were to drop anchor and open fire. The sending of gunboats was still urged by Pope, and finally Commander Henry Walke volunteered to attempt the voyage with the *Carondelet*.

"Caron-
delet"
runs the
batteries

On the 30th of March Commodore Foote gave him permission to make the experiment. Work was immediately begun to prepare the *Carondelet*. Her deck was covered with heavy planks, and chains were coiled over vulnerable parts of the boat. Barriers of cord-wood were piled about the boilers. Orders were given to sink the boat if it was liable to fall into the enemy's hands. Twenty sharpshooters, from the 42d Illinois, came on board to assist in case of emergency; a coal barge loaded with hay and coal was lashed to the port side to protect the magazine. It was intended to attempt the passage after the moon had gone down. Fortunately, about ten o'clock the sky was hidden by a black cloud, presaging a heavy thunder-storm. The lines were cast off, and all speed was given the vessel. She passed the last point of land without being observed by the enemy. Twice the soot in the smoke-stack blazed up. By the time the *Carondelet* had reached battery No. 2, she was discovered, and the combined fire of batteries 2, 3, and 4 was concentrated upon her. Notwithstanding, she passed through the fiery ordeal without damage, arriving safely at New Madrid about midnight.

"Pitts-
burg"
also

Three days later, the *Pittsburg* made the same trip without injury, through a like thunder-storm.

She was not ready for service, however, and the *Carondelet* attacked the principal batteries at Watson's Landing alone. At noon, signals were made to the land forces at the batteries. Those at Watson's Landing were silenced, and the way was cleared. It was learned from one of the prisoners that the forces were in full retreat to Tiptonville, some miles south. Paine's division, on the transports at the time, was ordered to land and push in pursuit. About nine miles from the landing, General William W. Mackall, in command of the Confederates, was found posted in a strong position, with infantry, artillery, and cavalry. He retreated as soon as the Union troops came in sight, but was closely followed. Meanwhile the skirmishers were gathering in large numbers of prisoners. The next morning General Mackall found himself hemmed in on the south and east by the swamp, and on the north and west by Federal troops. At two o'clock on the morning of the 8th, recognizing the uselessness of further opposition, he surrendered. Three hours later a deputation was sent from the island to Commodore Foote, offering an unconditional surrender of the fort and its garrison; and the Union troops speedily occupied it.

General Pope, in his report giving the result of all the operations, said: "Three generals, 273 field and company officers, 6700 privates, 123 pieces of heavy artillery, 35 pieces of field artillery, all of the very best character and of the latest patterns, 7000 stand of small arms, tents

1862
April 2-8

Watson's
Landing
batteries
abandoned

General
Mackall
captured

Island
No. 10
surrenders

1862
April-
May

for 12,000 men, several wharf-boat loads of provisions, an immense quantity of ammunition of all kinds, many horses and mules, with wagons and harness, etc., are among the spoils."

Prisoners
and
spoils of
Island
No. 10

The prisoners embraced seven regiments and one battalion of infantry, eleven companies of heavy and one of light artillery, two companies of cavalry, the officers and crew of the floating battery, and the laborers and employees. Besides these, there were six steamboats, two of which were sunk; the gunboat *Grampus*, also sunk; and the floating battery of nine guns, which the crew had attempted to scuttle.

Fort
Pillow

The next obstruction to the passage of the Mississippi, below New Madrid, was Fort Pillow, a few miles above Memphis. This work mounted forty heavy guns, and was garrisoned with about 6000 troops. To aid in its defense nine gunboats had been sent from Memphis, and were anchored under its guns. Its attack was planned; and Pope, with his victorious army, reached its vicinity on transports July 13. Four days later, however, orders came from Halleck to withdraw his forces and join the main army, which was marching on Corinth. The expedition by land against Fort Pillow, therefore, was abandoned.

Pope
recalled
from its
attack

Mortar-
boats
harass it

In the early part of May, two or three Federal mortar-boats were towed down the river and moored within reach of the fort, under the protection of a gunboat. No continuous attack was made, the boats only occasionally throwing bombs into the fort, two miles away. The Confederates,

having received reinforcements, planned to capture the mortar-boats. On the 8th of May, three of their vessels made a sudden descent upon the point in the river where they were supposed to be; but they had been withdrawn. Foote had foreseen some such movement, and the boats had orders to keep up up-stream and be ready for any movement that might be required by day or night. But he was suffering from wounds received at Fort Donelson; and on the 9th of May, at his own request, was relieved,—being at once succeeded by Flag Officer Charles H. Davis, under whose command the ensuing movements of the fleet on the river were conducted.

1862
May 8-10

Foote
replaced
by Davis

On the day following, a mortar-boat was towed down the river in the early morning to send the usual number of bombs over into Fort Pillow. The gunboat *Cincinnati* followed for her protection. At half-past six, eight Confederate rams were seen steaming up the river at full speed. They were at once recognized as a part of Commodore Hollins' famous river-defense fleet, on which the Confederate government was placing great dependence. The *Carondelet* made immediate preparations for action, and a general signal was made to the other vessels of the fleet to get under way at once. The *Carondelet* steered for the leading vessel, *General Bragg*, which was far in advance of the others, and which was apparently intending to strike the *Cincinnati*. As the *General Bragg* drew nearer, both the *Carondelet* and *Mound City* fired simultaneously on her with their

Naval
duel

1862
May

Naval
duel
on the
Missis-
sippi

Con-
federates
beaten

Fort
Pillow
evacu-
ated

bow guns, crippling her severely, but not before she had struck the *Cincinnati*, making a great hole in her side. The *Cincinnati* was not so disabled but that she was able to steam up the river; while the *General Bragg*, equally injured, drifted downstream. The *General Price*, which was just behind her consort, also rammed the *Cincinnati*, but backed off badly disabled. The *Cincinnati* was struck for the third time by another ram. The *Carondelet* now rounded to, and fired her bow and starboard broadside guns into the other advancing rams, the *Jeff Thompson*, *Beauregard*, and *General Lovel*. Then she brought her broadside guns to bear on the *Sumter* and *Price*. All this time the *Carondelet* was bearing the brunt of the battle alone, none of the other Federal gunboats having yet appeared on the scene. When they did appear, at last, the whole Confederate fleet was steaming and drifting down the stream in great confusion. Pursuit was made by the flagship *Benton*, but the Confederates were under the protection of Fort Pillow before she reached them. The vessels, with the exception of the *Carondelet*, which remained to watch the enemy, returned to their old anchorage.

On the 25th of May, seven additional Federal rams joined the fleet, and preparations were made for an early attack on the fort; but on the night of June 4 the works were quietly evacuated, the garrison dropping down the river to Memphis, accompanied by the gunboats. On the morning of June 5, possession of the works was taken;



COMMODORE ANDREW H. FOOTE.



REAR ADMIRAL JOHN RODGERS.



COMMODORE GEORGE N. HOLLINS.

when it was found that all the army stores not removable had been destroyed, while the magazines and breastworks had been blown up.

1862

On the next day, the 6th of June, was fought the Battle of Memphis. The Union fleet had followed close upon the retreating forces of the Confederates, whose vessels, in expectation of the attack, had been drawn up in double line of battle opposite the city. A hot fire was opened upon the approaching gunboats. Two of the Federal rams, the *Queen of the West* and the *Monarch*, commanded by the brothers Colonel Charles and Lieutenant-Colonel A. W. Ellet, made a dash for the enemy's fleet, sinking one vessel and disabling another. This onset was followed by an advance of the gunboats, under the lead of Flag Officer Davis, a continuous fire being kept up until the end of the battle. The *Queen of the West*, after her bold attack, was in return rammed by the *Beauregard*, which then, with the *General Price*, made a dash at the *Monarch*. In the excitement which attended the movement, the *Beauregard* missed the *Monarch* and struck her consort instead, tearing off her wheel and cutting her down to the water line. The *Monarch* then rammed the *Beauregard* so that she almost instantly sunk. A few minutes later the *General Lovel* was nearly cut in twain by the *Queen of the West*, and sank so suddenly as to take most of her officers and crew down with her. The *Price*, *Little Rebel*, and Federal *Queen of the West* were run ashore opposite Memphis. The *General Thompson* was run

Union
assails
Confeder-
ate fleet
at
Memphis

Destroys
it

1862
June 6
et seq.

ashore and blown up, the *Sumter* disabled and captured, the *Bragg* run ashore and abandoned; the *Van Dorn* alone escaped down the river.

Memphis
captured

Not a single man was killed in the Union fleet; 100 Confederates were killed and wounded, and 150 captured. Boats were put off from the Union vessels, and many lives were saved. An enormous amount of property was captured. Besides the vessels of the Confederate fleet which were not sunk, six large Mississippi steamers, the property of the Confederate government, were taken. There was also a large quantity of cotton on the steamers and in warehouses, and all the guns, stores, and supplies at the Navy Yard were added. A large steam ram, the *Tennessee*, which was on the stocks, was blown up and set on fire before the surrender of the city. But the most important result was the opening of the Mississippi from Cairo to Memphis, and the undisputed possession of Western Tennessee by the forces of the Union.

"The Battle of Memphis was in many respects," says Colonel Ellet, "one of the most remarkable naval battles on record. For two unarmed, frail wooden river steamboats, with barely men enough on board to handle the machinery and keep the furnace fires burning, to rush to the front between two hostile fleets, and into the enemy's advancing line of eight iron-clads, heavily armed and fully manned steam rams, sinking one, disabling and capturing three, and carrying consternation to the others, was a sight never before witnessed."

CHAPTER LXXXIV.

THE NAVY AND THE BLOCKADE

When the war broke out, there were just ninety vessels in the United States navy. Of these, fifty were sailing vessels of the old wooden type, some of them utterly useless, and all in various stages of repair and unrepair. There were, on paper, forty steam vessels, six of which were unserviceable, and nine laid up in ordinary. Seventeen were in foreign ports. In the Home Squadron there were only twelve vessels; seven being steamers, of which two were at Pensacola, two at New York, and one in the Gulf of Mexico. Of the sailing vessels, the *Saline* and *St. Louis* were at Pensacola, the *Cumberland* and *Macedonian* at Vera Cruz, and the store-ship *Supply* lying at Brooklyn Navy Yard. When the tocsin of war sounded, these constituted the available American navy. There was not a single iron-clad or protected vessel in the fleet; still, it was matched with others no better off. When, months later, the craft abroad were gathered in, the entire naval strength consisted of thirty steamers, large and small; the most important of which were five screw frigates, the *Wabash*, *Minnesota*, *Colorado*, and *Roanoke*, of forty guns each, and the *Niagara* of twenty guns, six sloops of the *Hartford* type,

1861

The navy
at
outset of
war

1861

four large side-wheel steamers, and eight sloops of the *Iroquois* class.

Naval
officers
join
seces-
sionists

Even these were insufficiently manned. Within a month from the attack on Sumter, out of 78 captains on the active list, 12 resigned or were dismissed; of 114 commanders, 39; and of 321 lieutenants, 73. According to the report of the Secretary of War, after the 4th of March and before July 1, 1861, 259 officers of the navy had resigned their commissions or been dismissed from the service. It is a noteworthy fact that not a single sailor or marine is on the records as having deserted the flag. The exigencies of the time demanded the services of every available man. Instead of the 5000 men who made up the personnel of the old navy, ten times that number were imperatively demanded. To meet this demand, officers and seamen were sought in the merchant marine, many of whom made excellent records during the war. Many skilled merchant seamen of other nations helped to swell the number, and after a time there was no lack of recruits.

Recruits,
how
obtained

Their
need

It was not for the blockade alone that men and ships were needed. The seaboard had to be protected, the forts that had been seized had to be recovered, strategic points along the coast had to be secured and held, the enormous demands for the transportation of men and supplies had to be met, and above all the contingency of a foreign war had to be provided against.

The administration took the most direct measures to meet these contingencies. All the

vessels that were laid up in the navy-yards were put in order, with new armament. Orders for building were distributed among the different navy-yards, and every available vessel that could be turned to use either for the blockade or for fighting purposes was purchased. By July 1, twelve large steamers had been bought and nine chartered. Among these were the *Connecticut*, the *Cuyler*, the *De Soto*, and the *Santiago de Cuba*, each of which paid for itself many times over in the prizes they captured. One of the most valuable prizes of the war, the *Circassian*, was captured off the coast of Cuba by a Fulton ferry-boat. Even for fighting purposes these armed ferry-boats, of which there were several in the service, were not to be despised. The number of vessels purchased during the war was 418, of which 313 were steamers. After the war they were resold by the government at less than half their cost.

In February, Congress authorized the building of eight sloops-of-war; and later in the year, of six more. The work on these was distributed among the government yards. In addition to these, the Navy Department, without waiting for the action of Congress, contracted with private builders for the construction of twenty-three gunboats of about 500 tons each, mounting from four to seven guns. The larger part of these were built, launched, and equipped within four months from the laying of the keel, and some of them had even taken part in battle. From their rapidity of construction, they were popularly known as "the

1361

Varied
craft for
new navy

Public
and
private
ship-
yards
used

1861 ninety-day gunboats." More important than any of these, however, were the iron-clads, seventy-seven of which were built during the war; but these came later.

Control
of the
inland
waters

Western
flotilla
organized

Securing
of seven
iron-clad
gunboats

Of equal importance with the navy that guarded the Atlantic coast was that which patrolled the great rivers and inland waters of the seceded States. The absolute necessity of controlling the Mississippi, the main artery of the nation, was apparent from the first. It ran through the heart of the Confederacy, and was of the utmost strategic importance. To gain and hold possession of it, the two sides joined in a death-struggle. As early as May 16, 1861, Commander John Rodgers was intrusted with the duty of organizing an inland navy; or, as it was called, the Western Flotilla. He began with the purchase, at Cincinnati, of three river steamers, the *Tyler*, *Lexington*, and *Conestoga*. These were altered into gunboats by raising around them musket-proof oak bulwarks; and arming them with guns both for shell and solid shot. These worked in conjunction with the army, and in a short time cleared all the Western rivers above Columbus, Kentucky. Early in August the War Department contracted with James B. Eads, of St. Louis, for the construction of seven iron-clad gunboats; the first of which, the *De Kalb*, was launched on the 10th of October. The remaining six, the *Cincinnati*, *Carondelet*, *Louisville*, *Mound City*, *Cairo*, and *Pittsburg*, were ready a few days later. To this fleet was added the *Benton* (the largest and best of the flotilla), the *Essex*, and



TYPES OF WAR VESSELS, 1861-1865.

a number of smaller and partially armored gun-boats. This fleet, when ready for service, was placed in command of Flag-Officer Andrew H. Foote. In addition, thirty-eight mortar-boats were constructed, consisting merely of heavy rafts of timber, each carrying one thirteen-inch mortar.

1861

Foote's
Western
flotilla

The flotilla to a large degree was manned by landsmen. There were a few man-o'-war's men, several hundred river-steamboat men, and a few lake sailors; but a majority of the crews were utterly ignorant of naval matters. In each vessel the commander was the only naval officer, and upon him devolved the whole labor of organizing and drilling this mixed multitude. Besides these boats, there was a special kind of craft, built for river service; of very light draft, and provided with a double bow, to avoid the necessity of turning. The first twelve built were paddle-wheelers of 800 or 900 tons. They proved so effective that twenty-seven larger ones were constructed. These were all unarmored, and carried from seven to ten guns. Later eight iron "double-enders" were built, each carrying ten guns of a heavier calibre than their predecessors. Besides these, there was an immense fleet made up of every conceivable kind of craft,—river steamboats great and small, rams, ironclads, mortar-boats, tugs, converted ferry-boats, fishing vessels, and in short, everything that could float and carry a gun.

Crews,
arma-
ment, etc.A motley
fleet

The necessity of an effective blockade of the Southern ports as an important war measure had been clear to the government from the outset; and

1861

on the 19th of April the President issued a proclamation, which, after setting forth the causes for the step, concluded as follows:

Lincoln's
blockade
procla-
mation

Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, have deemed it advisable to set on foot a blockade of the ports within the States aforesaid, in pursuance of the laws of the United States and of the Law of Nations in such case provided. For this purpose a competent force will be posted so as to prevent entrance and exit of vessels from the ports aforesaid. If, therefore, with a view to violate such blockade, a vessel shall approach or shall attempt to leave any of the said ports, she will be duly warned by the commander of one of the blockading vessels, who will indorse on her register the fact and date of such warning; and if the same vessel shall again attempt to enter or leave the blockaded port, she will be captured and sent to the nearest convenient port for such proceedings against her and her cargo, as prize, as may be deemed advisable.

Foreign
nations
dubious

The condition of our navy, and its inability to cover the ports along 3000 miles of the southern Atlantic coast, were well known abroad. According to the Declaration of Paris, "Blockades, to be binding, must be effective; that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy." Foreign governments were naturally distrustful of the ability of the United States to institute and sustain such a blockade; and as their commercial interests were deeply involved, it was doubtful for some time if it would meet with recognition. Both England and France soon after the proclamation sent vessels to obtain exact information as to the status; but though they found the blockade inefficient at the time, they decided to make no opposition

There are, according to international authorities, two ways of beginning a blockade: the first by a public announcement, coupled with the presence of a force before the blockaded port; the second by stationing the force without an announcement. The first is a blockade by notification; the second is a blockade in fact. As breach of blockade only becomes an offense when accompanied by knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of the blockade, it is a question of some importance when the blockade begins, and how knowledge of it is to be acquired. In a blockade by notification, knowledge is held to have been acquired when sufficient time has elapsed for the notice to have been generally received; and after this time a neutral vessel, by sailing for the blockaded port, has committed an offense, and incurred a penalty. With a blockade that is purely *de facto*, on the other hand, knowledge must be obtained on the station, and neutrals have a right to sail for the port and be warned off on their arrival. Whether a blockade is initiated as a blockade by notification or as a blockade *de facto*, the indispensable condition of its establishment is the presence of a force at the blockaded port. Actual notice of the fact can never preclude the existence of the fact.

There was a vagueness about the wording of the proclamation which later gave rise to much discussion; neutral vessels captured claiming that they had a right to individual notice before seizure, no matter how generally the existence of the

1861

Inter-
national
law of
block-
adesAs to
Lincoln's
procla-
mation

1861 blockade had become known. Had this concession been made, however, as it was in some early instances, there might as well have been no blockade at all.

Ports
built
up by
blockade-
runners

Nassau

Very few of the blockade-runners made the voyage direct from European ports. To insure the maximum amount of profit, the cargo must be as large as possible. The coal for a long voyage would take up a large amount of room which might otherwise be devoted to the cargo. Intermediary ports were therefore almost a necessity; and these were found in Nassau, New Providence, Bermuda, Havana, and Matamoras. Of these, the first offered the best advantages and was the most utilized. It was only 180 miles from the Florida coast, with an intricate channel through which no vessel of any size could pass without a skillful pilot. In the early spring of 1861, Nassau was an insignificant little port largely inhabited by fishermen. In six months it had become a great commercial centre, its harbor filled with blockade-running craft, its wharves piled high with bales of cotton and merchandise. Agencies of the Confederate government were established, as they were also at the other ports, and money was everywhere abundant.

The con-
tinuous
voyage

There is an old principle of the English prize courts known as the "doctrine of continuous voyages," according to which the mere calling at an intermediate port, by a vessel engaged in contraband traffic, does not break the continuity of a voyage or remove the liability of seizure. When

this difficulty became known, shippers sent their cargoes consigned to one of these ports, where they were transferred to other vessels with new bills of lading. Heavy freighters carried the goods to Nassau or Bermuda, where light, swift steamers, with low hulls and twin screws, were employed to make the short run to the blockaded ports. Their methods were for a time successful; but suddenly the courts found that these double voyages came legally under the head of one transaction, and that both ship and cargo were liable to confiscation, provided the ultimate destination of the cargo to a blockaded port was known to the owner. This decision, by the highest courts of the United States, aroused indignation abroad among those who were interested in contraband traffic; but it had an English precedent in the form of a decision by Lord Stowell, that the continuity of a voyage was not broken unless the cargo was really imported into the common stock of the neutral country. The blockade-running capitalists, however, were fertile in devices; and they finally hit upon an ingenious plan which for a few weeks had partial success. Cargoes were shipped to New York by the regular lines of steamers, and re-shipped from that port to Nassau and Bermuda. The owners argued that the United States could not or would not interfere with the trade between its own ports and those of a neutral; but they reckoned from uncertain premises. As soon as this new scheme for overreaching the government was discovered, instructions were sent to all

1861-2

 Breaking
cargo

 Re-
shipping
from
New York

1861-2

collectors of customs to refuse clearances to vessels which, no matter what their ostensible destination, were evidently intended for Southern ports, or would be in danger of seizure by the enemy.

Confeder-
ate and
English
squir-
m-
ing

Baffled for the second time, the Confederate agents at Nassau made a protest against what they styled "unjust discrimination against the trade of the Bahamas." They even succeeded in getting Earl Russell to take up their case and address the government on their behalf. A brief correspondence between the two governments ensued, and the matter was dropped. Every week saw the blockading force strengthened; and after the first year, only the swiftest and boldest craft dared to attempt the breaking of the line. By the close of 1861 the Southern press had ceased to call it "a paper blockade," although it must be confessed that they had adequate cause for so styling it six months before. Some idea of the magnitude of the blockade-running interests may be gathered from the fact that during the war the number of prizes brought in was 1149, of which 210 were steamers. There were also 355 vessels burned, sunk, or driven ashore, of which 85 were steamers; making a total of 1504 vessels, the value of which and their cargoes was over \$31,000,000.

Volume
of
blockade-
running
business

Efficiency
of
blockade

Considered as a war measure, the blockade was one of the most effective of all the agencies employed to bring about a close of the troubles. The States of the South were in a manner isolated, and depended largely upon the sale of cotton and tobacco for both the necessities and luxuries of

life. When the exportation of these was cut off, their government was deprived of its means for carrying on the war; it could not import arms, merchandise, medicines, or provisions, in exchange for its cotton. At the beginning, the South believed that England would not tolerate a prohibition on the exportation of cotton, on account of the injury it would work to her own industries. But England could find no just reason for interference, although the manufacturers of Lancashire were obliged to close their mills, and in two years' time the government was obliged to disburse over ten millions of dollars for the support of operatives thrown out of employment.

1861-2

South
expects
inter-
ference of
England

Which
finds no
pretext

Under instructions from the President, Commodore Prendergast, commanding the Home Squadron in Hampton Roads, established the Atlantic blockade by proclamation on May 1, 1861. It had been decided to place the whole force on the Atlantic coast under one command; and two weeks later, Commodore Silas Stringham was appointed Flag Officer commanding the Atlantic Blockading Squadron, with the *Minnesota* as his flagship. The line of operations of the squadron began originally at Washington, and extended down the Potomac and Chesapeake, and out to sea beyond the capes down to Key West. The three principal ports of blockade were Wilmington, Charleston, and Savannah, and demanded special watching. On the 1st of May the screw frigate *Niagara*, just arrived from Japan, was sent with the *Harriet Lane*, to cruise off

Atlantic
coast
blockade

1861-2
Atlantic
blockad-
ing
squadron
divided

Northern

Southern

Potomac

Charleston; the *Brooklyn* and *Powhatan* moved westward along the Gulf; the *South Carolina* arrived off Pensacola June 4; the *Keystone State* reached Norfolk a few days before; Savannah was blockaded May 28. But there were other and almost innumerable points to be guarded, and the increase of ships and extension of the blockade led later to a division of the squadron. The North Atlantic Squadron, which guarded the coast of Virginia and North Carolina, was placed in the command of Commodore Louis M. Goldsborough, who assumed the duties of his position September 23. He was relieved one year from that time by Acting Rear Admiral Lee. Flag Officer Samuel F. Dupont was appointed to the South Atlantic squadron, with the *Wabash* as his flagship. His line of operations extended from the northern boundary of South Carolina to Cape Florida. Later he was superseded by John A. Dahlgren.

In addition to the two Atlantic squadrons was a small fleet known as the Potomac flotilla, which was organized at the same time as the others, and was under the command of Commander James H. Ward. The duty of the flotilla was the restriction of communication between the two shores, and keeping open the water approaches to the capital. It had the honor of making the first naval attack upon land works during the war. Early in May the seceded State of Virginia began the erection of batteries along the Potomac, and at other places along the Virginia shore. Works were thrown up at Acquia Creek, Mathias Point, and Quantico.

One of the first tasks assigned to the flotilla was the destruction of these works. On the 31st of May the unprotected side-wheel steamer *Freeborn* made an ineffectual attack upon the batteries at Acquia Creek; no damage resulted to either vessel or works. The following day a second attack was made, the *Freeborn* having been joined by the *Pawnee*. Hardly more was accomplished than the day before. A month later an attack was made upon Mathias Point, during which Commander Ward was killed and four men wounded. Commander Thomas T. Craven succeeded Ward, and the flotilla was increased by the addition of several other vessels; but the Confederates were too strongly intrenched, and retained their position until March 1862, when they abandoned their works and removed their guns to the line of the Rappahannock. The flotilla subsequently seconded army operations at various points; but its main services after that time were in the way of policing the river and preventing contraband trade.

Of all the blockaded ports, Wilmington, North Carolina, gave the most trouble and was the most difficult to watch. The town is situated on the Cape Fear River, nearly thirty miles from its mouth. The river is broad and deep, and has two entrances, one at its mouth, the other six miles eastward; but a long strip of sand and shoal, forming what is called Smith's Island, lies between, making the real available distance between the two entrances nearly forty miles. The

1861-2

Potomac
flotilla
bombards
shore
works

Which
are aban-
doned
next
year

Wilmington as
blockade-
running
port

1861-4 channels of both were comparatively safe, and both were guarded by strong works. Near the mouth of the river, and equidistant from the two entrances, was a small village called Smithville. At this point the blockade-runners could watch their opportunity and take what seemed the safer passage. One of the entrances, New Inlet, was commanded by Fort Fisher, the other by Fort Caswell. Both were armed with heavy ordnance, so that the blockading fleet was obliged to keep its distance. Owing to these peculiar conditions, two-thirds of the contraband trade with other countries was carried on through the port of Wilmington. It was only after the fall of Fort Fisher that blockade-running through the New Inlet was stopped. It was at its height in 1864, despite the fact that fifty steamers, some of them the fastest in the service, were guarding the two entrances. Sixty-five steamers were captured or destroyed at this station during the war.

Blockade-running at Wilmington

Advantages and volume

Besides the ports already mentioned on the Southern coast, there were many places where small craft could enter, and which had to be guarded to constitute an efficient blockade. During the three months of June, July, and August, forty-two vessels entered and cleared at Wilmington; while at Charleston from June to December there were one hundred and fifty arrivals and clearances.

Charleston

Early in the war, an attempt was made to close the harbor of Charleston by placing obstructions in the channel. A number of old whale

ships were loaded with stone and sunk on the bar; but the tide soon washed them out to sea, and no further attempt at closing the entrance was made in this channel. The batteries on Morris Island kept the blockading fleet at a distance, so that the blockade was maintained with difficulty. There were, besides, several inlets to the north and south of the main entrance, where light-draught vessels could easily pass through. These were not closed until 1863, when Dupont took command. In the summer and fall of that year the Union land forces, aided by the gunboats, drove the Confederates from Morris Island, and closed the passage in that direction. The blockade-runners were then obliged to have recourse to the Beach channel, which ran past Sullivan's Island and opened into the harbor near Fort Moultrie. The beach was lined with heavy batteries, making the entrance comparatively safe for such vessels as succeeded in slipping through the blockading line. The channel was very narrow, however; and occasionally vessels trying to run in during the night got aground at the entrance, where they were visible in the morning, and the monitors made short work of them.

1861-3

Attempts
to
blockade
Charles-
ton
harbor

After the capture of Fort Pulaski, Savannah was of no further importance as a port of entry. The entrance and channel were stripped of buoys and lights, and the forts made the river impassable in the daytime. Several attempts were made to break the blockade on the South Atlantic coast, but with no other result than disabling one or

Savan-
nah

1863

Attempt
to break
Charles-
ton
blockade

two ships and increasing the stringency of the blockade. The first of these attempts was made January 31, 1863, off Charleston. The fleet was anchored in a semicircle off the harbor, six miles in length. Among the vessels in the line were the *Housatonic*, the only war vessel of any size, the *Mercedita*, the *Keystone State*, the *Memphis*, and the *Augusta*. The *Powhatan* and *Canandaigua*, the largest vessels of the fleet, had been sent to Port Royal for coal and supplies, and happily or unhappily were not present. Early in the morning, before daylight, two ironclad rams, the *Chicora* and the *Palmetto State*, came out of the harbor, and approached the vessels, the forms of which were just discernible through a thick haze. The nearest was the *Mercedita*, whose captain was unaware of the presence of the enemy until a rifle shell struck his vessel, passing through the condenser and steam drum and exploding on the port side, disabling her. Seeing that she was about to be rammed, he surrendered. The two rams now attacked the *Keystone State*. The fight continued for over two hours. The *Keystone State* was badly crippled, and would probably have been destroyed but for the arrival of three small gunboats, whose interference allowed her to drift out of reach. The rams finally retreated, and reached the harbor in safety.

Preme-
ture
procla-
mation

That afternoon a proclamation was issued in Charleston, signed by Beauregard as Commanding General, and Ingraham as Senior Naval Officer, declaring that the blockade was raised, and that

the blockading squadron had been "sunk, dispersed, or driven out of sight." It was stated by the papers that two vessels were sunk, four burnt, and the rest driven away. These statements in exaggerated form were republished abroad, and had considerable effect, notwithstanding five captains of the fleet published a complete refutation of the story, and set forth a plain statement of the facts. The fleet was at once strengthened, and no further trouble from the rams was experienced.

1863

Charles-
ton
blockade
not
broken

In the following June an attempt was made to break the blockade by a bold dash of gunboats from Savannah. In the fall of 1861 an English iron steamer, the *Fingal*, ran the blockade to that port, and was purchased by the Confederate government to be converted into a fighting ship. In making the alterations, she was cut down to two feet above the water when her armament was on board. From the deck rose a casemate like that of the *Merrimac*, with sloping sides, but with a flat roof. Inside there were four Brooke rifles, 6-inch and 7-inch, so mounted that they could be used laterally or fore and aft. Her armor was four inches thick, made of English railroad iron. The deck was of enormous strength, its edges projecting six feet on each side, and protected by a heavy covering of wood and iron. Her bow was arranged for ramming purposes, and over it projected a torpedo spar. Altogether, she was one of the strongest boats afloat. She had been rechristened the *Atlanta*, and was expected to achieve great things.

Attempt
to break
that of
Savan-
nah

By
ironclad
ram

Called
"At-
lanta"

1863
June 17

"At-
lanta"
comes
down
the Sa-
vannah

Word came to Admiral Dupont that she was about to leave Savannah River and enter Warsaw Sound, for the purpose of destroying the gun-boats near the inlets and raising the blockade. He dispatched the powerful single-turreted ironclad *Weehawken*, Captain John Rodgers, and the *Nahant* of the same class, Commander Downes, to watch the river. Just after sunrise on the morning of the 17th of June, the *Atlanta* was espied coming down the river. Behind her were two large steamers crowded with spectators, who had come down to witness the destruction of the Federal fleet. As the vessel came nearer, Captain Rodgers cleared his ship for action and went to meet her.

Duel
with
"Wee-
hawken"

Surren-
ders after
a few
shots

The *Weehawken* was armed with two heavy guns, an 11-inch and a 15-inch. The *Atlanta* fired the first shot, which missed its mark. Rodgers answered with a shot from his 15-inch gun, which penetrated the armor, ripped out the wooden backing, and prostrated forty of the crew, many of whom were wounded by the splinters. The second shot tore off a section of the plating; the third carried off the roof of the pilot-house, wounded the two pilots, and stunned the man at the wheel; the fourth shattered a port shutter, driving the fragments inside and wounding several of the crew. The commander of the *Atlanta* had no disposition to continue the encounter, and surrendered without firing a second shot. The fight had lasted just fifteen minutes, and was won by the *Weehawken* alone, the *Nahant* not having

had the opportunity to fire a gun. The *Atlanta* was not so badly damaged but that she was taken to Port Royal without difficulty.

1861

In the Gulf, the general course of operations was much the same as on the Atlantic coast. Wherever military occupation was possible, it was carried out. In the winter of 1861 Commander Mervine was relieved by Flag Officer McKean, and a division of the Gulf Squadron was made, Farragut being placed in command of the newly created West Gulf Squadron, whose cruising-ground extended from Pensacola to the Rio Grande. The most important points to be guarded on this line of the blockade were Mobile and New Orleans.

Gulf
blockad-
ing
squadron

The former presented few natural difficulties to the blockaders. The channel leading to the harbor is five miles in length, and only half a mile wide at its narrowest point. It lies between two long sand-spits, with a sand-bar crossing its southern extremity. Besides the main entrance, there were two others: one to the west, where the water was so shallow that it could not be utilized; the other to the northeast, which connected with a main channel near Fort Morgan. The water was not deep, but it could be used at high tide by some of the lighter blockade-runners. All these entrances were efficiently guarded, and after the first few months the port was effectually cut off from blockade-running.

Mobile

New Orleans was by far the most important of all the cities of the South. It had an enormous

1861 commerce, and its export trade was one of the most extensive in the world. Even if all the other ports of the South had been closed, that of New Orleans, if left open, could have supplied in a great measure the wants of the Confederacy; hence its closing was a matter of the utmost importance. To understand the peculiar difficulties of the blockade at this point, one needs to refer to the map. There are two large entrances to the Mississippi from the Gulf, called respectively Pass à l'Outre, and Southwest Pass; with several smaller ones of little commercial use. These main passes were about fifteen miles in length, with fourteen to seventeen feet of water at their mouth. Where they diverge from the main stream, the river is wide, with a safe anchorage. Twenty miles north of this point of divergence were the two forts which formed the main defenses of New Orleans. Evidently the most effective way to seal the port would have been to station a fleet at this point, which would close all the outlets at once; but then such a position would expose the fleet to an attack from the Confederate gunboats at New Orleans. The attempt was made, however.

Block-
ading
New
Orleans

Mouths of
the Mis-
sissippi

Point of
vantage
and
danger

In the early part of October, 1861, the squadron moved up Southwest Pass, and took a position at the place indicated. A force was landed, and earth-works were thrown up. The fleet consisted of the *Richmond*, the *Vincennes*, the *Preble*, and the side-wheel steamer *Water Witch*. The *Richmond* was a screw sloop, and carried a battery of

Fleet at
head of
delta



DAVID G. FARRAGUT.



D. D. PORTER.

twenty-two 9-inch guns, one 80-pounder, and one rifled 30-pounder. The *Vincennes* carried four 8-inch shell guns, and fourteen 32-pounders. The *Water Witch* had only a 24-pound howitzer, two 12-pounders, and one Dahlgren 20-pounder. It was known to the commander of the fleet that a naval force, under the command of Commodore George N. Hollins, was being fitted out at New Orleans; that a powerful ram, the *Manassas*, was nearly completed, and a descent on the blockading fleet planned.

With a singular disregard of this danger, however, no special precautions seemed to have been taken to avoid it. About light on the morning of the 12th of October, the *Manassas* was suddenly discovered within a few hundred feet of the *Richmond*, which she struck but failed to inflict any serious damages. The *Richmond* slipped her cable and avoided a second attack. The ram, which had been partially disabled by the collision, at once withdrew up the river. A few minutes later, a number of fire-rafts were discovered floating down-stream, which were intended to drift against the ships and set them on fire. Having no guidance, however, they were carried by the current to the shore, where they burned themselves out. The squadron, fearing that the rafts would be followed by the gunboats, and feeling its inability to cope with a powerful ironclad fleet, left its anchorage and steamed at full speed down the Southwest Pass to the bar. On reaching the mouth of the Pass, both the *Vincennes* and the *Richmond*

1861
Oct.

Union
fleet at
head of
Missis-
sippi
passes

Attacked
by the
"Manas-
sas"

With-
draws

1861

Missis-
sippi
blockade
shifted

grounded. At eight o'clock the Confederate flotilla followed down the Pass and attacked the gunboats. A brisk cannonade was kept up for two hours without result on either side. At half-past nine, Hollins withdrew his fleet, and steamed back up the river. No further attempt was made to hold the head of the Pass, and the blockade was continued by keeping the gunboats at the mouth of each of the passes.

Ship
Island
occupied

About the middle of September the Confederates were driven from Ship Island, and the fort at that place was at once occupied by Union troops. This occupation was a great assistance to the blockading fleet, and served as the depot of the West Gulf Squadron until the evacuation of Pensacola. The policy of Farragut was to convert the blockade of prominent points into military occupation. Posts were established at Sabine Pass, Galveston, Corpus Christi, and other places. Other points were seized at different times and by different expeditions, but difficulties often arose from the lack of troops to garrison places captured by the Union forces.

Expe-
dition
against
Sabine
City

The Sabine River afforded peculiar advantages for the entrance of blockade-runners, and it had been difficult to sustain an adequate blockade. At Sabine City, an active trade had been carried on in the export of cotton and the import of munitions of war. An expedition consisting of three vessels under Acting Master Crocker went up the river and made an attack upon the fort just below Sabine City, and captured it without loss. While

at Sabine City, a blockade-running schooner came in, which Crocker seized, armed, and manned as a cruiser. Pushing farther up the river, he captured a steamer, and fitted her out for service with a rifled 20-pounder and a howitzer. On his return, he found that a detachment of Confederate cavalry, in camp back of Sabine City, had fired upon his boats. Taking a party of 50 men, with a field-piece, he marched to the encampment, drove off the enemy, burned their buildings and tents, and captured their supplies.

1862-3

Crocker
raids
Sabine
River

A little later, an expedition was sent to Galveston under the command of Commander Renshaw. It was quite formidable in men and guns, as it was uncertain what opposition would be met. No fighting took place, however, the Confederates evacuating the fort without firing a shot. A military force, consisting of a detachment of Massachusetts troops under Colonel Burrell, took possession. Renshaw's fleet remained at Galveston, making occasional excursions, capturing and destroying a number of blockade-runners.

Galves-
ton
captured

Just after Christmas, the commanders at Galveston were warned that an attack would be made by a Confederate squadron on the last day of the year. Promptly on the date, a little after midnight on the morning of the 1st of January, two large river steamers, the *Bayou City* and the *Neptune*, appeared coming down the river. Both were barricaded with cotton bales, the first armed with a rifled 32-pounder, the second with two

Con-
federates
attempt
recap-
ture

1863
Jan. 1

Confed-
erates
attack
block-
ading
fleet at
Gal-
veston

small guns. Each carried 200 men besides the crew. The *Bayou City* opened fire, but her gun burst at the third discharge. The *Harriet Lane*, which had been the special object of attack, fired her bow gun at the *Bayou City* and attempted to ram her; but instead of striking her amidships as she had intended, only sheered against her wheel-guard, which was carried away. The *Neptune* steamed at the *Harriet Lane*, with the intention of ramming her in return, but met with an obstruction which tore a hole in her side, and she sank in a few minutes. The *Bayou City* now opened a sharp musketry fire on the *Harriet Lane*, mortally wounding Captain Wainwright and Lieutenant Lea, and driving the men from the guns. A few minutes later she surrendered. The Confederates then poured upon her deck, and turned her guns upon the other vessels of the fleet.

Which is
badly
damaged

Meantime Renshaw's boat, the *Westfield*, had run aground three miles away, and was helpless: while all this was taking place, a land force was making an attack upon the fort. The *Owasco* and two small boats were assisting in repelling this force and keeping it from capturing the fort. The *Clifton* was making desperate attempts to get the *Westfield* afloat, and could not go to the rescue of the *Harriet Lane* until it was too late. The Confederate commander now sent a flag of truce to Renshaw to demand the surrender of the vessel. This was refused. It was Renshaw's intention to take to his boats and blow up the *Westfield*; but

from some cause or other a premature explosion took place, and Renshaw with several of his officers and crew were killed. The vessels, with the exception of the *Harriet Lane*, escaped from the harbor and steamed off at once to Southwest Pass.

1863
Jan. 1-21

As soon as the news reached Admiral Farragut, he dispatched the *Brookline*, the *Hatteras*, and several gunboats, to resume the blockade. They reached there just in time to find the commerce-destroyer *Alabama* leaving the port. The *Hatteras*, the fastest vessel in the fleet, was dispatched in pursuit. Twenty-five miles from Galveston an encounter took place, and the *Hatteras* was sunk. A proclamation was issued by the Confederate General Magruder a week later, couched in the same terms as that of Beauregard at Charleston, declaring that the blockade of Galveston had been raised, and inviting neutrals to resume commercial intercourse until an actual blockade had been re-established "with the usual notice demanded by the law of nations." It came a little late, however, as Commander Bell of the *Brookline* issued a counter-proclamation of the same date, giving notice that an actual blockade was in existence. On the 21st of January, two Confederate steamers attacked the *Morning Light* and *Velocity*, two sailing vessels, blockading the Sabine Pass. Both were captured, and the *Morning Light* was burned.

Gal-
veston
blockade
resumed

Attack
on Sabine
River
fleet

Unquestionably there were strong temptations to enter the blockade-running business by foreign

1861-5
Foreign
blockade-
running

Confed-
erate
vessels
in it

The
"R. E.
Lee"

merchants and business men, who were under no obligations to this government, and could see nothing dishonorable in turning a penny that way as in any other line of trade. Cotton could be bought in the Southern ports at fourpence a pound, and sold in Liverpool at two shillings. Merchants of high standing in London and Birmingham and Liverpool eagerly invested their capital in these adventures, and companies were formed to carry on operations on a large scale. Many officers of high rank in the English navy, on leave of absence, entered under assumed names the employ of these owners of vessels, and made fortunes. The Confederate government had several vessels engaged in running the blockade. One of the most successful of these was the Clyde-built side-wheel steamer *R. E. Lee*, commanded by a former United States naval officer, Captain Wilkinson. Between December 1861 and November 1862, ten months, she ran the blockade twenty-one times, and carried abroad 6000 bales of cotton. This was landed at Nassau, where it was intrusted to a mercantile firm, and shipped to England in neutral vessels.

Great
profits

Large profits were made at both ends of the trip. The imports sometimes brought 1000 per cent. profit. The export cargo was always cotton; and long narrow blockade-runners would carry from 800 to 1200 bales of five to six hundred pounds each. A clear profit of \$150,000 was no uncommon result; and even as net for three voyages was splendid. It was a common practice,

when a blockade-runner was hard pressed in a chase, for the captain to run her ashore, and trust to chance for saving some of his cargo. These vessels never went armed and never showed fight. In one case, however, the escaping vessel turned upon her pursuer. In November 1863 the *Nippon*, Captain Breck, in cruising off Wilmington, got sight of a side-wheel steamer stealing along toward the entrance of the river. He laid his course to intercept her; when the steamer, the *Ella and Emma*, finding escape impossible, turned and came on at full speed, planning to run the *Nippon* down and escape up the river. Breck at once divined her intention, and placing his boarders on the bow, waited for the attack. The vessel struck him a blow that carried away his bowsprit. In a moment his boarders were over the rail and on her deck. No further opposition was made, and she was declared a prize. She had on board 300 cases of Austrian rifles, and a large amount of valuable merchandise, netting at the prize sale \$180,000. The *Ella and Emma* was taken into service, and her name changed to the *Malvern*; the next year she served as the flag-ship of Admiral David D. Porter.

1861-5

"Ella and
Emma"
captured

Becomes
Porter's
"Mal-
vern"

Blockade-running was not attended with much personal danger, and the vessels ran through the fleet with little fear of harm. As the attempts were almost always made at night and under the most favorable circumstances, the swift silent gray steamers were able, eight times out of ten, at most ports to slip through the lines undetected; and if

A safe
business

1861 detected, there was not one chance in a hundred that a shot fired would strike them. Few adventures with as much dash and excitement demanded as little bravery.

Need of
harbors

It was early perceived by the Navy Department that the effective maintenance of the blockade required the possession of one or more good harbors on the blockaded coast. Coaling at sea was attended with much risk and delay, and the voyage around Cape Hatteras to the nearest coaling station at Norfolk was long and hazardous. The stoppage of blockade-running could be secured with comparative ease and certainty, by vessels stationed within the bars or sandy islands which abounded along the south Atlantic shores; but as long as those shores were held by the Confederates, the Federal ships could not approach them, but were compelled to keep a position some miles out, exposed to the risks of the weather and unable to keep the closest watch for elusive blockade-runners. The occupation of a Southern port was also desirable for military purposes, as a base of supplies from which the heart of the Confederacy might be penetrated; and finally, such a capture was likely to create a favorable effect on skeptical and unsympathetic European governments.

Effect in
Europe

Early in August, 1861, Major-General Butler was relieved by Major-General John E. Wool from the command of Fortress Monroe, but was left by Wool in command of all the volunteer troops in the vicinity. Butler, whose energetic character demanded constant activity, went to Washington

to lay before the War Department a plan for the capture of Hatteras Inlet, the first of the entrances south of Cape Hatteras which penetrate the narrow and sandy strip of land which divides the waters of Albemarle Sound from the Atlantic. The inlet, which lies about thirteen miles south of the cape bearing the same name, was at this time much used by blockade-runners as a convenient means of access to the ports of Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds, as well as for a harbor of refuge by Confederate privateers. Two forts, Hatteras and Clark, defended the entrance. The former, much the more important of the two, mounted ten guns, and was excellently situated on a narrow spit of land almost impossible of approach from the shore. Fort Clark, a four-sided redoubt, carried five guns and two 6-pounder rifles. Much of this information was given to Butler by Commodore Silas H. Stringham, then in command of the Union naval forces at Fortress Monroe, who had received it in turn from an escaped Union prisoner.

Butler succeeded in impressing the authorities with a favorable view of his proposition. An expedition was ordered to put it into execution; Commodore Stringham being placed in command of the naval contingent, while Butler himself was given the military command, for which he had volunteered.

Sailing from Hampton Roads at 11 A. M., August 26, 1861, the expedition arrived off the Inlet at five o'clock in the afternoon of the same day. The attack was begun the morning of the 28th by the

1861
Aug.

The inlet
a refuge
for
blockade
runners

Butler in
command

1861
Forts
Hatteras
and
Clark
taken

Wabash and sailing frigate *Cumberland*, which had joined from her cruising-ground off the coast. After two days' bombardment the forts surrendered, giving up 715 officers and men, 1000 stands of arms, 31 pieces of artillery, 5 stands of colors, and 75 kegs of powder; also a brig laden with cotton and a sloop with provisions, which lay in the harbor. They had lost 12 or 15 killed and 35 wounded (this according to Butler's report), while of the Union forces not a man had been hurt.

The original intention had been to destroy the fortifications and choke up the shallow channel; but through the representations of Butler, who went to Washington for the purpose, the War Department was induced to retain them and leave there a permanent garrison.

Expedi-
tion to
Port
Royal

In the summer of 1861, the Navy Department had called together an advisory board composed of several officers of the army and navy, a plan proposed by Professor Bache of the Coast Survey. As a result of their discussions, the capture of a harbor on the enemy's Atlantic coast had been determined upon; and one of their number, Captain Samuel F. Dupont, was commissioned to organize and command the necessary naval force. He was created a flag officer, as commanding officers of squadrons were then designated (the highest regular naval rank being that of captain), and was assigned the steam screw frigate *Wabash* as flag-ship. To act in conjunction with Dupont, a military expedition of 12,000 men was to be organized under the command of Brigadier-General Thomas W. Sherman.

Sherman rendezvoused in Hampton Roads. The fleet was of a rather heterogeneous description, as it had been necessary to secure anything and everything available in the way of ships. Dupont had besides his flag-ship four new gunboats and a number of converted merchant vessels, some of which were none too seaworthy. Sherman's troops and supplies were carried in some thirty transports. The expedition sailed on the 29th of October, its destination known only to the two officers in command. The commanding officers of the several ships had received sealed orders, to be opened only in event of separation. Notwithstanding these precautions, the Confederate government had learned through secret channels that Port Royal was to be the object of attack, and had sent warning telegrams to the governor of South Carolina and to the officers in command at the threatened point.

1861
Oct.

Port
Royal
warned

Port Royal harbor is the best on the Atlantic coast south of Cape Hatteras, and one of the finest in the world. It is formed by the confluence of the Broad and Beaufort Rivers, on the latter of which lies the town of that name. Two forts defended the entrance. On Hilton Head to the westward was Fort Walker, and on Bay Point to the eastward Fort Beauregard, mounting 20 and 19 guns respectively. The distance between these forts, in an air line, was about two and a half miles. Against the 39 guns of the forts, the Federal fleet had 161 guns which were of a greater average calibre and range. Brigadier-General Thomas F. Drayton, in command of the Confederates, had

Defenses
of the
harbor

1861
Nov. 4-7

some 2400 men, of whom three-fourths were on Hilton Head. In addition to these land forces, the Confederates had a tiny fleet of three river gunboats under the command of Commodore Josiah Tatnall, formerly a regular naval officer of the United States. These boats, however, were entirely incapable of coping with the heavy armed ships of the expedition, and at no time did they succeed even in annoying the Federals.

Port
Royal
taken

The Port Royal bar stretches in a broad arc across the entrance, some twelve miles from the shore. The channel was soon "sounded out" by the lighter draft ships; and on the following day the entire fleet passed in across the bar, and anchored some five miles from the forts. Tatnall's little flotilla having ventured within range, the Federal gunboats gave chase and approached near enough to draw the fire of the forts, but received no injury. At 9:26 the first gun was fired, and at two o'clock the flag was lowered.

In October, 1861, General Burnside formulated a plan for the seizure of several important points on the Atlantic coast, Roanoke Island among them. It was to organize a division of from 12,000 to 15,000 men; to fit a fleet large enough to transport the division, its armament, and supplies, rapidly from point to point along the coast; with a view to establishing lodgments, landing troops, and penetrating into the interior, thereby threatening the lines of transportation in the rear of the army then concentrating in Virginia, and holding possession of the inland waters on the Atlantic coast.

On the 23d of October, General Burnside established his headquarters at Annapolis. Considerable difficulty was experienced in procuring vessels of a light draft; but before the middle of December, transportation and armament had been secured of sufficient capacity to transport 15,000 troops with baggage, camp equipage, rations, etc. The objective point of the expedition was Hatteras Inlet, with a view to operations in the inland waters of North Carolina. The troops were embarked on the 7th of January, and on the morning of the 9th left Annapolis Harbor for Fort Monroe. Except General Burnside, his staff officers and brigade commanders, not a man in the fleet knew the final destination of the expedition.

On the night of the 11th the fleet, under the command of Flag Officer Goldsborough, got under way, and on the morning of the 13th reached Hatteras Inlet in safety.

After the capture of Hatteras Inlet and the opening of Pamlico Sound, the Confederates retired to Roanoke Island, which, lying between Pamlico Sound and Albemarle Sound, commanded the passage to the latter. On the east side of the island the channel is shallow, and navigable only by light-draft boats. The western channel, known as Croatan Sound, was defended by three strong earthworks on the island. Its defenses had been intrusted to General Henry A. Wise of Virginia, who says in a report that the island was "the key of all the rear defenses of Norfolk. It unlocked two sounds, eight rivers, four canals, two

1861-2

Burnside
plans to
take
Roanoke
Island

The
key to
Norfolk

1862

Feb.

railroads, and guarded more than four-fifths of the supplies of Norfolk. The seizure of it endangers the existence of the Confederate army there, threatens the navy-yard, interrupts the communications between Norfolk and Richmond, and intervenes between the North and the South. It lodges an enemy in a safe harbor from the storms of Hatteras, gives him a rendezvous and a large, rich range of supplies. It commands the seaboard from Oregon Inlet to Cape Henry."

The
advance
on New-
berne

On the morning of the 7th of February the Federal gunboats passed inside Roanoke Sound, and discovered the Confederate gunboats close in shore under the batteries of the island. At half-past eleven the attack was opened. At one o'clock the Confederate gunboats retired up the sound, still continuing fire. At ten o'clock the entire force of nearly 12,000 men was safely landed, and began the advance on New Berne. At daylight the next morning the first of the forts, Dixie, was reached. It was found to be deserted, and the national flag was hoisted over it. Fire was then opened on Fort Ellis, and a magazine was blown up. Fort Thompson, a strong earthwork, opened fire on the vessels; but the garrison, evidently feeling itself incompetent to cope with the attacking force, retreated. Fort Lane, the next above, was deserted, without a gun being fired. The gunboats then passed up Neuse River, where they took three prizes. At noon New Berne was reached, and at sunset the nine forts, all well-constructed earthworks, were occupied by Union troops.



GENERAL A. E. BURNSIDE.



REAR ADMIRAL
L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH.



CAPTURE OF ROANOKE ISLAND.

While the navy had been thus occupied, the army had completed a very large intrenchment camp at Hilton Head. It had besides occupied Beaufort and established a post on Tybee Island. By this time the enemy had recovered from their late defeat, and now formed a plan of making a sudden attack, and capturing the whole or a part of the forces at Beaufort and Port Royal. General Sherman, who had become apprised of this intended movement, wrote to Flag Officer Dupont and requested a naval force to support the army in a counter attack. The request was granted, and Commodore Rodgers was put in command.

1862

An
attempt

To retake

The movement was carried out on the morning of the first of January, 1862. No opposition was met on arrival at Port Royal Ferry; the works were found deserted, all the guns having been carried off save one. Two or three other fortified places were visited, but all were found empty. On the return at Port Royal Ferry, a detachment of the enemy was seen at a distance, and shelled by the *Seneca*. The result of the action was abandonment of any future attempt on the part of the enemy to plant batteries near these waters, or to make preparations with the view of landing troops on Port Royal Island.

Port
Royal

Fails

An attack upon Fernandina, Florida, had long been contemplated. The works there were strongly fortified, and a resort to strategy was had, to weaken the garrison and reduce its artillery strength. To secure that end it was determined to threaten Savannah, it being believed that

1862
March

Alarm
at Savan-
nah

a movement in that direction would cause heavy reinforcements to be sent from Fernandina. The ruse was successful. Savannah was thrown into a state of great alarm. Troops were brought from other places, the works at St. Simons and Jekyll Island were stripped of their guns to be sent to Savannah, and those at Fernandina were in process of removal when the expedition reached that spot.

Fort
Marion
taken

On the 8th of March the *Wabash* with a number of gunboats anchored off St. Augustine. A boat was sent ashore with a flag of truce. As it approached, a white flag was raised on Fort Marion. At the wharf Commander Rodgers was met by the mayor and conducted to the town hall, where the municipal authorities had come together. Commander Rodgers said to them that his visit was for the purpose of restoring the authority of the United States; that he had deemed it better to come in an unarmed boat to inform them of the fact, than to send an armed force on shore to occupy the town. He assured them that no harsh treatment was intended, and that the persons and property of all citizens who submitted to the lawful authority of the United States would be carefully respected. He also assured them that so long as they acted in good faith, the conduct of their municipal affairs would be left in their own hands. In answer, the mayor and council declared their intention to respect the authority of the United States, and ordered the national flag hoisted over the fort.

The expedition proved eminently successful; and by the end of the year, the Federals had obtained possession of the entire coast and its defenses from North Edisto Bay to Fernandina, almost without firing a shot. General Sherman captured fifty-two guns in all, the batteries of the surrounding region being abandoned at once. As for the naval objects of the expedition, their effect was soon felt in the increased closeness of the blockade and the movements of the vessels, which were thenceforth able to coal and refit in these various harbors.

1862

Blockade
extended

Operations along the Florida coast led to the abandonment of the entire coast-line defense by batteries, except the defenses of Charlestown and Savannah. The gunboats patrolled the navigable waters of the St. John's, entirely preventing the Confederates getting arms through the small inlets of Florida, to which they had been compelled to resort through the blockade. After the operations on the coast of Florida were fully completed, the fleet returned to Port Royal.

To
Florida
coast

During the absence of the flag officer, the Federal garrison had planted batteries of rifled guns and heavy columbiads on the sand hills of Tybee Island for the purpose of attacking Fort Pulaski, situated on Cockspur Island at the mouth of the Savannah River. This was considered one of the strongest defenses on the Atlantic coast. It was built of brick with five faces, casemated on all sides; the walls, seven and a half feet thick, rising 25 feet above high water. It mounted one tier of guns in

Fort
Pulaski
invested

1861 casemates and one en barbette. The ground it
occupied was of a marshy formation, the nearest
approach to it on firm ground being nearly two
Sieve miles distant. Owing to its situation, it was be-
opera- lieved that any successful siege operations against
tions it would be absolutely impracticable. General Tot-
difficult ten, chief engineer of the United States Army,
declared that the works could not be reduced in
a month's firing with any number of guns of
manageable calibres.

Attack On the 29th of November General Q. A. Gill-
from more, chief engineer of the expeditionary corps,
Tybee was directed to make an examination of Tybee
Island and Fort Pulaski and report on the best
Island method of reducing the latter. General Gillmore
reported that he believed the reduction of the work
practicable with batteries of mortar and rifle guns
established on Tybee Island; recommending the
occupation of the island, with suggestions concern-
ing the disposition of the batteries and the method
of their construction. His project was approved;
and in consequence, a force consisting of the 46th
New York, the 7th Connecticut, two companies
of the New York volunteer engineers, and two
companies of the 3d Rhode Island artillery, under
the general command of Colonel Terry of the 7th
Connecticut, took possession of the island. Eleven
batteries were constructed, at distances from the
fort varying from 1650 to 3400 yards. The con-
struction of these batteries, as well as the trans-
portation of the guns, was done at night and with
the greatest caution, the men speaking only in

whispers, and being directed entirely by the sound of a whistle. The five batteries nearest the fort were screened from view by the bushes and brushwood in front. On the 10th of April, everything being in readiness, the fort was summoned to surrender. Its commander refused. The first shell was fired at a quarter past eight o'clock A. M., from Battery Halleck, and by half-past nine all the batteries were hard at work, the mortars firing at 15-minute intervals and the guns from two to three times as rapidly. After two days' bombardment the Confederate colors were lowered and a white flag run up. The articles of surrender were signed that afternoon, and the fort was at once occupied by the Union troops.

1862
April

Union
troops
occupy
Fort
Pulaski

As soon as the news reached Savannah the city was in the wildest consternation. Many closed their houses and sent their families and portable property into the interior. No attempt to press the advantage was made, however, and the city soon resumed its wonted aspect. There had been no interest on the part of the Federal commander to make an attack on Savannah. His purpose was to close the river to blockaders. This was now accomplished, and the naval force which had been employed there was hereafter free for service elsewhere.

Port of
Savan-
nah
closed

"The most important event of the War of the Rebellion," says Admiral David D. Porter, "with the exception of the fall of Richmond, was the capture of New Orleans, and the forts Jackson and St. Philip guarding the approach to that city.

1862
Import-
ance of
New
Orleans

New Orleans was the largest southern city, and contained all the resources of modern warfare, having great work-shops where machinery of the most powerful kind could be built, and having artisans capable of building ships in wood or iron, casting heavy guns or making small-arms. The people of the city were in no way behind the most zealous secessors in energy of purpose and in hostilities to the government of the United States. The Mississippi is thus seen to have been the backbone of the rebellion, which it should have been the first duty of the Federal government to break. At the very outset of the war, it should have been attacked at both ends at the same time, before the Confederates had time to fortify its banks or to turn the guns in the government forts against the Union forces. A dozen improvised gunboats would have held the entire length of the river if they had been sent there in time. The efficient fleet with which Dupont, in November, 1861, attacked and captured the works at Port Royal, could also have captured New Orleans. Any three vessels could have passed Forts Jackson and St. Philip a month after the commencement of the war, and could have gone on to Cairo; but the Federal government neglected to approach the mouth of the Mississippi. The Confederates made good use of this delay. No hostilities had commenced except a blockade. The Confederates made good use of this delay, putting forth all their resources, and fortifying not only the approaches to New Orleans, but both banks of the river as far north as Memphis."

Inex-
cusable
delay

Strongly
fortified

When the blockade of the Mississippi was established in the spring of 1861, Admiral Porter was sent with the *Powhatan* to watch the Southwest Pass. While there, he made use of every opportunity to gain a knowledge of the defenses of the river. At that time there was no vessel of importance on the Mississippi below New Orleans, with the exception of the ram *Manassas*, which was then unfinished and which when in commission had only a single gun. Early in November, 1861, Admiral Porter was recalled to New York with his vessel, and ordered to report to the Navy Department at Washington. He had already evolved a plan for the capture of New Orleans, which he laid before the Secretary of the Navy and the President.

1861

Porter's
plan
presented

At that time General McClellan had just assumed command of the armies of the United States, and the plan was submitted to him. A conference was held, at which the President, General McClellan, Secretary Welles, Assistant Secretary G. V. Fox, and Admiral Porter were present. The plan met with unanimous approval. It was as follows: A naval expedition was to be fitted out with a powerful mortar flotilla, and with steam transports for carrying supplies. Twenty thousand troops were to form the military part of the expedition; a portion being for the purpose of occupying New Orleans after its capture, and a portion to aid in the attack upon Vicksburg, while a simultaneous movement was to be made upon Vicksburg by the ironclads on the upper Mississippi.

And is
generally
approved

1862

Instruc-
tions to
the com-
mandersTo take
New
Orleans

Work was immediately begun to hasten the expedition. General B. F. Butler of Massachusetts was selected for the military command, with Captain David Farragut as commander of the whole expedition. His most important instructions were, "There will be attached to your squadron a fleet of bomb vessels, and armed steamers enough to manage them; all in command of Commander D. D. Porter, who will be directed to report to you. As fast as these vessels are got ready, they will be sent to Key West, and the commanding officers will be permitted to organize and practice with them at that port. When these formidable mortars arrive, and you are ready, you will collect such vessels as can be spared from the blockade and proceed up the Mississippi River, and reduce the defenses which guard the approaches to New Orleans; when you will appear off that city and take possession of it under the guns of the squadron, and hoist the American flag, therein keeping possession until troops can be sent to you. If the Mississippi expedition from Cairo shall not have descended the river, you will take advantage of the panic to push a strong force up the river to take all their defenses in the rear."

By the middle of March, 1862, the gunboats and the mortar flotilla had reported at the entrance of Southwest Pass. The only ships that were unable to cross the bar with ease were the *Hartford*, *Brooklyn*, *Pensacola*, and *Mississippi*. It was with great difficulty that the two latter succeeded in crossing at all, owing to the great obstructions.

A reconnaissance was made up the river by Captain Bell, who reported that the obstructions in the river were of a formidable character. The hulks of eight large ships were moored in line across the river, with heavy chains extending from one to the other. Besides these there were heavy rafts of logs, so that the passage of the river below the forts was completely closed. At Plaquemine Bend, twenty miles north of the head of the pass and ninety miles below New Orleans, the river makes a sharp bend to the northeast for nearly two miles. At this bend two strong forts were constructed: one on the left or north bank of the stream, called Fort St. Philip; the other on the right bank and several hundred yards lower down, called Fort Jackson. Fort St. Philip was a formidable structure of brick and earth, mounting 42 guns in all, commanding the channel by which the ships must come, as well as the stream in front. Fort Jackson, on the other side of the bend, was a casemated work built of brick. Each fort was garrisoned by something less than 1000 men. In addition to the fort defenses, there were twelve vessels called the River Defense Flotilla, under the control of Commander John K. Mitchell. The most important of these was the ironclad *Louisiana*, Commander Charles F. MacIntosh, formerly of the United States Navy; the *McRae*, a sea-going steamer mounting six 32-pounders and one 9-inch shell gun; the *Jackson*, mounting two 32-pounders; the ironclad ram *Manassas*, mounting one 32-pounder, and two launches mounting each

1862

The
river ob-
structedFormida-
ble forts
guard the
banksRiver
fleet

1862
April

Other
craft and
fire rafts

one howitzer. There were also two steamers with cotton barricades to protect the machinery and boilers, the *Governor Moore* and *General Quitman*. The *Louisiana* mounted sixteen heavy guns and carried a crew of 200 men. She was shot-proof, and fitted with a gallery for sharpshooters. At the time of the attack her machinery was not in order, and she was moored to the river bank, where she could only use one broadside and three of her bow guns. Besides the Defense Flotilla there were six converted tow-boats under the command of an officer named Stephenson, who refused to obey the orders of Mitchell and did little in the way of defense. In addition to the fleet, a number of flatboats filled with pine knots were used as fire rafts.

Attack
begun

When the preparations were fully completed, the Union fleet moved up the river, and anchored on the 16th just below the intended position of the mortar-boats on the west bank of the stream. On the 18th the mortar-boats were anchored in a line under cover of the woods on the right bank. The bombardment opened on the morning of the 18th of April, each mortar vessel having orders to fire once in ten minutes. At five o'clock Fort Jackson was on fire. The bombardment was kept up for six days and nights, during which 13,500 shells were thrown. The forts answered with vigor, disabling many of the mortar-boats, and sending down the river fire rafts intended to destroy some of the vessels of the fleet. Most of them drifted on the banks of the river, where they burned harmlessly.

After the first day's bombardment Fort Jackson could do little in the way of defense. The woodwork of the citadel had been destroyed by the fire; and the crumbling walls, knocked about the fort by the bursting of shells, drove the men from their guns. Magazines were inaccessible. One shell burst near the magazine door, opening the earth and burying the sentinel and another man five feet deep in the same grave. The barricades and interior of the fort were completely honey-combed. On the morning of the 24th, when the fleet burst through the obstruction, the precision with which the shells were hurled upon the fort made it impossible to serve the guns with any effect.

Farragut, impatient at the delay in taking the forts, determined to run by them. A council was held, at which Porter insisted that the forts be taken and garrisoned before the attack was made on New Orleans; but Farragut had made up his mind. He had become convinced that nothing more could be accomplished by the mortars. Porter believed that if a passage should be attempted, the mortar-boats should be towed by the ships; a suggestion which Farragut promptly put aside. He was confident that he could destroy the enemy's fleet; and that done, he would either push on to New Orleans, pass the batteries above the forts at Chalmette, or cover with his guns the landing of Butler's army through the bayou in the rear of the forts. At heart he was determined to push on to New Orleans without waiting, and demand the surrender of the city.

1862

Fort
Jackson
silencedPlans to
run the
batteries

1862
April

Prepara-
tions for
action

The order
of battle

On the 20th Farragut issued a general order, in which he announced his determination to run past the forts. The time fixed upon for the fleet to start was two o'clock on the morning of the 24th. Orders had been previously given to the different commanders to prepare their ships for action. Chain cables were hung along the sides to protect the engines and boilers, and around the latter were packed bags of sand; while the insides of the bulwarks were packed with cotton and hammocks, to keep the splinters from flying in case they should be hit by shot. Captain Farragut's first plan was to lead the fleet with the *Hartford*, followed by the *Brooklyn*, *Richmond*, *Pensacola*, and *Mississippi*; but this order was afterwards changed by the remonstrances of other officers of the fleet, who represented to him that it was unwise for the commander-in-chief to take the place of the greatest danger. As finally arranged, the fleet was divided into three parts: the First, consisting of eight gunboats, was led in the *Cayuga*, by Captain Theodorous Bailey, who was to make the attack on Fort St. Philip; the Second, consisting of the *Hartford*, *Brooklyn*, and *Richmond*, was led by Farragut, and was to attack Fort Jackson; the Third division with six gunboats, commanded by Captain H. H. Bell, was to pass on and attack the Confederate fleet.

Captain Bailey took his division through the line of obstructions without difficulty. As soon as he had done so, however, the guns of Fort St. Philip met him with a shower of shell and shot.

He soon brought his guns to bear, and, for the moment, drove the enemy from their guns. He was immediately attacked by the Confederate gunboats, which were soon driven off. The *Varuna*, under Commodore Boggs, one of the swiftest vessels of the fleet, pushed on up the river after the fleeing vessels of the enemy; and, it being dark, was supposed to be one of their own vessels. They were disillusioned, however, when Boggs delivered his broadsides at short range right and left, one shot exploding the boiler of a large steamer crowded with troops, and others driving two vessels ashore in flames.

The *Varuna* was closely followed by the *Governor Moore*, a powerful steamer fitted as a ram and commanded by Lieutenant Beverly Kennon. She carried two rifled 32-pounders and a crew of 93 persons. The two vessels kept on until they were quite alone, when Kennon opened fire. His second shot raked the *Varuna's* deck, killing three and wounding nine. Boggs then brought his starboard battery to bear, but Kennon kept head on and rammed the *Varuna* with all his vessel's force. At the moment of impact the battery of the *Varuna* swept her antagonist from stem to stern, killing and wounding half her crew. A second ram, the *Stonewall Jackson*, now turned upon the *Varuna* and rammed her on the port side, receiving a deadly blow in return, which drove her out of action disabled and in flames. The *Varuna* was now run into shallow water, where she sank. Kennon then set fire to his own ship, and escaped to

1862
April

Running
the
batteries

The
exploits
of the
"Varuna"

1862
April

The "Pen-
sacola"

the shore in a boat. The *Oneida* and *Cayuga* followed the *Varuna*, and about five miles above the fort came upon a Confederate camp on the right bank of the river; which, after a volley of canister, surrendered. The *Pensacola* stopped near Fort St. Philip, and poured in a broadside from which the gunners of the barbette battery fled to cover. As soon as the ship began to move again, the gunners returned and again opened fire. Just at this time the ram *Manassas* charged her, but missed, receiving the ship's broadside; and continuing down the river, attacked the *Mississippi* just below, but with a glancing blow that did no damage.

And
"Hart-
ford"

The port column was led by the *Hartford*, which steered in near to Fort Jackson; but, a fire raft coming down, she sheered across the river, where she grounded near Fort St. Philip. Here a fire raft in full blaze was pushed against her by the tug-boat *Mosher*, which was sunk at the same moment by a shot in her boilers, the whole crew losing their lives. The *Hartford* took fire, the flames running up the rigging and bursting through the ports. The fire department of the ship soon extinguished the flames, and a little later she worked herself clear and backed off the shoal into deep water. While passing the forts she was struck thirty-two times, and had thirteen men killed and wounded. Close after the *Hartford* came the *Brooklyn*.

By this time the smoke of the battle had settled down upon the river, and it was with difficulty that the attacking ships avoided collision. The

Manassas, after attempting to ram the *Brooklyn*, followed the Union fleet up-stream, when the *Mississippi* turned and poured in two broadsides, which crushed her armor and set her on fire. At eight o'clock she exploded and sank. When the smoke had cleared away, it was found that nine vessels of the Confederate fleet had been destroyed.

1862
April

Severe
Confed-
erate
losses

Farragut's fleet anchored for the day at quarantine five miles above the forts. The next day, leaving the *Kineo* and *Wissahickon* with the *Mississippi* to protect the landing of General Butler's troops, the *Farragut* moved up the river. Four miles below New Orleans the Chalmette batteries were encountered and silenced. They were erected on both sides of the river, and mounted twenty heavy guns.

In the mean time Commander Porter had been left in command below the forts with the mortar-boats. The day after the passage of the fleet, he sent Commander Guest with a flag of truce to Fort Jackson, demanding the surrender of the two forts. The demand was refused, and Porter immediately opened fire on Fort Jackson, with such effect that a mutiny broke out among the Confederate gunners, who refused to stay in the fort and be needlessly slaughtered. At midnight of the 27th the garrison rose, seized the guard and postern, reversed the field-pieces commanding the gates, and began to spike the guns. Many of them left the fort with their arms, and so widespread was the disaffection and panic that all except one company refused to fight longer.

Fort
Jackson
shelled

1862
April

The city
is
alarmed

Supplies
burned

The people of New Orleans, having been assured by the military authorities and the press that the forts were invulnerable, and that there was not the slightest danger of the capture of the city, were not alarmed when the bombardment of the works became known. Excursion parties were made down the river to enjoy the sight of the flying shells. The city was never gayer. It was a time of balls and parties and the opera and crowded theatres. Suddenly there came a change. On the morning of the 24th, vague rumors came up the river that the fleet had passed the forts. Later these rumors were verified. Inhabitants were terror-stricken, and streets were filled with wild crowds stunned and silent. It was not until great columns of flames and smoke were seen rising from the ships and yards in Algiers, across the river where the great ironclad *Mississippi* and other vessels were building, that hope was given up. They understood then that the vessels and government property were being burned to save them from the enemy.

The city
evacuated

Later in the day General Lovell, who had been watching the bombardment, arrived and began to make preparations for evacuating the city. The ships and steamboats lying at the levee were fired and set adrift in the river, in hopes that some of the vessels of the Union fleet might be destroyed by them. Storehouses were emptied of thousands of bales of cotton and hogsheads of sugar which were dumped on the levee for miles and set on fire. The beating of the drums of the retiring troops, and



GENERAL BENJAMIN F. BUTLER.



OLD CITY HALL, NEW ORLEANS.
(Where the Officers came to demand the Surrender of the city.)

the tolling of the church bells, together with the boom of the cannon engaged in destroying the batteries of Chalmette, all lent additional terror to the scene.

1862
April

At one o'clock P. M. on the 25th of April Farragut anchored his squadron in front of the city, and Captain Bailey, of his flagship, was sent ashore to the mayor with a demand for its surrender, and to inform him that no flag but that of the United States would be permitted to fly in the presence of the national fleet. To the demand for the surrender of the city, the mayor stated that he had no authority to surrender the city, which was under military rule; and that General Lovell, who was in command of the forces, was the proper person to reply to that demand.

Surrender
demanded

In this refusal of Monroe to hoist the United States flag the members of the city government united. General Lovell, on whom the same demand was made, refused to surrender either the city or his forces; but offered to withdraw his troops and leave the question to the civil authorities. During this meeting of the Council a mob gathered about the city hall threatening violence to Captain Bailey and his party. They had come from the Mint, where the United States flag, raised an hour or two before, had been torn down and thrown into the street. This had been dragged through the mud, and was now torn into fragments and thrown through the windows into the Council room. The ringleader in the affair was hanged by General Butler a few weeks later.

Mobs
gather

Summary
vengeance

1862
April

That evening a special meeting of the Council was held, at which a message from the mayor was read, stating that, as the withdrawal of General Lovell's troops rendered resistance impossible, the occupation of the place by the enemy could not be resisted. "All acts," he said, "involving authority, must be performed by the invading force themselves. We yield to physical force alone, and maintain our allegiance to the government of the Confederate States."

The city
occupied

This reply was sent to Farragut, who at ten the next morning sent a battalion of marines under command of Captain Broome, and a company of sailors, with two boat howitzers, with orders to raise the flag over the public buildings. This was accomplished without opposition. As the city hall did not cover United States property, there was no demand for raising the national flag over it, but the State flag was removed.

Butler in
command

On the 1st of May, General Butler arrived with his troops, and the following morning Farragut, having accomplished his mission as far as New Orleans was concerned, sent him the keys of the custom-house and turned over to him the future administration of the city.

The exterior line of the defenses of New Orleans having now been destroyed, the remaining works were hastily abandoned. Such guns as could be taken away were hurried to Vicksburg. The whole delta of the Mississippi was now cleared of offensive obstructions, and a few days later Pensacola was evacuated and the guns removed.

Early in May, after the occupation of New Orleans by the Federal troops, Farragut sent seven vessels, under the command of Captain Craven of the *Brooklyn*, up the river. At Baton Rouge, the capital of the State, a correspondence ensued with the mayor which was exactly the counterpart of that which had taken place with the mayor of New Orleans. The mayor of Baton Rouge declared that the city would never be surrendered voluntarily to any power on earth, and he furthermore declined to offend the sensibilities of the people by hoisting the flag of the United States. Captain Palmer of the *Iroquois*, who had made the demand for surrender, wasted no time arguing, but hoisted the flag over the arsenal, and remarked that "war was a sad calamity, and often inflicted severer wounds than those upon the sensibilities."

1862

Baton
Rouge
taken

Natchez surrendered to the fleet May 13, when summoned. May 18, the advanced steamers of the fleet reached Vicksburg. A demand for the surrender of the city was promptly made by Commander Lee of the *Oneida*; to which the reply was made by the military governor, "I have to state that Mississippians don't know and refuse to learn how to surrender to an enemy. If Commodore Farragut or Brigadier-General Butler can teach them, let them try."

Natchez
sur-
rendered

On the 18th of June the *Brooklyn* and *Richmond* arrived and anchored below Vicksburg. A week later Farragut arrived on the *Hartford*, accompanied by Commander Porter with the transports, and seventeen schooners of the mortar

Vicks-
burg
threat-
ened

1862
Orders to
clear the
river

boats. After investigation of the conditions, Farragut reported that he did not think it possible to reduce the place without a strong land force; but the Navy Department sent peremptory orders that an attempt should be made and the river cleared. At that time Vicksburg was the only strongly defended work on the river. Unfortunately, apart from the lack of military coöperation, the condition of the fleet by no means warranted an aggressive movement. Many of the vessels had been injured in the passage of the forts by the enemy's fire and by collision with each other and with river obstructions. The engines of some were in need of extensive repairs. The maintenance of the coal supply was extremely difficult. The river was near the time of lowest water, the *Hartford* at one time getting aground, so that her coal and ammunition and some of her guns had to be taken out before she could be floated off. The enlistment term of many of the men had ended, and they were clamoring for their discharges. Besides this, a large number of men were down from illness caused by the unhealthy climate. Spurred on by repeated orders, Farragut determined, in spite of all these drawbacks, to run by the batteries.

The fleet
in poor
condition

Position
of Vicks-
burg

The position of Vicksburg is peculiar. It lies exactly half-way between Memphis and New Orleans. The Mississippi, whose irregularities have been already mentioned, makes a turn to the northeast, five miles before reaching the bluffs above the city. At that point it makes another abrupt turn, and runs southwest exactly parallel

to the first reach. Between the turn it leaves a narrow tongue of low land nearly a mile in width. At the bend of the river the bluffs are 260 feet high, sloping gradually to the water, while just below at Vicksburg the elevation is less than 200 feet. The natural position is the strongest on the river, which at this point is quite narrow compared with the stream lower down.

1862
June

At this time, though not so strongly fortified as afterwards, there were in position at the fortifications 26 guns so placed as to have a raking fire upon the ships before and after passing their front. Half a mile below the town was a water battery with other guns placed along the tops of the hills below the town. From end to end the siege batteries covered a distance of three miles. On the 28th of June the fleet, with the exception of the *Brooklyn* and two gunboats, safely passed the batteries and anchored above at 6 A. M., with a loss of 15 killed and 30 wounded. On the 9th of July Commander Porter was ordered to return down the Mississippi, and proceed to Hampton Roads with twelve mortar schooners. The next morning he sailed on the *Octarora* with the schooners in company.

Passing
the
batteries

Further operations against Vicksburg being now abandoned, Farragut dropped down the river past the batteries, arriving at New Orleans June 28, going thence to Pensacola.

While the squadron lay off Baton Rouge an attack was made by the Confederates upon the regiment occupying that place, under the command

1862
Sept.

of General Williams. The gunboats came into position and compelled the attacking force to make a precipitate retreat. A Confederate ram, the *Arkansas*, which was to have taken part in the engagement, was attacked by the gunboat *Essex* and blown up. In September Admiral Farragut took possession of Corpus Christi and Sabine City, and in October the city of Galveston was captured after a feeble resistance.

CHAPTER LXXXV.

CONFEDERATE NAVY; VIRGINIA AND MONITOR

The Confederacy at the beginning of the war was entirely without naval preparation. Its only vessels fit for service were those seized in Southern ports after the secession of the several States, and consisted of six revenue cutters and twelve coasting steamers large and small, built for commercial purposes. A little later a fleet of some importance was gathered at New Orleans, fitted out by Commodores Rousseau and Hollins. Among its vessels were the *Sumter*, in which Captain Raphael Semmes made his first commerce-destroying cruise, and the ram *Manassas*. Two large ironclads, the *Mississippi* and *Louisiana*, were constructed for the defense of New Orleans, at great cost, but when completed were found unmanageable. Both were destroyed by the Confederates before the capture of the city. In addition to these means of offense and defense there was formed what was called the River Defense Flotilla. This consisted of fourteen river steamers, fitted as rams, and were under army instead of navy control. Great things were expected of this flotilla.

The failure of the Confederate river fleet was very largely due to bad management and division of authority. Says Professor Soley, U. S. N.,¹

¹ *Leaders of the Civil War*, Vol. i., p. 628.

1861

Naval
resources
of the
Confed-
eracy

1862

Evils of
divided
command

“Authority was divided between the State government and the Confederate government, and still further between the army, the navy and the steam-boat captains. The War and Navy Departments at Richmond did not work together. There were some differences of opinion between General Lovell, in command of New Orleans, and General Duncan, commander of the exterior defenses. Four naval officers, Rousseau, Hollins, Mitchell, and Whittle, were successively in command of the Naval Station; and there were plenty of sources of disagreement between them and their colleagues of the army. They were perplexed and worried by confusing orders, and by the presence of independent agents in their own field of operations.”

Vessels
pur-
chased
and built

After the recapture of Norfolk and Pensacola, and the taking of New Orleans, in the spring of 1862, the Confederates had no yards where large vessels could be constructed. They had foundries and rolling mills for the manufacture of plate armor, ordnance foundries and powder mills; but for vessels of over a thousand tons they had to depend on purchase. By the winter of 1862 they had purchased and altered forty-four vessels, and had built and completed twenty-four, with thirty-two more in process of construction. These were nearly all small, and intended only for river and inland water service. Craft of a more formidable nature were the *Arkansas*, which after doing effective work came to grief in the Yazoo River; the *Albemarle*, torpedoed at Plymouth by Lieutenant Cushing; the *Tennessee*, captured in her first fight

in Mobile Bay; the *Atlanta*, an ironclad, captured by the monitor *Weehawken*; and the ironclads *Richmond*, *Virginia*, and *Fredericksburg*, of the James River Squadron. For sea-going vessels, regularly commissioned ships-of-war, the Confederate government purchased the *Florida*, *Alabama*, *Georgia*, and *Shenandoah*, built to order in British shipyards, all of which were used as commerce destroyers, and were manned largely by foreign sailors. Six vessels were built in France for the Confederacy, but only one was delivered, and that too late in the war to be of any service.

1861

The
cruisers

The Confederate government early recognized its naval weakness. In the beginning it had not a single vessel which could cope with the weakest in the United States Navy on the high seas. The blockade was fast closing its ports. Retaliation in kind was impossible. But there was one point in which the enemy was vulnerable. The United States held the second place among the commercial nations of the world. Its vessels were in every port and its flag flew on every sea. The merchant marine could be made the point of attack.

Destruc-
tion of
the
merchant
marine

On the 17th of April, 1861, Jefferson Davis put forth a proclamation declaring his intention to issue letters of marque. The first of these, named the *Lady Davis*, a small steamer mounting two guns, left Charleston the following day. Two others, the *Savannah* and *Petrel*, soon followed. Within the next six weeks twenty prizes had been taken, and the outlook became quite serious. The *Savannah* had been a pilot boat and mounted

Letters of
marque

1861 a single gun. On June 2 she captured a brig loaded with sugar, bound from Havana to Philadelphia. Putting enough men on it to take it into port, she continued her cruise up and down off the harbor, watching for more prey. Late in the afternoon another brig hove in sight. The *Savannah*, jubilant with her late victory, gave pursuit and fired a gun to bring her second victim to. The brig, to the dismay of the pursuers, proved to be the United States brig-of-war *Perry*. The *Savannah* and her crew were taken to New York, the latter being held and tried as pirates. Legally and constitutionally they could have been condemned and treated as such; but the rebellion had assumed such proportions, and taken on such a phase, that both policy and humanity dictated that naval captures should be regarded as land captures, the two alike being considered prisoners of war.

Legal
status of
Confed-
erate
privat-
eers

Retali-
ation
threat-
ened

Davis, in the mean time, had written to President Lincoln that if the privateersmen were hung as pirates, he would in retaliation hang as many Union officers taken prisoners. Following up his threat, he selected Colonel Michael Corcoran, of the New York 69th, who had been captured at the battle of Bull Run, with several others, and put them in irons, to await the result of the trial. In consequence, the trials were dropped, and the prisoners were soon afterwards duly exchanged.

The brig *Jeff Davis*, a condemned slaver, after taking a number of prizes, was wrecked on the Florida coast. The *Beauregard*, of Charleston, was captured by a blockading steamer. The *Petrel*,

which sailed from Charleston the same day as the *Savannah*, met with almost exactly the same fate as her companion. Hardly had she left the port when she espied what was supposed to be a large merchant vessel, but which was in reality the United States frigate *St. Lawrence*. The captain of the *St. Lawrence*, taking in the situation, ordered the ports closed, and most of the men were sent below. A feint was made to escape. The *Petrel* gave chase and fired a gun across her bows. The *St. Lawrence* waited until she was within musket-shot, then, suddenly throwing open its ports, discharged a broadside which sunk her at once to the bottom. Only half a dozen of her crew were saved.

1861

Privat-
eering
aban-
doned

With the increasing stringency of the blockade, privateering died out, as prizes could not be taken into the closed ports. Its disappearance, however, gave place to a new phase of warfare against the merchant marine,—that of the total destruction of commerce. The first of the vessels devoted to this purpose was the *Sumter*, a screw steamer of 500 tons, made over from a New Orleans and Havana packet steamer, formerly named the *Marques de la Habana*. The frame of the vessel had been strengthened, a berth deck put in, with room for a magazine and additional coal bunkers. She was armed with an 8-inch pivot gun, and four 24-pound howitzers in broadside. When ready she was put under command of Captain Raphael Semmes, formerly of the United States Navy, and famous, later, as commander of the *Alabama*. Semmes had hoped to get his vessel out

Com-
merce de-
stroyed

1862

before the blockade began, but on the 26th of May a strong blockading fleet closed both the passes of the Mississippi. On the 18th of June the *Sumter* dropped down from New Orleans to the Head of the Passes, where she remained at anchor ten days, watching for an opportunity to run out. When at last she succeeded in doing so, she was chased by the *Brooklyn* and nearly overhauled. By a clever stratagem, however, she escaped, and at once entered upon her destructive career.

Theory
of legal
condem-
nation

According to the law of nations, prizes taken at sea have to be taken into some port of the country to which the vessel making the capture belongs, so that the legality of the seizure may be decided by a prize court. To capture vessels on the high seas without laying the case before the proper court is piracy and may be punished as such, but in this case there were no Confederate ports open into which the prizes might be sent. The first prizes taken by Semmes were sent in to New Orleans, but unfortunately for him they fell into the hands of the United States government. He then determined to be his own prize court. Accordingly he set up a so-called court on board his own ship, and whenever he captured a vessel, decided it should be destroyed, landing the crew at the nearest port.

When only three days out, the *Sumter* took its first prize, the bark *Golden Rocket*. Within a week she captured seven other merchantmen. Six of them were sent in to Cienfuegos, but were afterwards released by the Spanish authorities.

During the months of July and August the *Sumter* cruised among the West India Islands and along the South American coast. Notwithstanding her character was fully known, she was welcomed in the various neutral ports where she called, and no limit was placed on her stay. Only at one place, Puerto Cabello in Venezuela, was she required to depart after forty-eight hours. Early in October, she put in at St. Pierre in the island of Martinique for coal and water. Five days afterwards, the sloop-of-war *Iroquois* came in under Captain Palmer. Finding that, if he remained in port, the rule forbidding either vessel to leave within twenty-four hours of the other would be enforced, Captain Palmer immediately weighed anchor and took a position outside the harbor. Here he waited for a week, standing off and on waiting for the *Sumter* to come out.

On the night of the 23d of November, Semmes made his escape by a shrewd stratagem and sailed eastward. His ship was badly in need of repairs, and proceeded to Cadiz, where she arrived early in January. After being docked and repaired, she sailed for Gibraltar. On the way she took two prizes, burning one and ransoming the other. At Gibraltar she was out of coal, and was unable to secure a supply from either the government or the private dealers. Just at this moment the *Tuscarora* arrived at Gibraltar, and a few days later the *Kearsarge* and the *Ino*. In view of the desperate circumstances, the *Sumter* was sold, afterwards becoming a blockade-runner. The results of her

1861

Cruise
of the
"Sumter"

1862

brief career were the capture of seventeen ships, of which two were ransomed, two were recaptured, and seven were released in Cuban ports by order of the Captain-General. The total injuries inflicted by the *Sumter* consisted in the burning of six vessels with their cargoes.

Fate of
the
"Nash-
ville"

The *Nashville*, another Confederate steamer, had a brief and inglorious career. She began as a blockade-runner, and was noted for her speed and sea-going qualities. In the fall of 1862 she was blockaded in the Great Ogeechee River, where she had taken on a load of cotton for an English port. Here she lay for eight months, waiting for a chance to escape. Finding this impossible, her cargo was removed and she was fitted out as a privateer. It was impossible to reach her, as the river was protected by Fort McAllister, a strong and well-mounted earthwork, which enfiladed the approach for a mile. Below the fort a line of torpedoes had been placed, with obstructions in the way of piles driven into the channel. In January the monitor *Montauk*, under Commodore Worden, joined the blockading fleet, and took up a position where the fort was within unobstructed view. On the night of February 27, Worden discovered that the *Nashville* had grounded half a mile above the barrier. As it was then high water, he knew that she could not float again before the turn of the tide. He waited until morning, and then steamed deliberately up to the barrier, followed at a distance by three gunboats. The fort at once opened upon the *Montauk* with shot and shell. Worden made no



RAPHAEL SEMMES.



THE "ALABAMA."

response, but trained his guns upon the *Nashville*, dropping his 11-inch and 15-inch shells upon her deck with fatal precision. In fifteen minutes she was in flames. After a time her pivot gun exploded from the heat; then her smoke-stack toppled over, and finally, an hour after the firing of the first gun, her magazine blew up. The *Montauk* then withdrew from the range of the fort, having sustained no injuries.

1862

Most famous of all the privateers was the *Alabama*, which was built at Liverpool in the shipyard of Mr. Laird, a member of Parliament. The American minister protested against her being allowed to go to sea. Notwithstanding, she sailed from Liverpool with a British crew to the Azores Islands, accompanied by another British ship carrying her armament. At the Azores she was turned over to her future commander, Captain Semmes of the Confederate Navy, and as soon as her guns and supplies were on board, started out on her career of destruction. In the course of two years she captured sixty-five vessels, and destroyed property to the amount of \$10,000,000. In June, while at Cherbourg, France, she was found by Captain John A. Winslow, of the United States steamer *Kearsarge*. On Sunday morning, June 19, the *Alabama* steamed out of port and made directly for the *Kearsarge*. Captain Winslow went to sea to draw her out of French waters. The *Alabama* promptly followed, and then began that famous fight the story of which has been so often told as to hardly need repetition here.

The "Alabama"

Great destruction of commerce

1864

"Kear-
sarge"
and "Ala-
bama"

The end
of the
fight

When the two vessels were about seven miles off the coast the battle began. The *Alabama* fired three broadsides before a shot was returned from the *Kearsarge*. At 900 yards distance the *Kearsarge* returned the enemy's fire with her starboard battery. She then endeavored to pass the stern of the *Alabama* and rake her, but the latter prevented this manœuvre by sheering, and keeping her starboard broadside to the *Kearsarge*. During the entire contest the vessels kept the same relative position, following each other on a circular course, gradually nearing, until they were not more than 500 yards apart. In a short time the sides of the *Alabama* were torn out by shells, and her decks covered with killed and wounded. After an hour's fighting the *Alabama* ceased firing and headed for the shore, five miles away. This movement exposed her port side, which was blown out by the 11-inch shells of the *Kearsarge*. The great gaps made in the hull gave free entrance to the water, which put out the fires. The *Kearsarge* now steered across the bows of the *Alabama*, to prevent her escaping into neutral waters. Semmes realized that he could fight no longer, and struck his flag. The fire of the *Kearsarge* then ceased. After a few minutes the *Alabama* again opened fire, and in consequence the *Kearsarge* returned it with a couple of broadsides.

A boat was now sent from the former to announce to Captain Winslow the surrender of the vessel, and to ask assistance in the saving of the crew. Only two boats remained on the *Kearsarge*

that were not disabled. These were lowered and sent to bring off the officers and crew. The *Alabama's* boat was allowed to return for the same purpose, the officer commanding it giving his pledge that he would return. This pledge was not kept, however. At this moment a British yacht, the *Deerhound* approached. Winslow hailed her, and asked her assistance in bringing off the crew of the *Alabama*. In answer she picked up 42 persons, including Semmes and fourteen other officers. Instead of bringing these to the *Kearsarge*, she steamed across the channel to Southampton. The battle lasted only an hour, and in twenty minutes from the surrender the *Alabama* sank to the bottom. Semmes lost 40 men killed and wounded, and 70 prisoners were taken by the *Kearsarge*. Of the crew of the latter three men were wounded. With this exception there were no casualties.

1864

British
Help

The *Florida*, after a brief career, ran into the port of Bahia on the South-American coast, where she encountered the United States steamer *Wachusett*, commanded by Captain Napoleon Collins. Captain Collins was an accomplished officer, but he had little respect for international law. Failing to get the commander of the *Florida* to fight him, he seized her, lashed her to his vessel, put a crew on board, and sailed away with her to Hampton Roads, where she was soon after sunk by accident.

The
"Florida"

At the close of the war the United States government claimed payment for the damages inflicted by these vessels; and the matter was left to a court of arbitration, the members of which

1861

consisted of the representatives of five governments, the United States, Great Britain, Italy, Switzerland and Brazil. The court decided that the British government was at fault, and judgment was rendered in behalf of the United States for the sum of \$15,500,000.

The
"Moni-
tor"
planned

At the extra session of Congress in August, 1861, \$1,500,000 was appropriated for the building of armored vessels, according to plans approved by a board consisting of Naval Captains Charles H. Davis and Melancthon Smith, and Commodore Hiram Paulding. Many plans were submitted to the board, and from these three were selected, which resulted in the building of the *New Ironsides*, the *Galena*, and the *Monitor*; the latter built in the private yard of Thomas F. Rowland at Greenpoint, L. I., from the plans of Captain John Ericsson. This unique war vessel, over which many naval authorities shook their heads while building, and of whose existence the general public knew nothing, revolutionized in two hours' time the naval system of the whole world. The crash of her shot against the iron walls of the *Virginia* sounded the death-knell of the old wooden warships. When the news of the fight reached England, the *Times* declared that there was not one of the 149 first-class battle-ships in the English fleet "that it would not be madness to trust to an engagement with the little *Monitor*." The Admiralty had the same idea, as it gave orders for cutting down several of its largest ships and converting them into turreted or broadside ironclads.

It was not without considerable hesitation that the board decided upon Captain Ericsson's plan. In fact, upon its first examination it was not approved; and it was not until the inventor had wrestled with the board for hours, and met its objections one by one, that a decision was made in its favor. Even then a clause was inserted in the contract to the effect that if it proved a failure, the sums advanced by the government for its construction should be returned. Captain Ericsson did not hesitate a moment before putting his name to this rather unusual contract, so sure was he of success.

1861

Contract
with
Ericsson

The keel of the *Monitor* was laid October 20, 1861; on the 30th of January, 1862, she was launched; on the 25th of February she was commissioned; on the 4th of March she left Brooklyn navy-yard, and reached Hampton Roads on the 9th, the day of her famous contest with the *Virginia*. The rapidity of her construction was due to the fact that the work was divided among three leading establishments, which worked night and day, three shifts of men being employed. Out of the 3000 different pieces turned out by these establishments, strange to say there was not a single misfit. All came together as if from a single hand.

Building
the
"Moni-
tor"

When completed, the *Monitor* was utterly unlike any craft that had ever before sailed the water. It consisted of an iron hull 124 feet long, and 34 feet wide at the top. This was surmounted by a raft, or armored deck, five feet deep, projecting over the hull 25 feet each way fore and aft;

1861

Design
and con-
struction

while on each side its overhang was from four feet amidships to twelve toward the bow and stern. The sides of the raft were protected by five 1-inch iron plates backed by oak, while the deck was covered with two half-inch plates over timber laid on heavy beams. The turret was a huge cylinder made of iron plates nine inches thick, and was made to revolve, so that the two 11-inch Dahlgren guns inside could be brought to bear on any point without turning the vessel. The bow was heavily braced, and armed with a sharp iron beak, for ramming. Her deck was almost level with the water, and her screw and anchor-well were thoroughly protected by the overhang. The pilot-house was placed on deck in front of the turret, and was built of solid blocks of wrought iron nine inches thick, held to the deck by 3-inch bolts.

Officers
and crew

The *Monitor* was commanded by Lieutenant J. L. Worden, afterwards Admiral Worden, with Lieutenant S. Dana Greene as executive officer. There were four engineer officers, the senior being Isaac Newton, and two acting-masters, Stodder and Webber. Chief Engineer A. C. Stimers accompanied the vessel, to inspect the working of the machinery and report thereon. There were seven other officers and 42 men, making 58 in all, on board. As might have been expected in a vessel of a new type and so hurriedly constructed, certain weaknesses developed; they came near causing her loss on the first trip. The first day out, the weather was fine and everything went smoothly; but on the second, off Delaware, a strong breeze

sprang up from the northwest, causing a rough sea which broke over the smoke and blower pipes, stopped the draft in the furnace, and filled the engine-room with gas, prostrating the engineers and firemen, who were dragged out at the risk of the rescuers' lives. For several hours the engines were useless. Thanks to the tug which had the vessel in tow, they were finally pulled into smooth water, which gave them a chance to make repairs; but no sooner were these completed and a fresh start made, than they ran for the second time into a head sea and were deluged as before. After five hours of this experience, the expedition struck smooth water again. The danger was over; and at four o'clock in the afternoon, freed from the tug, the *Monitor* steamed into Hampton Roads, and at eight o'clock dropped her anchor near the frigate *Roanoke*, and reported to its commander, Captain Marston.

1862

Dangers
at sea

It will be remembered that when, on April 20, 1861, the navy-yard at Gosport was evacuated and the vessels stationed there destroyed, one of them was the steam frigate *Merrimac*. The Confederates had no navy, and no facilities for creating one except by purchase. It occurred to them—and it was a happy thought—to raise the half-burned vessels and fit them for service. Unlike the department at Washington, they did not dally over the matter, but set to work at once. The *German-town* and *Plymouth* were raised and restored, but were never put in commission. When the *Merrimac* was raised, it was found that though her

The "Mer-
rimac"

1862 upper works were destroyed, her hull with the boilers and machinery was practically undamaged. It was decided to turn her into an ironclad, by constructing upon her hull an armored casemate with inclined sides and submerged eaves. The plates were made at the Tredegar foundry, and the work was pushed with all possible dispatch. The fact of its building was well known at Washington; but, as has already been seen, nothing was done until October. True, the board was appointed in August to consider the question of ironclads; but though composed of three of the best naval officers in service, they had been trained under the old system and could not at once readjust their minds to a revolution.

Changed
into an
ironclad

Named
the "Vir-
ginia"

The restored *Merrimac* was rechristened the *Virginia*, and at the time was the most formidable war vessel afloat. She was 310 feet in length. On the mid-ship section, 140 feet long, was built at an angle of 45 degrees an oak roof two feet thick, extending to the water line and to a height over the gun deck of seven feet. This was covered with iron plates two inches thick, in double layers, making a total thickness of four inches. The bow, intended for use as a ram, was made of cast iron and extended four feet. The armament consisted of ten guns,—two 7-inch rifles, two 6-inch rifles, and six 9-inch smooth-bore guns. The vessel was commanded by Admiral Franklin Buchanan, formerly of the United States navy, and Lieutenant Catesby ap R. Jones as executive officer, with a staff of twenty officers and a picked crew of 300 men.

At noon on the 8th of March, the *Virginia* slipped her moorings and started down the river toward Hampton Roads. Her objective point was Newport News; where, swinging at anchor and unconscious of danger, lay two of the finest vessels of the United States navy, the sloop *Cumberland* of thirty guns, and the sailing frigate *Congress* of fifty guns. Seven miles away, near Fortress Monroe, lay the two 40-gun screw-frigates *Roanoke* and *Minnesota*, and the frigate *St. Lawrence* of fifty guns.

1862

As soon as the *Virginia* came in sight she was recognized by the *Cumberland* and *Congress*, and the two ships at once cleared for action, attempting meanwhile to get under way. The wind was light, however, and their tug the *Zouave* was unable to move them. Commander Radford of the *Cumberland* was attending a court of inquiry on the *Roanoke*, and the command of the vessel fell upon Lieutenant Morris, who proved himself a brave and accomplished officer. The *Virginia* accompanied by two gunboats, the *Beaufort* and *Raleigh*, steamed straight for the *Cumberland*, and when about three-quarters of a mile away, opened fire with grape from her bow gun. The *Cumberland* promptly replied with solid shot which rebounded as if it had been of rubber. One, more effective than the rest, entered a port hole and killed and wounded nineteen men. The *Virginia* pushed on, however, and drove her iron prow into the side of the *Cumberland* so far that it was wrenched off, the water pouring into the hole in

The first
day's
fight

1862

The "Vir-
ginia"
and
"Cumber-
land"


such volume that the ship began to settle in a few minutes. She had no thought of surrender. The men at the guns fought with desperation, hoping that some chance shot might pierce a weak place in the armor of their terrible antagonist. For nearly an hour all the available guns of the *Virginia* were concentrated upon the fated vessel, with terrible effect. At half-past three the water had risen to the gun-deck, drowning the magazines, and rendering further resistance impossible. With the last shot fired, the ship keeled to port, and those who were left of the crew sprang into the water. Five minutes later the *Cumberland* sank to her tops, her flag still flying at the peak.

The "Con-
gress"


While the fight was going on, the Confederate steamers *Patrick Henry*, *Jamestown*, and *Teaser* ran by the Union batteries at Newport News, and with the two gunboats began an attack on the *Congress*, which made a desperate attempt to escape the fate of the *Cumberland* by running in shore; but no sooner had she grounded than the *Virginia* took up a position within gunshot of the *Congress*, and proceeded to rake her with shot and shell. For an hour the stately old vessel lay helpless under the terrible fire of her enemies, unable to use any but her two stern guns, and those with little effect. Her deck was like a slaughter-house. After her commander had been killed, and the ship set on fire, a white flag was raised and the firing ceased. Most of the crew escaped. The ship burned slowly all night, and at nine o'clock the next morning blew up.



JOHN ERICSSON.



THE "MONITOR."



REAR ADMIRAL
JOHN L. WORDEN.

The *Minnesota*, under Captain Van Brunt, attempted to come to the relief of the *Congress*; but when within a mile and a half of the scene of action ran aground. The *Merrimac*, which drew 22 feet of water, was obliged to keep in the channel, and could not reach the *Minnesota* with her guns; but the *Patrick Henry* and *Jamestown* made a spirited attack, which, however, was easily repelled. The *Roanoke*, in attempting to get under way in a hurry to join the fight, broke her shaft; and the *St. Lawrence*, which had reached Fortress Monroe only the day before, eager to render aid ran into shoal water and grounded. Later she floated with the tide and returned to her anchorage.

1862

The
"Minne-
sota"

Night came, and at seven o'clock the *Merrimac* with her attendant fleet withdrew to Sewall's Point and anchored, looking forward to more important victories the following day. Sunday morning dawned bright and clear; and by sunrise the great ironclad, like a monster refreshed by sleep and eager for its morning meal, crept down the channel for its prey. The *Monitor* was soon espied, lying in the shadow of the *Minnesota*. It looked so small and inoffensive by the side of the great frigate that the attacking craft regarded it almost with contempt, and half expected to blow it out of existence with the first broadside. And now began that famous fight whose story has been so often told; the most far-reaching in its influence, perhaps, of any sea-fight in ancient or modern history.

The
"Moni-
tor"
arrives

1862

Rescue of
the fleet

The opening shot was fired by the *Merrimac* from her bow-pivot gun, followed by a broadside at short range. The fire was instantly returned, but without effect on either side. The *Monitor* steamed out to meet her antagonist in order to engage her as far as possible from the *Minnesota*, which was the direct object of the ironclad's attack. So close were they at times that they almost touched each other. At one time they became separated; and the *Merrimac*, taking advantage of the opportunity, turned her fire upon the *Minnesota*, sending a shell from her rifled bow gun which entered the berth-deck amidships and set the vessel on fire. The flames were quickly extinguished, however. A second shell exploded the boiler of the tugboat *Dragon*. In answer, Captain Van Brunt concentrated his full broadside upon the *Merrimac*, a discharge which he declared "would have blown out of water any timber-built ship in the world."

The
Action

At this juncture the *Monitor* came into action again, when the *Merrimac* attempted to ram her. Captain Worden saw the movement in time to check it, and gave his boat a wide sheer so that no damage was sustained by the impact. While they were still in touch, both guns of the *Monitor* were discharged, the effect being to force in the armored side of her antagonist several inches. The crews of the after guns of the *Merrimac* were knocked down by the concussion, and bled from the nose and ears. One more shot in the same place would have doubtless ended the ironclad's career.

And so, for six hours, the battle raged, without the loss of a single life. Two accidents occurred on board the *Monitor*, which fortunately did not prove to be serious. Acting-master Stodder, who had charge of the wheel that revolved the turret, happened to lean against the wall at the moment it was struck by a solid shot. He was disabled by the concussion, and had to be carried below. A little later, Captain Worden, who was directing the working of the ship from the sight-holes in the pilot-house, met with a like injury. The "sight-holes" were long, narrow, horizontal slits an inch wide, running round the four sides of the pilot-house, near the top. A shell struck one of these just in front of Captain Worden, stunning him temporarily and filling his face and eyes with powder and minute bits of iron. It was thought at the moment that he was permanently blinded, which was fortunately not the case. The command was at once turned over to Lieutenant Greene.

In the confusion attendant upon the accident, the *Monitor* drifted out of range. The *Merrimac* was leaking badly; and taking advantage of the cessation of fighting, steamed slowly away in the direction of Norfolk. Twice afterward she showed her nose at the mouth of the Elizabeth River, and twice withdrew when the *Monitor* got up steam to welcome her. She had made her one fight, and been defeated. Two months later, in order to prevent her falling into the hands of the Federals, she was run ashore near Craney Island, by order of Commander Josiah Tatnall, and set on fire.

1862

The
VictoryFate of
the "Vir-
ginia"

1862

The "Vir-
ginia"
disabled

The destruction of the *Merrimac* relieved the fears of the Union fleet as well as of the army on the peninsula. It had been feared that she would escape from Norfolk, and go up the James to assist in the defense of Richmond. Indeed, it was in an attempt to do this that Commodore Tatnall found himself in a trap, and was forced to the sacrifice which brought down on his head the anger and condemnation of the entire Confederacy. He demanded a court of inquiry, which finally gave him an honorable acquittal. For a whole month the Union vessels had been kept from going up the James River by the *Merrimac*. Now that the way was clear, Commander Rodgers, with an iron-clad fleet consisting of the *Galena*, the flag-ship of the squadron, with the *Monitor*, the *Aroostook*, the *Port Royal*, and the *Naugatuck*, steamed up the river to Fort Darling, at Drewry's Bluff, seven miles from Richmond. Here the Confederates had sunk several small vessels in the channel to impede the passage. The fort was manned by the late crew of the *Merrimac*, who had mounted three 32-pounders and two 64-pounders (shell guns), but were short of ammunition. The bluff was so high that most of the guns of the fleet were useless, being unable to attain the proper elevation.

Rodgers
ascends
the
James

The Confederate commander, Colonel John Taylor Wood, said afterward: "This was one of the boldest and best conducted operations of the war. . . . Had Commander Rodgers been supported by a few brigades, landed at City Point, or above on the south side, Richmond would have

been evacuated. The *Virginia's* (*Merrimac's*) crew alone barred the way to Richmond. Otherwise the obstructions would not have prevented his steaming up to the city, which would have been as much at his mercy as was New Orleans before the fleet of Farragut."

1862

Well adapted as she was for fighting, there were yet serious disadvantages in the construction of the *Monitor*. The pilot-house, which was hardly large enough to contain three men standing, was situated well forward, at some distance from the turret, the communication between the two being by means of a speaking-tube. The pilot-house was occupied by the pilot, the steersman, and Captain Worden, the latter directing the movements of the vessel. Lieutenant S. Dana Greene, the executive officer, commanded the gun crews of sixteen men in the turret; while the engines and boilers were manipulated by Engineer Isaac Newton and his assistants. It was the first time in naval history that the commander of a ship was separated from his crew. The speaking-tube got out of order early in the engagement, so that communication between the pilot-house and turret became difficult and uncertain. The revolving gear of the turret did not work satisfactorily, owing to unforeseen conditions.

Defects
of the
"Moni-
tor"

"The effect," says Lieutenant Greene in his description of the fight, "upon one shut up in a revolving drum, is perplexing," and it is not a simple matter to keep the bearings. White marks had been placed upon the stationary deck imme-

1862

diately below the turret to indicate the direction of the starboard and port sides, and the bow and stern; but these marks were obliterated early in the action. I would continually ask the captain, 'How does the *Merrimac* bear?' He replied, 'On the starboard beam,' or 'On the port-quarter,' as the case might be. It finally resulted, that when a gun was ready for firing, the turret would be started on its revolving journey in search of the target; and when found it was taken 'on the fly.' because the turret could not be controlled."

Fate of
the
"Moni
tor"

Like the *Merrimac*, the *Monitor* had fought her last battle. On the 29th of December, 1862, she was ordered to Beaufort, South Carolina. Off Hatteras a heavy gale was encountered with a terrific sea. The waves forced the water into the turret, and it soon became evident that nothing could save the ship. Several of the crew were washed overboard; a few who were overcome by fear refused to leave the turret, but most of them were saved by the *Rhode Island*. Commander Bankhead was the last to leave the boat. A few minutes later, at 12:30 on the night of December 31, the *Monitor* slowly settled and went down.

Place in
history

No ship in the world's history has a more imperishable place in naval annals than the *Monitor*. Not only, by her providential arrival at the right moment, did she secure the safety of Hampton Roads and all that depended upon it, but the idea that she embodied revolutionized the system of naval warfare which had existed from the earliest recorded history.

CHAPTER LXXXVI.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS—THE THIRTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS

The administration of the Department of State during the darkest period of the war was marked by patience, forbearance, and abiding faith in the perpetuity of the Union. Secretary Seward's chief object was to prevent the recognition of the Confederacy as an independent state; and in this he completely succeeded in spite of the fact that the South was not without strong support abroad.

1861

Seward's
success

At many of the foreign capitals the United States had been represented by men of the old school, a few of them lukewarm or active supporters of the South. With the change of parties new men were sent, men who upheld the Union and carried out the President's policy with discretion and zeal. Chief of these was Charles Francis Adams at the court of Great Britain, where his services equaled, if they did not exceed, those of his illustrious grandfather. Norman P. Judd of Illinois and Thomas Corwin of Ohio in the Prussian and Mexican Missions guarded the interests and advanced the welfare of the sorely tried government. To aid these diplomatic laborers there were Americans in Europe like Motley the historian, Bishop McIlvaine, and Archbishop Hughes, who by their personal influence spread abroad a sentiment favorable to the cause of the North.

New dip-
lomatic
agents

1861

Schemes
of France

The third Napoleon occupied the throne of France and endeavored to revive the glorious days of the earlier empire. He possessed at least one of the qualities which had distinguished his illustrious predecessor, the quality of ambition. Just as the United States was engaging in a civil war which he hoped would end in disunion, this Napoleon the "Little" joined with England and Spain in the expedition to Mexico ostensibly to collect debts, in reality to get a footing for Europe in the New World, possibly to rebuild the shattered edifice of a French colonial empire.

Russia's
friend-
ship

Officially, France was hostile to the Union from the moment that secession was threatened; Russia's friendship for the Union was warm and sincere from the beginning, while England's policy was one of hesitation and latent opposition which threatened to become active as commercial and party motives gathered potency. Upon the initiative of France, England recognized the Southern States as belligerents, and those two powers agreed to act together so far as the American war was concerned. In all probability each nation regarded the subjection of the South as an impossibility; England's manufacturing interests and her industrial classes suffered acutely by reason of the blockade; the division of the United States was a matter of not unpleasant contemplation to France, and the press of both countries joined in opposition to the war.

England
hostile

Disheartening as the aspect was, there were some causes for encouragement. The South could



PALMERSTON.



NAPOLEON III.

not disguise the fact that the war was essentially in the interest of slavery, and that slavery in some of its many effects had been responsible primarily for the difference between the sections since the days of independence. To support the cause of the South was to support the system, to recognize the independence of the South was to perpetuate it. Moreover, the North was not without powerful friends in England. The Queen looked with disfavor upon anything which might tend to disturb cordial relations between the two countries, and the Prince Consort contributed powerfully to allay the ill-feeling in the crisis of the *Trent* affair. Neither in England nor on the Continent was it possible for the South to secure the help or countenance of any of the men who had been prominent in political or social reform. The blight and curse of slavery was the sign of a thing unclean and of inevitable ruin to its supporters.

Toward the close of 1861 an event occurred which brought the United States very close to war with Great Britain, caused great excitement both here and in England, and, although amicably settled, left a feeling of antagonism and suspicion toward the mother country which rankled in the hearts of Northerners until long after the close of the war. This event, known as the *Trent* affair, was the stopping of the British steamer *Trent*, by the U. S. Cruiser, *San Jacinto*, the forcible removal from the former ship of the Confederate commissioners Mason and Slidell, and their imprisonment at Fort Warren for nearly two months.

1861

The effect
of
slaveryStopping
the
"Trent"

1861
Nov. 8
Confeder-
ate
envoys to
England
and
France

James M. Mason and John Slidell were appointed by President Davis as commissioners of the Confederacy to England and France. Both were men of considerable note, having been United States Senators and held important diplomatic posts. They sailed from Charleston, South Carolina, the night of October 12, on the *Theodora*, accompanied by their secretaries, George Eustis and J. E. McFarland. The party also included Mrs. Slidell and four children and Mrs. Eustis. The *Theodora* eluded the blockading vessels and reached Cardenas, Cuba, whence the party made their way to Havana and took passage on the *Trent* for Southampton. The *Trent* was a vessel of the British Royal Mail Steamship Company, making regular voyages from Vera Cruz, Mexico, by way of Havana, to the Danish island of St. Thomas, connecting there with the regular steamer for England.

The
"Trent"
sails

The United states cruiser *San Jacinto* was at this time at Cienfuegos, where her commander, Captain Charles Wilkes, heard of the arrival of the commissioners in Cuba. Proceeding to Havana, he learned of their intention to sail on the *Trent*, and resolved to capture them; to which end he placed his vessel on the regular course of the British ship, in the Bahama Channel, at a point where it narrows to about fifteen miles in width. The *Trent*, sailing the morning of November 7, was sighted from the *San Jacinto* a little before noon on the 8th. Captain Wilkes beat to quarters, and when the steamer was about a mile away, fired a

shot from his pivot-gun across her bows; to which she replied only by hoisting the British colors, but still came on with no apparent slackening of speed, until at a distance of less than 300 yards, when a shell brought her to. Upon being hailed by Captain Moir of the *Trent*, who asked what was wanted, Captain Wilkes replied that he would send a boat; and accordingly dispatched Lieutenant D. M. Fairfax in the second cutter, with an armed guard, and orders to arrest the commissioners with their secretaries and bring them on board the *San Jacinto*.

Lieutenant Fairfax, having boarded the *Trent*, asked to see the passenger list, which was refused; and then informed Captain Moir what his orders were, that he knew the commissioners were on board the *Trent*, and was prepared to arrest them forcibly if necessary. At this juncture Mr. Slidell made himself known, and stated that he and the others of his party would not go with Lieutenant Fairfax except by force; adding that it would take considerable force to make him go. The other gentlemen agreed with him that they would not yield except to superior force, and all protested vigorously against what they termed an unwarranted invasion of their liberties, stating that they were under the protection of the British flag. Lieutenant Fairfax, who had called his men on board, now sent for further assistance; and Lieutenant J. A. Greer, already in the third cutter with his crew, joined Fairfax. As the commissioners persisted in their refusal to go voluntarily, they

1861
Nov. 8

The
"Trent"
boarded

Commis-
sioners
object to
process

1861
Nov. 8

were now seized by the guard (though not, it appears, with any violence) and conducted to the boat, and upon their arrival at the *San Jacinto* were received by Captain Wilkes, who placed his cabin at their disposal. He had also instructed Lieutenant Fairfax to offer accommodations to the ladies of the party, but this was declined.

British
com-
plaints

During the above occurrences, much excitement and indignation were shown by the officers and passengers of the *Trent*, who expressed their opinion of the proceedings in strong language. An officer of the British Navy, Commodore Williams, on the ship as "Admiralty Agent in charge of Mails," was especially prominent in his denunciation of what he termed a "violation of international law" and "an act of piracy"; adding, "You would not dare to attempt it on a ship capable of resisting such aggression."

Wilkes
a popular
hero

At half-past three the vessels parted company, the *Trent* resuming her course and the *San Jacinto* going to Boston, where the prisoners were closely confined in Fort Warren. Wilkes at once became the hero of the hour, receiving enough applause and fêting to satisfy the most eager. Mr. Welles, Secretary of the Navy, sent him a letter congratulating him in the highest terms for his "intelligence, ability, decision, and firmness"; and Congress voted him a gold medal, which action, however, was later suspended indefinitely. There was great rejoicing throughout the North at the capture of two such important prisoners; there was also an equal or greater delight in the South, and

unfortunately it had a much better reason. Cooler heads, indeed, realized from the first that the price we were likely to pay for our prizes was far out of proportion to their value. It scarcely needed the constant sagacity of the President to determine the result of the affair; and Mr. Seward, Secretary of State, was prompt to write Minister Adams that the government had not sanctioned the act of Captain Wilkes, and would await communications from the British government before taking any action.

Anger and indignation moved the hearts of the English people when they learned of the "affront to their flag." Earl Russell, then Foreign Minister, communicated an account of the affair to Lord Lyons, the British representative at Washington, in which he instructed that immediate reparation be called for, in the shape of the surrender of the commissioners to England and an apology for Wilkes' act. For this, seven days were to be allowed, at the end of which time Lord Lyons was instructed to withdraw from Washington if the British demands were not complied with. Reinforcements were sent to Canada, and preparations for war were actively begun. Both countries were at this time fortunate in their representatives at each other's capitals. Lord Lyons was a man whose experience in diplomatic life was more than equaled by his caution, frankness, and friendliness toward the United States. At the court of St. James the Union possessed, in Charles Francis Adams, a minister who was scarcely behind his father and grandfather in ability.

1861

Presi-
dential
opinionUlti-
matum of
Great
Britain

1861

Dangers
in the
situation

It is probable that Mr. Seward felt little hesitation from the first as to what his course would be. To invoke war with Great Britain at the outset of our own life-and-death struggle, with the mere beginnings of a navy against the greatest sea power of the world, would have been little short of madness, if anything less than submission to absolute insult could avert it. He may also have been aided in his decisions by the representations of France, Prussia, and Austria; who declared their disapproval of Wilkes' act and their unwillingness to sanction the principles for which it stood.

Legal
theories
of the
case

On the 26th of December the British minister was informed that the United States disavowed the action of its officer, and would deliver the commissioners to British protection once more. Shortly afterward a second communication was sent, setting forth the reasons for the course followed; wherein Mr. Seward upheld the right of the United States to take the commissioners, but condemned the method used. The question was, he said, whether or not Captain Wilkes' proceeding "was authorized by and conducted according to the law of nations"; and this question involved the following inquiries:

The five
propo-
sitions

"1. Were the persons named and their dispatches contraband of war?

"2. Might Captain Wilkes lawfully stop and search the *Trent* for these contraband persons and dispatches?

"3. Did he exercise that right in a lawful and proper manner?

“4. Having found the contraband persons on board and in presumed possession of the contraband dispatches, had he a right to capture the persons?”

1861

“5. Did he exercise that right of capture in the manner allowed and recognized by the law of nations?”

In an argument of great ability and lucidity, Mr. Seward resolved the first four questions in the affirmative, but the fifth in the negative; and solely because of this negative answer, he said, the United States must deliver up the prisoners. What Captain Wilkes should have done was to bring the *Trent* into port as a prize; when, if she had been adjudged contraband for carrying the passengers, it would have followed that they were contraband. This course was necessary because the forms of prize courts do not allow the direct trial of persons, to determine whether or not they are contraband, and it is accordingly necessary to proceed indirectly through the vessel.

Sew-
ard's argu-
ment

The very soul of Mr. Seward's contention—that the commissioners and their dispatches were contraband, and thus liable to seizure anywhere on the sea, in any vessel—was entirely denied by Earl Russell in his reply, which had scarcely the clarity and power of Mr. Seward's argument. Both quoted from Vattel and Sir William Scott, well-known authorities, what seemed entire support of their conclusions.

The reply
of Earl
Russell

A curious reversal of sides may be seen in the arguments of the respective governments in the

1861

Old
doctrine
of
right of
search

Trent case. Great Britain, who had upheld the right of her officers to board American ships and take from them forcibly such persons as she claimed were under her jurisdiction, now opposed that practice when carried out by Captain Wilkes; while the United States, by a similar argument, supported a right which in 1812 she had gone to war to stop—at least supported it in sentiment, and partly in practice, though Mr. Seward's negative answer to his own question (the fifth quoted) was consistent with the earlier claims of the government.

Present
status of
these
questions

Of the two questions involved,—whether civil officials of an enemy may be taken from the protection of a neutral flag on the seas without form of trial; and whether a ship becomes contraband, when, under the circumstances under discussion, she carries diplomatic agents of an enemy (and that therefore they are contraband)—the first question may be regarded as settled by this case. The second is still open, but it must be confessed that usage and the tendencies of custom in war are opposed to the arguments of Mr. Seward. The practice of nations at war tends more and more to the confinement of hostilities to those actually engaged as a part of the fighting force, and to a greater regard for the rights of all non-combatants, whether private individuals or members of the government of the countries at war.

On December 30, the commissioners were placed on board a small steamer and taken by the British authorities, represented by the man-of-war

Rinaldo. Thence they went to Halifax, and at length reached England. They had enjoyed the hospitality of Fort Warren fifty-two days.

1861

The war feeling which had been aroused by the *Trent* affair was aggravated by the *Times*, and even tacitly encouraged by Palmerston. The liberation of the Southern commissioners was an immense relief to the saner part of both countries, but a great disappointment to the more excitable American patriots and the English Tories. John Bright wrote to Sumner, "The war-mongers here are baffled for the time, and I cannot but believe that a more healthy opinion is gradually extending itself on all matters connected with your great struggle." In addition, he expressed his belief that Palmerston and Louis Napoleon intended to recognize the independence of the South and break the blockade.

Feeling
of the
English
people

After the liberation of Mason and Slidell, they proceeded to London, where, contrary to their expectations, they met with a cool reception. Mr. Mason made application to Earl Russell for the recognition of the Confederacy, asking also the honor of a personal interview that he might explain in detail the grounds for such claim. The interview was courteously declined; and two days later the application was returned to Mason with the indorsement, "Her Majesty's government are still determined to wait."

Recep-
tion of
Mason
and
Slidell

Neither the North nor the South were satisfied with the action of the British government. In May, 1861, the Queen issued a proclamation of neutrality,

1861

The
Queen's
procla-
mation

in which was declared the royal determination to maintain a strict impartial neutrality in the contest between the two parties. The nature of its terms was the recognition of the Confederacy as a belligerent power. This directly conflicted with the stand taken by the United States government, that the Confederates were simply insurgents. Looking at it dispassionately at this distance of time, it is difficult to see what other stand England could have taken. What she could be justly charged with was undue haste. At any rate, it aroused the feeling of intense resentment which was aggravated by the persistent and hostile articles in the *Times* and *Saturday Review*, the former representing the feelings of the English business class and the latter of the leisure class. Besides, the sending of troops to Canada was regarded as an implied threat. Secretary Seward brought matters to a dangerous crisis by a defiant attitude, which was repressed with difficulty by the President.

Adams'
good
work

It was a fortunate thing for the United States that it had at that time in its minister to England a man of remarkable qualifications for the place, a man of clear head and sound judgment, and who, while thoroughly loyal to his government, was capable of seeing both sides of a question. He had great influence with persons of weight in Great Britain, and the gradual improvement in feeling was largely due to the tactfulness with which he managed the affairs of his office. On the last day of May, Mr. Adams wrote from London,



CHARLES F. ADAMS.

“The feeling towards the United States is improving in the higher circles here. It was never otherwise than favorable among the people at large.”

1861
June-
July

On the 1st of June the English government issued an order forbidding armed ships and privateers of both parties from carrying the prizes made by them into any British ports. A week later, a member of the House of Commons made a motion for the prompt recognition of the Southern Confederacy. So much open opposition was shown that the motion was withdrawn. That there were Englishmen in high circles who sympathized with the Union cause was occasionally evident from public utterances and private correspondence. Lord Lyons, the British minister at Washington, wrote home, “The taint of slavery will render the cause of the South repugnant to the feelings of the civilized world,” and Lord Russell said in the House of Commons that the trouble had “arisen from that accursed institution of slavery.”

First im-
pressions

Up to the time of the battle of Bull Run, a feeling of friendliness towards the North had been growing rapidly in England; but with that came the belief that the cause of the North was lost. Its friends had believed that the first clash of arms would result in defeat of the South, that the ports would be opened, and that the cotton famine would come to a close. When the news reached England, the *Times* and *Saturday Review* vied with each other in the publication of venomous editorials, of which Thomas Hughes, in a letter to the *Spectator* said: “Let any Englishman try to put himself

Effect of
Bull Run

1861-2

Char-
acter of
English
criticism

honestly in the place of an American and then read such articles, and I venture to say he will no longer wonder at the effect they have had in the United States. They are remarkable for two characteristics: First, for the deliberate imputation of mean motives, and secondly, for the cruel spirit in which they are written. To a nation or a man engaged in a struggle for life or death, the tone of flippant and contemptuous serenity is the worst we can adopt if we must speak."

Medi-
ation
proposed

Naturally, the utterances of these journals was met by the recrimination of our own. In October, Earl Russell proposed to Palmerston that England should unite with France in an offer to mediate between the North and South, with the implied understanding that its rejection would make these two countries the enemies of the United States. Palmerston refused. There was a strong party which favored this action by the government in the direction of mediation. If the United States refused to accept this, it was argued that the government would be justified in recognizing the Southern Confederacy and the breaking of the blockade. The English aristocracy and a portion of the middle class were anxious that the United States government should be broken up; partly because the result would destroy a power whose continental size was a possible menace to themselves, partly for reasons pithily stated by Lord Palmerston: "We don't like slavery, but we want cotton and don't like your Morrill tariff." Manufacturers who had been forced into idleness

were anxious for an ending of the war, which they insisted could be terminated at once by the recognition of the Southern Confederacy.

1862

A singular feature of the situation was that the operatives in the north of England were outspoken on the side of the North, in spite of their suffering from the closing of the factories and the shutting down of the industries in which they were employed. They understood that the struggle was one of freedom against slavery, and resisted every attempt to join in a demonstration against its continuance.

Feeling
of the
common
people

While the British government was careful to commit no positive act of hostility, it construed the laws of neutrality vigorously against the United States and as laxly as possible toward the South; and used so little diligence in fulfilling its duties that in March, 1862, this neutrality was violated by allowing the escape of the steamer *Philadelphia*, a vessel equipped for war, built at Liverpool for Confederate service. The *Times* was the organ of Prime Minister Palmerston, whose utterances were a constant irritation to Americans at home and abroad. "It wrote," says the *Spectator*, "every now and then as if it wanted war."

The
"Phila-
delphia"

After McClellan's retreat from the Peninsula the feeling against the North increased. There was sore distress in the cotton-manufacturing districts; and it is little to be wondered at that the English governing classes and manufacturers had supreme discontent with the struggle in America. Then came the case of the *Alabama*, already described.

Distress
in
England

1862

This was so gross a violation of neutrality that it aroused a storm of indignation both in the United States and among the friends of the North in Great Britain. A well-known English writer declared that every Cabinet minister rejoiced at the escape of the *Alabama*. The Queen's speech at the prorogation of Parliament, August 7, 1862, declared that "Her Majesty had still determined to take no part in the contest on the American continent."

Inter-
vention
proposed

When the news of the second battle of Bull Run reached England, both Palmerston and Russell came to the conclusion that the time was ripe for intervention, and were about ready to propose to the Cabinet that England should take the initiative and ask the other European powers to join for that purpose. Earl Russell wrote: "I agree with you that the time has come for offering mediation to the United States government, with the view to the recognition of the independence of the Confederates." The Antietam campaign was then in progress, and it was decided to wait for the results. When the news came of Lee's defeat, Palmerston wrote to Russell suggesting further delay. All at once, when the recognition of the Confederacy seemed certain, there came a sudden change. On October 14, Sir George Lewis, a member of the Cabinet, made a speech in Parliament to the effect that the government had no intention of recognizing the independence of the Southern States, and that the policy of non-intervention would be strictly observed. The reason was not far to seek. Mr. Adams,

Effects of
Antietam

anticipating the movement and certain contingencies which might rise from it, had communicated with his government and received the following instructions from the President: "If the British government shall in any way approach you, directly or indirectly, with propositions assumed or contemplated, and appeal to the President on the subject of our internal affairs, whether it seem to imply a purpose to dictate or to mediate, or to advise, and even to solicit or persuade, you will answer that you are forbidden to debate, to hear, or in any way receive, entertain, or transmit any communication of the kind. If the British government, either alone or in combination with any other government, should acknowledge the insurgents, you will immediately suspend the exercising of your functions, and give notice of that suspension to Earl Russell and to this department. The possible consequences have been weighed, and the solemnity is therefore felt and freely acknowledged. We meet and confront the danger of a war with Great Britain and other states. We have approached the contemplation of that crisis with a caution which great reluctance has inspired, but I trust that you will also have perceived that the crisis has not appalled us."

1862

Instruc-
tions to
AdamsThe issue
met

At bottom the English government did not wish to take any action by which they should run the risk of war with the United States. The Cabinet meeting which had been set for October 23 to discuss the question of intervention was not held, and mediation was abandoned.

1862-3

Slidell in
France

In the mean time Slidell, the Confederate commissioner to France, had held an interview with the Emperor, and intimated that as the United States government sympathized with Mexico, the Confederate States under certain conditions would join with him against the common enemy. He also offered 100,000 bales of cotton worth at that time over \$12,000,000, if Napoleon would break the blockade. In return for this he asked for the recognition of the Confederate government. Three months later, in an interview with Slidell, the Emperor told him that he would try to bring about joint mediation of France, England, and Russia; and sent dispatches to representatives of the French government at St. Petersburg and London, proposing that the three governments should exercise their influence to obtain an armistice for six months. Russia replied that "what ought specially to be avoided is the appearance of any pressure whatsoever, to an end to wound public opinion in the United States: and to excite susceptibilities very easily aroused at the bare idea of foreign intervention." Earl Russell also declined, for the reason that there was no ground to believe the proposal would be accepted. Two months later, February 3, 1863, Slidell made another appeal, as a result of which the French Emperor sent a dispatch to the United States government in which he offered the friendly mediation of his government. It was declined with thanks.

Russia
and
England
decline
to join
France

In the summer of 1863 the Lairds' Shipbuilding Company were working on two steam ironclad

rams intended for the Confederates. Minister Adams called the attention of Earl Russell to the fact, and furnished him evidence showing the character of these vessels; saying that if the laws of Great Britain were not sufficient to insure a proper observance of neutrality, the United States would be obliged to protect themselves, and that, being brought to a condition of things where a war was urged against them, "by a portion, at least, of the British nation," the United States navy might be ordered to pursue these vessels into British ports, and that, "while recognizing the risks consequent on such action, the responsibility of war would not fall upon the United States."

1863

Vessels
under
con-
struction

In consequence of this communication, Earl Russell, promptly set at work to ascertain the real ownership of the ironclads, with the intention of stopping them if there should be warrant for such action. It was asserted by the Lairds that they were building for the French government. This statement was at once shown to be false. Then it was declared that they were for the Viceroy of Egypt. This was in turn disproved.

Investi-
gation

In the mean time the Confederate agent had made a pretended sale of the ships to a French firm, which engaged to re-sell them when they should get beyond British jurisdiction. The case was laid before the law officers of the Crown, who, after the delay of a month, declared that the claim of French ownership seemed to be legally sustained, and therefore they could not advise the government to detain the vessels. This decision was at once

Declared
to be
French

1863

Adams
learns
the
truth

committed to Mr. Adams, who received it in the afternoon of September 4. He immediately wrote to Earl Russell, transmitting copies of depositions showing that these rams were without doubt intended for the Confederate service. The next day, hearing that one of them was to sail, he sent to the Foreign Office "a last solemn protest against the commission of such an act of hostility against a friendly nation." On the 5th of September he sent his celebrated note to Earl Russell. He wrote:

Makes a
vigorous
protest

"My Lord: At this moment, when one of the iron-clad vessels is on the point of departure from this kingdom on its hostile errand against the United States, I am honored with yours of the 1st instant. I trust I need not express how profound is my regret at the conclusion to which her Majesty's government have arrived. I can regard it in no otherwise than as practically opening to the insurgents free liberty in this kingdom to execute a policy of attacking New York, Boston, and Portland, and breaking our blockade. It would be superfluous in me to point out to your Lordship that this is war. I prefer to desist from communicating to your Lordship even such portions of my existing instructions as are suited to the case, lest I should contribute to the aggravated difficulties already too serious. I therefore content myself with informing your Lordship that I transmit by the present steamer a copy of your note for the consideration of my government, and shall await the more specific directions that will be contained in the reply."

1861

Before this letter was received, however, Earl Russell had issued orders for the iron-clad rams to be stopped and detained until further orders. In the mean time the Foreign Office made a systematic and careful investigation, with the result that the French ownership was found to be a blind, and that the iron-clads were intended for the Confederates. Both vessels, by order of Earl Russell, were seized, and to prevent any attempt at getting them to sea by stratagem, they were watched by a British man-of-war. The vessels were finally purchased by the British Admiralty. After this there was no serious friction between the two governments.

Three questions of the utmost importance faced the 37th Congress when it convened for the long session December 2, 1861. How should the ordinary expenses of the government be met; what provision could be made for the war debt now increasing at an appalling rate and what should be done with the institution of slavery?

The
questions
of
slavery
and
finance

National finances were in a condition truly deplorable. At first it had been predicted that the war would be of short duration; sixty or ninety days and all would be over. For the first three months the war had been conducted by voluntary loans; then Congress authorized loans to the extent of 250 millions, from which about 183 millions had been realized. Expenses were about one and a quarter millions a day; there were large sums owing to contractors and the troops were in part unpaid. January 1, 1861, the amount of the

1861 national debt was approximately 69 millions; January 1, 1862, it was 292 millions; a year later, 780 millions.


The
Treasury
in 1860

In the closing years of Buchanan's administration, national credit was at its ebb. The 36th Congress had authorized an issue of Treasury notes, payable in one year, to the amount of ten millions, a part of which could not be disposed of at a rate of less than twelve per cent. John A. Dix succeeded Howell Cobb in the Treasury and the rate dropped to about ten per cent. Such was the situation when Salmon P. Chase, of Ohio, became Secretary of the Treasury.

Problems
before
Chase

For years the people had looked with disfavor upon a national debt, and to advocate increased taxes was to court political obscurity, perhaps extinction. It had long been a political axiom that industry must not be burdened, and the members of Congress from the agricultural districts dared not arouse the "farmer vote" by taxation. The Secretary had no resources save the unsold remainders of previous loans, but refusing to accept the disgraceful discounts of his predecessors, Chase had secured 15 millions at almost par value.

When Congress met in special session, July 4, 1861, Chase presented estimates aggregating more than 300 millions, a sum which was speedily found to be inadequate. In July, Congress authorized a loan of 250 millions, assessed a direct tax of 20 millions on the States, and greatly increased the tariff. A month later, after a meeting at New



SALMON P. CHASE.

York with some of the leading bankers of the country, loans of 100 millions were obtained at a rate of seven and three-tenths per cent., to which were added bonds to the extent of another 50 millions. At the close of the year it was found that nearly 200 millions had been obtained from these loans, but, on the other hand, the estimates had been made upon too small a scale.

1861-2

Large
loans

That there was not enough specie in the country to meet this enormous outlay was at once apparent. December 28, the banks suspended specie payments and the government followed of necessity. In both Houses the leading financiers were brought face to face with that expedient which they had condemned as a most dangerous heresy, the issue of paper money. As the Constitution prohibited that power to the States, it followed by implication that the process was to be looked upon with disfavor by the general government. "Reluctantly, painfully, I consent that the process should issue," said Sumner; "and yet I cannot give such a vote without warning against the dangers from such an experiment. The medicine of the Constitution must not become its daily bread." "We can take all the property of any 'citizen,'" said Senator Fessenden. "This is what is called a forced contribution. After all the question returns: Is this measure absolutely indispensable? If so, necessity knows no law. If it be necessary for the salvation of the government, all considerations must yield; but to make the best of it, it is bad faith, and encourages bad morality, both public and private."

Specie
pay-
ments
sus-
pendedLegal
Tender
Act nec-
essary

1862 Secretary Chase, himself, was thoroughly opposed to making the Treasury notes legal tender, and in later years, as Chief Justice, reversed his decision as Secretary, while admitting, as he did in 1862, the almost overwhelming necessity of the act. His excuse seemed to him and to his associates to be a valid one. Only by making the notes legal tender was it possible to secure their circulation. Without this provision the railroads would not take them in payment for transportation; many banks and other corporations would refuse also, and the burden would be doubly heavy upon the patriotic citizen who accepted them as a part of his duty to the government. Finally an opposing majority bowed to the dictates of stern necessity, and the first legal tender act upon the statute books of the United States was signed by the President, February 25. In accordance with the law, 150 millions were issued in non-interest-bearing notes to be legal tender in payment of all debts, public and private, except duties on imports and interest on public debts. In the following June, an additional 150 millions were issued and by the time the war closed, the amount authorized by Congress reached one billion and a quarter, of which approximately 670 millions were issued.

Full
amount
not
issued

One result of the act was to lead to speculation in gold, which now became a favorite stock on Wall street. Twice, the premium was 185; for a considerable time it was over a hundred, a condition which Chase turned to advantage by selling surplus gold from the Treasury. Another result was the

National Banking Act, prepared in 1861, recommended in 1862, and passed finally, February 20, 1863. By it the Government became sponsor for a system of banks, and was enabled to turn many millions of its notes into bonds. A uniform currency was provided, a guarantee of specie resumption was given, and public faith and credit increased.

1862

The
Banking
Act

Among the miscellaneous bills brought forward at this session of Congress, was one authorizing the President to seize and place under military control all telegraph and railway lines whenever the welfare of the country made such control necessary. Another abolished slavery within the territories of the United States and in the District of Columbia, paying the legal master of each slave a sum which was in no case to exceed three hundred dollars. The Department of Agriculture was established, a homestead act was passed, and provision was made for a railway from the Missouri River to the Pacific Ocean. The Republics of Liberia and Haiti were recognized and a treaty with Great Britain permitted more stringent measures for the suppression of the slave trade.

Tele-
graphs
and
railwaysPacific
Railway

After a long and sometimes bitter debate, the celebrated Confiscation Act was passed. As at first proposed, penalties were severe and regulations stringent, but upon its passage, a milder spirit was infused into it. The penalty of death was fixed for treason, though the court might commute to fine and imprisonment. The President was directed to seize the property of all military

The Con-
fiscation
Act

1862

and civil officers of the Confederacy, and, after a period of sixty days, to make a like seizure of property belonging to those engaged in the rebellion. The act freed the slaves of all owners who had been convicted of treason and slaves who escaped to the Federal lines, and as a step toward emancipation, was generally approved.

Internal
taxation

Prominent in the legislation effected during the session was the comprehensive and searching scheme of internal taxation, which, duly formulated into an Act, passed both houses by a large majority, and was approved by the President July 1. It bore hard upon the people, but was cheerfully accepted as a measure necessary for the salvation of the country. It covered everything, and the poor man suffered from its enforcement, in his degree, equally with the rich man. Sydney Smith's description of the British Taxation Act of 1820 would admirably apply to it.

The provisions of the Act, with the persons, corporations, professions, trades, articles, and products they affected, may be thus summarized: Distillers of spirits, brewers of ale, beer, and porter, all other manufacturers, wholesale and retail dealers, men in all kinds of business,—whether their trade was to supply necessities or luxuries or to furnish amusements (such as jugglers and proprietors of theatres and circuses),—lawyers, physicians, surgeons, and dentists, were required to pay for licenses. A duty of twenty cents per gallon was imposed on spirits, a dollar per barrel on malt liquors, and that on tobacco and cigars was

heavy. Many products and nearly all manufactured articles were taxed, including carriages, yachts, billiard-tables, and plate, slaughtered cattle, hogs, and sheep; also railroad bonds, passports, legacies, and distributive shares of personal property. A duty of three per cent. was laid on the gross receipts of railroads, steamboats, and toll-bridges, dividends of banks, savings institutions, trust and insurance companies, the gross receipts from advertisements in newspapers, etc.; and on salaries and pay of officers and persons in the service of the United States above an exemption of \$600. On the gross receipts of railroads using other power than steam, and of ferry-boats, the duty was one and one-half per cent. One-tenth of one per cent. was exacted on the gross amount of auction sales. A tax of three per cent. was imposed on incomes less than \$10,000, and of five per cent. on incomes over \$10,000, with an exemption of \$600, although certain deductions were allowable in making the return. Upon the income of citizens residing abroad, there was laid a tax of five per cent. without the usual exemption. Stamp duties were imposed upon every species of paper used to represent or transfer property, on medicines or preparations, perfumery, cosmetics, and playing-cards. The duties on imports were increased by an Act approved by the President July 14.

1862

Taxes on
corpo-
rationsOn
incomesStamp
duties

The President appealed to the Congressmen from the border slave States to adopt some measure for the gradual abolishment of slavery, and

1862

Eman-
cipation
urged
upon the
States

accept the compensation for their slaves which had been offered by Congress. "I do not argue," he said, "I beseech you to make arguments for yourselves. You cannot, if you would, be blind to the signs of the times. I beg of you a calm and enlarged consideration of them, ranging, it may be, far above personal and partisan politics. This proposal makes common cause for a common object, casting no reproaches upon any. It acts not the Pharisee. The change it contemplates would come gently as the dews of heaven, not rending or wrecking anything. Will you not embrace it? So much good has not been done by one effort in all past time as in the providence of God it is now your high privilege to do. May the vast future not have to lament that you have neglected it."

This appeal, although it had no effect upon those whom it most nearly concerned, made it clear to the people that the President would be glad to see the nation rid of slavery if it could be constitutionally done.¹ A week later, he called

¹ Lincoln never tired of urging the plan of gradual emancipation upon the prominent members of his party. In a letter written to a Republican Senator in Utah, he reduced his argument to figures as follows:

MY DEAR SIR:—As to the expensiveness of the plan of gradual emancipation with compensation, proposed in the late message, please allow me one or two brief suggestions.

Less than one-half day's cost of this war would pay for all the slaves in Delaware, at four hundred dollars per head:

Thus, all the slaves in Delaware, by the census of 1860, are..	1,798
	\$400

Cost of the slaves	\$ 719,200
One day's cost of this war.....	2,000,000

1862

Lincoln's
argu-
ment

the Congressmen of the border States to the White House and pleaded with them to adopt his policy, that of gradual emancipation of the slaves and compensation of their owners. "If the war continues long," he said, "the institution in your States will be extinguished by mere friction and abrasion—by the mere incidents of war. Much of its value is gone already; how much better for you and for your people to take the step which at once . . . secures compensation for that which is sure to be wholly lost in any other event."

Again, less than eighty-seven days' cost of this war would, at the same price, pay for all in Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, Kentucky, and Missouri.

Thus, slaves in Delaware.....	1,798
Slaves in Maryland.....	87,188
Slaves in District of Columbia.....	3,181
Slaves in Kentucky.....	225,490
Slaves in Missouri.....	114,965
	432,522
	\$400

Cost of slaves.....	\$173,048,800
Eighty-seven days' cost of the war.....	174,000,000

Do you doubt that taking the initiatory steps on the part of those States and this District would shorten this war more than eighty-seven days, and thus be an actual saving of expense?

A word as to the time and manner of incurring this expense. Suppose, for instance, a State devises and adopts a system by which the institution absolutely ceases therein by a named day—say January 1st, 1862. Then let the sum to be paid to such State by the United States, be ascertained by taking from the census of 1860 the number of slaves within the State, and multiplying that number by four hundred—the United States to pay such sums to the State in twenty equal annual installments, in six per cent. bonds of the United States.

The sum thus given, as to time and manner, I think would not be half as onerous as would be an equal sum, raised now, for the indefinite prosecution of this war; but this you can judge as well as I.

I enclose a census-table for your convenience.

Yours very truly,

A. LINCOLN.

1862

Oppo-
sition to
the plan


In answer, a majority of members from Virginia, Maryland, Missouri, and Kentucky replied that such measures constituted an interference by the national government in matters belonging to the States alone; that Congress had no constitutional power to make appropriations of money for such a purpose; that they did not believe that the country could not bear the proposed expense; that if this offer should be made in good faith, an amount sufficient for the proposed compensation of slave-owners should be voted before such a proposition should be entertained.

Other
propo-
sitions

On the 14th of July, two days before adjournment, the President asked the two bodies of Congress to pass a bill placing at his disposal a certain sum in 6% bonds, which should be devoted to paying for slaves in any of the States that should legally abolish slavery. This was warmly opposed in the Senate, but finally referred to the Committee on Finance. Sumner tried in vain to induce the two houses to defer adjournment for consideration of the subject.

Fail

On the 15th of July, the select Committee of Emancipation introduced a bill into the House providing for the issue of bonds to the amount of \$180,000,000, to be used for the compensation of loyal owners of slaves in the border States and in Tennessee, when any one of them legally abolished slavery. To this was added an appropriation of \$20,000,000 to be used in colonizing the freedmen. The bill, however, was not given consideration.



WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

When Congress adjourned, there was a strong feeling of hostility to the President among the radical Senators and Representatives. They charged him with instituting a reactionary policy, and cited as proof his action in the case of General Hunter. Hunter, who commanded the Department of the South, on the 9th of May issued a proclamation freeing all the slaves in South Carolina, Florida, and Georgia. As with Frémont's proclamation to the same effect, it was made without authority, the first knowledge coming to Lincoln through the newspapers a week later. Hunter's order was declared void by the President on the 19th of May.

1862

Lincoln
charged
with
favoring
slavery

On the 22d of July the President read to the Cabinet in secret session the Proclamation of Emancipation. As he had done many times before, he declared that the object of the war was a restoration of the Union; and, as a fit and necessary military measure for effecting this object, all slaves in States not recognizing the constitutional authority of the United States should be thenceforward and forever free. The members of the Cabinet were nearly unanimous in the support of the policy proposed, but two or three of them believed in longer delay.

The proc-
lamation

Secretary Seward, while approving the proclamation, questioned the expediency of its issue just at that time. "The depression of the public mind," he said, "consequent upon our repeated reverses, is so great that I fear the effect of so important a step. It may be viewed as the last measure of

Sew-
ard's sug-
gestion

1862
August

Pub-
lication
post-
poned

an exhausted government, a cry for help; the government stretching forth her hands to Ethiopia, instead of Ethiopia stretching forth her hands to the government. It will be considered our last shriek on the retreat. Now, while I approve the measure, I suggest that you postpone its issue until you can give it to the country supported by military success, instead of issuing it, as would be the case now, after the greatest disasters of the war." The reasonableness of this suggestion was at once apparent to the President. The proclamation was put aside until a victory should be won. It was agreed that silence should be kept in regard to this conference.

The
Greeley
letter

On the 4th of August the President ordered a draft of 300,000 men for nine months' service. Criticism on the conduct of the war now became intensified. On the 20th of August Greeley printed in the New York *Tribune* a double-leaded editorial, written by himself and called "The Prayer of Twenty Millions." It was a fierce attack on the policy of the President's consideration for slavery. "We require of you," said Greeley, "as the first servant of the Republic, charged especially and preëminently with this duty, that you execute the laws. We think you are strangely and disastrously remiss in the discharge of your official and imperative duty with regard to the emancipating provisions of the new Confiscation Act; you are unduly influenced by the counsels, the representations, the menaces of certain fossil politicians hailing from the border slave States; timid counsels in such a crisis calculated to prove perilous and

probably disastrous. We complain that the Union cause has suffered and is now suffering immensely from your mistaken deference to rebel slavery. We complain that the Confiscation Act which you approved is habitually disregarded by your generals, and that no word of rebuke for them has yet reached the public ear. Frémont's proclamation and Hunter's order were promptly annulled by you, while Halleck's No. 3, with scores of like tendency, have never provoked even your remonstrance. We complain that a large proportion of our regular army officers evince far more solicitude to uphold slavery than to put down the rebellion. I close as I began, with the statement that what an immense majority of the loyal millions of your countrymen require of you is a frank, declared, unqualified, ungrudging execution of the laws of the land, more especially of the Confiscation Act."

1862

Sharp
criticism
of
Lincoln

The President replied to Greeley at once in a letter which shows the supreme greatness of the man, his infinite tact and ability to seize upon every advantage in a difficult situation. After disclaiming any intent to argue the matter, the President said: "As to the policy I 'seem to be pursuing,' as you say, I have not meant to leave any one in doubt. I would save the Union. I would save it the shortest way under the Constitution. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with

The reply

1862

The
Union at
stake—
not
slavery

them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to destroy or to save slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others, I would also do that. What I do about slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union. I shall do less whenever I shall believe what I am doing hurts the cause, and I shall do more whenever I shall believe doing more will help the cause. I shall try to correct errors when they are shown to be errors, and I shall adopt new views so fast as they shall appear to be true views."

The
President
deter-
mined

It will be remembered that Lincoln had submitted the question of emancipation to the Cabinet, July 22, that he deferred it upon Seward's suggestion that it would seem like a measure of last resort, a confession of defeat. The President had promised himself to issue it immediately after a victory, and while he was waiting the Greeley letter was added to the intemperate expression by which it was sought to force him to act. September 13, a deputation of Chicago clergymen visited him, urging emancipation, and to them he expressed his full belief in his own powers to emancipate and an equally firm intention to do so when his judgment told him that the time was ripe. Both incidents added greatly to the President's strength. Whenever his policy was clearly announced, the mass of

the people followed him in full faith, for his opinions and conclusions were those of the common people. While Greeley and the Chicago ministers were uniting to condemn what they fancied was the President's weakness, Illinois and the Western States were ringing with the musical reply to the July call for troops: "We are coming, Father Abraham, three hundred thousand strong."

1862

People
rally to
the Presi-
dent

Meanwhile the armies of the Confederacy invaded Maryland and were checked at Antietam. September 22, at a Cabinet meeting, Lincoln explained the development of his ideas upon emancipation and then read the proclamation.

Secretary Welles thus describes the meeting: "The subject was the proclamation for emancipating the slaves, after a certain date, in States that shall then be in rebellion. The President stated that the question was finally decided,—the act and the consequences were his,—but that he felt it due to us to make us acquainted with the fact and to invite criticisms on the paper which he had prepared. In the course of the discussion, which was long, earnest and harmonious, he remarked that he had made a vow—a covenant—that if God gave us the victory in the approaching battle, he would consider it an indication of the Divine will, and that it was duty to move forward in the cause of emancipation."

The Pres-
ident's
vow

The proclamation declared the purpose of the war to be the restoration of the constitutional relations between the States; expressed the President's intention to recommend pecuniary aid to

1862
Emanci-
pation
claimed

States not in rebellion which would abolish slavery, and his approval of the principle of colonization. Finally, after the first day of January, 1863, all persons held as slaves within States then in rebellion, were to be forever free, their freedom to be recognized and maintained by the Executive Government of the United States.

CHAPTER LXXXVII.

FAIR OAKS, THE SEVEN DAYS, AND RETREAT

In a preceding chapter, the story of the Peninsula was brought down to the arrival of McClellan's army at the left bank of the Chickahominy. Before proceeding further, it may be well to give some idea of the topography of the country over which the two armies conducted their operations.

1862

Geog-
raphy of
the
campaign

The Peninsula, so called, is that section of Virginia lying between the York River on the east and the James River on the west. At its lowest point, where it thrusts itself into the waters of Chesapeake Bay, is situated Fortress Monroe. Seven miles to the west, at the mouth of the James, is Newport News; a strongly fortified position, where the left division of the army was disembarked on its arrival from Washington, for the advance on Richmond. The width of the Peninsula varies from five to twenty miles; its length from Fortress Monroe to Richmond is about eighty. Its narrowest part is at Yorktown, widening gradually to the north. The Chickahominy cuts the Peninsula in half, lengthwise. It was up the eastward division, between the Chickahominy and the York, that the march of the Union army was conducted. The difficulties McClellan had to encounter in his movements about Richmond can be best appreciated by recourse to the map.


1862

Land cut
up by
streams

Between the Potomac and Richmond are several large rivers: the Occoquan, which combines Bull Run and Cedar Run; the Rappahannock, made up of the North Fork and the Rapidan; the Mattaponi, a union of four smaller rivers; the Pamunkey, formed of the North Anna and South Anna. All these flow into the York River. South of these is the Chickahominy, which flows in a southeasterly direction on the north of Richmond, curving below to the west, and emptying into the James near Williamsburg. Besides these are innumerable small streams, brooks, and runs. The country through which these flow is low and swampy. This condition necessitated a large number of bridges, as these were destroyed all along the line of approach and had to be replaced. Rapid movement was impossible. On the southern side of all these large streams, at places where crossing was possible either by bridge or ford, earth-works were thrown up and preparations made for defense.

Country
almost
impass-
able

General Avery, who had command of the division of cavalry of the Peninsula, says that from Fort Monroe to Hanover Court-House there was hardly a field with sufficient scope for the manœuvre of a single regiment of cavalry. After the rain the soil became, under the tread of horses, a bed of mud knee-deep. The forests between the York and the James Rivers were filled with tangled thickets and unapproachable morasses. The tributaries of these rivers, naturally deep and sluggish, became more tortuous as they



THE COUNTRY AROUND RICHMOND.

approached their confluence, and the expanse of floods was converted into stagnant swamps. The heavy rains in a few hours rendered these streams formidable obstacles. Above this dismal landscape, the fierce rays of the sun were alternated by deluges of rain, so that men and animals were alternately scorched and drenched.

1862

When the Union army landed on the Peninsula, its march was in a northwesterly direction from Hampton and Newport News through Little Bethel, Big Bethel, Yorktown, New Kent Courthouse to White House Landing, on the Pamunkey River, some distance above its confluence with the York River. White House, which was made the first Federal base of supplies, lies nearly twenty-five miles due east from Richmond, on the direct line of the Richmond and York Railroad, which crosses the Chickahominy about half-way between the two places. McClellan's headquarters were between White House and the Chickahominy, on the north side of the river.

Union
base

On the south side of the river, nearer Richmond, were Fair Oaks and Savage's stations on the railroad. A mile below Fair Oaks was the Seven Pines tavern, which stood on the northern border of White Oak Swamp. This latter extended from the region about Bottom's Bridge, west two-thirds of the distance to the James. It was traversed by a hard road, which ran in a southern direction to Malvern Hill. Over this McClellan made his change of base. On the north side of the river, some five or six miles from

1862
May
Seat of
the
campaign

Richmond, was Mechanicsville; and on its right, within short distances of each other, were Beaver Dam Creek, Ellerson's Mill, Cold Harbor, and Gaines' Mill, at each of which places fighting occurred. Hanover Court-House, held by the right wing of McClellan's army, was about fifteen miles due north from Richmond on the Virginia Central Railroad. Malvern Hill lies about twenty miles southeast of Richmond, on the north side of the James River and south of White Oak Swamp. Harrison's Landing is at a bend of the river several miles below.

Perma-
nent base

On the 16th of May, 1862, McClellan reached White House, and the following day a permanent base of army supplies was established there. Two additional corps were organized: the Fifth Provisional Corps, consisting of the divisions of Porter and Sykes, and the reserve artillery, under the command of Fitz John Porter; and the Sixth Provisional Corps, consisting of the divisions of Franklin and Smith under the command of General W. B. Franklin.

Stoneman's advance guard was one mile from New Bridge on the extreme right; Franklin's corps three miles from New Bridge, with Porter's Corps in the rear; Sumner's corps on the railroad about three miles from the Chickahominy, connecting the right with the left; Keyes' corps on the New Kent Road near Bottom's Bridge, with Heintzelman's corps as a support in the rear. Franklin's corps was at Tunstall's station, five miles from White House.

May 20, when Bottom's Bridge was reached, it was found that that, as well as the railroad bridge on the Chickahominy, had been destroyed. The river at that point was only about forty feet wide; but both sides for miles were bordered by low, marshy bottom-lands from half a mile to a mile in width. The banks were fringed by a thick growth of forest trees. The stream was subject to sudden variations in the volume of water, and a rise of a few feet would cause an overflow of the swampy ground adjoining. At low water it could be forded at almost any place, but during high water it could only be crossed at the few points where bridges had been constructed. These means of crossing having been destroyed, it became necessary not only to reconstruct them but to build others. Back on the river, at two places on the west bank, New Bridge and Mechanicsville Bridge, there were high bluffs, which gave the Confederates opportunity to fortify and establish batteries, enfilading the approaches upon the two principal roads to Richmond on the right.

As the enemy was not in great force at Bottom's Bridge, and as it was very important to gain a lodgment upon the south bank before they should have time to concentrate and dispute the passage, McClellan ordered Casey's division to cross and occupy the opposite heights. This was promptly done, and the troops were ordered to throw up defenses to protect the left flank. Heintzelman's corps was thrown forward in support on the 25th. On the same date Hooker's

1862
May

Nature of
the
country

Bottom's
bridge

1862
May
Hooker's
advance

division moved southward to guard the White Oak Swamp bridge, and Kearney's division took position just beyond Savage's station. On the north side of the river now were Sumner's, Franklin's, and Porter's corps, with General McClellan's headquarters at Gaines' Mill. The official returns of the army for that date show that the Army of the Potomac aggregated 126,089 officers and men, with 280 pieces of artillery.

Alarm at
Wash-
ington

Coincident with McClellan's arrival at the Chickahominy, McDowell was marching beyond Fredericksburg with 40,000 men to join him; but Jackson's whirlwind raid up the valley had thrown Washington into a panic, in which the President and Stanton shared. The latter telegraphed the governors of the Northern States: "Intelligence from various quarters leaves no doubt that the enemy in great force is marching on Washington. You will please organize and forward immediately all the militia and volunteer force in your State." Orders were sent to McDowell to send half his men at once to the Shenandoah Valley, to help intercept Jackson; but, as has been seen, the move was of no effect. Jackson had accomplished his purpose, which was to break up McDowell's advance, and was prepared to return to Richmond. During the progress of this raid, McDowell's forces were closely watched by Anderson's brigade, which was stationed with a part of Stuart's cavalry near Fredericksburg, and by Branch's brigade at Hanover Court-House, fourteen miles north of Richmond. These two

bodies, numbering 12,000 men, not only hindered McDowell's intended advance, but impeded the proposed flanking operations of the Union army.

1862
May 27

On the 26th of May, General Fitz John Porter was ordered by McClellan to proceed with a picked force in the direction of Fredericksburg, clear out the enemy from the upper peninsula as far as Hanover Court-House or beyond, destroy the railroad and other bridges over the South Anna and Pamunkey rivers, in order to prevent attack in the rear, and by so doing, cut the line connecting Richmond with northern Virginia. In pursuance of these orders, Porter, with a force of 12,000 men—made up of Maine, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, Pennsylvania, and Michigan troops, selected by himself—marched at four o'clock in the morning from New Bridge on the extreme Union right to Hanover Court-House. The movement was made in the face of a pelting rain storm, over roads almost impassable from the mud. The enemy, though taken by surprise, made a plucky resistance, but was overpowered and forced to retreat. The fighting was severe and lasted all day; 200 Confederate dead were left on the field of battle, among them eight officers, and 750 prisoners were taken. One field-piece, a large number of small-arms with camp supplies and officers' baggage, fell into the hands of the Federals.

A picked
force sent
to cut
communi-
cations

Fight at
Peak's
Station

In the mean time Colonel G. K. Warren had pushed on toward Ashland, a few miles west of Hanover Court-House, when he encountered the rear-guard of a brigade of Anderson's division,

1862
May
30-31

on the way from Fredericksburg to Richmond. Pursuit was made, but resulted only in the capture of a few prisoners. The road and railroad bridges over the Pamunkey and South Anna rivers were destroyed, and two railroad trains loaded with supplies were captured. The Union loss, killed, wounded, and missing, was 355.

New
arrange-
ment of
forces

General Johnston, recognizing the danger of the junction of McDowell's army with that of McClellan, determined to strike the latter before he could be reinforced. Several days before, he had made arrangements for an attack. A. P. Hill's division had been moved to the north of the Chickahominy, at Meadow Bridge; while General Smith's division took place on the left of Magruder, on the Mechanicsville turnpike. Longstreet's division was placed on the left of that of D. H. Hill, and Huger's in rear of the two. The plan of attack was, that Smith and A. P. Hill should move against the Union right on the north side of the Chickahominy, while Longstreet and D. H. Hill should attack the right flank of the two corps on the Richmond side of the stream.


The Confederate forces for the movement consisted of twenty-seven brigades. Of these, twenty-three were concentrated for the attack upon the two corps of Keyes and Heintzelman, on the south side of the river near Fair Oaks station, on the line of the Richmond and Yorktown railroad. The other four brigades were employed in watching the river from New Bridge up to Meadow Bridge, to intercept any reinforcements.




JAMES LONGSTREET.



D. H. HILL.



A. P. HILL.



BENJAMIN HUGER.

CONFEDERATE GENERALS.

The attack was planned for the morning of May 31, but on account of the muddiness of the roads the movement could not be made till after noon. Casey's division of Keyes' corps was stationed about six miles from Richmond on the Williamsburg road, in front of a country tavern which stood near seven large pines. A mile away, near a little railway station, called Fair Oaks, was Couch's division of the same corps. Heintzelman and Kearney both held the Williamsburg road, two or three miles from Seven Pines. This position, which was at the junction of the Williamsburg and Nine Mile roads, was deemed important; and a line of defense consisting of rifle-pits, the commencement of a redoubt, and trees felled as abatis, was hastily constructed. The entire defensive force, at the attacking point, consisted of about 8020 men of Casey's First and Second Division, Fourth Corps.

1862
May 31-
June 1

Attack to
be on
Casey's
division

On the night of the 30th occurred one of the most fearful tempests of rain and wind that had been known for many years. The bridges that McClellan had been constructing were swept away, the streams overflowed their banks, and the low-lying lands along the river were covered with water. Notwithstanding, two Confederate divisions under Longstreet and D. H. Hill made a desperate attack on Casey in the afternoon, drove him back upon Couch's line at Seven Pines, and captured six of his guns. About half-past four, part of Kearney's division arrived on the scene, but its ranks were soon broken. The fighting was

The
storm of
May 30

1862
May 31-
June 1

Casey
driven
back

furious. Many of the Union officers were killed or wounded, several batteries were disabled and the horses killed. Reinforcements had been sent for; but their coming was delayed, and it was not until two hours after the despatch of the messenger that relief came. At that time Berry's and Jamison's brigades of Kearney's division arrived. Casey had been pushed backward upon Couch's lines, and the Confederate sharpshooters had gained a position where they could pick off the gunners of the Union batteries.

Attacks
on flanks

Heintzelman now came up; but Longstreet was attacking not only in front, but on the right and left flank and fresh bodies of Confederate troops were constantly arriving. The sound of the guns reaching McClellan, he ordered Sumner to reinforce Casey as rapidly as possible. Fortunately a temporary bridge had been constructed across the river; and over this Sumner hurried Sedgwick's division to the scene of battle. The combined forces of Longstreet and Hill had made desperate efforts to turn the Union left, but were unable to do so. Their plan was,—and it came near succeeding,—to get between the left and the Chickahominy and obtain possession of Bottom's Bridge. If this plan could have been carried out, the whole left wing would have been obliged to surrender; that it was not, was due as much to the lack of co-operation on the part of the Confederates as to the stubborn defense of the Federals.

Failure
to co-
operate

Sedgwick's division, with twenty-four Napoleon guns, lined up on the Bottom's Bridge road,



FAIR OAKS, VA.



BEGINNING OF A BATTLE AT FORT SUMNER, NEAR FAIR OAKS.

flanking the oncoming Confederate columns, which felt victory already within their grasp. No body of living men could have withstood the terrible fire poured into their ranks. Their triumphant march was checked; the column wavered, then rallied, wavered again, and at last broke and fell back in disorder upon Fair Oaks station. At this juncture of the fight, General Johnston was struck by a bullet in the shoulder, and a moment afterwards, by the fragment of a shell; and was severely, though not dangerously, wounded. The command then devolved upon General Gustavus Smith.

1862
May 31-
June 1

Enemy
checked
by
artillery

Night fell, and neither side had achieved a victory. The Confederates had forced the Federal centre from its position, but had not defeated it, and had been balked of its main purpose. The closing movement of the day had been disastrous to them, and their forces were in a state of confusion. Some of the Union regiments were composed of undisciplined recruits, who had never before been in battle, and could not be controlled by their officers. Wessell's brigade of Casey's division lost heavily. It was enveloped by superior numbers and enfiladed on both flanks, and finally was driven from its position back to Savage's station.

Situation
at the
close
of day

About five o'clock in the afternoon, the left and centre, where the hardest fighting had taken place, began to give way. Generals Keyes and Heintzelman in person rode along the weakening line, urging and encouraging the men to stand

1862
May 31-
June 1

Severe
losses

their ground while a new line was being organized in the rear. This was composed of companies, regiments, and parts of regiments, fragments of divisions and brigades which had lost their integrity during the battle. They represented the commands of Casey, Couch, Heintzelman, Kearney, and Birney. The contest ceased at half-past six, and both sides rested on their arms to resume the struggle the following day. On the Confederate side, the loss during the day was 1283 killed and wounded. General Pettigrew was wounded and taken prisoner, General Hampton was wounded, and General Hatton killed. On the Union side the losses were severe.

Con-
federate
advance

The next morning the attack of the Confederates was renewed, without any apparent understanding or harmony among the leaders. Many of the regiments seemed to have lost heart by the wounding of Johnston. The fight began about sunrise. The whole Confederate line moved forward without any skirmishers in advance. The fire was very heavy on both sides. About eight o'clock the Confederates fell back; but after a brief time, having received reinforcements, they renewed the contest. A little after nine o'clock French's division, which had borne the brunt of the fight, charged upon their left and rear, compelling them to fall back. Again and again they attempted to take the offensive, but finally retreated in confusion. General Sickles, in his report of the advances on June 1, says that the fields were strewn with Enfield rifles and muskets,

thrown away by Longstreet's soldiers in their sudden retreat. The movement, which began with every prospect of success, had ended in disaster, and the troops which on the night of May 31 encamped on ground won from the Federals, streamed into Richmond on the night of June 1 disorganized and disheartened.

1862
June 1

Con-
federate
retreat

The Prince De Joinville, who was on the ground and watched the various movements of the contending forces, asks in his book, "What now would have happened if, instead of 15,000 men whom Sumner had brought, the whole right wing, 50,000, had crossed?" Later that night, the idea of throwing bridges across the stream and crossing the entire Federal army was suggested and discussed. The suggestion came too late. Heavy rain had fallen during the night. The river rose so high that both banks were flooded, and the entire valley was covered with water one or two feet deep, and the crossing was impossible.

Union
advance
proposed

On the 3d of June Hooker's division reached a point only four miles from Richmond, but was ordered the next day by McClellan to withdraw. It was believed by some military critics that a successful advance could have been made at that time on the Confederate capital. McClellan referred to this in his report to the War Department.

Four
miles to
Rich-
mond

"The only available means," he says, "of uniting our forces at Fair Oaks for an advance on Richmond, soon after the battle, was to march the troops from Mechanicsville and through points on the left bank of the Chickahominy down to Bottom's Bridge, and thence over the Williamsburg road

1862

Why the
army did
not go
forward

to the position near Fair Oaks, a distance of about twenty-three miles. In the condition of the roads at that time, this march could not have been made with artillery in less than two days. By that time the enemy would have been secure with his intrenchments around Richmond. In short, the idea of uniting the two wings of the army in time to make a vigorous pursuit of the enemy, with the prospect of overtaking him before he reached Richmond, only five miles distance from the field of battle, is simply absurd; and was, I presume, never for a moment seriously entertained by any one connected with the Army of the Potomac. An advance involved the separation of the two wings by the impassable Chickahominy, and would have exposed each to defeat in detail; therefore I held the position already gained, and completed our crossing as rapidly as possible. In the mean time, the troops at Fair Oaks were directed to strengthen their position by a strong line of intrenchments, which protected them while the bridges were being built, gave security to the trains, liberated a larger fighting force, and offered a safer retreat in the event of disaster."

Lee
placed in
command

After the battle of Fair Oaks, the command of the Confederate army was given to General Lee, who was commissioned General-in-Chief, an office especially created for him. Up to this time, Richmond had been inadequately fortified against attack. General Lee now proposed a regular system of defense, by the erection of earth-works about the city which might be defended by a minimum force. This would enable him to mass his army, throw it against McClellan, and break his connections with York River. He had taken the measure of McClellan; and while giving him credit for his skill in organization and military



ROBERT E. LEE, IN MIDDLE AGE.



ROBERT E. LEE, IN OLD AGE.

engineering, he recognized just as fully his indecision and dilatoriness.

While "Stonewall" Jackson was hurrying from the valley, and the lesser important organizations from other places, the Richmond papers reported that large reinforcements were being sent from Richmond to Jackson. Lee knew that McClellan depended upon the Confederate journals for information; and it was not until the latter part of June that the latter discovered that he had been played upon, and that while he had been building bridges and making preparations for an advance, rapid concentration of the Confederate troops had been going on, and that Jackson, instead of being encamped near Winchester, was making ready to attack his rear. He at once took alarm, and telegraphed to the Secretary of War that he was about to be assailed by the entire Confederate army of 200,000 men; adding: "I will do all that a general can do, with the splendid army I have the honor to command, and if it is destroyed by overwhelming numbers, can at least die with it and share its fate. But if the result of the action is disaster, the responsibility cannot be thrown on my shoulders; it must rest where it belongs. I feel that there is no use in again asking for reinforcements." McClellan's force was now 156,838, of whom 115,102 were present for duty; the Confederate forces amounted to about 80,000 men. There were no overwhelming numbers to destroy the Union army, and no one but himself ever supposed there were, nor did he ever expose himself

1862
May-
June

Con-
federate
forces
massed

McClel-
lan
demands
reinforce
ments

1862
June
12-15


in action, or run any risk of dying with or for the army of which he was commander.

Stuart's
brilliant
qualities

It was known to General Lee that the Federals had been throwing up extensive earthworks; and desirous of knowing their strength and extent, ordered a cavalry expedition, under General J. E. B. Stuart, to find out. Stuart was a West-Pointer, and at the time of the breaking out of the war, was a lieutenant in the regular army. When Virginia seceded, he resigned his position and was at once appointed a colonel of cavalry in the Confederate army. He was only twenty-seven years old at the time, adventurous and reckless, fond of display, and was always dressed in the gayest of uniforms. Social, generous, and brave, accomplished in many ways, brimming over with vitality, he was a favorite with every one. It was said that he never drank, never uttered an oath, nor permitted any profanity or loose talk at his headquarters. He was the true type of a southern cavalier, and no man could have been better assigned for the dangerous duty assigned him.

The raid
begun

On the night of June 12, he started out from Richmond with 1200 cavalry and two field pieces. From Richmond he rode north, then east, sweeping round McClellan's right flank to Hanover Court-House, where a small detachment of Federal cavalry was met and scattered. Turning to the right, he met with stronger resistance at Old Church, where a detachment of Union cavalry with a regiment of infantry was scattered. At Tunstall station, he cut the telegraph wires and seized a



GENERAL J. E. B. STUART AND MAP OF THE RAID AROUND RICHMOND.

quantity of Federal supplies, and made an attempt to block the road at that station; but time pressed, and as he feared being cut off by troops in his rear, their work was left unfinished. It was not the original intention to push the raid so far, but Stuart felt sure that a large force would soon be at his heels; and he made a sudden determination to keep on to the south, and when safely in the rear of the Federal army, to strike across to the James and follow its banks north, back to Richmond. At several places along the route, horses and prisoners were captured.

1862
June
12-15

As the raiders were on the east side of the Chickahominy, it was necessary to cross the stream before they could be sure of being safe. At Sycamore Ford, they found the river so swollen by the rains that crossing was impossible. Stuart, who was well acquainted with the country, turned down-stream a few miles to a place where there was an old stone bridge; but when he arrived, it was found that the bridge had been swept away and only the abutments were left. There was an old storehouse near the spot. Stuart ordered his men to tear it down; and in an hour's time a substantial bridge had been made, over which the force crossed. Hardly had the rear-guard disappeared on the other side, when a large body of Union cavalry galloped down to the bank. But Stuart was safe, and on Sunday night, June 15, he entered Richmond from the south, giving Lee valuable information, resulting in the attack a few days later on McClellan's army on the north side of the Chickahominy.

Stuart's
safe
return to
Rich-
mond

1862
June

McClel-
lan fears
an over-
whelm-
ing force

No force could prevent cavalry dashes in its rear; but McClellan had no doubt that a great Confederate corps, 50,000 men at least, would be at once flung on him, while another of double his own numbers attacked him in front. He must therefore immediately strengthen his works on the right, retreat, or submit to a battle outside his intrenchments. It was clear to him that the communications with his base of supplies at White House could no longer be safely held: as always, it was the lack of McDowell's corps which not only made it impossible, but prevented his taking Richmond at once. In his view, if he were to concentrate his force on the north bank of the Chickahominy, it would have the effect of a public abandonment of his plans for the capture of Richmond, and would mean a humiliating and disastrous retreat to Yorktown. On the other hand, if he should concentrate on the south bank, he would lose his communications with White House, and be obliged to attempt a change of base by a movement through a section of country beset with difficulties. He determined to change it from the York to the James. It was seventeen miles thence from Fair Oaks, and the single road over which the army must pass was cut by many ways radiating from Richmond, offering abundant opportunities for Confederate flank assaults. Full information as to the topography was gained by cavalry scouts; but he resolved to wait a few days longer in hope of McDowell's arrival.

Decides
to change
his base

Meantime new and stronger works were thrown up on the right. These field works, mounted with

heavy guns and a line of rifle-pits, commanded the roads and fields on the west bank of Beaver Dam Creek, a small stream running parallel with the Federal lines. The infantry outposts and their supporters were instructed, if attacked or threatened by superior forces, to fall back and leave the approaches open for the fire of the artillery. Trees were felled to obstruct the ways against the sudden attack of any force upon the flank or rear of the right wing. Cooke's cavalry at Cold Harbor guarded the rear of the right, while Morell's and Sykes' divisions were placed so as to cover the bridge crossings and be able to move quickly upon any point threatened by the enemy.

1862
June 26

Strengtn
of the
Union
position

Early on the morning of the 26th, it was apparent that the Confederates in front had received large reinforcements, and that they intended to cross the river at Meadow Bridge, in Mechanicsville. At the same time, reports were brought in that large masses of troops were marching in column from the north. It was plain that a large force of the Confederate army was to be turned against the Union right, with a view to its complete destruction. The position held by the Union army was very strong. The banks of the stream, along the valley, were rough and steep. The stream itself was over waist deep and bordered by swamps. There were but two places where it was practicable for artillery to cross,—the bridge at Ellerson's Mill and one near Mechanicsville. Troops marching over the roads and adjacent plains were exposed to both infantry and artillery fire.

Attack on
the Union
right

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June 26

Defeat of
Con-
federates

The approach of the enemy was announced at two o'clock in the afternoon by the boom of a single cannon at Mechanicsville, the signal agreed upon. An hour later, the divisions of Longstreet, D. H. Hill and A. P. Hill crossed the Chickahominy, pushed the outposts before them, and advanced on the Union works. One division advanced on Ellerson's Mill, the other two moved along the valley to Beaver Dam Creek. This last body was apparently unaware of its nearness to the Federal intrenchments. While less than a quarter of a mile away, the Union batteries opened upon it with rapid volleys, while there was a continuous line of fire from the infantry in the rifle pits. The road and the hillside, in a few minutes' time, were covered with hundreds of dead and wounded, the survivors breaking ranks and hurrying back to Mechanicsville. The forces directed against Ellerson's Mill suffered even more disastrously. After one or two repulses, reinforced by a brigade, they made a desperate attack, some almost reaching the intrenchments. They were repulsed, however, with terrible slaughter. The Federal loss was about 250 out of the 5000 engaged, while that of the Confederates was nearly 2000 out of an attacking force of 10,000.

Line of
battle
shifted

Immediately after the battle, with the knowledge that Jackson had arrived and would join in the attack the following day, it was decided to withdraw from Beaver Dam Creek, and select a new line of battle in a more advantageous location. The place selected was six miles from Beaver Dam Creek at Gaines' Mill. The movement commenced

about three o'clock in the morning, and was rapidly executed. The front of the new line of defenses consisted of wet bottom land, with deep pools and swamps, making a front attack almost impossible. The intrenchments occupied higher ground, with ravines in the rear. The line of battle was a half-circle, the right and left being in the valley of the Chickahominy with the centre on higher ground. The forces which were to defend this position consisted of Porter's Fifth Corps, composed of Sykes' and Morell's divisions of three brigades each; Berdan's First United States Sharpshooters, armed with breech-loading rifles; and a support of several batteries of artillery, with McCall's division withdrawn from Mechanicsville. the position occupied by Sykes' division was a hill some sixty feet high, over which Johnston's troops were obliged to march for some distance in face of the fire of the sharpshooters. The infantry line occupied the slope of the hill, behind light and hastily constructed barricades.

The Confederates had followed Porter slowly, and he had reached his lines of defense on the hills before they made their attack. About two o'clock in the afternoon the battle began on the right side of the Union line; but many of Hill's troops, being recruits and never under fire before, were repulsed and driven back with great loss. Longstreet then fiercely attacked the Union left, and "Stonewall" Jackson and D. H. Hill threw themselves against the centre. For two hours the battle raged all along the whole line. The fire from the Union side was

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Porter's
position
and
forces

The
attack
begun

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terrible; and Longstreet believed during the whole afternoon that the entire army of the Potomac was in his front. Soon after four o'clock the Confederate fire ceased. The natural inference was that the Confederate troops were being massed for an overwhelming attack; in consequence, the Union front line was concentrated, and arranged to meet it should it come.

A second
desperate
effort

The silence lasted but a short time, when a desperate attack was made against the entire front. Bodies of Confederate infantry, from the direction of Old Cold Harbor, were continually arriving, and under cover of artillery directed their attacks upon Sykes' division and Martindale's battery. Other regiments approaching from the west were hurled against Martindale and Butterfield. All these attacks were successfully repelled. At four o'clock, General Slocum arrived with his division; and in fortunate time, as the reserves were exhausted. His brigades were separated, and sent to different points where they were most needed. On the right, Jackson's men captured a Federal battery and advanced a line of infantry. Sykes ordered a charge, and the Sixteenth New York retook the battery without loss.

Porter
with-
draws at
night

At six o'clock another silence occurred, when a final attack was made. It was a last desperate effort. Brigade after brigade was thrown in rapid succession against the Union ranks. Defeat under these conditions seemed almost certain; but even this last attack was successfully repulsed, and the large battalions were driven back with immense

loss. Only in one place was the line broken, and that but for a short time. The troops at this point fell back in order, but were compelled to leave two guns and a battery. They soon rallied, however, and re-formed their broken ranks. Porter had asked for all the reinforcements McClellan could spare; but General Magruder, in command of the Confederate troops at Richmond, impressed him with the idea that he had a very much larger number of men than was the fact, and he was afraid to weaken his forces.

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Porter's
gallant
defense

By these means, the 28,000 Confederates in Richmond held 70,000 Union troops in check on one side of the Chickahominy, while 60,000 Confederate troops fought 35,000 troops on the other side. At about five o'clock, Jackson massed his men, scaled the height on the Union left, and captured fourteen guns. In all, twenty-two guns were lost during the fight. Early in the evening, McClellan ordered Porter to withdraw to the south bank of the Chickahominy and destroy the bridges after him. The order was at once carried out, and the men were safely withdrawn. The losses on the Union side were about 6000 killed and wounded, and 2000 taken prisoners. The Confederate loss was something less. And here occurred another of McClellan's lost opportunities. General Magruder, writing after the war, said: "Had McClellan massed his whole force in column, and advanced it against any point in our line of battle, though the head of his column would have suffered greatly, its momentum would have insured him

McClel-
lan's
lost op-
portunity

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June

success; and the occupation of our works about Richmond, and consequently of the city, might have been his reward."

Change of
base con-
tinued

Both Lee and Jackson believed that McClellan would still try to hold his line of supply by White House; and that if he fell back, it would be by the route over which he had come. General Ewell therefore, with a strong cavalry force and a brigade, moved on the north side of the Chickahominy to Dispatch Station and destroyed a portion of the railroad track, moving from there to Bottom's Bridge. Simultaneously, McClellan's movement for a change of base was being put into execution. Casey's troops were ordered from White House to the new base on the James. All the material that could not be taken on the transports was burned; the engines and cars were run into the river, 5000 army wagons loaded with supplies were sent over the road across White Oak Swamp, the reserve artillery was also taken over the same road, and 2500 head of live cattle brought up the rear. Everything that could not be carried was destroyed. One hundred tons of ammunition and shells were thrown into the Chickahominy. The uncertainty of the Confederate commander as to McClellan's movements gave the latter twenty-four hours to carry out his plans; and when these became known, the retreat was too well advanced for effective interference.

On the 29th of June, headquarters were moved from Savage's Station, and the works at Fair Oaks abandoned. On the morning of that day,

Sumner's and Heintzelman's corps were stationed at the Allen Farm, their forces fronting Richmond across the railroad. Here were also the forces of Sedgwick, French, Caldwell, and Brooks, with four pieces of Hazard's battery. This force was attacked by Griffith's brigade and Jones' division from Richmond, which were repulsed three times, but without any considerable loss on either side. Magruder sent for reinforcements, which he failed to receive, and withdrew. Sumner then fell back on Savage's Station. Jackson with his entire force followed the retreating Union column through White Oak Swamp, on the morning of June 30. He found the bridge destroyed, however, and a Union brigade had planted batteries which commanded the bridge site so that it was impossible to rebuild it. He attempted to force a passage, but was repulsed.

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June 29

Minor
engage-
ments

At the same time, Longstreet and A. P. Hill were moving rapidly over a road west of the swamp, which crossed that over which the Union army was retreating. The intent was to strike the column in flank, and delay the march until Jackson could come up. The attack began about three o'clock, and was directed with furious violence against the division of General McCall, which numbered about 6000 men. A heavy column of the enemy fell upon Seymour's brigade. Two German batteries were driven to the rear. McCall sent them back to their position, but the guns were soon after abandoned by the cannoneers. Constant charges upon the Union line were made, which

Attacks
upon the
Union
lines

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June 30

were as often repulsed. The Third and Tenth Pennsylvania regiments charged a rebel battery, and captured 100 prisoners.

Fierce
fight for
Randol's
battery

One of the incidents of the fight was a charge on Randol's battery. A Confederate brigade, formed in wedge shape, made a dash for his guns. As they approached, the discharge tore great gaps in their column, but did not suffice to check its onward rush. The yelling mass swept swiftly up to the guns, overturned them, and shot the horses. A fierce bayonet fight followed. The charge had broken McCall's right. At the same time an assault was made on Kearney's line. In his front the sloping ground was swept by his batteries, and the advancing host was mowed down in ranks. Despite the slaughter, they still pushed on. The Sixty-third Pennsylvania and Thirty-seventh New York advanced to the line of the guns, and opened on the attacking force with such rapid volleys that it at last broke and retreated. At three different times during the afternoon, this attempt to seize the guns was repeated and as often repulsed. Toward night, while it was growing dark in the woods, General McCall rode forward to form a new line; but took the wrong direction and fell in with a company of the Forty-seventh Virginia, by whom he was taken prisoner. In this battle General George G. Meade, afterwards commander-in-chief of the Army of the Potomac, was severely wounded.

Just before noon of June 30, Sykes' division reached the plateau of Malvern Hill, where the



MALVERN HILL.



GAINES MILL.

artillery was immediately placed so as to control the approaches in front. The Confederate Generals Holmes and Wise, who were posted between Richmond and Malvern Hill, saw the Union troops moving in great disorder, as they supposed, and were eager to attack them. With a corps of 7000 men and six batteries, they hurried in pursuit. By advice of General Lee, they planted a battery of six rifled guns within 800 yards of the hill, with infantry and cavalry support. Before they could unlimber their guns, the Federals opened upon them with thirty pieces, while one of the gunboats began dropping shells among the infantry. Within ten minutes the battery was destroyed, and two caissons were blown up; the gunners and cavalry rushed to the rear in a panic,—riding over the infantry, who were not slow to follow them. The 30th of June was certainly a day of events, and often termed a critical one. The Union army successfully repulsed three separate attacks on its flank and rear, made a long and tiresome march in face of great difficulties, and secured a position equally advantageous for offense or defense.

In his official report, referring to the criticisms on his change of base, General McClellan said:

“It may be asked why, after the concentration of our forces on the right bank of the Chickahominy, with a large number of the enemy drawn away from Richmond upon the opposite side, I did not, instead of striking for James River fifteen miles below that place, at once march directly on Richmond. It will be remembered that at this juncture the enemy was on our rear, and there was every reason to

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June 30.
July 1

First
attack on
the hill
repulsed

1862
July

believe that he would sever our communications with the supply depot at the White House. We had on hand but a limited supply of rations, and if we had advanced directly on Richmond, it would have required considerable time to carry the strong works around that place, during which our men would have been destitute of food; and even if Richmond had fallen before our arms, the enemy could still have occupied our supply communications between that place and the gunboats, and turned the disaster into victory. If, on the other hand, the enemy had concentrated all his forces at Richmond during the progress of our attack, and we had been defeated, we must in all probability have lost our trains before reaching the flotilla."

McClellan's arguments against an advance

It will be noted that this defense is based on McClellan's invincible belief in limitless Confederate battalions, able to execute any number of irresistible movements in all directions at once, while the Union forces stood helplessly around. Scott had scouted this because the Confederacy had no means of raising them. McClellan's officers argued against it, and his intelligence department gave constant and decisive evidence to the contrary; but neither facts nor others' judgment availed an iota to shake his confident apprehensions. The lack of McDowell's corps was the scapegoat on which he loaded every failure to act; but there is no reason to suppose that if received, he would have effected a single movement other than he made as it was.

Malvern Hill, the position selected for resisting the further advances of the enemy, is a plateau on the left bank of the James River, about sixty

feet in height. The summit is about a mile and a half in length and three-quarters of a mile in width, well cleared of timber, with open fields and several converging roads running over it. In front are numerous ravines; and the ground slopes gradually toward the north and east, giving clear ranges for artillery. On the south and east, the position is guarded by the curving river and the thick undergrowth. The western side is protected by forests and swamps, making it very difficult for the movement of cavalry and artillery. The slopes of the hill were admirably adapted for tactical movements.

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Nature
of the
ground

General McClellan had selected positions for the various corps before their arrival. These were directed and placed on the ground by General A. A. Humphrey, who had made a thorough examination of the locality the day before. The line of the army was in the form of a huge semicircle, its wings resting on the river, the right being at Haxall's, where it was protected by the fire of the gunboats. It seemed probable, from the position of the enemy, that his principal attack would come from the direction of Richmond and White Oak Swamp, and would consequently strike the left wing. The lines in that place were strengthened, therefore, by massing the troops and collecting there the principal part of the artillery. Porter's corps held the left of the line, with Sykes' division on the left and Morell's on the right, with the artillery of his two divisions advantageously posted; while the artillery of the

Sup-
ported by
gunboats

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reserve was so disposed on the high ground, that the concentrated fire of some sixty guns could be brought to bear on any point in its front or left. Colonel Tyler had ten of his siege guns in position on the highest point of the hill. Martindale's brigade was north of the Richmond road, and Butterfield's in its rear, on the south side of the Richmond road.

Forma-
tion of
the line
of battle

General Griffith had command of all the artillery on the left, and the Fourteenth New York Volunteers, with a section of Weeden's battery, was watching that flank. McCall's division was in rear of Porter, and Couch was placed on the right of Porter. Next to Couch, on the right came Kearney and Hooker, then Sedgwick and Richardson, then Smith and Slocum, then part of Keyes' corps extending nearly to the river. The Peninsula Reserve Corps was held in reserve just behind Porter's and Couch's position. One brigade of Porter's was thrown to the left on the low ground, to save that flank from any movement over the Richmond road. Near Hooker was Sumner's corps, prolonged until it met that of Franklin. The bridge at Carter's Mill and that of Haxall's were guarded by Keyes with Peck's division. This position was most favorable for the use of artillery.

The line was very strong along the whole front of the open plateau; but from that point to the extreme right the troops were more deployed. The right was made stronger by cutting down trees and barricading the roads. Commodore

Rodgers commanded the flotilla on James River, placing his gunboats in position so as to protect the flanks and command the approaches from Richmond. In front of some parts of the line, trenches had been cut; but they were hardly deep enough to be called rifle-pits. There were no intrenchments whatever, the inequality of the ground serving as sufficient cover to the batteries. McClellan had his headquarters in what was called Crew House, on the summit of the plateau, from whence he could overlook the movements of the enemy.

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Defenses
of the
Union
lines

General Lee, who was in personal command of the Confederate forces, had organized the attack with Jackson and D. H. Hill on his right, Whiting on his left, a part of Ewell's corps keeping the interval, with Jackson's division in reserve. Two of Huger's brigades were formed next to Hill; Magruder on his right, with his own and one of Magruder's brigades. The signal for advance was to be a yell by Armistead's brigade, which was to take the lead. About one in the afternoon of July 1, the two divisions of Whiting and D. H. Hill advanced over the plain at the foot of the hill, and were met with a sharp artillery fire. During the whole morning there had been constant firing, though without any heavy attack. Small bodies of the enemy would occasionally emerge from the woods, and approach near enough to fire upon the gunners; but at every such movement they were speedily dispersed by the concentrated fire of the batteries. At about three o'clock

Plan of
the
attack

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a heavy artillery fire opened on Kearney's left, followed by an infantry attack. Couch's infantry remained lying on the ground until the advancing column was within short musket range, when they sprang to their feet and poured in a volley that drove the attacking forces back to their own ground. Couch took immediate advantage and pushed the right of his line half a mile to the front, where there was a thick clump of trees, forming a much stronger position.

Desper-
ate final
assault
repulsed

About four o'clock the firing ceased along the whole front. Preparations were evidently making for an attack. At six o'clock the whole strength of the Confederate artillery was suddenly opened upon Couch and Porter. Under cover of this an attempt was made to carry the hill by assault. Brigade after brigade formed under cover of the woods, and charged at a run across the open fields and up the slope to seize the batteries; but the rapid fire of the Union guns, with a steady volley of the infantry, at every attempt sent them back to shelter, and covered the ground with their dead and wounded. Several times the infantry withheld their fire until the attacking column had nearly reached the Union lines; then, pouring in a single volley, they dashed forward with the bayonet, capturing prisoners and colors, and driving back the broken columns in confusion. Until dark the enemy persisted in his efforts to take the position so tenaciously defended; but despite his vastly superior numbers, his repeated and desperate attacks were repulsed with fear-

ful loss. The battle continued until nine o'clock. The Confederates had been repulsed at all points with a loss double that of the Federals. Neither Jackson nor Longstreet nor A. P. Hill had taken part in this attack; the battle had been fought by D. H. Hill and Magruder.

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In describing the battle, General Hill says: "I never saw anything more grandly heroic than the advance after sunset of the nine brigades under Magruder's orders. Unfortunately they did not move together, and were beaten in detail. As each brigade emerged from the woods, from fifty to one hundred guns opened upon it, tearing great gaps in its ranks; but the heroes reeled on and were shot down by the reserves at the guns, which a few squads reached. Most of them had an open field half a mile wide to cross, under the fire of field artillery in front and the fire of the heavy ordnance of the gunboats in their rear. It was not war, it was murder." Magruder went into battle with 26,000 men; his loss was 2900. Out of 6500 in Hill's division, the loss was 2000. On the Union side the burden of the battle was borne by Couch's division of Keyes' corps, and Morell's of Porter's corps.

Hill's
descrip-
tion of
the
battle

Although the result of the battle was a victory for the Union forces, McClellan deemed it necessary to make a second retreat, in order to secure a position more easy of defense and which could be more easily reached by transports. Harrison's Bar, seven miles below Malvern Hill, on the James, was selected as that position. Orders were

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The
baggage
with-
drawn

given for an immediate movement. The order prescribed a movement by the left and rear, General Keyes' corps to cover the manoeuvre. Vigorous preparations at once began for covering the movement of the entire army and protecting the trains. It being evident that the immense number of wagons and artillery carriages belonging to the army could not move with celerity along a single road, General Keyes laid out new ones wherever the ground would permit. The trains were well closed up, and the march was so directed that the troops could move on either side of the road, so that the passage would not be obstructed. When it is understood that the carriages and teams in use by the army, stretched out in one line, would extend not far from forty miles, the energy and caution necessary for their safe withdrawal in presence of the enemy will be appreciated. The last of the wagons did not reach the site selected until after dark on the 3d of July.

Discour-
agement
of the
army

The withdrawal of the army from Malvern Hill, a position that seemed to be impregnable, was a surprise to the men in the ranks; and for the first time in the campaign they became discouraged. During their retreat, the night following the battle, there was a furious rainstorm; and when the tired regiments reached Harrison's Landing they were thoroughly soaked. The passage of the wagons and the tramp of men had converted the wet soil into mud, and nowhere could tents be pitched on solid ground. Many of the men had not had food in forty-eight hours. The

rain continued all night. The soil would not hold the tent-pins, and in the morning nearly every tent was flat, exposing the men, whose beds were sinking deeper and deeper in the mud under the pelting rain; and yet most of them were so thoroughly worn out that they slept heavily, and could hardly be awakened to eat. A day or two later, when the clouds had cleared and the sun had dried the soil, the tents were pitched on the high ground about Harrison's Landing, making an intrenched camp several miles in extent.

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The
encamp-
ment

The terrible strain imposed upon the men, the malarial character of the regions about Richmond and particularly in the camps along the Chickahominy, the lack of proper food, the want of rest, the excitement of battle, and the terrible heat, were the varying causes of an immense amount of sickness and death: 6000 sick were sent away soon after the army reached Harrison's Landing, with 12,000 still remaining in camp hospitals. And here came in the good work of the Sanitary Commission, which brought tents, food, medical supplies, and competent nurses.

Sickness
in camp

The retreat of the army from Malvern Hill was closely followed by Hill and Jackson, with Lee in command. At Harrison's Landing, skirmish lines were thrown out, and Hill ordered an advance. Jackson, however, contrary to his usual policy of aggression, urged Hill to wait until the arrival of General Lee. When Lee came, he carefully considered the position of the army and their gunboats, and decided that an attack would

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A Union
defeat

be unwise. The skirmish lines were therefore withdrawn; and two days later the entire Confederate army in Virginia was gathered within its old lines around Richmond. The result of the seven days' fighting, though success was with the Federal arms in every instance but one, was rightly viewed in sum as a Confederate victory, for the Union plans were wholly foiled. Its fruits were the relief of Richmond, the capture of 9000 prisoners, 52 pieces of artillery, 35,000 stand of arms, and many military stores. The Confederate loss in killed and wounded was 19,000.

McClel-
lan's call
for help

On the day of the battle, McClellan telegraphed for reinforcements of 50,000 men. As soon as he reached Harrison's Landing, two days later, he wrote to the Secretary of War: "To accomplish the great task of capturing Richmond and putting an end to this rebellion, reinforcements should be sent me rather much over than much less than 100,000 men." He begged that men should be sent from Halleck's army; but that officer strongly protested, declaring that if his troops were sent to the Army of the Potomac he should be forced to retreat. McClellan still insisted; and Lincoln, at last out of patience, answered:

Lincoln's
reply

"Your dispatch of Tuesday morning induces me to hope your army is having some rest. In this hope, allow me to reason with you a moment. When you ask for 50,000 men to be promptly sent you, you surely labor under some gross mistake of fact. Recently you sent papers showing your disposal of forces made last spring for the defense of Washington, and advising a return to that plan. I find it included

in and about Washington 75,000 men. Now, please be assured I have not men enough to fill that very plan by 15,000. All of Fremont's in the village, all of Banks', all of McDowell's not with you, and all in Washington, taken together, do not exceed, if they reach, 60,000. With Wool and Dix added to those mentioned, I have not, outside of your army, 75,000 men east of the mountains. Thus the idea of sending you 50,000, or any other considerable force, promptly, is simply absurd. If, in your frequent mention of responsibility, you have the impression that I blame you for not doing more than you can, please be relieved of such impression. I only beg that in like manner you will not ask impossibilities of me."

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The reluctance to retreat from Malvern Hill was by no means confined to the men in the ranks. When the order was promulgated, General Kearney exclaimed, in a group of indignant officers, "I, Philip Kearney, an old soldier, enter my solemn protest against this order to retreat. We ought, instead of retreating, to follow up the enemy and take Richmond; and in full view of all the responsibility of such a declaration, I say to you all that such an order can only be prompted by cowardice or treason." The Committee of Congress on the Conduct of the War declared, "The retreat of the army from Malvern Hill to Harrison's Bar was precipitate." The troops, upon their arrival there, were huddled together in great confusion, the entire army being collected within a space of about three miles along the river. No orders were given the first day for keeping the heights which commanded the position, nor were the troops so placed as to be able to resist an attack by the enemy. Nothing but a heavy

Protests
against
retreat

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rain, which prevented the enemy from bringing up its artillery, apparently saved the army from destruction.

McClel-
lan again
under-
rates his
forces

After his arrival at Harrison's Landing, McClellan telegraphed to Stanton that he presumed he had not over 50,000 men left with their colors. There had been sent to the Peninsula nearly 160,000 men. Startled at this report, which would indicate a loss of 110,000 men, the President hastened to Harrison's Landing, to find, to his great relief, 86,000 men in camp. Three days after his retreat from Malvern Hill, McClellan sat down in the midst of his disorganized army and dictated the following extraordinary letter to the President, which proves that his mind was too much given up to matters outside his province for efficiency within it:

His re-
markable
letter to
Lincoln

"MR. PRESIDENT: You have been fully informed that the Rebel army is in our front, with the purpose of overwhelming us by attacking our positions or reducing us by blocking our river communication. I cannot but regard our condition as critical; and I earnestly desire, in view of possible contingencies, to lay before your Excellency, for your private consideration, my general view concerning the existing state of the rebellion. These views amount to convictions, and are deeply impressed on my mind and heart. Our cause must never be abandoned. It is the cause of free institutions and self-government. The Constitution must be preserved. Let neither military disaster, political faction, nor foreign war, shake your settled purpose to enforce the equal operation of the laws of the United States upon the people of every State. The time has come when the government must determine upon a civil and military policy, covering the whole ground

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McClellan's
view of
the
method
of conducting
the war

of our national trouble. The responsibility of determining, declaring and supporting such civil and military policy, and of directing the course of national affairs near to the rebellion, must now be assumed and exercised by you, or our cause will be lost. The Constitution gives you power sufficient even for the present terrible exigency. This rebellion has assumed the character of a war. As such it should be regarded, and it should be conducted upon the highest principles known to Christian civilization. It should not be a war looking to the subjugation of the people in any State, in any event. It should not be, at all, a war upon populations, or against armed forces and political organizations. Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial organization of States, or abolition of slavery, should be contemplated for a moment. In prosecuting the war, all private property and unarmed persons should be strictly protected, subject only to the necessity of military operations. All private property taken for military use should be paid or receipted for; pillage and waste should be treated as high crimes; all unnecessary trespass sternly prohibited. An offensive demeanor by the military, toward citizens, promptly rebuked. Military arrests should not be tolerated, except in places where active hostilities exist; and oaths not required by enactments constitutionally made should be neither demanded nor received. Military power should not be allowed to interfere with the relations of servitude, either by separating or impairing the authority of the master, except for repressing disorder, as in other cases. Slaves contraband under the act of Congress, seeking military protection, should receive it. A system of policy thus constitutional, and pervaded by the influences of Christianity and freedom, would receive the support of almost all truly loyal men, would deeply impress the rebel mass and all foreign nations, and it might be humbly hoped that it would commend itself to the favor of the Almighty. Unless the principles governing the future conduct of our struggle shall be made known and approved, the effort to retain requisite

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A
general-
in-chief
needed

forces will be almost hopeless. A declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present armies. The policy of the government must be supported by concentrations of military power. The national force should not be dispersed in expeditions, posts of occupation, and numerous armies, but should be mainly collected into mass and brought to bear upon the armies of the Confederate states. These armies thoroughly defeated, the political structure which they support would soon cease to exist. In carrying out any system of policy which you may form, you will require a general-in-chief of the army, one who possesses your confidence, understands your views, and who is competent to execute your orders by directing the military forces of the nation to the accomplishment of the objects by you proposed. I do not seek that place for myself. I am willing to serve you in such position as you may assign me, and will do so as faithfully as ever subordinate served superior.

“GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN, *Major-General.*”

Halleck
appointed

On July 23, Halleck—whose conduct of the Western Department had given him very great reputation with the government—was appointed general-in-chief of all the armies of the United States; and on the 3d of August, McClellan received peremptory orders from him to withdraw the entire Federal army to Acquia Creek. Against these orders McClellan vigorously protested, and in a long dispatch to Halleck stated his reasons for so doing in detail. They were to the effect that he was preparing for another grand movement, which he believed would be successful; that demoralization of the army would ensue; that it would depress the North, and would influence foreign powers to recognize the Confederacy. “It

is here," he declared, "that all our resources should be collected to strike the blow which will determine the fate of the Confederacy. Here is the true defense of Washington. I entreat that this order may be rescinded."

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As many writers, without a clear understanding of the conditions, have taken McClellan's point of view, and regarded the withdrawal of the army of the Peninsula as a blunder on the part of the government, it may be well in the interests of history to give Halleck's answer to these objections, which was doubtless inspired by the President, and which puts in a clear light the exact military conditions at that date, and betrays the waning faith of the Administration in the defeated leader. Said General Halleck in defense of his order:

"Allow me to allude to a few of the facts in the case. You and your officers at one interview estimated the enemy's forces in and around Richmond at 200,000 men. Since then, you and others report that they have received and are receiving large reinforcements from the South. General Pope's army covering Washington is only about 40,000. Your effective force is about 90,000. You are thirty miles from Richmond, and General Pope eighty or ninety, with the enemy directly between you, ready to fall with his superior numbers upon one or the other, as he may elect. Neither can reinforce the other in case of such an attack.

"If General Pope's army be diminished to reinforce you, Washington, Maryland, and Pennsylvania would be left uncovered and exposed. If your force be reduced to strengthen Pope, you would be too weak to even hold the position you now occupy should the enemy turn round and attack you in

**Halleck's
reasons
for
abandon-
ing the
Penin-
sula**

1862
August
The Army
of the
Potomac
divided

full force. In other words, the old Army of the Potomac is split into two parts, with the entire force of the enemy directly between them. They cannot be united by land without exposing both to destruction, and yet they must be united. To send Pope's forces by water to the Peninsula is, under present circumstances, a military impossibility. The only alternative is to send the forces on the Peninsula to some point by water, say Fredericksburg, where the two armies can be united.

McClellan's
reason-
ing
faulty

"Let me now allude to some of the objections which you have urged. You say that the withdrawal from the present position will cause the certain demoralization of the army, 'which is now in excellent discipline and condition.' I cannot understand why a simple change of position to a new and by no means distant base will demoralize an army in excellent discipline, unless the officers themselves assist in that demoralization, which I am satisfied they will not. Your change of front from your extreme right at Hanover Court-House to your present position was over thirty miles; but I have not heard that it demoralized your troops, notwithstanding the severe losses they sustained in effecting it. A new base on the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg brings you within about sixty miles of Richmond, and secures a reinforcement of 40,000 or 50,000 fresh and disciplined troops. The change, with such advantages, will, I think, if properly represented to your army, encourage rather than demoralize your troops. Moreover, you yourself suggested that a junction might be effected at Yorktown, but that a flank march across the isthmus would be more hazardous than to retire to Fort Monroe. You will remember that Yorktown is two or three miles farther than Fredericksburg is. Besides, the latter is between Richmond and Washington, and covers Washington from any attack of the enemy. The political effect of the withdrawal may at first be unfavorable; but I think the public are beginning to understand its necessity, and that they will have much more confidence in a united army than in its separated fragments.



MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK.



GENERAL JOHN SEDGWICK.

“But you will reply, ‘Why not reinforce me here, so that I can strike Richmond from my present position?’ To do this you said at our interview that you required 30,000 additional troops. I told you that it was impossible to give you so many. You finally thought that you would have ‘some chance’ of success with 20,000. But you afterward telegraphed me that you would require 35,000, as the enemy was being largely reinforced. If your estimate of the enemy’s strength was correct, your requisition was perfectly reasonable; but it was utterly impossible to fill it until new troops could be enlisted and organized, which would require several weeks. To keep your army in its present position until it could be so reinforced would almost destroy it in that climate. The months of August and September are almost fatal to whites who live on that part of James River; and even after you received the reinforcements asked for, you admitted that you must reduce Fort Darling and the river batteries before you could advance on Richmond. It is by no means certain that the reduction of these fortifications would not require considerable time, perhaps as much as those at Yorktown. This delay might not only be fatal to the health of your army, but in the mean time General Pope’s forces would be exposed to the heavy blows of the enemy without the slightest hope of assistance from you.

1862
August

Large
additions
im-
possible

Dangers
of the
climate

“In regard to the demoralizing effect of a withdrawal from the Peninsula to the Rappahannock, I must remark that a large number of your highest officers, indeed a majority of those whose opinions have been reported to me, are decidedly in favor of the movement. Even several of those who originally advocated the line of the Peninsula now advise its abandonment.

“I have not inquired, and do not wish to know, by whose advice or for what reasons the Army of the Potomac was separated into two parts, with the enemy between them. I must take things as I find them. I find the forces divided, and I wish to unite them. Only one feasible plan has been presented for doing this. If you or any one else had pre-

1862
Aug. 20

sented a better plan, I certainly should have adopted it. But all of your plans require reinforcements, but it is not so easy to give them when you have no disposable troops at your command. H. W. HALLECK, *Major-General.*"

Change
of base to
Acquia
Creek
begun

Plainly there was no room for further argument. McClellan, who thoroughly understood the duties of a subordinate in military matters, promptly began preparations for the removal of the army. After the commencement of the movement, it was continued with the utmost rapidity until all the troops and material were on the way, both by land and water, on the morning of the 16th. On the 20th the army was embarked at Yorktown, Fortress Monroe, and Newport News. The movement of the main body of the army on this march was covered by General Pleasonton, with his cavalry and light artillery. The march was made without interference, and not a shot was fired nor an enemy seen during the entire movement. On the 18th of August, McClellan sent General Halleck the following dispatch regarding his army:

"Please say a kind word to my army, that I can repeat to them in general orders, in regard to their conduct at Yorktown, Williamsburg, West Point, Hanover Court-House, and on the Chickahominy, as well as in regard to the seven days and the recent retreat. No one has ever said anything to cheer them but myself. Say nothing about me; merely give my men and officers credit for what they have done; it will do you much good and will strengthen you much with them if you issue a handsome order to them in regard to what they have accomplished. They deserve it."

With the retreat from Harrison's Landing ended the ill-conceived, ill-starred expedition of the Peninsula. Three months before, the Army of the Potomac, 100,000 strong, the best equipped and most splendidly armed military body ever brought together since Napoleon's time, sailed proudly down the Potomac, with flying banners, to the sound of martial music. From its first landing on the Peninsula, it was like a vast machine, powerful and capable, without any controlling hand. Its every movement was marked by indecision on the part of its head. At Yorktown, where a line of thirteen miles in length was defended by a force of only 11,000 Confederates, the Federal leader calmly sat down for a siege of the works instead of breaking through them. "No one but McClellan," wrote General J. E. Johnston afterwards, "could have hesitated to attack." In this month of waiting, the Confederates had ample time to reorganize their army and bring together their scattered forces. At Williamsburg, McClellan was absent from the field, and failed to assign the command to either of the corps commanders; so that the battle was fought without plan, and with confused orders, resulting in defeat and loss. His march from Williamsburg to the Chickahominy, even taking all its difficulties into consideration, was of excessive slowness, the advance being little more than three miles a day.

When, after the destruction of the *Virginia*, the Union gunboats went up the James, there was a panic in Richmond; and Confederate writers

1862
August

Strength
of the
army

McClellan's
fatal in-
decision

1862
August

Some of
McClel-
lan's
mistakes

have since acknowledged that a vigorous forward movement on the part of McClellan would have resulted in the capture of the city. Instead of making that movement, he went on quietly digging and bridge-building. He made the dangerous division of his army on both sides of the river; he was not present at the battles at Beaver Dam Creek, Gaines' Mills, Fair Oaks, or Savage's Station; he did not personally superintend the change of base he had organized, and its successful carrying out was wholly due to the good judgment and skill of his subordinate generals. Curiously, he seemed to take more pride in this retreat across the Peninsula than in any successes achieved by his troops in any battle. "When all the circumstances of the case are known," he wrote to the President, "it would be acknowledged by all competent judges that the movement just completed by this army is unparalleled in the annals of war."

The end

And this was the end. Thousands upon thousands of the flower of American manhood had sickened and died in the malarial swamps of the Chickahominy, and thousands more had watered with their blood the fields about Richmond, and all to no purpose.

CHAPTER LXXXVIII.

POPE'S CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA AND LEE'S INVASION OF MARYLAND

It had become evident to the administration, even before the Seven Days' battles, that the Union armies must be at once and largely increased. The conscription act of the Confederate government had filled the ranks of its armies with fresh men, and there was no doubt that an aggressive movement would soon be attempted. Prompt action was needed. It was thought best by the President before issuing a public call for troops, to confer with the governors and prominent men of the loyal States. Secretary Seward was entrusted with that duty, and proceeded at once to visit New York, Boston, Philadelphia, and Cleveland, furnished with a letter from the President in which the need of additional troops was made apparent. In this letter the President said: "I expect to maintain this contest until successful, or till I die, or am conquered, or till my term expires, or Congress or the country forsakes me; and I would publicly appeal to the country for this new force, were it not that I fear a general panic and stampede would follow, so hard is it to have a thing understood as it really is."

After consultation with many of the leading men in New York, Democrats and Republicans

1862

The support of the North obtained

1862
July

Letter to
the
govern-
ors of the
States

alike, Seward reported to the President that it was thought by all that the proper policy would be to issue a circular letter to the governors of the various States, setting forth the situation and asking for the needed number of men. On the second day of July, by previous arrangement, a letter from the governors appeared in the newspapers, asking the President to call upon the several States for men enough "to speedily crush the rebellion." As a result, a call was made, August 4, 1862, for a second army of 300,000 three years' men. Simultaneously came the news of McClellan's retreat from the front of Richmond, with his dispatch to Stanton, in which he spoke of "the sad remnant" of his army, and saying: "If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to any other persons in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army."

It was feared that the news would have a dispiriting effect upon the country, but fortunately it was the reverse. There had long been a feeling, however, among radical Republicans that the administration was not prosecuting the war with sufficient vigor. Loud calls had been made for the removal of McClellan, who was charged with vacillation, imbecility, and even treason. Never had the Union cause looked darker. Fully two months earlier it was plain that a new leader must be had, to supplement McClellan and perhaps be in training to replace him afterwards; one who could be trusted to act, and in whom the people as well as the soldiers would have confidence. The first choice

fell upon Major-General Burnside, who declined it. Hooker was considered, but he had not yet sufficiently proved his ability. Turning to the Army of the West, the President, after long deliberation, selected General John Pope as best fulfilling the demands of the position.

1862
June 27

Pope had done good service in Missouri, and at that time was in command of the army corps in the Department of the West known as the Army of the Mississippi, then forming the left wing of Halleck's army at Corinth. Pope was strongly averse to leaving the Army of the West, and so telegraphed to Halleck; who also objected to his removal, considering him as one of his most efficient subordinates. He was forced to obey the summons, however. On arriving at Washington, he at once reported to Secretary Stanton, who without any circumlocution told him that the President had decided to consolidate the separate forces of McDowell, Frémont, and Banks, into one organization, under the title of the Army of Virginia, and to give him its command. It was the plan to make such demonstration with this army in the direction of Gordonsville and Charlottesville as would draw off a considerable portion of the forces in front of McClellan, and distract the attention of the enemy in his front, thereby reducing the resistance to his advance upon Richmond.

Pope
brought
from the
West

To com-
mand the
Army of
Virginia

Pope at once recognized the difficulties of the position which was to be thrust upon him. It was really a sort of forlorn hope; and what made it more embarrassing still was the fact of his being

1862
June 27

Pope's ob-
jections
over-
ruled

called from the army of a different department, to command another of which the corps commanders were all his seniors in rank. He placed these objections before the Secretary, and begged to be permitted to return to his command in the West. The Secretary informed him that all these objections had been already considered, and that the country's good was to be regarded instead of private preference. In deference, therefore, to the wishes of the President and the Secretary, Pope submitted, but with great reluctance and forebodings. He saw that it was perfectly natural that the subordinate officers and the enlisted men of the corps under his command should be ill pleased at what would seem to them like an affront, in an officer strange to them and the country in which they were operating being called to supersede those whom they knew and had confidence in.

On the 27th of June, the consolidation of the Army of Virginia was effected and General Pope took command. Frémont at once sent in his resignation, refusing to serve under his junior. It was promptly accepted; and General Franz Sigel, a German officer, who had served with Pope in Missouri, was appointed in his place.

On the same day, according to the Official Records of the War, the strength of the Army of Virginia was as follows: Headquarters, 200; Sigel's corps (formerly Frémont's), 13,200; Banks', 12,100; McDowell's, 19,300; cavalry, 5800; making a total of 44,600, or 6000 more than General Pope's estimate. The cavalry was badly organized



GENERAL ALEXANDER POPE.



GENERAL PHILIP KEARNY.



GENERAL FRANZ SIGEL.



GENERAL FITZ-JOHN PORTER.

and armed, and was of very little service. The forces were widely scattered, and out of supporting distance of one another, while some of the divisions were in a disorganized and demoralized condition; this was especially true of those in Frémont's corps. Pope lost no time in bringing these forces in touch.

1862
July

The plan for weakening the Confederate army by a forward move of Pope's army was rudely shattered by the news that McClellan had begun his disastrous retreat to Harrison's Landing. The whole plan of the campaign was at once changed. It was plain that immediate measures must be adopted for the relief of the Army of the Potomac. Pope offered to march from Fredericksburg direct upon Richmond, on condition that McClellan should be peremptorily ordered to make a vigorous attack with his whole army the moment that his own army was engaged, and that measures should be taken in advance so that it would not be possible for him to evade such an order on any pretext. The move, however, was not deemed advisable.

McClellan's
retreat
inter-
feres

Before this, and when it was known to the President that McClellan intended retreating from the Chickahominy to the James, Pope strongly urged the President to order McClellan to mass his army on the north side of the Chickahominy and push forward to Hanover Court-House, where the two armies could combine. He showed that to retreat to James River was retreating from reinforcements, and that, besides, it gave the enemy the privilege and power of exchanging Richmond for

Pope
plans to
combine
the
armies

1862
July

Washington. The loss of Richmond, he argued, would be trifling; while the capture of Washington would mean not alone a defeat of the North, but an inglorious end of the war, since foreign governments would seize the pretext to at once recognize the Confederacy.

Pope's
appoint-
ment
criticised

The appointment of Pope was bitterly resented by McClellan and his entourage; and subsequent incidents showed that this feeling, on one or two vital occasions, seriously endangered the success of important movements. It was clearly apparent to the administration that in order to secure harmony between the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Virginia, there must be some military authority higher than either McClellan or Pope, to exercise command over both. At that time General Halleck held a high reputation as a strategist and executive officer. Although a West-Pointer, he had left the army soon after his graduation for the study of law. At the breaking out of the war he offered his services to the government, and it was under his general management that Kentucky and Tennessee had been recovered, and the Mississippi River cleared of obstructions from Cairo to Vicksburg. He was not, however, a practical soldier, but under the circumstances he was deemed the best available man for the place, and on the 11th of July was appointed general-in-chief of all the armies of the United States, assuming control two weeks later.

An office
general
in
command

It was soon evident that the principles upon which Pope proposed to conduct the campaign were decidedly different from those observed by

McClellan. His orders to the army directed that the troops should subsist on the country, and contributions for the subsistence of the cavalry be levied on villages and neighborhoods, vouchers being issued in all cases for the supplies so taken. This was common military use and need in all countries, and not exceptionable; but a supplementary special order was open to extreme divergence of opinion. The people of the country through which he proposed to move were "notified that they will be held responsible for any injury done to the track, line, or road, or for any attacks upon trains or straggling soldiers by bands of guerrillas in their neighborhood," and that "whenever a railroad, wagon-road, or telegraph is injured by parties of guerrillas, the citizens living within five miles of the spot shall be turned out in mass to repair the damage," and taxed for the pay and subsistence of the military force necessary to coerce them into doing the work; and far beyond even this, that "if a soldier or legitimate follower of the army be fired upon from any house, the house shall be razed to the ground, and the inhabitants sent prisoners to the headquarters of this army;" that if it was done from cover at a distance from houses, the dwellers for five miles around should be penalized, and that "any persons detected in such outrage, either during the act or at any time afterward, shall be shot without awaiting civil process."

1862
July 18

Pope's
new ideas

The latter part of this order aroused intense indignation at Richmond; and President Davis issued a retaliatory proclamation. Pope and his

The effect

1862
July

Retalia-
tion
threat-
ened

underlings were not to be considered soldiers, and were to be incarcerated if captured; and for every Confederate citizen executed under the order, a Federal commissioned officer should be hanged in retaliation. General Lee wrote a personal letter to Halleck on the subject, which the latter ordered to be returned to him as "couched in language exceedingly insulting to the government of the United States"—a fact hardly to be wondered at if true.

Pope left Washington on the 29th of July to begin the new campaign, the aim of which was to prevent a concentration of Lee's army upon McClellan's forces in the Peninsula. His first move was to threaten Gordonsville with a force of over 30,000 men. On the 13th of July, Ewell's and Winder's divisions, under the command of Stonewall Jackson, had been ordered to move from Mechanicsville on the Chickahominy, to dispute the expected advance of Pope's army south of the Rapidan. The column reached Gordonsville on the 19th; Jackson, learning that Pope's forces largely outnumbered his own, refrained from attack, and remained inactive until the arrival of A. P. Hill's division early in August. Jackson's intent was to strike Banks at Culpeper before reinforcements reached him. Pope, who was well aware of his movements, ordered Banks' corps forward to Cedar Mountain, eight miles beyond Culpeper. Jackson's command was disposed along the northern base of the mountain, and numbered over 20,000 men; while Banks' line was formed in the valley of Cedar Run. The cavalry were on the

Pope be-
gins the
campaign

flanks, and kept up a continual skirmishing with the enemy. Jackson pushed Ewell forward against the Federal left, along the northerly slope of Cedar Mountain. Firing began about nine, and was kept up without cessation until three, when the Confederate General Winder was killed by a shell while directing the fire of a battery. At this juncture Banks, who entirely underestimated the Confederate strength, determined to assault with his whole corps with the purpose of turning the enemy's left. The attack was at first successful, the Confederate line being pushed back for some distance. One brigade gave way and fled from the field; and the panic thus begun was communicated to two or three regiments on its right. General Early made a desperate stand with one Georgia and two Virginia regiments, though attacked in front and flank.

1862
Aug. 9

At first a
victory

Half an hour later the tide turned. General Garnett struck Crawford's brigade in the flank, crumbling it up, and at the same time Hill's division of fresh troops was led against Prince and Geary: by six o'clock Generals Augur and Geary had been wounded, and Prince had been captured, but the remains of Crawford's brigade still clung to its position. At this time Banks sent for Gordon's brigade, which had been held in reserve on the extreme right; he was still unconvinced that he was defeated. The struggle after their arrival was brief but terrible. Gordon's troops, which consisted of the Second Massachusetts, the Third Wisconsin, and the Twenty-seventh Indiana, held their

Reverses
begin

1862
Aug. 9

Union
forces
withdraw

position without flinching until the enemy had gained their right and rear; the first-named lost 12 officers and 147 enlisted men killed and wounded within half an hour. The Confederates now pushed back the retreating Union forces until the latter were reinforced by Ricketts' division and Sigel's corps, which had just arrived. The battle ended at that point. Two days later Jackson retreated to the Rapidan. The battle was fought with stubborn courage on both sides; that it was fought, was no part of General Pope's plans.

No further movement took place until August 25. The defeat at Cedar Mountain had not been followed by grave results. Pope's retreat to the line of the Rappahannock was approved by Halleck, who sent word to him to dispute every inch of ground, promising him heavy reinforcements within forty-eight hours. Pope felt that his situation was extremely serious, and telegraphed to Halleck as follows:

Pope's
com-
plaints
begin

"McDowell's is the only corps that is at all reliable that I have. Sigel, as you know, is perfectly unreliable, and I suggest that some officer of superior rank be sent to command his army corps. His conduct to-day has caused great dissatisfaction. Banks' corps is very weak, not amounting to more than 5000 men, and is much demoralized. Kearny's division from the Army of the Potomac is the only one that has yet reached me from Alexandria. Banks' corps must be left somewhere in the rear, ready to be set up again. Sigel's corps, although composed of some of the best fighting material we have, will never do much service under that officer."

Fitz John Porter, whose corps was now marching from Falmouth to join Pope, was under the

impression that if this junction should be made, there was to be no offensive movement until all the forces were united and a commander for them designated by the President. At this critical time Halleck showed extraordinary indecision. Pope complained of his inactivity, and begged to know what he should do. Burnside's corps had been promised him; but Burnside, with the larger portion of his forces, was still at Fredericksburg.

1862
August

Halleck
un-
decided

General Lee meantime learned that McClellan's army was on its way to join Pope, and suspected also that General Cox was coming with his division from West Virginia as an additional reinforcement; he realized, therefore, that if he were to crush Pope he must act promptly. While the Federal general was telegraphing Halleck for instructions, Lee ordered all the forces in and about Richmond, with the exception of two brigades, to be sent to him. He had evolved a plan which was not in accord with the recognized principles of strategy, but he had studied carefully both McClellan and Pope, and knew the weaknesses of both; he knew that some risk must be taken, but he was willing to take it.

Con-
federate
troops
concentrated

Early on the morning of August 25, Stonewall Jackson was dispatched with 25,000 men, with instructions to cross the Rappahannock above the position of the Union army, to move through Thoroughfare Gap, strike the Orange and Alexandria Railroad in Pope's rear, and sever his communications with Washington. It was to be a forced march, and, in consequence, all baggage was

Jackson
sent
forward

1862
Aug. 25

left behind. A few days' cooked rations in the haversacks, and salt for the ears of corn which the men expected to pick in the fields and roast, was all the food supply taken. The first day the march covered twenty-five miles.

Pope
deceived

While this was going on, Lee was making vigorous demonstrations in Pope's front to mislead him. The movement of a large body of Confederate troops was known to Pope by noon of that day, but he believed that it was marching for the Shenandoah Valley by the way of Luray and Fort Royal. If he had suspected Jackson's real design, and at once seized Thoroughfare Gap and Gainesville, he would have preserved his lines of communication and frustrated Lee's plan at the outset. Next day Jackson pursued his rapid march, passing through White Plains, Thoroughfare Gap, and Gainesville unobserved and unopposed. At Bristoe Station he tore up the railroad tracks and cut the telegraph wires, severing Pope's line of supplies and his telegraphic communication with Washington. One of his brigades made a rapid march to Manassas Junction, and captured a large amount of commissary stores.

Jackson's
march
dis-
covered

At eight o'clock that evening, when he attempted to forward a dispatch to McDowell, Pope found that his communications had been severed at Manassas Junction. He at once suspected that a large force of Confederates had taken possession of that place, and decided at once to abandon his front on the Rappahannock and march his main body to Gainesville. On the march a skirmish took

place between Hooker and Ewell, the latter retreating. Pope arrived at Bristoe Station on the evening of the 27th, where he learned the whereabouts of Jackson. He at once decided to concentrate his army at Manassas, and issued orders to McDowell, who was at Gainesville, and to his other commanders, to march upon that point at dawn.

1862
Aug. 27

On the afternoon of August 26, General Lee, leaving a single division to hold his position on the Rappahannock, started with Longstreet over the same road covered by Jackson the day before. On the night of the 27th they were at White Plains. Lee's army, including the forces of Jackson and Longstreet, consisted of about 50,000 men, all veterans, commanded by efficient officers. Pope's army, counting in his reinforcements, amounted to nearly 70,000 men, but they were badly organized; and with the exception of McDowell, there was no very able corps commander. It was said that Fitz John Porter, of the Fifth Corps, openly showed his contempt for Pope, and his officers and privates must have felt strongly the influence of this attitude. The odds, so far as numbers were concerned, were in favor of the Federal troops; but in discipline, whole-heartedness, and loyalty to their commander, the Confederate Army was much the stronger. At noon, August 28, Pope reached Manassas to find that Jackson had departed.

Relative
strength
of the
forces

Late in the afternoon of the 28th, Kearny drove the enemy's rear-guard out of Centreville: one part of it retreating by the way of the road of

1862
Aug. 28

Battle of
Centre-
ville

Sudley Springs; the other taking the Warrenton Turnpike towards Gainesville over the bridges at Cub Run and Bull Run, both of which they destroyed. King's division of McDowell's corps, marching towards Centreville, encountered an advance division of Jackson's and a sharp engagement ensued. Ewell, who was in command, believed that King was trying to escape, and attacked with both his own and Taliaferro's divisions. He very soon found his mistake. King's troops rapidly formed in line of battle, and for two and a half hours a stubborn and bloody fight raged without cessation, neither side yielding an inch. Darkness fell and the fighting ceased, but for several hours the lines of each army remained as they were at the beginning.

Curious
miscon-
ceptions

For the number of men engaged, the losses on both sides were severe. Of the Confederates, Generals Ewell and Taliaferro were wounded, the former losing a leg. Three colonels, one lieutenant-colonel and four majors were killed or wounded. On the Union side, more than one-third of the forces engaged was left dead or wounded on the field. The battle was purely accidental. Neither force was aware of the presence of the other until coming into actual collision. Jackson made the attack thinking, no doubt, he had before him the rear-guard of a demoralized army in full retreat; and on the other hand, General Pope believed that Jackson was retreating from him, and that this battle arose out of King's division attempting to bar his retreat. Pope fully believed that Jackson

was in full retreat from Manassas toward Thoroughfare Gap. On the night of the 28th, hearing the sound of Gibbon's guns, he believed that Jackson's retreat had been checked, and he would be overwhelmed by the Union forces in the morning. His army was so disposed that McDowell, Sigel, and Reynolds, whose combined forces numbered over 25,000, were immediately west of Jackson, and between him and Thoroughfare Gap; while Kearny, Hooker, Reno, and Porter, of the same strength, were to follow him from the east at daylight. Longstreet was so far off that by making a vigorous attack, Pope believed he could crush Jackson before Longstreet's possible arrival. Orders were sent to McDowell to hold his ground at all hazards, and prevent the retreat of Jackson to the west. He intended that at daylight the entire national force, from the two directions of Centreville and Manassas, should fall upon the enemy, who must be crushed between them. At three o'clock in the morning an order was sent to General Porter at Bristoe Station to move upon Centreville at the first dawn of day with his whole command, leaving his trains behind. Similar orders were sent to General Heintzelman.

After the issue of these orders General Pope learned, to his great surprise and indignation, that King and Ricketts had left Thoroughfare Gap, without orders, and were at Manassas. He now doubted whether Jackson could be possibly detained by Sigel and Reno, or headed off by Porter. Accordingly, he sent immediate orders to Sigel to

1862
Aug. 29

Pope
plans to
crush
Jackson

But his
plans fail

1862
Aug. 29

attack the enemy as soon as it was light enough to see, and bring him to a stand if it were possible for him to do so. A second order was sent to Porter to push forward with his corps and King's division upon Gainesville.

Battle of
Groveton

In obedience to orders, General Sigel attacked Jackson the next morning, August 29, near the railway station at Groveton. He was supported by Hooker and Kearny, the combined forces pushing Jackson back some distance. Reaching Sudley Springs, he made a stand, his right resting on Warrenton Turnpike, and his line protected by the old railroad grade. He had a large number of batteries, which were posted on both sides of Warrenton Turnpike, while his troops were massed in the thick woods behind the railroad embankment. General Heintzelman held the right of the Union line, Sigel was on his left, while the extreme left was kept by Reynolds. A portion of Reynolds' corps was held in reserve on the rear of the centre. Pope reached the ground about twelve o'clock, and informed his commanders that Porter and McDowell were moving rapidly up from Manassas and would soon be in position to fall upon Jackson's right flank, and probably upon his rear. At two o'clock, sharp firing was heard on the Confederate right. Pope supposed that Porter and McDowell were coming into action; but a dispatch was now received saying that McDowell, who had been delayed, would reach the ground about four o'clock. Thereupon, Porter was ordered to attack Jackson's right, and if possible turn his rear.

Shifting
the
troops

When Pope supposed that sufficient time had elapsed for this to be done, he ordered Heintzelman and Reno to attack in front. As a result, Jackson's left was forced from its position.

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McDowell had now arrived on the field, and at once moved into action along the Warrenton Turnpike towards Jackson's right, which was then falling back. This attack was made by King's division. All this time Porter made no movement whatever; and Longstreet was able to extend his lines. From five o'clock until dark the fighting was severe, and the losses on both sides were heavy. About sunset Longstreet's troops from the Gap began to arrive; and at night both armies rested on the field, each having lost about 7000 men. During the night that followed, there were strong indications that Jackson was preparing to retreat from the Union front. Paroled prisoners who had been taken during the day's fighting, and who came into camp the next morning, reported the enemy retreating during the whole night in the direction of the Warrenton Turnpike. Both Generals McDowell and Heintzelman, who had made reconnaissances, confirmed this statement. They reported the evacuation of the enemy's left, and an apparent retreat in the direction of Gainesville.

Reports
of a Con-
federate
retreat

On the morning after the battle the Union troops, who had been marching and fighting almost continuously for several days, were in a state of exhaustion. They had been short of rations, and for two days had had little to eat. The artillery and cavalry horses had been in harness and under

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Aug. 30

Union
forces at
first suc-
cessful

saddle for nearly two weeks, and had been out of forage for forty-eight hours. Neither men nor horses, therefore, were in any condition for further active service. Notwithstanding, Pope determined to renew the battle without delay. About one o'clock on the 30th, Porter's corps, supported by King's division, Sigel's corps, and Reynolds' division, was advanced to attack the enemy along the Warrenton Turnpike, while Heintzelman and Reno were directed to attack the enemy's left flank. At four o'clock, Porter drove the enemy from the woods back upon the railroad entrenchments. The attack was made with so much vigor that Jackson was afraid he could not resist it, and hurriedly appealed to Lee for reinforcements, which were sent from Longstreet's division.

In the mean time, Longstreet had placed his batteries where their fire enfiladed any troops attacking the front of Jackson's position. It was impossible to withstand their fire, and in ten minutes Porter's troops were forced to retreat.

The fight
along
Warren-
ton
Turnpike

On the extreme right, Hooker's division drove the enemy from the woods, but without any practical advantage. Pope now, apparently for the first time, recognized the seriousness of his position, and promptly took such steps as were yet available to ward off disaster. The great struggle was now for the Turnpike, which was the Union line of retreat; and to secure it Longstreet's whole line was rushed forward at a charge. One after another of the Union brigades was forced back; but when the Turnpike was reached, the Union guns

were found to be in position with a strong infantry support. There was not a regular line of battle; but the two principal eminences, Bald Hill and Henry House Hill, were strongly held, and troops from the Union right were being hurried down the road as fast as possible. Sigel's corps had until now taken no part in the fight, and was therefore available to occupy Bald Hill. For holding the other position there were two brigades from Sykes' division, together with those of Generals Warren, Meade, and Seymour. Reno and Heintzelman held a line on the north of the Turnpike, resisting the advance of Jackson.

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There was an obstinate struggle for the possession of Bald Hill. Hood's Texans made an impetuous attack, but were swept back without making any impression. Charge after charge was made without effect. In one of the brigades of Anderson's division, 631 officers and men were killed and wounded. Out of the five regiments of this brigade but one field officer was untouched. It was during this struggle that Colonel Fletcher Webster, of the Twelfth Massachusetts, was killed at the head of his regiment. Notwithstanding this heroic resistance, the position was at last carried, and the Union forces were driven from Bald Hill.

Attack on
Bald Hill

At Henry House Hill the same desperate fighting took place. It was for either side a post of the utmost importance, no position west of Bull Run offering such advantages for defense. The Union army was already in full retreat; but this retreat, which was being conducted in an orderly manner,

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30-31

Union
forces in
retreat

would at once be changed into a rout if the Confederates should succeed in obtaining its possession,—the fighting in other parts of the field had been too severe, however, and the exhausted Confederate troops no longer fought with the same spirit and energy they had displayed earlier in the day. With the coming on of darkness they ceased from further attack. By eight o'clock in the evening everything was quiet, and the safe retreat of the Federal army beyond Bull Run was assured.

Pope reached Centreville at ten o'clock that night. The following morning the various corps were posted in the old intrenchments around Centreville, and the next day was spent in resting the men and re-supplying them with ammunition and provisions. A regiment of Confederate cavalry advanced within two miles, but retreated again without any attempt at attack. The Union cavalry was completely broken down; it was impossible, therefore, to use it for making reconnaissances of the enemy's front.

Pope's
right
threat-
ened

On the following day it was found that Lee was moving in the direction of Fairfax, southeast of Centreville, and towards Alexandria, with the evident intention of turning the Union right. Pope at once made the necessary disposition of troops to fight a battle between the Little River Pike and the road from Fairfax to Centreville. Hooker was sent to Fairfax Court-House to concentrate all the troops in that vicinity, and to push forward to Germantown with his advance, while McDowell was ordered to move from Centreville

toward Fairfax Court-House and connect on his right with Hooker. General Reno, in the mean time, was directed to move north of the road to Centreville in the direction of Chantilly towards Lee's flank, with Heintzelman's corps as his support.

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Late in the afternoon the troops of the Ninth Corps, with General Stevens, who had taken the place of Reno, came in contact with a Confederate division at a place called Chantilly, strongly posted behind an old railroad embankment. Stevens determined upon a vigorous attack, and, seizing the colors of the Seventy-ninth New York Highlanders, which he had formerly commanded, led the charging column across the open space in front of the enemy's position, which was swept by a withering fire. Inspired by his example, his division of 2000 men swept forward, carrying everything before them; but just before the position was reached Stevens fell, shot through the heart. A few minutes later the gallant Phil Kearny met with a like fate. A terrific thunder-storm now set in, and it grew very dark before the engagement closed. Both sides lost heavily, and neither could claim a victory.

Chan-
tilly

Stevens
and
Kearny
killed

Among the sequences of Pope's campaign were the loss to the army of the services of Pope, McDowell, and Fitz John Porter. All were able men and under other circumstances might have been useful to the country. Pope was banished to the Northwest to watch the Indian tribes, an order which he bitterly resented; McDowell was relieved

Fate of
the com-
manders

1862
Sept.

from command; while Fitz John Porter was court-martialed for his action at the battle of Bull Run, and sentenced to be cashiered and forever disqualified from holding any office of trust or profit under the government of the United States. Twenty-five years later, however, the case was again brought before a new board, and Porter was exonerated and restored to his rank and rights.

Halleck's
reasons
for the
relief of
Pope

On the 5th of September, the President directed that General Pope be relieved and report to the War Department. On the same day Halleck wrote a private note to Pope, in which he said: "Do not infer from this that any blame attaches to you. On the contrary, we think you did your best with the material you had. I have not heard any one censure you in the least. The differences and ill feeling among the generals are very embarrassing to the administration, and unless checked will ruin the country. It must cease. It is discreditable to all parties. We must all act together or we shall accomplish nothing, but be utterly disgraced." McClellan was at once appointed in his stead, and the Army of Virginia was merged in the Army of the Potomac under his command.

While one cannot help recognizing the weakness of Pope, it cannot be denied that he was handicapped from the first in many ways. He had to fight against the opposition of McClellan, the enmity of Porter, and the indifference of certain minor officers. Nor were his superiors free from blame. The task which he had been set, against his will, to accomplish, was one of great difficulties.

He was sent on a campaign to compel the Confederates to loose their hold on the Army of the Potomac in the Peninsula. He was ordered to hold in check an army whose separate divisions were commanded by Lee's ablest generals. He was repeatedly promised reinforcements from McClellan's army, which had been brought to Acquia Creek and Fredericksburg; but he says in his report: "Twenty-five thousand men were all of the ninety-one thousand veteran troops from Harrison's Landing who ever drew trigger under my command, or in any way took part in this campaign."

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After Pope's defeat and the retreat to Washington, Lee recognized the fact that even in the demoralized condition of the Union army, an attack upon the capital would be attended with too great risk. He determined to move north and cross into Maryland, which State he believed was ready to rise as soon as the opportunity was given. Accordingly he turned his army toward the Potomac, with Stonewall Jackson's division in front; on the 5th of September crossed that stream at White's ford near Leesburg, and on the following day went into camp near Frederick. After crossing the border, General Lee issued a proclamation addressed to the people of Maryland in which he said that "the people of the South have watched your wrongs with the deepest sympathy; and have seen with profound indignation their sister State deprived of every right and reduced to the condition of a conquered province." To aid them in throwing

Lee
decides
to enter
Mary-
land

His proc-
lamation

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Hopes
of the
South

off this foreign yoke, he declared, was the object of their coming. It was believed that the Confederate army would be received with open arms; that the young men along the line of march would flock to its ranks; that supplies would be poured in upon them from every quarter. But the Marylanders were found to be more than lukewarm in their reception of the invading army. They gave no signs of rising, and the utmost difficulty was experienced in procuring subsistence for the troops. Hundreds of farmers drove their cattle into Pennsylvania, and closed their granaries against the demands for forage and food. General Lee proposed to pay for supplies, but the people refused to accept Confederate money. In Frederick City the people closed their shops. During the whole of the Maryland campaign not 500 men joined the Confederate ranks, while there was double that number of deserters.

Alarm
at the
North

The Confederate advance aroused intense excitement throughout the North. The governor of Pennsylvania issued a proclamation calling out the entire State militia. Stanton was in fear lest communications with the North should be cut off. To the President the situation looked ominous. There was consternation in Philadelphia and immediate steps were taken to place that city in a state of defense. The Union armies were without a head. The shattered remnants of the Army of the Peninsula were scattered from Fortress Monroe to Washington, and the demoralized Army of Virginia was sheltering itself in the forts about

the Capital. The leaders of both were in disgrace. Driven by necessity, the President, early on the morning of September 2, sought out McClellan, who tells the story of the interview as follows:

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"The President and General Halleck came to my house. When the President informed me that Colonel Kelton had returned from the front; that our forces were in a bad condition; that the army was in full retreat upon the defenses of Washington; and that the roads were filled with stragglers, etc., he instructed me to take steps at once to stop and collect the stragglers, to place the works in a proper state of defense, and to go out and meet and take command of the army when it approached the vicinity of the works. Then to place the troops in the best position, committing everything to my hands."

Union
forces
demor-
alized

It is a curious fact that McClellan was never by official order reinstated in his old command, nor was an order ever issued by which the Army of Virginia ceased to exist. The verbal instructions of the President were all on which his authority depended, and these were recognized by Halleck only so far as they related to the defenses of the capital. At that time McClellan had his headquarters near Alexandria, as commander of the defenses of Washington. His jurisdiction had been expressly limited by Halleck to the works and their garrisons, and he had been prohibited from exercising any control over the troops under Pope.

McClel-
lan's
strange
position

His reinstatement by the President was bitterly opposed in the Cabinet by Chase and Stanton.

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Sept.

Objec-
tions to
McClel-
lan

Chase maintained that as a military commander he had been a failure, that his neglect to urge reinforcements to Pope proved him unworthy of trust, and that giving command to him was equivalent to giving Washington to the rebels. Seward and Blair were also opposed to the appointment. Lincoln himself had little faith in McClellan, and had repeatedly declared him incompetent; but the conditions were such that to him it seemed he had no choice. Lee, with his army, was about to cross the Potomac into Maryland. The Union troops must be sent in pursuit, and a commander for them must be designated. The President had offered the command to Burnside, who had declined it. To whom then could he turn? McDowell was unpopular in the army; Pope's standing as a general had been destroyed by his failures in the field and the intrigues of his enemies; out of all the other Union officers, there was not one who had given evidence of sufficient capacity and ability for the leadership. Halleck was an office general, and even he was broken down by work and worry. McClellan, therefore, seemed the only one available. There is little doubt that the President came with great unwillingness to this conclusion.

On September 3, the day following McClellan's interview with the President, he was told by Halleck that the assignment of a commander of the army had not been decided upon. The army was ready to move on the 7th of September, but nothing further had been heard by McClellan from the President or from Halleck. Notwithstanding, on

that day he moved out from Washington with his staff and personal escort, and assumed the command of the combined armies. It was no time for hesitation.

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Reorganization was necessary before the new army would be able to meet that of Lee on equal terms. This work was carried on during the march, and caused delays that were unavoidable. "It must be borne constantly in mind," says McClellan, "that the purpose of advancing from Washington was simply to meet the necessities of the moment by frustrating Lee's invasion of the northern States; and when that was accomplished, to push with the utmost rapidity the work of reorganization and supplies, so that the new campaign might be promptly inaugurated with the army in condition to prosecute it to a successful termination without intermission."

The army
reor-
ganized

Proper arrangements for the defense of Washington had been made, and General Banks, under instructions from McClellan, was placed in command; having subject to his orders the Third Corps under Heintzelman, the Fifth Corps under General Fitz John Porter, and the Eleventh Corps under General Franz Sigel. These troops, with other regiments in and about Washington, numbered about 72,000 men. The combined armies which McClellan led from Washington on the Maryland campaign consisted of the First Corps, under General Hooker; the Second Corps, under Sumner; one division of the Fourth Corps, under Couch; the Sixth Corps, under Franklin; the

The
corps'
com-
manders

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Sept.

Ninth Corps, under Reno; and the Twelfth Corps, under Mansfield. Couch's division was attached to the Sixth Corps. The First and Ninth formed the right under Burnside; the Second and Twelfth under Sumner, and the Sixth Corps, with a division of Couch, the left under Franklin. A few days later, Porter's Fifth Corps was ordered to join McClellan; the entire force present for duty, as reported by McClellan on the 20th of September, including Pleasonton's infantry, numbering 89,452.

Lee's
army

Lee's army was made up of Longstreet's command of five divisions, containing twenty brigades; Jackson's command of three divisions, containing fourteen brigades; D. H. Hill's division of five brigades; an unattached brigade of General Evans; and a large force of cavalry and artillery,—the whole numbering about 60,000 men.

And
plans

In an interview with John G. Walker on the 7th of September, General Lee outlined his plan of campaign as follows: "In ten days from now, if the military situation is then what I confidently expect it to be for the capture of Harper's Ferry, I shall concentrate the army at Hagerstown and effectually destroy the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and march to Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. That is the objective point of the campaign. You remember, no doubt, the long approach of the Pennsylvania Railroad from the Susquehanna, a few miles west of Harrisburg? Well, I wish effectually to destroy that approach, which will disable the Pennsylvania Railroad for a long time.

With the Baltimore and Ohio in our possession and the Pennsylvania Railroad broken up, there will remain to the enemy but one route of communication with the West, and that very circuitous, by way of the lakes. After that I can turn my attention to Philadelphia, Baltimore, or Washington, as may seem best for our interests. McClellan is an able general, but a very cautious one. His army is in a very demoralized and chaotic condition, and will not be proper for offensive operations, or he will not think it so, for three or four weeks. Before that time I hope to be on the Susquehanna."

Although McClellan knew that a portion of the Confederate army had moved up the Virginia side of the Potomac towards Leesburg, and that a portion had crossed into Maryland, he was still uncertain as to Lee's plans. It was possible that he might throw his whole force across the Potomac, with the view of turning Washington by a flank movement down the river; or his plan might be to move on Baltimore or invade Pennsylvania. Either of these moves might be made, but that upon Washington was most feared. Consequently, he found himself obliged "to march cautiously and to advance the army in such order as to keep Washington and Baltimore continually covered, and at the same time to hold the troops well in hand so as to be able to concentrate and follow rapidly if the enemy took the direction of Pennsylvania, or to return to the defense of Washington if, as was greatly feared by the authorities, the enemy should be merely making a feint with a small force to draw

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Lee's
opinions
of Mc-
Clellan

McClel-
lan's
campaign
a defens-
ive one

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off our army, while with their main force they stood ready to seize the first favorable opportunity to take the capital."

McClel-
lan's
advance

In order to move as rapidly as possible, and also to secure information as to the exact position and intentions of Lee's army, McClellan's troops advanced by three roads leading in the same general direction; the outer line being about twenty-five miles distant from the inner, which ran nearly parallel to the Potomac on the Maryland side of the river. They were then in a condition to concentrate rapidly in case the enemy should be unexpectedly encountered. If Lee, for instance, threatened the left flank on the outer line of approach, there was a strong naval force to hold him in check until reinforcements should arrive. If he took a position near Frederick, the whole army could be concentrated to attack him in force. If he marched upon Baltimore, the entire Federal army could be thrown in his rear and he could have no line of retreat. If he moved toward Chambersburg or Gettysburg, he would be exposed to the same danger.

The army moved slowly, while the process of reorganization went rapidly on. By night on the 13th of September it was disposed as follows: Its main portion was near Frederick, with a part of the Ninth Corps advanced some eight miles to Middletown; Franklin was at Buckeystown, some five miles to the left and rear; and Couch was at Licksville, at the junction of the Monocacy with the Potomac.

At the beginning of the campaign there was a garrison at Harper's Ferry of 9000 men under Colonel Dixon S. Miles, of the Second United States Infantry; and 2500 men at Martinsburg under General Julius White, placed there to guard the entrance to the Shenandoah Valley. Lee expected that his advance into Maryland would lead to the evacuation of both these places, and thus give him an open line of communication through the valley of Virginia. But in this he was disappointed. It now became a matter of necessity for him to dislodge these forces and concentrate his army. He knew that McClellan was advancing slowly, and that he would have full time to operate against Harper's Ferry.

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Sept.

Harper's
Ferry and
Martins-
burg

His decision was promptly made. On the 9th of September he issued a special order, which by a singular accident fell into the hands of McClellan on the 13th. This order gave information of the utmost importance. It showed that Lee, by orders issued four days before, had divided his army, sending Jackson and his command and Walker's division across the Potomac; and that the object of this division was the capture of the garrisons at Harper's Ferry and Martinsburg. It also told him where the other wing of the army, the trains, rear-guard, infantry, and all were to march and halt, and where the detached commands were to join the main body.

Lee's
lost
orders

Lee, in the mean time, after the issue of this order, had moved a portion of his army in a north-westerly direction about twenty-five miles to


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Sept.

Passes of
South
Mountain

Hagerstown on the Antietam, within a day's march of the Pennsylvania border and about the same distance north of Harper's Ferry. D. H. Hill's division was at Boonsboro, thirteen miles south of Hagerstown, guarding the wagon trains and parks of artillery belonging to the whole army. Between Frederick and these two places stretched a continuation of the Blue Ridge of Virginia known as the South Mountain Range, over which, through depressions or gaps, run two thoroughfares: Turner's Pass, which debouches on the west side near Boonsboro, and exactly opposite Sharpsburg; and Crampton's Pass, further south, and within five miles of Harper's Ferry.

McClellan's
delay

Within an hour after Lee's last order was received, the army was set in motion to follow Jackson and force a battle. For military reasons McClellan determined not to move by the most direct road, through Jefferson to Knoxville and thence up the river to Harper's Ferry, but to divide his army and seize both passes over South Mountain at the same time; defeat or capture the forces guarding each, join the two wings on the other side, and move rapidly upon Harper's Ferry, which he hoped to reach before Jackson. The plan was a good one if it had been carried out as proposed; but the movement was delayed in order to give the troops a night's rest, and the result was the capture of Harper's Ferry and the drawn battle of Antietam. A Confederate spy who had gained a knowledge of the intentions of McClellan made his way through the lines and gave the information to



VIEW OF HARPER'S FERRY.

Lee, who at once changed his plans. Leaving Jackson to capture Harper's Ferry, he retraced his steps from Hagerstown with the main army, gathering up the forces at Boonsboro on his way, and took a strong position behind Antietam Creek and in front of the village of Sharpsburg.

1862
Sept.
11-13

Jackson left Frederick on the 10th, crossing the Potomac the following day at Williamsport, one division moving from that town to Martinsburg. The two other divisions moved farther to the west, to prevent the Federal forces at Martinsburg from escaping in that direction. General White, learning of the Confederate approach, left that town on the night of the 11th and retreated with his men to Harper's Ferry. Early on the 12th the head of Jackson's column came in sight of the Federal troops, which were drawn up on Bolivar Heights above Harper's Ferry.

Martins-
burg
evac-
uated

In the mean time General McLaws, with his own and General Anderson's divisions, moved into Pleasant Valley. On the other side of this valley a high elevation called Elk Ridge borders the Potomac for several miles. Its southern extremity, which touches the Potomac, is called Maryland Heights. This elevation completely commands Harper's Ferry, and while held by the Federals would completely prevent the occupation of that place by the Confederates. McLaws, with very little opposition, gained full possession of Maryland Heights at 4 P. M. on the 13th, and at once got his artillery into position. General Walker crossed the Potomac on the 11th, and on the

Mary-
land
Heights
lost

1862 Sept. 13-15	13th reached Loudon Heights and occupied them with two regiments. By these movements the forces at Harper's Ferry were completely surrounded and at the mercy of the enemy. On the 14th, Jackson disposed of his troops for an attack during the night. On the night of the 14th, Hill's and Ewell's divisions reached Harper's Ferry, secured commanding positions on the left bank, where seven batteries were placed; while ten guns were taken across the Shenandoah and put in the position on the right bank, which gave an enfilade fire on the Union infantry line on Bolivar Heights, while Jackson's batteries were placed so as to command the town. For an hour the garrison made a stiff defense against double its numbers; but at last a white flag was raised, and General White, who had succeeded to the command upon the wounding of Colonel Miles, surrendered the position, with 11,000 men, 73 pieces of artillery, and a large number of small arms. Jackson, who knew the value of time, left General Hill to attend to the details of the surrender and hurried back to rejoin Lee. His expedition had taken him longer than he had anticipated, and he feared that McClellan's advance might reach the main army and precipitate a battle before his return.
Harper's Ferry sur- rounded	
Union forces sur- render	

The capture of Harper's Ferry was largely attributable to the incapacity of its commander, Colonel Miles. The various officers in his command testified unanimously, before the commission appointed to investigate the facts, that he was utterly incompetent to perform the duties with which

he was intrusted. He knew and admitted that Maryland Heights was the key to the position; and yet, though he expected an attack, made no effort to strengthen it by fortifications, although between the 5th and 13th of September there was ample time to do so. During the siege of Harper's Ferry he paroled many prisoners and sent them to the enemy's headquarters; and this when he should have known that the lack of ammunition, the entire absence of fortifications, and the abandonment of Maryland Heights, were facts which undoubtedly would be immediately communicated to the enemy. The evidence before the commission showed that not only Maryland Heights but Harper's Ferry itself was prematurely surrendered. General Halleck, who was before the commission, testified that General McClellan, after having received orders to repel the enemy invading the State of Maryland, marched only six miles a day on an average when pursuing the invading enemy; and also that in his opinion General McClellan could and should have relieved and protected Harper's Ferry.

While these events were taking place McClellan was pushing on after Jackson. The distance between Crampton's Gap and Turner's Gap, through which the troops had to pass, was about six miles in a straight line, the country between being a practically unbroken range of rugged hills. The attack and defense, therefore, of each pass was quite isolated from the other, though fighting was going on at both places at the same time. General Franklin, with the Sixth Corps, was ordered to

1862
Sept. 15

Criminal
negli-
gence at
Harper's
Ferry

1862
Sept. 14

Battle of
Cramp-
ton's Gap

carry Crampton's Pass in order to cut off McLaws and R. H. Anderson on Maryland Heights and relieve Harper's Ferry; while the First Corps under Hooker, and the Ninth under Reno, with Pleasanton's cavalry and infantry supports, was to force Turner's Pass defended by Longstreet and D. H. Hill. This wing of the army was under the general command of Burnside, and the personal oversight of McClellan. On reaching Crampton's Pass General Franklin found the enemy strongly posted on both sides of the road, which ran up a steep hill through a narrow gap densely wooded on both sides, offering important advantages of cover and position. The Confederates had posted their outer line at the foot of the mountain, behind a stone wall which stretched to the right of the road, at a point where the rise was gradual and for the most part over open country. Eight guns had been stationed at various points along the road on the left of the pass. The conditions of the region made the use of the Union artillery impossible, and it was evident that the attack must be made by infantry alone. Franklin formed in line of battle, charged over the stone wall, dislodged the forces which had held place behind it, pursued them up the side of the mountain to the top and down the opposite side. The Confederate reserves arrived just in time to participate in the flight.

At Turner's Gap the action was on a larger scale, and more desperately contested. The pass was guarded by D. H. Hill and Longstreet. Hill's forces were attacked early in the morning of the

16th by General Cox, commanding a division of the Ninth Corps. Colonel Hayes, afterwards President, was ordered with his regiment to gain, if possible, the enemy's right. He succeeded in driving a detachment of the enemy from its position, and established himself there in spite of a vigorous resistance. He was soon reinforced with several batteries, and the entire position was carried by 9 A. M. At four o'clock Burnside ordered Gibbon's brigade to advance up the main road to attack the Confederate centre. The attack was successful, and the enemy, though making a stubborn resistance, at last gave way. All through the fight the movements on the part of the Federals were governed by the belief that Longstreet, with his force of 15,000 men, was hidden in the dense woods on the side of the mountain awaiting his opportunity. It was this belief that prevented General Cox from following up his success after the retreat of Garland from his front. The battle was largely fought by Reno's and Hooker's corps of Burnside's column, under the immediate command of that general. At seven o'clock General Reno fell while leading an advance. The fighting continued until dark. The Confederates, now outflanked on both right and left, abandoned their position during the night, leaving their dead on the field. The Union leaders failed to follow up their advantage, and the defeated forces fell back to the new position before Sharpsburg, without molestation.

The Federal losses at the battle of South Mountain were 1568 men, all but 22 of whom were killed

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Sept. 14

Union
victory
not
utilized

1862
Sept.
14-17

or wounded. About 1500 Confederate prisoners were taken. McClellan's estimate of the opposing forces, as usual, was largely exaggerated. In his report he gives their numbers as 30,000, when in reality they were less than one-third that number.

Lee's new
position

Lee, when he heard the sound of Longstreet's guns, hurried from Hagerstown down through Boonsboro, bringing with him the rest of Longstreet's and Hill's divisions, and took position along the low ridge of hills in front of Sharpsburg parallel with the river in front. The place was one of great natural strength, besides offering unusual strategic advantages. At this place he would be upon the flank and rear of any force moving upon McLaws; it offered good opportunities for defense; and in case of retreat there was an excellent road leading the shortest possible distance to the Potomac. Longstreet could reach him unopposed from Harper's Ferry in his rear, and A. P. Hill from Boonsboro on his left flank.

The village of Sharpsburg lies in a hollow between the elevated ground on the west bank of the Antietam and the Potomac. The road to Hagerstown, over which the approach was made, runs nearly northeast from the town. A mile distant stands the famous Dunker Church in a patch of woods. These two, with fields between them, were the scene of the bloodiest fighting of the 17th of September. Antietam Creek is crossed by four bridges, three of which were used for the crossing of the Union troops during the battle. The most important of these, the Burnside Bridge,

is that by which the road from Sharpsburg to Rohrersville crosses the stream. The next above is the bridge of the road from Keedysville to Williamsport. The Antietam is a narrow and sluggish stream, and although it has several fords between the bridges, they are all difficult on account of the depth of the water and the steepness of their banks. In the rear of Sharpsburg to the west a road leads to the Shepherdstown Ford of the Potomac. It was over this that Lee made his retreat on the 18th of September. At the Dunker Church the turnpike is crossed by two roads, one of them leading in a southwesterly direction, and the other a little northwest from the church.

1862
Sept. 16

In the Confederate line of battle, Longstreet was on the right with his right flank resting on the Antietam. D. H. Hill held the left, supported by Hood's division of Longstreet's corps; the line running nearly north and south, although Hood's division faced north across the Hagerstown road. All day the 15th of September, only the troops of Longstreet and D. H. Hill held the line of this position; while the entire Army of the Potomac, with the exception of Franklin's corps and Morrel's division, faced them.

Arrange-
ment of
the line
of battle

On the morning of the 16th Jackson arrived at Sharpsburg from Harper's Ferry, with his own and Ewell's division. He was at once placed on the left of Hood, his forces prolonging the Confederate line to the north and west, touching the Hagerstown pike. His front line was formed by Winder's and Jones' brigades and Taliaferro's

1862
Sept.
16-17

and Stark's; on his second, Early, or Ewell's division, was placed so as to guard his flank with Hayes' brigade in the rear. Stuart's cavalry was placed farther to the left near the Potomac, Lawton's and Trimble's brigades resting near the Dunker Church. Later in the day General Walker reached the position on his return from Harper's Ferry, taking his place on the extreme right about a mile and a half south of Sharpsburg, joining Tombs' brigade, which was guarding the Burnside Bridge. McLaws' division did not reach the ground until early the next morning. Anderson's division followed, and A. P. Hill arrived at two o'clock.

Unex-
plained
delay

For some unexplained reason, McClellan did not appear upon the ground until late in the afternoon. Had an immediate attack been made, nothing could have prevented the destruction of Lee's army. McClellan did nothing, however, beyond directing the placing of the batteries in the centre and placing the different corps; as usual, he was getting ready. His plan of battle was to attack the Confederate left with the corps of Hooker and Mansfield supported by Sumner and Franklin, and simultaneously to move the Ninth Corps against their extreme right; whenever either of these attacks should prove successful, all the rest of his force should be hurled upon the Confederate centre. Back of the high ground in the centre of his position, McClellan placed several batteries of long-range guns. The ground was such that these could sweep almost the whole extent of

the Confederate line. At two o'clock in the afternoon, Hooker was ordered to cross the stream at the upper bridge and make an attempt to turn the Confederate left. Orders were also given to Sumner to cross Mansfield's Twelfth Corps during the night, and prepare the Second for crossing early the next morning. Two hours later Hooker crossed without meeting special opposition, and moved to the south until he came upon the Confederate pickets. He at once deployed his men, putting Meade in the centre, Doubleday on his right, and Ricketts on his left. Meade's division came in contact with Hood's two brigades, which were soon reinforced with two other. The Federals fell back, but were not followed, and went into camp for the night.

1862
Sept.
16-17

Early on the morning of the 17th Hooker made ready for his advance. In front of him looking south was a rolling farming country, with open fields dotted with dwellings and barns; the commanding point in the landscape being the Dunker Church, whose white walls made a bright spot in the landscape. On the west side the road was bordered by a thick wood, which began some distance above the church and extended a quarter of a mile below it. On the opposite side of the road, and a quarter of a mile from it to the east, there was another patch of woods. Between this and the turnpike was a large cornfield. There was a slight rise in the ground at the Dunker Church, and just below it another. Stretched along this and across the road Hooker could plainly see the

Hooker
leads the
attack

1862
Sept. 17

Confederate line of gray, sheltered in places by light breastworks. He saw at once that the ground about the little church was the key to the position, and that if he could gain it the first step to a decisive victory would be gained.

Heavy
artillery
fire
begins
battle

The engagement was opened at daylight by rapid fire from a battery posted beyond the cornfield, just at the edge of the woods on the east side of the pike. The fire was returned, and at the same time Hooker ordered an advance. Doubleday's division, with Gibbon's and Phelps' brigades in the lead, at once charged upon the Confederate line under the protection of their batteries. Directly in front of the advance was the cornfield already spoken of, the stalks of which were higher than a man's head. In this a heavy force of the enemy was concealed. The batteries opened with canister at once. In ten minutes' time every stalk of corn in the northern and greater part of the field was cut as closely as could have been done with a knife, and the slain lay in rows precisely as they had stood in their ranks a few moments before. Those that escaped fled and sought refuge behind the trees, fences, and stone ledges.

Double-
day's
charge
broken

Notwithstanding the losses at this point, there was a strong force beyond; and Doubleday's charge was met with so furious a fire that his lines broke and fell back in disorder. The carnage on both sides was terrific. More than half the brigades of Lawton and Hayes were either killed or wounded, and more than half of Trimble's. All their regimental commanders except two were either killed

or wounded. Stark was killed, Lawton wounded, and nearly all the general and field officers had fallen. On the Union side Mansfield was killed, Hooker, Crawford, and Hartsuff were wounded.

1862
Sept. 17

A lull now took place on the right, which lasted until night. At the Union left and centre, heavy cannonading had been kept up on the enemy's position across the creek. It was briskly replied to, and one of the shots went through Burnside's headquarters. At nine o'clock Burnside received an order to carry the bridge. This order was at once communicated to General Cox, who took direction of the troops. The ground about Burnside Bridge was particularly favorable for the defense. It was a strongly built stone structure of three arches with a stone parapet which reaches some distance along the road on either end. On the west side of the bridge there was a series of low hills, the crests of which were commanded by higher hills in the rear. On the west side the road ran over one of these hills and descended to the bridge; while along its sides, immediately above, there was a strong stone fence running nearly parallel to the creek. Along the roadway above the bridge, the turns and hilltops were covered by rifle-pits and hastily constructed breastworks.

Fighting
on the
centre
and left

The plan was to carry the bridge with a rush of two columns, the one to move to the right and the other to the left as soon as the crossing was accomplished. Rodman's division was to cross by a ford one-third of a mile below the bridge. Crook's brigade was to take the defense, covered

Taking
the
Burnside
Bridge

1862
Sept. 17

Progress
of the
battle

by the Eleventh Connecticut, deploy as skirmishers, supported by Sturgis' division. In the excitement and confusion Crook missed his way to the bridge, reaching the stream above it instead of below, and met with so strong opposition that he was obliged to halt. This necessitated the forming of a new storming party to be organized from Sturgis' division, which reached the bridge first. The Second Maryland and Fifth New Hampshire were selected for this service. They charged at the double quick with fixed bayonets, but the fire concentrated on the approach was so hot that they were withdrawn. The Fifty-first New York and Fifty-first Pennsylvania were ordered up, supported by the Thirty-fifth and Twenty-first Massachusetts. Two heavy guns were turned upon the Confederates at the opposite end of the bridge. With the help of these the fresh troops charged upon and carried the bridge, and the division of Sturgis with the brigade of Crook immediately followed. Rodman was killed and his division broke and retreated to the protection of the Federal batteries. Almost at the same time the Confederate general Branch was killed at the head of his brigade. While this attack was being made by the Confederate centre, Jackson was endeavoring to turn the Federal right; but found it so strongly defended with artillery that the attempt had to be abandoned.

At this moment General Sumner, who led the command on the right, directed further offensive operations to be postponed, as its possible repulse, being the only corps available for attack, would

peril the safety of the whole army. The situation was critical. Sumner's, Hooker's, and Mansfield's corps had met with severe loss. Several general officers had been carried from the field severely wounded, and affairs had anything but a promising look. In view of these circumstances, General McClellan, after making changes in the position of some of the troops, directed the different commanders to hold their positions and cease firing for the day. The corps bivouacked in position on the night of the 17th. Night closed the long and desperately contested battle. Over 100,000 men and 500 pieces of artillery had been engaged for fourteen hours in the bloody contest for supremacy.

When the soldiers went to sleep that night on the field of battle, it was with the expectation of renewing the fight on the following day; but McClellan, as he tells us, "after a night of anxious deliberation and a full and careful survey of the situation and condition of our army and the strength and position of the enemy," concluded that the success of a renewed attack was doubtful. His reasons, as summed up by himself, were that the troops were greatly overcome by the fatigue and exhaustion attendant upon the long continued and severely contested battle of the 17th, together with the long marches to which they had been subjected during the previous three days; that supply trains were in the rear, and many of the troops had suffered from hunger; that they required rest and refreshment; that a large number of the batteries had consumed all of their ammunition, and it was

1862
Sept.
17-18

Situation
at
nightfall

McClel-
lan
hesitates
to renew
the
attack

1862
Sept. 18

impossible to supply them until late on the following day; that supplies of provisions and forage had to be brought up and issued, and infantry ammunition distributed.

Other
risks
involved

“At this critical juncture,” he adds, “I should have had a narrow view of the condition of the country, had I been willing to hazard another battle with less than an absolute assurance of success. At that moment, Virginia lost, Washington menaced, Maryland invaded, the national cause could afford no risks of defeat. One battle lost, and almost all would have been lost. Lee’s army might then have marched as it pleased on Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia, or New York. It could have levied its supplies from a fertile and undevastated country, extorted tribute from wealthy and populous cities, and nowhere east of the Alleghanies was there another organized force able to arrest its march.”

Lee
crosses
the
Potomac

On the night of the 18th Lee abandoned his position and retreated across the Potomac without interference. The following day 2700 of the Confederate dead were buried upon the battlefield. Thirteen guns, 39 colors, 15,000 stand of small arms, and more than 6000 prisoners, were the trophies of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.

McClellan has been bitterly criticised by military authorities for his conduct of the battle. He did not appear either day upon any part of the field, where his presence would have been an inspiration to his troops, until the battle had ended.

His open preparations for placing the troops on the morning of the battle told Lee exactly where he intended to strike. Instead of combining his forces for a grand attack, he sent them in one after another without proper support. The First Corps got through with its fighting before the Twelfth was called in; and the Twelfth did its fighting alone, having no assistance whatever from the First. The Second Corps was not called upon until the Twelfth was exhausted, and even then its leading division went forward entirely alone. The other two were later engaged, but had no connection with each other. The Ninth Corps did not get to work until later in the day, while the Fifth and Sixth Corps were neither of them used as a whole, and only used at all in separate brigades.

Orders were given by McClellan to renew the attack the next morning at daylight. At that time Lee's escape was discovered by a cavalry reconnaissance. It was also found that several batteries had been placed in strong positions upon the elevated bluffs on the opposite bank, so as to cover the fords. General Porter, commanding the Fifth Corps, ordered a detachment from Griffin's and Barnes' brigades, under General Griffin, to cross the river at dark and if possible capture them. All along the eastern bank of the Potomac Union sharpshooters were placed, with guns so posted as to command the opposite bank. Volunteers from the Fourth Michigan, One Hundred and Eighteenth Pennsylvania, and the Eighteenth and Twenty-second Massachusetts Regiments, under

1862
Sept.

Attacks
in detail

Pursuit
attempted

1862
Sept. 20

Griffin, and captured five guns, one of which had belonged to Battery D of the Fifth Artillery, lost at the first battle of Bull Run. On the morning of the 20th, the divisions of Morrell and Sykes were sent across the river, but without proper coöperation, and were driven back across the river with considerable loss.

The Union losses during the campaign amounted in the aggregate to 15,220. In General Sumner's corps four commissioned officers and 819 enlisted men had been killed, four general officers, 89 other commissioned officers, and 3708 enlisted men had been wounded, besides 448 missing. In Hooker's corps the casualties amounted to 2619.

Reorgan-
ization of
the army
begun

The work of reorganizing, drilling, and supplying the army was begun at the earliest moment, and troops were stationed along the river in the best positions to cover and guard the fords. The line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad was guarded at all important points. Harper's Ferry was occupied four or five days after the battle and the heights on both sides of the river were strongly fortified.

Lee's army, in the mean time, had encamped in the vicinity of Martinsburg and Bunker Hill, twenty miles northeast of Harper's Ferry, where he issued a congratulatory order to his army, and immediately began its reorganization. On the 9th of October, in accordance with instructions from General Lee, General J. E. B. Stuart, with a cavalry force of 1800 men and four pieces of artillery under command of Brigadier-General Hampton

and Colonels Lee and Jones, crossed the Potomac at McCoy's Ferry between Williamsburg and Hancock, and proceeded north until they reached what is called the National Road. Here a signal station on the mountain, and all the operators with their flags and apparatus, were captured. From there he proceeded towards Hagerstown, where large supplies were stored, but found that it was too strongly occupied for attack; he therefore turned towards Chambersburg, which was reached in the night during a heavy rain. Here the wires were cut, the railroad obstructed, and an unsuccessful attempt made to destroy a trestle-work on the railroad to Harrisburg. The extensive machine shops and depot buildings of the railroad, and several trains of loaded cars, were entirely destroyed. From Chambersburg learning that strong detachments of Union cavalry were in pursuit, Stuart crossed the Blue Ridge, turned towards Hagerstown, and took the road through Turner's Gap towards Frederick. At daylight he reached Hiatstown, where he captured several wagons.

As soon as the movement was known, General Averell was ordered to move down the north side of the river with his cavalry, get upon the trail of the enemy and follow it up vigorously. General Pleasonton was ordered to post his cavalry at all of the available fords below the position of the main army. His orders were to spare neither men nor horses, and to pursue the enemy wherever found. General Crook, who was at that time in command of Cox's division at Hancock, was

1862
Oct. 9-18

Stores
destroy-
ed at
Cham-
bersburg

Union
forces in
pursuit

1862
Oct. 9-18

Stuart
makes
his
escape

ordered to place his men on the cars and be in readiness to move at any point along the railroad where the enemy might be found. The other commanders between Hancock and Harper's Ferry were instructed to keep a vigilant watch upon all the roads and fords so as to prevent the escape of Stuart within these limits. General Burnside was directed to send a force to the Monocacy Crossing ready to move at a moment's notice; and General Stoneman, whose division was guarding the fords on the river below the mouth of the Monocacy, was directed to keep his cavalry well out on the bridges from the direction of Frederick, so as to give him time to mass his troops at any place where the enemy might attempt to cross the Potomac in his vicinity. General Pleasonton, pursuing his course to Mechanicstown, found the enemy were only about an hour ahead of him, retreating towards the Monocacy. Spurring on, he reached the river just in time to see the rear of the enemy climbing the opposite bank. A large number of horses were seized, several hundred soldiers found in hospital were paroled, and a number of prominent citizens from Pennsylvania were taken along as hostages for civilians arrested by the Federal authorities in Virginia.

On the 6th of October a telegram was sent to General McClellan from Halleck, with orders from the President to cross the Potomac without delay, and give battle to the enemy or drive him south. To this an answer was returned that the army was unprepared for a forward movement; that it was

deficient in cavalry, and many of the troops were in want of shoes, blankets, and other indispensable articles of clothing. He complained that notwithstanding all his efforts, he had been unable to secure the needed supplies. "Corps commanders, upon receiving notice from quartermasters that they might expect to receive their supplies at certain dates, sent the trains for them, which after waiting were compelled to return empty. Several incidents occurred where these trains went back and forth from the camps to the depots as often as four or five different times without receiving their supplies; and I was informed by one corps commander that his wagon train had traveled over 150 miles to and from the depots before he succeeded in obtaining his clothing. I made every exertion in my power, and my quartermasters did the same, to have these supplies hurried forward rapidly; and I was repeatedly told that they had filled the requisitions at Washington, and that the supplies had been forwarded, but they did not get to us and of course were inaccessible to the army."

1862
Oct.

Army
poorly
supplied

At last McClellan began to put his troops in motion. On the 25th of October the army began recrossing from Maryland into Virginia, and on the second of November its rear-guard crossed at Harper's Ferry. Lee at once sent about half his army under Longstreet to Culpeper, to intercept the Federal advance towards Richmond in that direction, while Stonewall Jackson was directed to remain in the Shenandoah Valley so as to still threaten Maryland. It was General McClellan's

The
advance

1862
Nov. 7

intention to get between the two wings of the Confederate army and defeat them in detail, or else force them to concentrate as far back as Gordonsville, and thus place the Army of the Potomac in position either to adopt the Fredericksburg line of advance upon Richmond or to be removed to the Peninsula. The army had now increased to nearly 130,000 men, and was in admirable condition and spirits. In his report McClellan says, "I doubt whether during the whole period that I had the honor to command the Army of the Potomac, it was ever in such excellent condition to fight a great battle."

On the 7th of November a heavy snow-storm set in. Winter seemed at hand, and yet McClellan lingered. There was an end at last to Lincoln's forbearance. At midnight of that day orders reached McClellan to turn over the command of the Army to General Burnside, and report at Washington.

CHAPTER LXXXIX.

THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION

Continual pressure was brought to bear upon the President, on the part of the radical press and people, all through the spring and summer of 1862, to issue a proclamation of emancipation; no one dreaming that it was already prepared, and lying in the President's desk awaiting the opportunity for its production. Lincoln believed that the army would be strengthened by it, notwithstanding he knew that many of the leading officers in the army were opposed to it. He was confident, too, that public opinion at the North would sustain him in his action. On the other hand, there was the possibility that the border slave States might be alienated by it. It certainly would revive opposition on the part of a large section of the Democratic party. There was still fear that England and France would recognize the Confederacy. The proclamation, by showing clearly the real issues involved, would put that out of the question at once.

By talking with representative men of all classes from all parts of the country, and studying the daily press, the President became more and more impressed with the feeling that the country would be with him, and that the act was one of

1862

For and
against
the
procla-
mation

Impres-
sions
of the
Presi-
dent

Views of
Chicago
clergy-
men

military necessity. Still he kept his counsel and waited. On the 13th of September a delegation of Chicago clergymen called upon him; and he was told that the late disasters were "tokens of Divine displeasure, calling for new and advanced action by the President in behalf of the country, such as would indicate national repentance for the sin of oppression." He replied:

Lincoln's
answer

"I hope it will not be irreverent for me to say that if it is probable that God would reveal his will to others on a point so connected with my duty, it might be supposed he would reveal it directly to me; for unless I am more deceived in myself than I often am, it is my earnest desire to know the will of Providence in this matter. And if I can learn what it is, I will do it. These are not, however, the days of miracles, and I suppose it will be granted that I am not to expect a direct revelation. I must study the plain physical facts of the case, ascertain what is possible, and learn what appears to be wise and right."

The
crisis
of the
struggle

Lee was then in Maryland, and the great struggle was then impending. It was a dark time, and Lincoln had in remembrance the hours that followed the second defeat at Bull Run. To a friend, afterwards, he said: "When the rebel army was at Frederick, I determined, as soon as it should be driven out of Maryland, to issue a proclamation of emancipation. I said nothing to any one, but I made the promise to myself and to my Maker." Four days after the battle of Antietam, and the retreat of Lee across the Potomac, September 22,

a Cabinet meeting was called. After a desultory conversation the President said: "The rebel army is now driven out of Maryland, and I am going to fulfill the promise I made to myself and my God. I have got you together to hear what I have written down. I do not wish your advice about the main matter, for that I have determined for myself." He then read the proclamation, of which the more important clauses were as follows:

1862
Sept.

Lincoln's
promise
to God

"That on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State or designated part of a State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free; and the executive government of the United States, including the military and naval authority thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or acts to repress such persons, or any of them, in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom."

Clauses
of the
procla-
mation

The next day, September 23, the proclamation was given to the country. It had been approved by all the members of the Cabinet excepting Blair, whose objection was not on account of principle but of expediency. On the next evening large crowds gathered about the White House, and a band serenaded the President; he was called for, and made a short speech, in which he said: "I have not been distinctly informed why it is that on this occasion you appear to do me this honor, though I suppose it is because of the proclamation. What

Given
to the
country

1862-63 I did, I did after a very full deliberation, and under a very heavy and solemn sense of responsibility. I can only trust in God that I have made no mistake."

McClellan's
views

When a copy was sent to McClellan, he wrote to his wife: "Mr. Aspinwall, of New York, is decidedly of the opinion that it is my duty to submit to the President's proclamation, and quietly continue doing my duty as a soldier. I presume he is right, and am at least sure that he is honest in his opinion. I shall surely give his views full consideration." Comment is needless.

The
procla-
mation
goes into
effect

The measure had its anticipated influence in the autumn elections, but the President was no less determined to follow out the policy he had chosen after long and deliberate thought. On the first day of January, 1863, the final order was given, which declared forever free the slaves in Arkansas, Texas, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, Louisiana, and Virginia. The President at the same time declared that the military and naval power of the government would be employed in enforcing the provisions of the proclamation; that negroes formerly enslaved would be received into the Federal service as soldiers, while all were recommended to abstain from violence, and secure work for wages wherever it could be found. "Upon this act," the President concluded, "sincerely believed to be an act of justice, warranted by the Constitution upon military necessity, I invoke the considerate judgment of mankind and the gracious favor of almighty

God." In his December message to Congress the President discussed at length his favorite project of slave compensation. His plans again called for the issue of bonds for long terms, payable in installments to the States. At the same time he made an attempt to negotiate treaties with South American countries for the establishment of colonies of Southern negroes.

1862-63

At the fall elections, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin,—all of which, except New Jersey, had cast their electoral votes for Lincoln,—declared against the administration. This was not from a loss of patriotism or from lack of belief in the Union cause, but because the people were losing faith in the President. There had been an enormous waste of life and money; and there was, from a large portion of the Democratic press, a protest against the proclamation as unconstitutional and unsupported by any statute. In answer to this objection, Lincoln wrote some time after:

Result
of the
fall
elections

"I am naturally anti-slavery. If slavery is not wrong, nothing is wrong. I cannot remember when I did not so think and feel, and yet I have never understood that the Presidency conferred upon me an unrestricted right to act officially upon this judgment and feeling. I did understand, however, that my oath to preserve the Constitution to the best of my ability imposed upon me the duty of preserving, by every indispensable means, that government—that nation—of which that Constitution was the organic law. Was it possible to lose the nation and yet preserve the Constitution? By general law, life and limb must be protected, yet often a limb must be amputated to save a life; but a life is never wisely given to

Lincoln's
defense
of his
position


1863 save a limb. I felt that measures otherwise unconstitutional might become lawful by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the nation. Right or wrong, I assumed that ground, and now avow it. I could not feel that, to the best of my ability, I had tried to preserve the Constitution, if to save slavery or any minor matter I should permit the wreck of government, country, and Constitution altogether.

When
doubtful
measures
may
become
lawful


“When, early in the war, General Frémont attempted military emancipation, I forbade it, because I did not then think it an indispensable necessity. When, a little later, General Cameron, then Secretary of War, suggested the arming of the blacks, I objected, because I did not yet think it an indispensable necessity. When, still later, General Hunter attempted military emancipation, I again forbade it, because I did not yet think the indispensable necessity had come. When, in March, and May, and July, 1862, I made earnest and successive appeals to the Border States to favor compensated emancipation, I believed the indispensable necessity for military emancipation and arming the blacks would come unless averted by that measure. They declined the proposition, and I was, in my best judgment, driven to the alternative of either surrendering the Union, and with it the Constitution, or of laying a strong hand upon the colored element. I chose the latter. In choosing it, I hoped for greater gain than loss, but of this I was not entirely confident. More than a year of trial now shows no loss by it in our foreign relations, none in our home popular sentiment, none in our white military force—no loss by it anyhow or anywhere. On the contrary, it shows a gain of quite a hundred and thirty thousand soldiers, seamen, and laborers. These are palpable facts, about which, as facts, there can be no caviling. We have the men, and we could not have had them without the measure.

Cautious
action
neces-
sary

“I claim not to have controlled events, but confess plainly that events have controlled me. Now, at the end of three years of struggling, the nation’s condition is not what either party or any man devised or expected. God alone can claim it. Whither it is tending seems plain. If God now wills the removal of a great wrong, and wills, also, that we of the



THUS WILL IT EVER BE WITH TYRANTS.



WE ARE SEVEN.

ONE OF THE REBELS



MARTHA WASHINGTON

VIRGINIA THE MIGHTY.



DEVICES FROM WAR ENVELOPES.

Those at the top and bottom are Union ; in the second row are two from South Carolina ; in the third, two from Virginia.

North, as well as you of the South, shall pay fairly for our complicity in that wrong, impartial history will find therein new causes to attest and revere His justice and mercy.” 1862-63

The proclamation caused a profound sensation in the Confederacy. A week after it was given to the public it was discussed in the Confederate Senate at Richmond; and some of the prominent members proposed, as an act of retaliation, the raising of the black flag. General Beauregard telegraphed to one of the Senators, “It is high time to proclaim the black flag for Abolition prisoners taken after January 1, 1863. Let the execution be with the garrote.” A servile insurrection was prophesied. Davis, in a message to the Confederate Congress January 12, declared that the proclamation “encouraged slaves to a general assassination of their masters.” A joint resolution was passed, denouncing the proclamation, authorizing retaliation, and providing for the execution of negroes taken in arms and the banishment of their white commanders. These fears had no foundation whatever. Not a single attempt throughout the whole South was made during the war towards a rising of the slaves. Instead, they showed remarkable fidelity to their owners. They raised food for the soldiers who were fighting to keep them in slavery, and were even more faithful and devoted to their owners than in time of peace. They sewed and knit and packed soldiers’ boxes with as much interest and alacrity as their white masters. Their conduct during the war was a disproof of the statement that no man can serve

Consternation
in the
Confederacy

Fidelity
of the
colored
race

1863

two masters. They befriended Union soldiers who escaped from Southern prisons, and helped them back into the Federal lines. At the same time they concealed valuables of the household so that they should not be stolen by stragglers from the Union army. They showed a singular devotion to their masters who were in the service, and shared their dangers on the march and on the battlefield; while at the same time they rendered valuable service as guides in the movements of Union forces.

Popular
sym-
pathy
in Eng-
land

When the news reached England of the issue of the supplementary emancipation proclamation, on the 1st of January, 1863, the demonstrations of approval and popular sympathy were enthusiastic and almost universal. On the Sunday following the reception of the news, Spurgeon prayed before an immense congregation: "We pray Thee, give success to this glorious proclamation of liberty which comes to us from across the waters. Bondage and the lash can claim no sympathy from us. God bless and strengthen the North; give victory to their arms!"

Cheers
for
Lincoln

Public meetings were constantly taking place. One held in Exeter Hall January 29 was so great that an overflow meeting was held in the open air. At the name of Lincoln the audience rose, cheered, and waved hats and handkerchiefs. At another great public gathering at Bradford, Yorkshire, a resolution was adopted, declaring that "any intervention, physical or moral, on behalf of the slave power would be disgraceful." The meeting closed with cheers for the President. During the

month of February large public meetings were held in nearly every large city of England and Scotland, at which like resolutions were adopted. Thus matters stood between England and America at the beginning of the third year of the war.

1863

It is not to be supposed that all who were opposed to the administration were animated by disloyal sentiments. There was much to offend the lover of justice in some of the acts perpetrated by the government. For none of them was the President personally responsible, although many were committed in his name. Chief of these were the arbitrary arrests of civilians in various States, not always for offenses committed, but for those that might be committed.

Variety
of
opinion

On the first day of the second session of the thirty-seventh Congress, Mr. Cox of Ohio offered a resolution in the House, declaring that all arrests of citizens in States where there was no insurrection, previously made by the United States authorities, were unwarranted by the Constitution and a usurpation of power. A like resolution was offered in the Senate, which asserted that the right to suspend the *habeas corpus* did not include the right to make arrests. Subsequently, a bill was introduced in the House which passed the Senate, authorizing the President to suspend the *habeas corpus* in any case throughout the United States. It made provision for the protection of all arrested persons, and provided that the order of the President should be a sufficient power in prosecutions for arrests made under that order.

Regarding
acts
of the
govern-
ment

1863

Martial
law in
Rich-
mondReign of
terror

In Richmond, President Davis had boasted that “through all the necessities of an unequal struggle, there has been no act on our part to impair personal liberty or the freedom of speech, of thought, or of the press. The courts have been open and the judicial functions fully executed, and every right of peaceful citizens maintained as securely as if a war had not disturbed the land.” But no more than Lincoln could he leave his enemies the sword and refuse to grasp it himself. One week later he proclaimed martial law in the city of Richmond and the adjoining country to the distance of ten miles, and declared the suspension of the privilege of *habeas corpus*. As at the North, so at the South. Many of the citizens of Richmond and other prominent places openly condemned the act and were at once arrested and confined as traitors. The editor of one of the papers who criticised the order was placed under arrest. A Confederate war clerk named Jones, who kept a diary through the war, wrote on April 17, 1863: “The press has taken the alarm, and several of the publishers have confessed a fear of having their offices closed if they dare to speak the sentiments struggling for utterance. It is indeed a reign of terror. Every Virginian and other loyal citizens of the South, members of Congress and all, must now, before obtaining General Winder’s permission to leave the city for their homes, bow down before the official in the provost-marshal’s office, and subscribe to an oath of allegiance while a file of bayonets are pointed at their backs.”

On January 17, 1863, the President approved the joint resolution which directed the Secretary of the Treasury to issue \$100,000,000 United States legal-tender notes, for the discharge of the arrears of pay due the soldiers and sailors in service. At the time of the assembling of Congress, many of the soldiers had not been paid for four or five months; so that at the beginning of the year 1863 the amount due to the army and navy was about \$60,000,000. Government bonds were selling with difficulty, but with the new legislation there was an immediate change. A plan had been devised by which the 5-20 bonds were sold by popular subscription; and in two months Secretary Chase announced that the popular loan was an assured success, subscriptions averaging over \$3,000,000 a day. The Secretary of War stated in April that the rolls showed 800,000 men under arms, all of them paid till the 1st of March, and better clothed and better fed than any soldiers ever were before.

1863

Govern-
ment in
debt to
soldiersImproved
condition

At this time there was a general movement throughout the country in the way of organizing patriotic societies. It was the day of Union leagues, loyal national leagues, and Union clubs; and new life seemed to be once more instilled into the veins of the nation.

Great
spread of
patriotic
societies

At the beginning of 1863 the relations of the United States government with France were in a very delicate condition. The French, as has been said, had established an empire in Mexico with Maximilian as its head. On January 11, resolutions were offered in the Senate, setting forth that

1863
Rela-
tions
with
France

the French attempt to subvert the Mexican Republic was an act hostile to the United States, and that it was the duty of the government to require France to withdraw her armed forces from Mexico. These were referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. In the House of Representatives Henry Winter Davis offered a joint resolution which was unanimously passed. It read:

“The Congress of the United States are unwilling by silence to leave the nations of the world under the impression that they are indifferent spectators of the deplorable events now transpiring in the Republic of Mexico; and they therefore think fit to declare that it does not agree with the policy of the United States to acknowledge a monarchical government erected on the ruins of any republican government in America under the auspices of any European power.”

The report of this action aroused strong feeling on the part of the French government, which was only allayed by the assurance of President Lincoln that the government did not “at present contemplate any departure from the policy hitherto pursued in regard to the war which exists between France and Mexico.” Notwithstanding, Napoleon clearly saw behind this assurance that his operations in Mexico were regarded as inadmissible by the United States Government.

CHAPTER XC.

FROM FREDERICKSBURG TO GETTYSBURG

General Burnside, whom the President had chosen to succeed McClellan, accepted the position with great unwillingness. It is possible that he felt himself unequal to the task imposed upon him. He was a man of unusually fine presence, genial, gentlemanly, and magnetic, and had a multitude of friends in the army. But like many excellent division leaders he was unequal to the command of an army.

1862

Burnside
to the
front

Within a week after Burnside assumed command, he submitted a plan for a new attack upon Richmond. Unlike McClellan, he believed the true line of operations against the Confederate capital was the direct one. His plan was to make a rapid move of the whole army to Fredericksburg, to cross the Rappahannock, and push on to Richmond before Lee could bring together his scattered troops for an adequate defense. He proposed to cross the river by pontoons, instead of relying upon the bridges, which would probably be destroyed as soon as the movement was discovered. Neither the President nor Halleck approved of his plan, but he was insistent, and finally secured the assent of the President.

His
plans
against
Rich-
mond

On the morning of the 14th of November, 1862, he issued orders for a general forward movement.

1862 The army had now been reorganized into three grand divisions. The right, under General Sumner, was composed of the Second and Ninth Corps. The left division was commanded by General Franklin, and consisted of the First and Sixth Corps. The centre division, made up of the Third and Fifth Corps, was under General Hooker. Each division was amply supplied with artillery. On the 10th of November the official report shows that there were present for duty on that date, 127,574¹ officers and men. On the 17th, General

Reorgan-
ization
of the
army

¹The figures given as to the number of men in the different armies are misleading to the general reader, who is apt to take them as representing the forces actually engaged in active warfare. A prominent official in the Union service makes the following statement and estimates:

"Our paper armies were very large, while the officers and men for actual duty were very small in comparison. As a rule, in a well-ordered army, if sixty-six per cent. of the men 'present' can be brought into battle, it is a good average; the other thirty-three per cent. are employed as cooks, teamsters, nurses, servants, etc., etc., are sick, on furlough, or detached. Then the men reported as 'absent' to guard rivers, depots, prisons, railroad stations, as escorts, etc., etc., make fearful blanks in every regiment and subdivision of the army. During our war, at no time, so I think, one-half of the men receiving pay were engaged with the fighting armies at the front, and this half was subjected to the further diminution of the thirty-three per cent. before mentioned; so that in an army whose muster-rolls would give 100,000 men 'present' and 'absent' for pay, no general could expect to bring into battle, at any distance from his base of supplies, more than 35,000 men. By way of illustration, I take the case at the close of the war, when for the first time we got at the real facts and figures: 1,050,000 men were then on the muster-rolls to be paid off and discharged. The active fighting armies then were: Grant at Richmond, 80,000; Sherman at Raleigh, 65,000; Schofield in North Carolina, 15,000; Canby at Mobile and in the Southwest, 30,000; Wilson's cavalry at Macon, Georgia, 12,000; Stoneman in East Tennessee, 5,000; Thomas in Kentucky and Tennessee, 40,000; west of Mississippi (Missouri and Arkansas), 15,000; total, 262,000. Where were all the rest? Guarding thousands of miles of seacoast, rivers, and roads, guarding prisoners, and acting as provost-guards, or loafing about the country. I do not mention this in criticism, but to show how in war such vast expenses

Sumner's command reached Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg.

1862
Nov.-Dec.

As soon as Lee found that the whole Army of the Potomac was concentrating at Fredericksburg, the Confederate forces from every quarter were drawn together in haste; and in a brief time the two armies in full strength confronted each other on the opposite sides of the river. During the latter days of November and the first week in December, Burnside occupied himself with accumulating supplies and preparing for the proposed movement; while Lee was no less busy in strengthening his lines, which extended from about a mile and a half above the town to the Richmond railroad below. On each side of the Rappahannock were long ranges of hills, those in possession of the Federals being the highest. Between these two ranges, in the valley, and on the banks of the river, lay the town of Fredericksburg, commanded by the guns of both sides. The Stafford Heights were occupied by Sumner, and were lined with batteries which covered the construction of bridges and the laying of pontoons. Lee recognized the fact that it would be impossible under the circumstances to prevent the Federals from crossing. He therefore selected a position with the view to resisting

Burnside
and Lee
both
active

Lee
assumes
defensive

do arise, and how often the country overestimates the exact strength of armies from the official returns. At no single time during the late Civil War—not even in 1864, the time of the greatest pressure—do I believe that fifty per cent. of the men drawing pay as soldiers were actually within striking distance of the enemy. To this cause may be traced some of the worst failures, when the government and people behind pushed their officers 'on,' supposing that figures could handle muskets and fight battles."

1862 the advance after the crossing had been made,
Dec. guarding the river with a force sufficient only for
impeding the Federal movements and affording
time for concentration.

Five pontoon bridges were thrown by Burnside's engineers across the river during the night of the 11th. A line of rifle-pits in front of the city made it almost impossible to continue the work after daylight. A hundred volunteers from the Nineteenth and Twentieth Massachusetts and the Seventh Michigan and Eighty-ninth New York crossed over in boats, and drove the sharpshooters from their defenses with the bayonet.

A
crossing
effected

The crossing was made on the 12th. Nineteen batteries of 104 guns were taken over by Sumner, but most of them were ordered back across the river. Twenty-three batteries of 116 guns crossed the river at the lower bridge, all but one of them taking part in the battle of the following day. Behind Fredericksburg the ground ascends gradually with many inequalities of surface. On this rising ground and on the hills beyond, the Confederates had planted batteries in every available position. A narrow road bounded by a stone wall ran along the foot of the heights. In the rear of the heights a new road had been cut, by means of which the two wings of the Confederate army could be easily connected.

Burnside's plan was to seize this road by a powerful attack with his left, and as soon as that had succeeded, for Sumner to assault the position at his right. He would then advance his centre



GENERAL T. J. (STONEWALL) JACKSON.

under Hooker against the Confederate front. A dense fog covered the valley of the Rappahannock on the morning of the attack, but before noon the weather had cleared and the sky was cloudless. The opening attack on the left was made by General Meade of Franklin's grand division with 4500 men. He advanced to the hill where Jackson was stationed, broke through the Confederate lines, gained the position they had occupied, when all at once Jackson opened a terrific fire which threw them into confusion. They again massed and broke Jackson's line, but a counter attack drove them back to the railroad. On the right Sumner made ready to storm the fortifications on Marye's Heights in his front. This hill had been so protected as to be absolutely invulnerable to assault. General Alexander, the superintendent of artillery, in describing its strength to Longstreet, said, "We cover that ground so well that we will comb it as with a fine-tooth comb. A chicken could not live on that field when we open on it."

Sumner had selected the corps of French and Hancock for the attack, with Howard's division as a support. Just before 12 o'clock the two bodies pressed on to the assault. The Confederate artillery from the right, front, and left tore through their ranks, but they kept on until they reached the stone wall where Cobb's brigade awaited them. Then suddenly a storm of lead swept through their advancing ranks. They halted, wavered, and fell back repulsed and shattered. Five times the Federals formed and charged and were driven

1862
Dec. 13

Strength
of Con-
federate
position

Federals
repulsed

1862 back. Hooker's attack in the centre met with the
Dec. 13 same fate.

Weak-
ness of
Burnside
shown

The movements of the day showed the utter incapacity of Burnside as a commander. According to his own reports, he had no definite plan of operation beyond seizing the road referred to. Nothing could have been plainer than the impossibility of success in the attack upon Marye's Hill, and yet six times his obedient brigades were driven to certain death under the fire of its guns. Hooker says, "A prisoner in the morning had given to General Burnside, General Sumner, and myself full information of the position and defenses of the enemy, stating that it was their desire that we should attack that point in rear of Fredericksburg on the road; that it was perfectly impossible for any troops to carry the position; that if the first line was carried, a second line of batteries commanded it."

His per-
sistency

So impressed was Hooker with the hopelessness of the enterprise, that, after consulting with several of the general officers of his and Sumner's command, he sent to Burnside acquainting him with the facts, and advised him not to attack. Burnside sent back the reply that the attack must be made. Hooker then saw Burnside in person, explained the facts more fully, and told him it was the universal opinion that an attack should not be made. Burnside still insisted, and the results were as have been described.

When the sun set on the 13th of December, 15,000 men lay dead or wounded along the banks

of the Rappahannock. The Army of the Potomac was no nearer Richmond than before. It was Burnside's intention to renew the battle the next morning. The chief commanders urged him at night to recross the Rappahannock, but for some time he obstinately refused. Finding at last that all his chief officers were against him, and that they regarded the enemy's lines as impregnable, he unwillingly consented. The Confederate losses during the battle in killed and wounded were 5400. Three days later, in a storm of wind and rain, the army was withdrawn across the river without interference, and went into camp on the north bank of the Rappahannock in full sight of the battlefield.

Driven almost to frenzy by his failure, and with the knowledge that it was imputed to his incapacity, Burnside determined to cross the river again and make another attack. Preparations to that end had already begun when the President telegraphed him, "I have good reasons for saying that you must not make a general movement of the army without letting me know." This took Burnside to Washington. He told the President that both Halleck and Stanton, who opposed his plan, had not the confidence of the army and the country, and ought to be retired. He still insisted on his plan, and finally the President consented with certain changes. General Franklin declared the proposed movement impossible, and Hooker, with his usual freedom of speech, denounced it as absurd and doomed to certain failure. Nine-tenths of the army, officers and men, agreed with him. Just

1862
Dec.

With-
draws
across
the
Rappa-
hannock

Goes to
Wash-
ington

1862
Dec.

as the arrangements had been completed, and orders for the advance had been given, a furious storm came on which lasted three or four days, turning the road to beds of mud and making any forward movement impossible. Criticism among officers and men became so outspoken at last that Burnside hurried to Washington with the demand that several of his leading generals, among them Franklin, Hooker, and Sumner, should be at once removed, the alternative being the resignation of his command. The latter was accepted, and the choice of the next leader of the Army of the Potomac fell upon Major-General Joseph E. Hooker. On the same day Generals Franklin and Sumner were relieved at their own request.

Hooker
succeeds
Burnside

A
Cabinet
crisis

Burnside's defeat precipitated what might be called a Cabinet crisis. The Republican press and the leading members of Congress had got into the habit of attributing the reverses in the field to the President, and beyond him to Seward, whom they persisted in regarding as a clog to the administration. After Fredericksburg a caucus of Republican Senators was held, and a resolution was passed declaring that such changes should be made in the President's constitutional advisers as would secure better results in the war waged to suppress the rebellion. Although especially aimed at Seward, it indirectly included Chase and Stanton also. A committee of nine Senators was selected to wait upon the President and present the resolutions, and urge the dismissal of Seward, who was temporarily absent from Washington. The Cabinet was

invited to share in the interview, and a long and warm discussion followed. Seward, who was informed of the proceedings, at once sent in his resignation, and Secretary Chase resigned his portfolio the next day. Twenty-four hours later they were recalled by the President, for the reason that "the public interest did not admit of their resignation."

1863

A
heated
discus-
sion

General Hooker, who had now been selected as the leader of the Union armies, was a graduate of West Point, of supposed great military ability, and had proved himself an efficient corps commander. He has been summed up by a recent historian as follows: "Brave, handsome, vain, insubordinate, plausible, untrustworthy, he had many of the merits of a lieutenant, but not all. As an inferior, he planned badly and fought well; as chief, he planned well and fought badly. He was so unfortunate in his bearing as a corps commander that his great chief, Sherman, was glad to get rid of him. He left the army in front of Atlanta, and never was set to work against troops again." Certain it is, he lacked a cool head, and had little control over his tongue. He had openly declared that the government at Washington was "in imbecile hands," and that "the Union cause would not succeed except under a dictator." The day after he was appointed, the President wrote him a letter in which he said:

Opinion
of the
new com-
mander

"There are some things in regard to which I am not quite satisfied with you. I think that during General Burnside's

1863

Lincoln's
letter to
Hooker

command of the army, you have taken counsel of your ambition to thwart him as much as you could, in which you did a great wrong to the country and to a meritorious and honorable brother officer. I have heard, in such a way as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the army and the government needed a dictator. Only those generals who gain success can set up as dictators. What I ask of you now is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship. I much fear that the spirit which you have aided to infuse into the army, of criticising their commander and withholding confidence from him, will now turn upon you. I shall assist you as far as I can to put it down. Neither you nor Napoleon, if he were alive again, could get any good out of an army while such a spirit prevails in it. And now beware of rashness, but with energy and sleepless vigilance go forward and give us victory."

Con-
dition
of the
armies

He had now under his command a force of 124,000 men, of which nearly 12,000 were cavalry. Lee's army at that time numbered, according to official reports, 62,000 men, 3000 of which were cavalry. Both armies had been resting during the winter, and the discipline of both was excellent. Hooker was popular with his troops, who had every confidence in his ability. There was some dissatisfaction on the part of the Eleventh Corps,—which was largely made up of Germans,—because of the displacement of General Sigel, whose place was now occupied by General Howard. Hooker had evolved a plan of campaign which promised success. The Confederates occupied a long line, and could therefore not be strong along its entire length. His idea was to make a pretense of crossing with Sedgwick's forces below Fredericksburg, while the remaining corps, under General Slocum,

Hooker's
plan
of cam-
paign

should cross above Lee's left, at Kelly's Ford; and then to march down the river against the left flank of the Confederate army, clearing away the enemy from Banks' Ford and making a crossing for the other forces.

1863
April

But his idea was not only to crush Lee's army, but to capture it. To accomplish this, he sent out Stoneman with 10,000 cavalry two weeks in advance, to attack Lee's communications with Richmond and cut off his supplies. This, he believed, would necessitate a retreat and the surrender of Fredericksburg. The raid was to be made in two columns, one under Stoneman himself, and the other under Averill. If they should carry out their task as laid down, Lee's line of communications would be cut, he would be out of food supplies and be obliged to fall back towards Richmond. A heavy rain set in, which made the river unfordable, and Stoneman was delayed for several days. Hooker became impatient and refused to wait any longer, so, as soon as the water had subsided, the whole army,—infantry, artillery, and cavalry,—were sent over together. The crossing was begun on the 29th of April, and on the evening of the 30th four of the corps were at Chancellorsville with Sickles ready to cross. Sedgwick, with his 30,000 men at Fredericksburg, manoeuvred them in such a manner as to lead Lee to suppose that he was confronted by the greater part of the Federal army; but a day later he recognized that the movement was a feint, and that his real foe was to be met at Chancellorsville.

Begins
active
opera-
tions

A
crossing
effected

1863
May

Diffi-
culties
of ap-
proach

On the morning of the 1st of May, Hooker moved out to attack Lee in four columns, each column preceded by a detachment of cavalry. In attempting to form his line of battle, Hooker found himself hampered in his movements by almost impenetrable thickets and undergrowth, which had to be cut with axes before a passage could be made. It was impossible, under the circumstances, to form a continuous line or approach in any sort of order. So dense were the thickets, that aides who were sent from one part of the field to the other, got lost and wandered about in the woods. One brigade was all night trying to find a passage through the woods, and did not reach the main army until daylight.

Weak
point
in the
Union
line

The two armies at last met each other about two and one-half miles from Chancellorsville. The weak place in the whole Union line was that held by Howard. There was no heavy fighting during the day, the two sides working for position. Early the next morning the cavalry leader Stuart, who had been sent out on a reconnaissance, returned and reported that the right flank of Howard's corps was defenseless and open to attack. Jackson asked permission to lead his own corps, numbering 26,000 men, to an attack upon this point. Hooker understood the weakness of Howard's position, and wished to strengthen it with a part of Sickles' corps and an additional battery; but Howard became offended at the reflection on his skill and on the bravery of his troops, and refused the proffered assistance.



MARIE HEIGHTS, FREDERICKSBURG, VA.

As soon as Jackson started, a feint was made against Hooker's centre and left, to turn attention in those directions and prevent them from observing the movement to the right. Notwithstanding, Jackson's column was seen, and the fact was at once reported to General Hooker. Orders were at once sent to Howard to provide against an attack, but no precautions were taken by that commander. Hooker's order was received at 10 A. M.; and from that time until the attack was made at 6 P. M., there was ample time for Howard to form an impregnable line of defense. His division commanders appreciated the danger, and General Schurz tried to make him see that his flank was in danger, but nothing was done.

1863
May 1-2

Fatal
delay

The attack was made as planned, Jackson striking Howard's corps in the rear and flank. Breastworks had been thrown up; but the Confederates charged them with cheers, and the troops, surprised, broke and fled, creating a panic which infected the whole corps. Finally several of the brigades were rallied, and the Confederate advance checked. Though it was night, there was a full moon, and Jackson rode along his lines to make arrangements for a second attack. All at once a sharp volley of musketry came from the Confederate lines, killing several of the staff. Jackson turned and galloped back toward his line, when a second volley was fired which wounded him in three places. He was removed to the hospital and his left arm was amputated; but the shock was too great, and he died a week later.

Howard's
corps
routed

Death of
Jackson

1863
May 3-4

Hill now renewed the attack; but he also was struck down, and his troops were driven back to their original position. General Stuart then took command, and the next morning made a furious attack upon the same point, Lee attacking at the same time in front, the two joining forces at half-past nine.

Accident
to
Hooker

About that time General Hooker was knocked insensible by a cannon ball, which struck a pillar against which he was leaning at his headquarters. The army for the time was therefore without a leader. Before this accident he was in a state of nervous collapse, and both in mind and body unfit for the exercise of his great responsibility. By ten o'clock the Union lines had been forced back, and Lee had won the battle; 35,000 fresh troops were within reach and eager to fight, but were not called upon. Hooker sent word to Sedgwick to fall upon Lee's rear. To gain the road over which he was to march, he was obliged to take Marye's Heights, which were yet strongly garrisoned. This task was accomplished, however, after a short but severe fight. Sedgwick then pressed on, but on his way learned that Hooker had been defeated and driven from his position. Lee now fell upon Sedgwick and forced him to withdraw to the north bank of the Rappahannock. All that day, May 4, Hooker did nothing to relieve Sedgwick, although he had 80,000 men confronting 22,000.

Lee
comes off
victor

That night a council of war was held, and Hooker decided to recross the river, the movement

being accomplished without molestation by the morning of May 6. The loss of the Union army in the Chancellorsville campaign was 17,287; that of the Confederates was 12,463. After the battle Lee's army went into camp for several weeks, during which time it was reorganized into three corps of three divisions each.

1863
May 6

It was no substantial victory that the Confederates had won at Chancellorsville. It had been gained at a terrible expense of life, and when the battle was over Lee found himself too weak to follow the retreating forces. He fully recognized the conditions, and saw that a prolonged defensive warfare would ultimately exhaust the South without accomplishing independence. He had now to choose between two plans: to fall back to his base of supplies at Richmond and stand a siege, or to attempt an invasion of the North. By doing the former, he would save transportation of men and material, and would keep the Federal army at a distance from its source of supplies. Furthermore, the fate of Vicksburg was hanging in the balance. With its surrender the possession of the Mississippi would be lost; and that, with the retreat of his army upon Richmond, would not only dishearten the Southern people, but would arouse the North to fresh effort. An invasion of the North, therefore, seemed to be the only move to counterbalance these adverse conditions. Another reason for such a movement was the possibility that England, in case of a successful campaign, would acknowledge the independence of the South. In

Hooker
retreats

Lee in a
quandary

1863
June
Forced to
decisive
action

that case the Confederacy might secure loans on its securities, and possibly might form an alliance through which the coast blockade might be broken and the entire line of Southern ports be re-opened. In addition, Lee hoped by this advance to draw Hooker out where he could strike him a decisive blow, for he had absolute faith in his ability to defeat any Federal force which could be brought against him in the open field.

After Chancellorsville he had been reinforced by Longstreet's two divisions and a large body of conscripts, so that on May 31 he had nearly 89,000 men, of which 69,000 were fit for duty. Hooker discovered just before this date that Lee was preparing for a movement of this kind, and immediately informed the President. Owing to dissatisfaction with Stoneman's management of the cavalry operations during the Chancellorsville campaign, Hooker now displaced that commander in favor of Major-General Alfred Pleasonton.

Lee
moves

On the 3d of June the Confederate army began to move from Fredericksburg, and by the 10th Ewell's corps was in the Shenandoah Valley. At this time there was a small Union force intrenched at Winchester under General Milroy; although he had received warning, he delayed moving, and on Sunday, the 14th of June, was completely surrounded by Ewell and Longstreet. He fought them for two days, finally cutting his way through their lines with 5000 of his men, leaving 2000 sick and wounded behind, who were paroled, or taken prisoners to Richmond. At Martinsburg, after a

brisk fight, a portion of Ewell's corps captured a long wagon train on its way to Harper's Ferry, the garrison escaping to Maryland Heights.

1863
June

Lee had now cleared the Shenandoah Valley of Union troops, and it lay open to him as a highway for the invasion. The fugitives from Winchester, who fled to Chambersburg, spread the news of the advance of the Confederates in the towns through which they passed, creating the wildest excitement. On the morning of the 15th, Jenkins' brigade of 2000 cavalry pushed forward to Chambersburg, making heavy exactions upon the farmers in the way of horses, cattle, and all sorts of supplies. There were many negroes in Chambersburg, some of whom were captured, bound, and sent South to be sold as slaves. On the 15th Ewell's corps crossed the Potomac, and by June 26 Hill and Longstreet with their forces had passed into Maryland and joined him. June 22 Ewell was ordered by Lee to march towards Harrisburg, and if possible capture it. On the 27th Ewell reached Chambersburg, and sent Jubal Early with his division to seize York, which was laid under heavy contribution for hats, shoes, rations, and money. On that same date Lee reached Chambersburg; and the whole Confederate army, numbering 75,000 men, was on Pennsylvania soil.

On the
way to
Cham-
bersburg

In the
Keystone
State

In the mean time Hooker, who had been reinforced so that his army numbered about 100,000 men, crossed the Potomac on the 26th, and marched to Frederick. At that time there was a garrison of

1863
June

Meade
displaces
Hooker

11,000 men in the works on Maryland Heights opposite Harper's Ferry. Hooker demanded that these men should be added to his army, as they were of no use where they were, but Halleck refused. There was bad blood between the two, and Halleck's refusal of Hooker's demand was probably owing more to a dislike to oblige him than to any belief in the necessity of holding the position. In his irritation Hooker asked to be relieved from the command of the army. His request was at once granted, and General Meade, commander of the Fifth Corps, was appointed in his place. The appointment was wholly unexpected. Meade had proved himself an officer of courage and ability, had served in the Army of the Potomac with distinction, and was now in command of the Fifth Corps. He had no enemies in the army, and no voice was raised in criticism of his appointment. Halleck wrote to him, "You are intrusted with all the power which the President, the Secretary of War, or the General-in-Chief can confer upon you, and you may rely upon our full support." He was also informed that he could withdraw the troops on Maryland Heights, a favor refused to Hooker.

Meade
after Lee

Meade had now 100,000 men. He estimated Lee's force at 80,000. On the 29th of June, Lee, who had intended to move towards Philadelphia, turned his march eastward towards Gettysburg. On the 29th and 30th the army crossed into Pennsylvania and Meade established his headquarters at Taneytown, Maryland, thirteen miles south of



GEN'L GEORGE G. MEADE.



GEN'L WINFIELD S. HANCOCK.



GEN'L JOHN BUFORD.

Gettysburg. Each general was seeking a place for the battle that was now inevitable, and fate decided that it should be Gettysburg.

1863
June 30

On the 30th of June Buford's Union cavalry took possession of Seminary Ridge west of the town, watching for the Confederate approach. It was attacked by the advance of Hill's corps, but the position was held. A little later Reynolds came up with the First Corps, but he had hardly begun the deployment of his troops when he was mortally wounded. Howard reached the field with the Eleventh Corps about noon, and the Confederates were driven back for some distance, losing many prisoners. The tide turned with the arrival of Ewell's corps, which made a furious charge, forcing back the Union troops to the opposite side of the town, and taking 5000 prisoners and sixteen guns.

Coming
together

General Meade arrived on the field at midnight on the 1st of July, after Hancock had thrown the army rapidly into position. The Federal lines extended in the form of a fish-hook from Little Round Top at the south, below and on the right of the town, by way of Round Top and along Cemetery Ridge through the cemetery itself, by the way of the gate; and then bending to the right, formed the bowl of the hook, which extended around as far as Culp's Hill and Wolf Creek. The ground was elevated, and the convexity was towards the enemy.

Getting
into
position

By nightfall of the 1st, both armies were in a state of readiness for the conflict. The Union

1863
July 1-2

Both
armies
ready
for the
struggle

army was on the defensive. It was sufficient that it should hold its ground and repel all assault. The Confederates must advance and carry the Federal position in order to succeed. How this should be done was not agreed on by the Confederate commanders. General Lee formed a plan of direct assault; but General Longstreet was of opinion that a movement of the army to the Union left flank would be preferable, and that by that method the flank might be turned and the position of Meade carried with less loss and much less hazard. Longstreet, however, did not oppose the views of his commander to the extent of thwarting his purpose or weakening the plan adopted.

Battle
begins

On the 2d of July, about noon, the battle began in earnest. The Confederates advanced against the Union centre and left, and at a late hour a strenuous and partly successful attack was made on the Federal right. But complete success was not attained by Lee in any part of the field. About sundown the Confederates gained considerable advantage against Slocum, who held the line along Wolf Hill and Rock Creek; and on the Union left a terrible struggle occurred for the possession of Great and Little Round Top. In this part of the field the fighting continued until six o'clock in the evening; but the critical positions still remained in the hands of the Federals. In the centre the contest was waged for the mastery of Cemetery Hill, which was the key to the Union position. Here were planted batteries with an aggregate of eighty guns; and here, though the

Federals
have the
best of it



PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG.

assaults of the Confederates were desperate and long continued, the integrity of the Federal line was preserved till nightfall.

1863
July 2

The fighting, along a front of nearly five miles in extent, continued in a desultory manner until about ten o'clock on the July night, when the firing for the most part ceased, leaving the two armies in virtually the same position which they had occupied the day before. This signified, however, that thus far the advantage was on the Union side; for on that side the battle was defensive. The Confederate army had come to a wall, and must break through or suffer defeat. The burden of attack rested on the Confederate side; but General Lee did not flinch from the necessity. In the darkness of night both he and the Union commanders made strenuous preparations for the renewal of the struggle on the morrow.

Resting
on their
arms

On the morning of the 3d both armies seemed loath to begin the conflict. This phenomenon is nearly always witnessed in the case of really critical battles. It was so at Waterloo, and so at Gettysburg. It seems that in such crises the commanders, well aware of what is to come, wait awhile, as though each would permit the other to strike first. As a matter of fact, the topmost crest of the Civil War had now been reached; and from this hour the one cause or the other must decline to the end.

The
crest
of the
war
reached

The whole forenoon of the 3d of July was spent in preparations. There was but little fighting, and

1863
July 3

Battle
begins
at noon

Great
bombard-
ment

that little was desultory. At midday there seemed to be a lull along the whole line. Just afterwards, however, General Lee opened from Seminary Ridge with about one hundred guns, directing his fire against the Union centre on Cemetery Hill. There the counter position was occupied by the American artillery of about equal strength, under command of General Hunt. The cannonade burst out at one o'clock with terrific roar. Nothing like it had ever before been seen or heard in the New World. Nothing like it, we believe, had ever up to that time been witnessed in Europe. Certainly there was no such cannonade at Waterloo. For about an hour and a half this tremendous vomit of shot and shell continued. It was the hope of General Lee to pound the Union batteries to pieces, and then, while horror and death were still supreme in the Union centre, to thrust forward an overwhelming mass of his best infantry into the gap, cut Meade's army in two, plant the Confederate banner on the crest of the Union battle line, and virtually then and there achieve the independence of the Confederate States.

Hunt's
ruse

It seems that an action of General Hunt, about half-past two, flattered Lee with the belief that he had succeeded. Hunt adopted the plan of drawing back his batteries over the crest of the hill, for the double purpose of cooling his guns that were becoming overheated, and of saving his supply of ammunition that was running low. The Union fire accordingly slackened and almost ceased for awhile. Nor was Lee able to discover from



CHARGE OF THE LOUISIANA TIGERS AT GETTYSBURG.

his position but what his batteries under General Alexander had prevailed. It looked for the moment as though the battle were lost to Meade, and that victory was in the clutch of his antagonist.

1863
July 3

Already a Confederate charge of infantry had been prepared. About 18,000 men, in three divisions, under Armistead, Garnett, and Pettigrew, and led by General George E. Pickett of Virginia, had been got into readiness for the crisis which had now arrived. Longstreet was the corps commander, and through him the order for the charge should be given. General Lee had himself made the order; but Longstreet, seeing as he believed the inevitable, hesitated and turned aside. It was not a refusal to send an army to destruction, but the natural hesitation of a really great commander to do what he believed was fatal to the Confederate cause. Pickett, however, gave his salutation to Longstreet, and presently said: "Sir, I am going to move forward!"

Facing
the crisis

Then began the most memorable charge ever witnessed in America. The Confederate column was three-fourths of a mile in length. It was directed against the Union centre, where it was supposed the Confederate fire had done its work. What ensued was the finest military spectacle that had been seen in the world since the charge of the Old Guard at Waterloo; and the results were alike! The brave men who made the onset were mowed down as they crossed rapidly the intervening space. Hunt's batteries were quickly run back to their

A
notable
charge

1863
July

Terrible
slaughter

Union
forces
victor-
ious

Counting
the cost

position, and began to discharge their deadly volleys against the head of the oncoming column. That column veered somewhat to the right as it came. The line staggered, but pressed on. It came within the range of the Union musketry. Gaps opened here and there. Armistead, who led the advance, saw his forces sinking to the earth; but he did not waver. Nearer and nearer the column came to the Union line. It *struck* the Union line. There was a momentary mêlée among the guns, and then all was over. Hancock's infantry rose with flash on flash from among the rocks by which they were partially protected. The Confederates were scattered in broken groups. Retreat was well-nigh impossible. The impact of the charge was utterly broken, and the Confederate line was blown into rout and ruin. Victory hovered over the national army. The Confederate forces staggered away under the blow of defeat. Night came down on a broken and virtually hopeless cause. The field was covered with the dead and dying; 2834 Union soldiers had been killed outright, 13,709 were wounded, and 6643 were missing, making a total of 23,186 men. The Confederate loss was never definitely ascertained, but was greatly in excess of that of the Federals. The best estimate has fixed it at 31,621. The grand total of losses in those fatal three days thus reached the enormous aggregate of 54,807! Such was the unspeakable havoc by which the ill-starred Southern Confederacy went to its doom, and by which the national Union was preserved for posterity!



VIEW OF THE WHEATFIELD, GETTYSBURG.



DEVIL'S DEN, GETTYSBURG.

Position of the Confederate Sharpshooters on the Second Day of the Battle.

After the battle of July 3 Meade issued a congratulatory order to the army in which he spoke of "driving the invaders from our soil." This expression grated upon Lincoln, who impatiently said, "This is a dreadful reminiscence of McClellan. It is the same spirit that moved him to claim the great victory because Pennsylvania and Maryland were safe. Will our generals never get that idea out of their heads? The whole country is our soil."

1863

Meade's
congratulatory
order

Meade followed slowly after Lee, but made no attack. Lincoln's disappointment when he heard that the Confederate troops had safely crossed the Potomac was intense. He said, "Our army held the war in the hollow of their hand, and they would not close it. We had gone through all the labor of tilling and planting an enormous crop, and when it was ripe we did not harvest it."

Lee
retreats

On November 19, nearly six months later, the Gettysburg National Cemetery was dedicated. The address upon the occasion was made by Edward Everett, the most accomplished living American orator. His address, which had been elaborately prepared, occupied over an hour in delivery. Lincoln followed in a two-minute speech which has become immortal. He said:

Dedication of
the
Gettysburg
Cemetery

"Fourscore and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.

"Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation so conceived and so dedicated, can

1863
Nov. 19

Lincoln's
speech
at Get-
tysburg

long endure. We are met on a great battlefield of that war. We have come to dedicate a portion of that field as a final resting-place for those who here gave their lives that that nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper that we should do this.

“But, in a larger sense, we cannot dedicate—we cannot consecrate—we cannot hallow—this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it far above our poor power to add or detract. The world will little note nor long remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. It is for us the living, rather, to be dedicated here to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us,—that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion; that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain; that this nation under God shall have a new birth of freedom; and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.”

CHAPTER XCI.

SHILOH AND BEYOND

We now take up the thread dropped far back, and turn once more to the armies of the West and South, where the contest is being waged with no less vigor than along the banks of the Rapidan and James.

1862

After the fall of Donelson and New Madrid, that part of the Confederate army under General Albert Sidney Johnston fell back to Murfreesboro, so as to secure a position between Grant's army and Chattanooga; while Beauregard, who had been ordered to supervise the movements in the Mississippi Valley, planned to concentrate all the scattered Confederate forces at some important point, making a single powerful army with which to strike an effectual blow. The place chosen was Corinth, Mississippi, where the two great railroads connecting the Gulf of Mexico and the Mississippi came together, making it the key of the railroad system of Mississippi and Tennessee. To Corinth, therefore, in the month of March, 1862, General Beauregard summoned Bragg from Pensacola; Polk from Mississippi; Johnston from Murfreesboro, and Van Dorn from Arkansas. After General Johnston's arrival he assumed the chief command of the army, Beauregard taking second rank.

Opera-
tions
around
Corinth

1862
March

The plan of campaign, however, was due to the latter.

Union
forces
getting
together

Halleck in the mean time had become aware of this plan; and to meet the conditions compelled by it, the Tennessee campaign was organized. March 1, General Halleck sent to General Grant an order directing the course of operations. Two days later the forces at Fort Donelson marched from the Cumberland across to the Tennessee, where they were joined by Sherman's division and other reinforcements coming by boat up the river. From prisoners taken it was learned that Pittsburg Landing was the nearest of any of the available points on the river to Corinth, and that there was a good road between the two places. These facts were reported to General Smith, who selected Pittsburg Landing for the assembling of the army.

Buell
moves to
Pitts-
burg
Landing

When it was found that Johnston had disappeared from Buell's front at Murfreesboro, and was making a rapid march to join Beauregard, orders were sent to Buell to join Grant as rapidly as possible. Buell had about 40,000 men in good condition. The distance from Murfreesboro to Pittsburg Landing was ninety miles; but although he used all possible speed, the roads were so bad, and the rain was so incessant, that he was seventeen days in accomplishing the journey.

At the time of his arrival, Beauregard's army at Corinth numbered 45,000 men, including the forces of Bragg, Polk, and Johnston. Van Dorn and Price a few days later brought an army of



GEN'L A. S. JOHNSTON.

PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF SHILOH.

30,000 men from Arkansas. Halleck's plan had been to fall upon Beauregard and destroy him before Johnston could come to his aid; so now Johnston proposed to attack Grant before the arrival of Buell. The question was, whether he should wait for Van Dorn and Price, or strike at once. If he should do so, and should defeat Grant, he would have an overpowering force to attack Buell. The army could then take up its victorious march, and sweep away all opposition in Kentucky and Tennessee.

1862
March

Pittsburg Landing is a little collection of houses on the west bank of the Tennessee River, of no importance save as an occasional place of call for river steamers. It lies twenty-three miles northwest from Corinth, and is nine miles above Savannah, Tennessee. Lick Creek above the Landing, and Snake Creek below it, empty into the river almost three miles apart. The space between the two is a rolling plateau eighty to one hundred feet above the level of the river. Below the bluff, on the river front, the ground is cut up by sloughs and ravines, which in heavy rains are overflowed by back-water. A mile or two from the Landing, the ground is intersected by several small streams with miry bottoms and steep banks.

Pitts-
burg
Landing

A little over two miles from the Landing, on a rough country road leading to Corinth, was a small unfinished log building known as Shiloh Church. It had for some time been used as a Confederate picket station. The plateau, which was on a level with the top of the bluff, extended about four

And
Shiloh
Church

1862
April 6

an hour they were overpowered and fled back within the lines.

A com-
bined
attack

Grant reached Shiloh from his headquarters at Savannah, nine miles above, at eight o'clock. The preliminary fighting had already been sharp. He recognized at once that it was an attack in force of the combined armies. His entire available force was 33,000. In addition there were Wallace's 5000 troops. The forces under Jackson numbered over 40,000. The main attack was made by Hardee's corps, whose centre and left fell upon Sherman; while his right made a fierce attack upon Prentiss' division, which was made up of raw recruits who had been in service less than two weeks. Bragg's corps came up close behind Hardee, and added to the strength of the attack. Little by little Hardee wedged his way between two Union divisions. About nine o'clock they had driven Prentiss from his position and plundered his camp.

Attack
and
counter
attack

Sherman meantime was able to check the enemy long enough to enable the rest of the army to get into position. McClellan and Hurlbut both had sent regiments and batteries to strengthen his line. At last his left was turned, and a part of his division broke and fled to the rear. He at once changed position, throwing his right forward and holding it so tenaciously that the enemy could not get around it. By ten o'clock, however, he had lost two of his batteries and his camp had been captured. The combat has been well described as made up of numberless separate encounters of

detached portions of broken lines, continually shifting position and changing direction in the forests and across ravines. Several times during the day the supply of cartridges gave out in some of the Union regiments. For this reason, at one time, Stuart's brigade was in the utmost danger, and was obliged to fall back with the loss of the camp.

Hurbut's division, which hitherto had held place in the open ground, was now fiercely assailed and the camp captured. He fell back to the woods in his rear, where he was joined by General W. H. L. Wallace. For five hours they resisted a succession of desperate charges, in one of which Wallace was killed. The Union army had now been forced to the very verge of the river. It was time for the arrival of Lew Wallace, who, owing to an unfortunate misunderstanding of roads, had moved in the wrong direction and did not reach the ground until the fighting was over for the day.

The condition seemed to be almost hopeless. Five of the Union camps had been carried, and a large number of prisoners taken and many guns captured. Regiments had broken up and men fled in confusion toward the Landing. Thousands of fugitives had sought the shelter of the banks by the river. General Grant says that at that time there probably were as many as four or five thousand stragglers lying under cover of the river bluff panic-stricken, most of whom would have been shot without resistance where they lay before they would have taken muskets and marched to

1862
April
6-7

Stuart's
brigade
falls back

Desper-
ate con-
dition of
affairs

1862
April
6-7

Confeder-
ates also
disorgan-
ized

the front and protected themselves. Most of these men afterwards proved themselves as gallant as any of those who saved the battle from which they had deserted. On the Confederate side the disorganization was quite as bad. An estimate of the character of the struggle during the day may be gathered from the statement of the losses on Sherman's right flank, during the hour and a half's fighting. The Sixth Iowa lost 51 killed and 120 wounded; the Forty-sixth Ohio lost 34 killed and 150 wounded and 52 taken prisoners. In the Confederate First Kentucky Brigade, which lost 844 men in the two days' battle, 534 were of the four regiments engaged in the attack upon Sherman.

Change of
position
by
Sherman

About four o'clock Sherman took position so as to cover the road by which Lew Wallace was to arrive. When Sherman fell back from his old position, McClernand adjusted his right and connected again with Sherman's left. The ground occupied was rough, intersected by ravines and covered with impenetrable thickets. While making this change of position, a fierce attack was made upon the left of McClernand's line by Shaver's brigade, which was met with so hot a fire in front and on the right flank that it recoiled and took shelter in the timber. The Confederate general, B. R. Johnson, was wounded, and his brigade retreated in disorder, leaving its batteries behind. McClernand's whole division then advanced in line, pushing the enemy back beyond his camp. At the same time Hurlbut's command was pushed back by Bragg and Breckenridge. A sudden panic

seized McClernand's command, and several regiments broke in disorder. The line, however, was partially restored, and McClernand bivouacked for the night on what he designated as the eighth position he had taken in the course of the day.

1862
April
6-7

About two o'clock the Confederate troops were massed, and preparations were made to turn the Federal left and seize the Landing, a movement which, if successful, would have resulted in the capture of the entire Federal army. General Johnston was arranging the formation of the attacking column, when he was struck by a minie ball and bled to death in a few minutes. Beauregard was at a distant point of the field, and it was some time before he could get his army again in hand. The delayed movement was again attempted.

Massing
of Confed-
erates

In order to reach the Landing by the left, the Confederates would have to cross a deep ravine which could not be traversed by their artillery or cavalry, and presented unusual difficulties even for infantry. Grant had anticipated this movement, and some light earthworks were hastily constructed on the brow of the ravine. His chief of staff, General Webster, planted along this line a series of batteries, together with several siege guns, making in all about fifty cannon. The final assault was made by the brigades of Chalmers, Withers, Cheatham, Ruggles, Anderson, Pond, Stewart, and Stephens. Two or three charges had been attempted and repulsed. Beauregard believed that by one grand and desperate effort the Landing might be reached. Certainly, with the prospective

Grant's
foresight

1862
April
6-7

A gallant
charge

Success-
fully
repulsed

result in view, it was worth trying. The bottom of the ravine was covered with water, and its sides were very precipitous. With a cheer, brigade after brigade rushed down the ravine striving to cross it and climb the opposite side, but the blaze of Webster's guns met them full in front. The gunboats *Lexington* and *Tyler*, which had just reached the Landing, shelled their flank furiously, while the infantry from above poured a deadly fire into their fast melting ranks. Hundreds gained a foothold on the opposite bank, but were driven back or taken prisoners. The attempt had failed and the remnants of the Confederate forces made their way back as best they could. The struggle for the day was ended, and the Union army was left in possession of the field.

Lew Wallace was now near at hand, and Buell's troops had arrived. In trying to bring his troops into order, Beauregard found that out of the 40,000 men he had taken into the battle the day before, not 20,000 men were left. For the remainder of the contest, the forces were more nearly equal.

Notwithstanding, Beauregard determined to risk a renewal of the battle rather than retreat. The broken but undismayed remnants of his army were hastily reorganized, and in the morning they still constituted a problem to be dealt with.

Renewal
of the
battle

Fighting began very early in the morning by General Lew Wallace, who had now arrived with 6500 fresh troops, on the Federal right. The attack was pushed sharply; and Wallace, supported by McClernand, moved up to the latter's original



GEN'L JOHN A. McCLERNAND.



GEN'L W. J. HARDEE.



GEN'L J. C. BRECKINRIDGE



GEN'L LEW WALLACE.

camp, recovering the ground lost the day before. The centre and left of Grant's new line were made up of Buell's force. Two of the divisions, Nelson's and Crittenden's, pushed forward at the sound of Wallace's guns. Half a mile in advance they came in contact with the Confederate right. An artillery conflict continued for two hours and finally the Confederates fell back. Their left, in the mean time, was so hard pressed that Beauregard had to send several regiments from his right. On the National left, Sherman's troops were steadily advancing towards Shiloh Meeting-House against sharp resistance, forcing back the Confederate centre.

Step by step the Confederates were pushed back from the positions they had won the day before, resisting, however, with the greatest desperation. At two o'clock their line was broken. The terrific strain of the two days' fighting was beginning to tell upon them. After that, the fighting was not for supremacy, but to secure the retreat, which was made in an orderly manner. A heavy rain now set in, and the pursuit was delayed until the following morning, when Sherman with two brigades and Woods' division, with the Fourth Illinois Cavalry, were sent to overtake, if possible, the rear column of the retreating army. For miles they found the road impeded with deserted and broken wagons, arms and accoutrements, and dead and wounded men. Sherman was fallen upon by Forrest's cavalry a few miles out and forced to retreat. By the end of the week what was left

1862
April 7

Sherman
moves
steadily
forward

Confeder-
ates
retreat
towards
Corinth

1862
April

of Beauregard's army was back at Corinth discouraged and disappointed; but hardly more so than that of Grant, which had looked for a speedy capture of the place with its garrison.

Beauregard fortifying at Corinth

Finding that he was not pursued, Beauregard now occupied himself in strengthening and extending the fortifications at Corinth. Three days after the battle he was reinforced by Van Dorn with 17,000 seasoned troops, raising his effective strength to 50,000. The Confederate government at Richmond, and the State governments in the Southwest, used every effort to increase his strength. New regiments were recruited and old ones filled, so that after a time Beauregard found his strength on paper to be 112,000 men, although probably his effective forces were never more than 60,000.

Halleck takes command at the Landing

On the 11th of April Halleck arrived at the Landing and took command. Pope, with the Army of the Mississippi, joined him on the 21st, and, with other troops from Missouri and elsewhere, the Union forces were swelled to over 100,000 men. Halleck now proposed to move upon Corinth with a force that would make resistance impossible.

Grant ignored

Before leaving the banks of the Tennessee, the army had been thoroughly organized. Curiously enough, Halleck had little faith in Grant, and assigned him what was a mere honorary position, that of second in command of the forces, but without special duty or command. General Thomas was transferred with his division from Buell to Grant, who then commanded the Army of the

Tennessee, which formed the right wing of the army. Buell, with the Army of the Ohio, occupied the centre; and Pope, with the Army of the Mississippi, the left. Halleck took no risks. He moved slowly and cautiously, intrenching every time that he halted.

1862
May

By means of spies, General Beauregard kept himself well informed of the conditions in the Federal camp. On the 25th of May he called the commanders of the various divisions before him,—Bragg, Van Dorn, Polk, Hardee, Breckenridge, and Price,—to consider the propriety of evacuating Corinth. There was little difference of opinion. It was decided that the defenses should be abandoned at once and the army withdrawn southward; and the evacuation was begun that same night. The sick were sent to the rear, and all military stores and supplies were sent by rail southward to Tupelo, where Beauregard proposed to make a stand. The final order for the movement of troops was issued on the 29th. Among other precautions to hide the movements, it was ordered that “when-ever the railroad engine whistles during the night near the intrenchments, the troops in the vicinity will cheer repeatedly as though reinforcements had been received.”

Beaure-
gard
holds a
council

With-
draws
from
Corinth

General Pope understood the cheering and whistling of the engine as Beauregard intended he should. Nevertheless, skirmishers were sent forward to ascertain, if possible, the real condition of things. On the morning of the 30th, heavy explosions inside the works, followed by clouds of

1862
May

Union
forces
enter
Corinth

smoke, satisfied Pope that evacuation was taking place. An advance was ordered, and at eight o'clock Rosecrans' and Sherman's command entered the town. Immediate pursuit took place; and it was found that the larger part of the Confederate force had taken a new position at Baldwin, fifty miles south of Corinth, a position admirably chosen for defense. Pope made all preparations for attack, when Buell issued an order for him to return to Corinth.

CHAPTER XCII.

IN KENTUCKY AND TENNESSEE

Halleck now determined upon a new campaign for the purpose of driving the Confederates out of Tennessee. His first objective was Chattanooga. As an initial step he proposed sending Buell's army back into middle Tennessee, making such dispositions of his forces in western Tennessee as would assure the safety of the country west of the Mississippi. In March General O. M. Mitchell had been ordered to proceed from Nashville to Murfreesboro, and put in order the railroad bridges which had been burned by Johnston on his retreat.

1862

Mitchell pressed rapidly forward, and on the 7th of April entered Huntsville, Alabama, with Turchin's brigade, Kennett's Ohio cavalry, and Simonson's battery. He captured 170 prisoners, 15 locomotives, and 150 passenger and freight cars, with a large amount of army stores. On the following day he ordered Sigel, with his brigade, to proceed east along the line of railroad to seize Stevenson, at the junction of the Nashville & Chattanooga and Memphis & Charleston Railroads, where Turchin was to move west and take possession of Decatur and Tuscumbia. This was successfully accomplished, and Mitchell was in possession of over one hundred miles of this

Success-
ful raid
into Ala-
bama

1862
May

important link connecting Corinth with Richmond, in the heart of the enemy's territory.

Advance
upon
Chatta-
nooga

On the last of April Mitchell heard that a force under Kirby Smith was preparing to attack General Sill at Stevenson. He at once moved upon the place, using the captured cars for transportation. A fight ensued in which 350 prisoners were taken and the Confederate forces dispersed. In May, General Mitchell, who had been placed in command of all the troops between Nashville and Huntsville, ordered General Negley, with the Seventh Brigade of McCook's division, to advance against the Confederate General Adams at Rogersville, Alabama. The enemy, learning of the approach of the Federal forces, retreated across the Tennessee, giving up all that portion of Alabama lying north of that river. On the 29th of May General Mitchell concentrated the troops of his district for an expedition against Chattanooga, which place was reached on the 7th of June. On the evening of that day he bombarded Chattanooga and made a demonstration of crossing the river; but the bridges had been destroyed, and the intention was not carried out.

Con-
dition of
things
in Ten-
nessee

In the mean time, under orders from Buell, General G. W. Morgan had assumed command of the forces in eastern Kentucky. His instructions were to proceed without delay to Cumberland Ford, and commence operations at once against Cumberland Gap, which was held by Kirby Smith. This Gap, which played a prominent part in the movements of the war, is a deep depression in the

Cumberland Range on the boundary line between Kentucky and Tennessee. It forms a roadway through the mountain, and is the centre of all the roads in that section of country. Its sides rise abruptly to a considerable height, the passage being broken by ravines, protected by parallel ranges of less height on both sides. General Morgan, after several sharp skirmishes, determined to compel Smith to fight or retreat. He accordingly sent General Spears with three brigades to Pine Mountain, on the road to Pike Creek Gap. General Smith, whose forces numbered some 8000 men, made a move to cut Spears off, by so doing making it dangerous for the Federal forces at Cumberland Ford. Spears was withdrawn; but Morgan, hearing through Buell of the operations of Negley's command, and that Kirby Smith had left with a portion of his command for the relief of that place, resumed his advance. On the 18th of June General Morgan, finding that Kirby Smith had taken his entire command away from the Gap, made a rapid march, found the fortifications unoccupied, and took possession.

1862
June

Union
forces
possess
Pike
Creek
Gap

In the early part of May the Confederate cavalry leader John H. Morgan, with 500 men, started out from Pulaski, Tennessee, on a raid through Kentucky. On the 5th he reached Lebanon, where he was attacked by two bodies of Union troops sent out from Murfreesboro and completely routed, losing many of his men. He was chased twenty miles, but managed with a few of his men to make his escape by boat over the Cumberland River.

Morgan's
raid into
Kentucky

1862

Valuable
stores
burned

A week later, Morgan, with two new companies, made a raid on the Louisville & Nashville Railroad, capturing a freight train of forty-eight cars, which they burned. From here he went to Chattanooga to prepare for a more extensive expedition in the same direction. From this point he set out with nearly a thousand men for Knoxville, and from there marched on to Lebanon, where he destroyed \$50,000 worth of stores.

Rapid
move-
ments

From Lebanon he pushed on to Harrodsburg, sending out detachments to burn the railroad bridges on the Kentucky Central and Louisville & Lexington Railroads. His plan was to attempt the capture of Lexington; but he wished to make it appear that he intended to attack Frankfort, and draw the Union troops in that direction. He gave out wherever his force passed that he was marching on the State capital with 5000 men. This statement found rapid circulation, and spread the utmost alarm throughout the State. On the 15th of July he reached the town of Midway, captured the operator, installed his own, and sent dispatches in the name of the Union general, changing the orders for the movements of troops. As a result there was the utmost confusion and alarm at Cincinnati, Louisville, Lexington, and Frankfort. Learning how strongly Lexington was garrisoned, and finding that there was danger of his being surrounded, he began a rapid retreat to the south. At Paris, Kentucky, he was attacked by a large body of Union cavalry under Colonel Green Clay Smith, and driven out of town, losing very heavily. He

And
general
alarm

managed to escape with many of his men, crossing the Kentucky river; and reaching Richmond, Kentucky, at four o'clock in the morning, pushed on to Crab Orchard and Somerset, capturing 130 wagons with large quantities of government supplies. From Somerset he reached the Cumberland River, crossed it, and reached Monticello, where he was safe from pursuit.

1862
July

Reaches
Monti-
cello

The object of Morgan's raid was to obtain recruits and horses, and to secure equipments and arms for his men. In the report made to his commanding officer on his return, he says: "I left Knoxville on the fourth day of this month with about 900 men, and returned to Livingston on the 28th with nearly 1200, having been absent just twenty-four days; during which time I have traveled over a thousand miles, captured seventeen towns, destroyed all the government supplies and arms in them, dispersed about 1500 home guards, and paroled nearly 1200 regular troops. I lost in killed and wounded and missing, of the number that I carried into Kentucky, about ninety."

Morgan's
report of
his raid

On the 13th of July Colonel N. B. Forrest, another Confederate cavalry leader, with a force of 2000 men, attacked the Federal garrison in Murfreesboro. The post was under the command of General F. F. Crittenden. Little defense was made; supplies were seized in camp, and many of the Federal officers and men were captured. Having seized the town, Forrest now proceeded to the camp of the 'Third Minnesota on Stone's River, about a mile and a half away. Colonel Leicter,

Forrest
seizes
Murfrees-
boro

1862
July

who was in command, formed a line of battle with nine companies of infantry and four pieces of artillery, and opened fire as the Confederates advanced. Forrest attempted to flank this force and get in its rear; but unexpectedly encountered a guard of 100 men, left to protect the camp, strongly posted behind a ledge and a strong barricade of wagons. Twice this position was charged, and as many times was repulsed. A third attempt was made which was successful, and the guard was forced from its position to the main command.

Forrest
captures
troops

Up to this time but little had really been accomplished. Forrest's officers, finding the resistance stronger than they had expected, and fearing concentration of the Federal forces, were anxious to withdraw. This Forrest refused to do, and instead made preparations to attack the camp of the Ninth Michigan, which was supported by a company of the Second Kentucky Cavalry. After having disposed his forces, he sent in a written demand for the surrender of Duffield's command, which was complied with at once. The surrender of the Second Minnesota was then demanded, which the colonel, after a council with Colonel Duffield and a consultation with the other officers, consented to make. The entire force surrendered was 700 men with four batteries. Nearly a million dollars' worth of stores and government supplies was destroyed.

And
destroys
stores

From Murfreesboro Forrest moved to McMinnville, and from there to Lebanon, fifty miles away, where he expected to find and capture a force of

500 Federal cavalry. In this he was disappointed, but on his way he captured 150 men and burned four railroad bridges. From Lebanon he returned to McMinnville, from which point he made repeated raids on the line of the railroad below Nashville.

1862

Meanwhile Morgan was pursuing the same tactics on the Louisville & Nashville road. Buell, who was in command of the department, lacking sufficient cavalry, ceased to meet or to follow him. The cavalry that he had, he had been obliged to divide and send in different directions, to check the guerrilla warfare on his line of railroad. He now consolidated the Second Indiana, Fourth and Fifth Kentucky, and Seventh Pennsylvania cavalry regiment into a brigade; and on August 11 dispatched it, under the command of General R. W. Johnson, against Morgan, who had been sent out by Bragg to destroy the railroad between Louisville and Nashville, in order to delay Buell's movement to Louisville. Johnson attempted to attack Morgan before he could form a junction with Forrest, who was on his Lebanon raid at the time; but Morgan, ascertaining that Johnson had both infantry and artillery supports, persistently avoided an engagement. Johnson, however, forced the attack; but after a stubborn fight was obliged to surrender, only about twenty-five of his men being left. General Nelson attempted to intercept Forrest, but found it impossible to chase cavalry with infantry, and retired to McMinnville to await orders.

Morgan
activeAnd
escapes
capture

1862

Creation
of the De-
partment
of Ohio

On the 9th of November, 1861, by general orders from headquarters of the army, the Department of the Ohio was created, "to consist of the States of Ohio, Michigan, that portion of Kentucky east of the Cumberland River, and the State of Tennessee," to be commanded by Brigadier-General D. C. Buell, headquarters at Louisville. On the 2d day of December an order was issued creating the Army of the Ohio. Of the six divisions of which it was composed, the First, consisting of four brigades, was under the command of General George H. Thomas; the Second, of four brigades, under General A. D. McCook; the Third, commanded by General O. M. Mitchell; the Fourth, by General William Nelson; the Fifth, by General Thomas L. Crittenden; the Sixth, by General T. J. Wood. A battery of artillery was attached to each brigade. These were the troops which under Buell took part in the operations at Forts Henry and Donelson, and afterwards at Shiloh and Corinth, and which were now organized to contest the invasion of Kentucky and Tennessee.

Bragg
succeeds
Beaure-
gard

General Bragg, it will be remembered, succeeded General Beauregard when he was removed from his command after the battle of Corinth. His command consisted of the Army of the Mississippi, with the combined forces of Generals Price and Van Dorn and 2000 cavalry, numbering about 45,000. Halleck's command, which included the armies of Grant, Pope, and Buell, numbered at that time about 108,000. A Union force of nearly 9000 men under General George W. Morgan was at

Cumberland Gap. General O. M. Mitchell had a division of about 6400 men in north Alabama. Smaller forces were at Nashville, Murfreesboro, and other points in middle Tennessee. There had been a steady series of Confederate reverses. Tennessee and Kentucky were now under the control of the Federal armies, and the Mississippi was open from St. Louis to Vicksburg. A line of the Federal army reached from northern Mississippi to the southern border of eastern Tennessee. It was evident that no Confederate force could hope to meet with any success in facing the combined armies under Halleck; and yet it was imperative for the Confederate cause that something should be done to regain a portion, at least, of the territory that had been lost. After long consideration, aggressive movements threatening Washington and for the reconquest of Kentucky were decided upon.

1862

Mississippi
River
open

Accordingly, Lee was directed to prepare for a campaign into Maryland, and Bragg for the invasion of Kentucky. It was believed that the advance of a Confederate army from Chattanooga along the west flank of the Cumberland Mountains would not only recover Tennessee and Kentucky, but would also threaten Louisville and Cincinnati, and compel the detachment of a large portion of Grant's army. Anticipating some such movement, Buell, early in the month of August, 1862, was ordered to proceed to eastern Tennessee to intercept any invading force, and to seize Chattanooga, which was the key to the position. Bragg

Lee to
invade
Maryland

1862 was at Tupelo, to which place he had retreated after the battle at Corinth.

Race
between
Buell
and
Bragg

As soon as Bragg learned of Buell's plans, he immediately put his columns in motion to out-march his rival. Buell was retarded by repairs of the railroad, and his forces were constantly depleted by the detachment of men to guard his line of communication. Bragg, on the contrary, had everything in his favor in the race. His way was clear, he had no railroads to put in order, and his line of communication was open. He reached Chattanooga several days before Buell's approach, and immediately put it in a strong state of defense.

Bragg
plans to
enter
Ken-
tucky

Bragg's army had been greatly strengthened by conscription and largely outnumbered that opposed to him. He now proposed to push boldly through Tennessee into Kentucky, and to call upon the people of those States who sympathized with the Confederacy to rise and help drive out the Federal forces. To carry out Bragg's various plans, Van Dorn was assigned to the command of the district of the Mississippi, and ordered to defend Vicksburg and keep open communication with the States beyond the Mississippi, and to prevent the Union armies from occupying the northwestern part of his department. General Price was placed in command of the district of the Tennessee, with orders to hold the line of the Mobile & Ohio Railroad and to prevent Grant from sending reinforcements to Buell. Kirby Smith was directed to be ready for orders, and Humphrey Marshall was notified to move out of western

Virginia into Kentucky. Polk was made second in command, while Hardee was put in immediate command of the Army of the Mississippi, which had in the mean time been thoroughly reorganized. This army was ordered to Chattanooga; Wheeler was sent with his cavalry on a raid into west Tennessee; Price was left with the Army of the West at Tupelo.

1862
June

During the first week in June the Army of the Mississippi was on its way to Chattanooga. Price was anxious to proceed to Corinth, in order, by threatening that place, to keep Grant from reinforcing Buell. He had about 17,000 men,—infantry, cavalry, and artillery. These men were not only well armed and equipped, but they were thoroughly organized, drilled, and disciplined; but even with these, Price did not dare to throw them against the fortifications of Corinth, defended by twice their number, commanded by Grant and Rosecrans.

Corinth
threat-
ened

It was in this month that General Morgan made his famous cavalry raid across the Ohio. At that time General Simon Buckner was planning to make a dash towards Louisville, and Morgan was sent in advance with a force of 3000 cavalry. He crossed from Tennessee into Kentucky, plundering and destroying as he went. He was joined by nearly a thousand Kentuckians and secured ten pieces of artillery. Buckner was prevented, by the approach of Rosecrans' army, from joining him at Brandenburg as he had proposed; being cut off from the retreat, he determined to cross into

Morgan
in Ken-
tucky

1862
July

Indiana. This he accomplished successfully, and rode boldly towards Cincinnati, burning bridges and mills and destroying the railroads.

The raid
fails

The whole country was at once up in arms, and armed forces were surrounding him in front and rear. Roads through which he had to pass were barricaded by cutting down trees, which delayed his march so that he did not reach the Ohio River until the 19th of July. Here he found two gunboats to contest his crossing, while a large force was close behind. Nearly a thousand of his men surrendered, the rest following up the river a dozen miles, where they attempted to cross by swimming their horses. Two or three hundred men succeeded in getting over, when the gunboats made their appearance and opened fire. A few crossed, but many were killed and drowned. Morgan, with a small number of his men, escaped farther up the river to New Lisbon, where he was surrounded and captured.

Effect
in the
Border
States

This raid, remarkable for its boldness, was a distinct injury to the Confederate cause. Much of the property destroyed in Kentucky belonged to private persons, many of them sympathizers with the Southern States. The effect was to turn hundreds of the people of the Border States into active Unionists. Morgan and his officers were sent to Columbus, Ohio, and confined in the penitentiary, from which he with a few others escaped in the following November by tunneling under the building. After his escape he made his way to Richmond, and was soon back in eastern Tennessee.



GEN'L AND MRS. JOHN H. MORGAN.



GENERAL E. KIRBY SMITH.

In the early summer of 1864 he started with 2500 men on another raid in Kentucky, plundering the whole country through which he passed. He was pursued by a strong cavalry force, surprised at Mount Sterling, and driven from there to Cynthiana, where he was badly defeated, losing besides his men more than a thousand horses. After collecting his scattered force and receiving some reinforcements, he planned an attack on a Union force under General Gillem sixteen miles distant. On account of a furious rain he postponed the movement, and went to bed in the house where he had made his headquarters. Gillem forestalled his movement and made a counter attack, surrounding the house about daylight. Morgan attempted to escape, but was shot and instantly killed by a Union cavalryman.

1862
August

Morgan's
last raid
and
death

About the middle of August, 1862, General William Nelson was assigned to the command in Kentucky, and ordered to make such disposition of his troops as would resist any movement by Kirby Smith, who was then threatening Cumberland Gap. The Confederate plan was for Kirby Smith to move through eastern Kentucky and Louisville and thence to Cincinnati, and for Bragg to push through central Kentucky to Louisville. With these two cities in their possession, they argued, it would be an easy thing to invade the Northern States; and with a large number of recruits gained on the way, their armies could resist all opposition. This had been Albert Sidney Johnston's plan, which he had proposed to carry

Plans to
attack
Louis-
ville and
Cincin-
nati

1862
Sept.-
Oct.

Ken-
tucky
invaded

Defense
works
inaugurated

Bragg's
force
foraging

out after his contemplated victory at Shiloh. Buell's army, at that time at Murfreesboro, consisted of five divisions under his immediate command. In addition, he had two divisions sent to him from the Army of the Tennessee. Early in September, Kirby Smith marched north and occupied Lexington. General Heth, with 6000 men, on the 6th of September reached a point a few miles south of Covington. He had orders not to attack, but to hold himself in readiness to move to form a junction with Bragg, who was then marching north through Kentucky. This advance of General Heth created a panic in Covington, Newport, and Cincinnati. All able-bodied citizens were ordered to report for work on the fortifications south of Covington. Regiments of militia were formed, and the works were manned by farmers, merchants, and business men, who came forward to defend Cincinnati from pillage. General Heth was very anxious to attack, but was not permitted; as in a battle with Buell, which was anticipated any day, every available man would be needed. October 4, Heth retreated from his position and reported at Frankfort.

On the 4th of October, Bragg and Kirby Smith were at Frankfort, and inaugurated a provisional governor of the State. In the mean time, Bragg had not lost view of one of the objects which had brought him into Kentucky. Detachments from his army were scouring the country, carrying off everything in the way of supplies. Cattle were driven from the farms, horses were taken, flour

and bacon were seized from private families, shops were broken open and their contents taken, while there was a general enforcement of the Conscription Act, and men were seized without warning and forced into the ranks. When Bragg found that Buell had already occupied Louisville, and that the real object of the campaign had been lost, he determined to retreat at once with the plunder he had collected. Buell, however, had no mind to let him retreat undisturbed. On the 1st of October he set out with his reorganized army from Louisville to take the offensive. His pursuit was slow, and it was not until they reached Perryville that the two armies came in touch.

1862

Buell in
pursuit
of Bragg

Buell's army consisted of three corps, under McCook, Gilbert, and Crittenden. The latter, for some reason, had fallen considerably behind the two former. Bragg learned this, and at once determined to attack before Crittenden could come up. They both fell upon McCook's corps, which was in advance, and which for four or five hours had to do all the fighting. One of the Union division commanders, General Jackson, was killed at the first fire. Terrill's brigade, which consisted entirely of recruits, was driven back and Terrill mortally wounded. The enemy made repeated assaults with fresh troops on the Federal right; but each time was driven back with heavy loss, until the ammunition of the batteries was exhausted. The troops then fell back to the original line. It was late in the day before Crittenden came up. The fighting had been desperate, and

Vigorous
fighting

1862

Bragg
retreats

still hung in the balance. McCook's corps by sunset had been assaulted on both flanks and nearly overwhelmed. A furious assault was now made upon Gilbert's, which was the central corps. It was successfully resisted and driven back by Generals Mitchell and Sheridan through Perryville. Bragg knew that Crittenden was near at hand, and took advantage of the darkness to make a rapid retreat. His losses in the battle were 2500. Buell's, as is reported by himself, were 916 killed, 2943 wounded, and 10 guns taken. Bragg left on the field more than 1000 wounded and eight of the captured guns. He retreated to Harrodsburg, from which place he was driven out with a loss of a portion of his stores and about 1200 prisoners, mostly sick and wounded.

And is
hotly
pursued

On the next day Buell made a reconnaissance, and found that Bragg had succeeded in crossing the river with his entire force. Immediate pursuit was made, but Bragg pushed steadily on to Cumberland Gap, refusing to be brought to an engagement. The pursuit was at last discontinued, and Buell's army turned to Bowling Green and Glasgow preparatory to the advance upon Nashville. McCook's and Gilbert's corps were encamped at the former place, and Crittenden's at the latter. These points were selected because of Buell's belief that Bragg would concentrate in the vicinity of Nashville, and seek to recover that place.

In the mean time Bragg, with Kirby Smith, hastened back to Chattanooga. So far as gaining a foothold in Kentucky was concerned, failure

had marked his expedition. In another sense it might be considered a success: a large amount of plunder had been seized. It was reported that "the wagon train of supplies brought out of Kentucky by Kirby Smith was forty miles long." On the other hand, Bragg had not gained a single brilliant victory. He had taken neither Louisville nor Cincinnati, and only a meagre number of Kentuckians had joined his army. He had seized several thousand by conscription, but he had lost more through desertion. Hundreds of those who had been favorable to the Confederate cause were outraged by the seizure of their property, and indignant at the malicious and needless destruction and devastation he had committed.

Simultaneously with Bragg's retreat to Chattanooga, Breckenridge went into camp at Murfreesboro and assumed chief command. He had about 7000 infantry and 3000 cavalry, the last of which were under Wheeler and Forrest. With this force, Buell's army being at Bowling Green, Breckenridge besieged Nashville.

During the six weeks' siege, skirmishing between scouting parties of the enemy and the garrison was constantly occurring. On the 6th of November, a body of 8000 infantry under the Confederate General Hanson moved upon Nashville from the south, while Forrest with a thousand cavalry pushed on from the east. The Federal pickets and cavalry were driven in, when a peremptory order from Breckenridge was received forbidding an attack on the city and ordering the

1862
Nov.

Wherein
Bragg
failed

Brecken-
ridge
besieges
Nash-
ville

But fails
to take
the city

1862
Nov.

return to camp. The siege was raised by the arrival, on the 17th of November, of the advance of the army concentrating there.

Securing
the base
of
supplies

The great trouble in Tennessee was now the security of communications in the rear of the base of supplies. The repairs to the railroad took a large force several weeks to complete. The railroad from Louisville to Nashville was reopened on the 26th of November, and for the next three or four weeks the road was busy with forwarding supplies. Since the middle of November Bragg had been concentrating his forces at Murfreesboro, meanwhile sending Morgan into Kentucky and Colonel Joseph Wheeler into west Tennessee to raid the Union lines.

Buell
relieved
of his
command

Halleck now laid out for Buell an impossible plan of campaign in east Tennessee; one which would compel a march of 240 miles over mountains and rivers, without any communication in the rear except by a wagon train, over rough and almost impassable roads, and in the face of the enemy, leaving Nashville unguarded. Buell reported to the War Department that it was impossible to carry out such a plan of campaign without endangering his own army, and risking the loss of both Tennessee and Kentucky. He was at once relieved of the command of the Department of the Ohio, and Major-General William S. Rosecrans was assigned to his command.

Buell, unfortunately, through his brusqueness and lack of tact, had incurred the enmity of many prominent men in the West, among them the

governors of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. Of these, Governor Morton of Indiana was the most persistent and outspoken. From the beginning of the war he had identified himself with the Union cause with an earnestness and vigor which carried everything before it, and could not understand or overlook what he considered the dilatoriness displayed in military affairs. He had no faith in Buell, either as a general or as a patriot. After the battle of Perryville he telegraphed to the President reflecting strongly upon that general. This was followed by communications from the governors of Ohio and Illinois to the same effect, which added to the causes for his removal.

1862

Reasons
for
Buell's
removal

It must be acknowledged that Buell was not a popular commander. His military training and habits did not permit him to recognize the distinction between the regular soldier and the thinking volunteer. The latter could not be made the mere machine which the former becomes through years of routine and discipline, and his failure to appreciate this caused a good deal of ill feeling among his men. But he was a thoroughly brave and competent officer, and when duty called him he was never absent from his post. It was he who planned the Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, and Nashville campaign, and to him too was due the credit of the second day's fight at Shiloh. As an organizer he was not inferior to McClellan, and the excellence of the troops under his command was due to the thoroughness of their training under his direction.

His
qualities
as a
soldier

1862

Reorgan-
ization
and
concen-
tration

The order placing Rosecrans in command created the new Department of the Cumberland, which embraced that part of the State of Tennessee lying east of the Tennessee River, and such portions of Georgia and Alabama as should be occupied by the Federal troops. Buell's army, from continuous marching and fighting, was found to be in bad shape, and General Rosecrans at once set to work to put it in proper condition. The new levy of 600,000 men called out by the government gave him ample opportunity to fill its depleted ranks. Reorganization was rapidly accomplished, and the different corps were concentrated at Nashville, which was to form the base of supplies. The railroad between Louisville and Nashville, which had been destroyed in places, was repaired, tracks were relaid and bridges rebuilt.



GENERAL DON CARLOS BUELL.



GENERAL W. S. ROSECRANS.

CHAPTER XCIII.

IUKA AND CORINTH

Towards the last of August, 1862, Van Dorn announced to General Price that he was ready to co-operate with him in an aggressive campaign, and proposed that it should be made through western Tennessee into Kentucky, wherever circumstances might dictate. On the 1st of September it was reported to Price that Buell was retreating upon Nashville, and that he must prevent his junction with Rosecrans. Price found that Van Dorn was not prepared to move for several days, and sent word to him that he could wait for him no longer.

On the 11th of September General Price moved on Iuka, purposing to proceed into middle Tennessee; his object being to prevent reinforcements being sent by the Federal commander in Mississippi to Buell in Kentucky. Iuka is a little village on the Memphis & Charleston Railroad, lying about half-way between Corinth and Tuscumbia, where a regiment of Union troops had been stationed. When Halleck got word of Price's whereabouts, he telegraphed Grant: "Do everything in your power to prevent Price from crossing the Tennessee River. A junction of Price and Bragg in Tennessee would be most disastrous."

1862

Buell
retreats
to Nash-
ville

Price
advances
to Iuka

1862
Sept.

Grant
studies
the
situation

Grant had been watching the movements of Van Dorn and Price, but was unable to determine their intentions. He believed, however, that everything indicated a combined attack on Corinth, and distributed his forces within supporting distance of each other so as to be ready to move promptly as soon as the enemy's movements took shape. A reconnaissance on the 15th of September showed that Price was occupying Iuka in force. It was evidently intended as the base of some future movement. It might be that Price proposed to cross the Tennessee for the purpose of joining Bragg, or of attacking Buell's rear. Another supposition was, that Corinth might be attacked simultaneously by Van Dorn from the southwest, and by Price from the east; or it might be that Price would endeavor to draw Grant away from Corinth, and Van Dorn attack that place in his absence. The last supposition seemed the most probable. Grant was satisfied, however, that Van Dorn could not reach Corinth in less than four or five days. He determined, therefore, to make an immediate attack upon Price, crush him if possible, and return to Corinth before Van Dorn could reach there.

Gives
orders to
Rose-
crans

To carry out his plans, he ordered Rosecrans to move to Jacinto and Rienzi; to leave small detachments in both places; to watch any movement from the south; then move with the remainder of his force, about 9000 men, till he was near Iuka; then turn northward and make his attack by the roads leading to the town from Jacinto to Fulton. At the same time, General Ord with 6000 men was

to move along the railroad and attack on the north and west of Iuka.

1862
Sept.

Grant accompanied Ord's column to within six miles of Iuka, reaching there the 18th. An attack was planned at 4:30 A. M. on the next day. At midnight, however, word was brought from Rosecrans that he had been delayed and that one of his divisions was still twenty miles distant, so that it would be impossible for him to reach Iuka before one or two o'clock in the afternoon. General Ord was thereupon directed not to attack until he heard Rosecrans' guns. At noon that same day Rosecrans sent word that he was within eight miles of Iuka; but unfortunately this message was not received by Grant until several hours later. Hearing nothing from him, Grant concluded that he could not reach the field that day, and General Ord was instructed to wait until further notice. Rosecrans, however, pushed his men with such energy that his leading division, under Hamilton, reached the point between two and three miles southwest of Iuka on the Jacinto road, about two o'clock in the afternoon.

Rose-
crans
marches
upon
Iuka

Running south from Iuka were two parallel highways about two miles apart, the eastern known as the Fulton road, and the western as the Tusculumbia. It was apparent to Grant that if Price should endeavor to retreat, it would be by the way of the Fulton road. He had therefore ordered Rosecrans to take possession of that highway, with the view of cutting off any chance of Confederate escape. Rosecrans ignored this order and took

Grant's
order
ignored

1862
Sept.

the Tuscumbia road instead, leaving the other open to the enemy.

Rose-
crans
and Price
collide

Price formed his line of battle in the woods below the town, on the side of the road by which Rosecrans' forces were approaching. A desperate fight ensued as soon as the two bodies came into collision, which was only ended by the coming on of darkness. Price determined to renew it the next day, but that night the Confederate division commanders held a council, and agreed that there was safety only in retreat. Price tried to convince his generals that their fears were groundless, but they would not be convinced. At last he gave in, and directed them to take measures for the withdrawal of the army to Baldwyn. During the night all the valuable captured stores, and all the sick and wounded that could be moved, were taken away safely, the troops following at sunrise. Grant at once ordered a pursuit, which was attempted but abandoned. The Confederate losses were, in killed and wounded and prisoners, 1438; that of the Federals, about half as many.

But the
latter
with-
draws to
Baldwyn

Grant
orders
Rose-
crans to
Corinth

Grant was not altogether pleased with Rosecrans' tactics. He believed that if proper energy had been shown, the Confederate forces after the battle at Iuka could have been captured or destroyed; and ordered him to Corinth, which, as has already been said, was a place of remarkable strategic importance. The works occupied a position on a long ridge in the fork of two streams, which ran parallel to each other nearly to their junction. They were protected on the front and

both flanks by swampy valleys traversed by the streams, and obstructed by dense thickets. The difficulty of approach was enhanced by a belt of timber which screened the works from view. Railroads going into the town facilitated reinforcements and supplies. Beauregard kept strong parties well advanced to his front; while Grant at the Landing, absorbed in the work of reorganization and supply, made little effort to ascertain his position.

1862

On the 30th of April General Halleck, who had been since the 11th at the Landing, superintending the reorganization of the army, moved upon Corinth with an army of 100,000 men. Instead of following closely upon the heels of Beauregard as Grant would have done, and risking a second battle, Halleck first fortified his position on the left bank of the Tennessee, and then gathered around him all the available forces of his immense department. Pope was recalled from Fort Pillow on the 21st of April and reinforcements were drawn from Curtis' army in the mountains of Arkansas. With this vast army, and an immense amount of supplies for its needs, he now proceeded to carry out his long-conceived plan of campaign. Not even the Army of the Potomac vied in personnel with the Army of the West as now constituted. Among its members were the future generals-in-chief of the United States—but we have seen how Halleck's magnificent plan failed step by step; how the reputations of some of his best officers were ruined.

Halleck
proceeds
with plan
of cam-
paign

1862
Strong
defenses
at
Corinth

In addition to the defenses raised by Beauregard, Halleck had constructed works inside of these; and Grant, who for the last two months had been in command of the place, erected other works still inside those of Halleck. These various lines of defense rendered the place well-nigh impregnable. Rosecrans' command consisted of about 20,000 men; Ord's command was encamped at Bolivar, while Grant was at Jackson at the junction of the two railroads.

The Confederates advance

Van Dorn was at Chewalla, twenty miles above Corinth, and between that town and Jackson; on the 2d of October, he moved toward Corinth. He had no knowledge of the new defenses which had been erected inside of the original works. Rosecrans, who had been informed of the Confederate advance, could not at first decide where the real attack was to be made. At first he suspected that it was directed at Grant, while that which threatened him was simply a feint. He was convinced, however, that if Van Dorn should attempt an attack upon Corinth, he would do it by either a northern or eastern approach. On each of these sides the country was open, and no defenses had been erected. In any case he determined to meet the attack inside the first line erected by Beauregard.

By dawn the next morning it was made certain that Corinth was really the objective point, and at once Rosecrans disposed his troops in the best order to meet the attack. By ten o'clock the Federal outposts were driven in, and the Union line

pushed backward. At half-past one the entire line of the outer works had been carried, and part of a battery captured. At sunset the firing slackened on both sides, and ceased entirely before dark. All through the day success had attended the Confederate arms. The Union forces had been driven back from their original lines nearly two miles, to the redoubts just outside the town, and the enemy had bivouacked upon the ground they had won.

1862
Oct. 3-5

Union
outposts
driven
back

That night a new line of battle was formed, about a mile in length and close to the edge of the north side of the town. At daylight the next morning the enemy opened the attack with a six-gun battery, which was soon silenced. About nine o'clock the Confederates were seen emerging from the woods west of the railroad. Half an hour later they made a furious attack on Rosecrans' centre. It was in the form of a wedge and came on, "the men bending their necks downward with their faces averted, like those who strive to protect themselves against a driving storm of hail."

Desper-
ate
charge
upon the
centre

The approaching host was met by the fire of the Union batteries, which tore great gaps in it; but it kept on undismayed. It carried Fort Richardson, and even captured Rosecrans' headquarters. The fort was immediately retaken, however; and Hamilton's division coming up on the right, Price's column crumbled into fragments and dispersed.

Van Dorn now advanced his troops in four sections, the line of march being under the guns of the two forts, Williams and Robinette. The

1862
Oct. 3-5
Confeder-
ates
beaten
back

troops were very largely from Texas and Mississippi. They advanced with a rush until they were within fifty yards of Fort Robinette, meeting a deadly fire of grape and canister without flinching. Suddenly an Ohio brigade, which had been lying upon the ground, sprang up and poured such a murderous fire of musketry into their ranks that they staggered, halted, and finally fled back into the woods. They were at once re-formed by Colonel Rogers of the Second Texas, and advanced again to the charge. This time they reached the edge of the ditch, when they broke again and fell back. Colonel Rogers, who led the charge in person, was shot by a drummer-boy as he was planting a flag-staff on the bank of the ditch. He was the fifth standard-bearer who fell in that desperate charge. Before noon the Confederates began to retreat. Sullivan's division was ordered to push after them and keep constantly in touch with them, so that they could have no time for intrenching. Rosecrans now directed his men to proceed to their camps, provide five days' rations, take what rest they could, and be ready to start early next morning in pursuit.

And
pursued
by Union
forces

By dawn the following morning Rosecrans' troops, with McPherson in the lead, moved out from Corinth in pursuit. Van Dorn, however, had too long a start to be overtaken. His march was temporarily stayed, however, at the bridge over the Hatchie River, at Davis' Mills, where General Ord was stationed. Here the Confederate advance guard was driven back; after a brisk engagement

Van Dorn was obliged to continue his retreat on the same side of the river for several miles farther, to a bridge at Crum's Mill, over which he crossed during the night, and pushed on through Ripley to Holly Springs. Rosecrans pursued as far as Ripley, at which place Grant telegraphed him on the 6th to recall his command to Corinth. Rosecrans at once telegraphed in return as follows:

1862
Oct.

Grant
recalls
Rose-
crans

"We have defeated, routed, and demoralized the army which holds the Lower Mississippi Valley. We have the two railroads leading down toward the Gulf through the most productive parts of the State, into which we can now pursue them with safety. The effect of our return to the old position will be to pen them up in the only corn country they have west of Alabama, including the Tuscumbia Valley, and to permit them to recruit their forces, advance, and occupy their old ground; reducing us to the occupation of a defensive position, barren and worthless, with a long front, over which they can harass us until bad weather prevents an effectual advance except on the railroads, when time, fortifications, and rolling stock will again render them superior to us. Our force, including what you have with Hurlbut, will garrison Corinth and Jackson, and enable us to push them. . . . All that is needed is to continue pursuing and whip them. We have whipped, and should now push them to the wall and capture all the rolling stock of their railroads. . . . If, after considering these matters, you still consider the order for my return to Corinth expedient, I will obey it and abandon the chief fruits of a victory; but, I beseech you, bend everything to push them while they are broken and hungry, weary and ill supplied."

Rose-
crans'
protests

Grant insisted, however, upon the return of Rosecrans to Corinth, much to the latter's disgust,

1862
Oct.

who declared that but for these orders he could have gone straight to Vicksburg.

In an order issued to his troops on the 25th of October, General Rosecrans said:

Rose-
crans'
order to
histroops

“The enemy numbered, according to their own authorities, nearly 40,000 men—almost double your own numbers. You fought them in the position we desired on the 3d, punishing them terribly; and on the 4th, in three hours after the infantry entered into action, they were beaten. You killed and buried 1424 officers and men. Their wounded, at the usual rate, must exceed 5000. You took 2268 prisoners, among whom are 137 field officers, captains, and subalterns, representing fifty-three regiments of infantry, sixteen regiments of cavalry, thirteen batteries of artillery, and seven battalions, making sixty-nine regiments, thirteen batteries, seven battalions, besides several companies. You captured 3350 stand of small-arms, fourteen stand of colors, two pieces of artillery, and a large quantity of equipments. You pursued his retreating columns forty miles in force with infantry, and sixty miles with cavalry. The Union losses were, in killed, wounded, and missing, 2359.”

Van Dorn
displaced

Immediately upon hearing of the defeat and retreat of Van Dorn, President Davis commissioned General J. C. Pemberton as lieutenant-general, and ordered him to Mississippi to take command. Van Dorn asked for a court of inquiry, which completely exonerated him from the charges of failure and neglect of duty, which had been brought against him. He continued in command of a division under Pemberton, and afterwards under Bragg, until his death in May, 1863.

The entire campaign, from the taking of Henry and Donelson to the occupation of Corinth, was a complete success for the Union cause. The

objects for which it was instituted—the breaking of the Confederate lines of advance; the clearing of the Mississippi from Cairo to Memphis; the forcing of the enemy from their camp at Bowling Green; the occupation of Nashville; the severing of the Memphis & Charleston Road; and the capture of Corinth—all these objects had been attained, but some of them with very narrow margins. The Confederate leader had shown ability in the conduct of the campaign, but he was not properly supported by his own government. Had he been, and had Beauregard delayed until the arrival of Van Dorn, the result at Shiloh might have been different.

1862

Objects
accom-
lished

Beauregard left the army soon after reaching Tupelo, on the 15th of June, on the plea of ill health, turning over his command temporarily to General Bragg. No sooner did Davis hear of this than he ordered Bragg to assume permanent command, declaring that he would not reinstate Beauregard, no matter what the emergency might be. The Confederates had now been driven out of Missouri, north Arkansas, Kentucky, and all of western and middle Tennessee, and had lost every city and stronghold on the Mississippi except Vicksburg.

Bragg
super-
sedes
Beaure-
gard

On the 3d of June Halleck dispersed the grand army with which he had marched upon Corinth from Shiloh; Grant, Buell, and Pope being ordered to resume their former commands. Sherman, in the mean time, had been ordered to move along the railroad toward Memphis. Grant, on Halleck's

1862

Grant
assumes
command

leaving for Washington, was left in command of all the troops near Memphis and Corinth, 60,000 in number, composed of the Army of the Mississippi under Rosecrans, and his own forces, the Army of the Tennessee. This disposition of troops reduced the armies of the West to the defensive, and turned over to the Confederate commanders the power of initiative.

CHAPTER XCIV.

VICKSBURG

On the 26th of October, 1862, Grant, then in command at Corinth, wrote to Halleck and suggested the destruction of the railroads to all points of the compass from Corinth, and the concentration of his forces at Grand Junction. From that point, he believed that he would be able to move down the Mississippi Central Railroad and cause the evacuation of Vicksburg, and capture or destroy all the boats on the Yazoo River.

No answer was received to this letter; and Grant was therefore compelled either to lie idly at Corinth, or to assume the responsibility and follow out the indicated line of campaign. He decided upon the latter course. Orders were issued on the 1st of November for the assembly at Grand Junction of two divisions under McPherson from Bolivar, and three under Hamilton from Corinth, about 30,000 men in all. He telegraphed Halleck November 2, his intention to move on Holly Springs, destroying railroad and telegraph lines as he advanced. Halleck at once sent word of his approval, with a promise of 20,000 men a few days later. It was the plan of Grant, after concentration, to move directly south by rail to Grenada and thence to Vicksburg. The movement of the

1862
Oct.-Nov.


Grant
suggests
plan to
capture
Vicks-
burg

Massing
at Grand
Junction


1862
Nov. army began on November 9. On the 13th it
Arrival reached Holly Springs, the Confederate forces at
at Helena that point retreating behind the Tallahatchee. On
November 15 he notified Sherman to meet him at
Columbus, moving from Memphis to join him.
The combined forces reached Helena on the 8th
of December.

Pember-
ton asks
for
reinforce-
ments At that time the Confederate General Pem-
berton, who was in command at Vicksburg, had his
headquarters at Jackson, while Van Dorn com-
manded the troops near Holly Springs. Van
Dorn's effective strength was about 24,000. There
were 6000 men at Vicksburg, and about the same
number at Port Hudson. There was also a force
at Jackson; so that in all Pemberton had some-
thing less than 40,000 men. On hearing of Grant's
approach, he reported to Richmond that his force
was entirely inadequate to hold his position, and
asked for reinforcements.

Grant
not sup-
ported Grant's plans had no hearty support at Wash-
ington; partly from the reason that one of his
division commanders, General McClelland, had
been secretly urging upon the Secretary of War
the idea of an independent expedition under his
command for the purpose of opening the Missis-
sippi River. No intimation of this had been given
to Grant, on whose plans it would necessarily have
a demoralizing and disorganizing effect. The early
part of the campaign was attended by a series of
disasters which came near driving the Union army
back to Corinth. The famous Confederate cavalry
leader, Forrest, was sent out with a force of 2500



FORTIFICATIONS AT PORT HUDSON.



FORTIFICATIONS AT VICKSBURG.

men to cut Grant's communications with his base of supplies at Columbus. On the 16th of December he reached Lexington, and captured a force of 700 cavalry and two guns under Colonel Robert G. Ingersoll, who had been sent out to reconnoitre. Pushing along the line of the Mobile & Ohio Railroad, he attacked and captured all the small posts and destroyed the railroad as far as the Kentucky line. Near Lexington he was intercepted by a brigade, but succeeded in escaping with the loss of about 300 men, a battery of six guns, and a number of ammunition wagons. Forrest destroyed sixty miles of railroad from Jackson to Columbus.

1862
Dec.

Forrest's
raid a
success

At the same time Van Dorn, with a cavalry force of 3500, moved north and captured Holly Springs with 1500 men, burned supplies estimated at \$1,500,000 in value, and returned in safety. Grant now withdrew the most of his troops to the vicinity of Grand Junction. The plan for the capture of Vicksburg was, that Sherman should go down with his army in boats from Memphis, where he would be aided in an attack by the gun-boat fleet lying above the city. McClernand at the same time was to take his forces down from Cairo and join in the attack; while Grant himself was to move against Pemberton, who was intrenched on the bluffs in the rear of Vicksburg. As it was impossible for Sherman to keep in touch with Grant, he was ignorant of the retreat of the latter to Grand Junction; and had landed his troops near the mouth of the Yazoo River, just above Vicksburg, where he expected to find Grant.

Plan of
attack
upon
Vicks-
burg

1863
Jan.

Plans
miscarry
and
Sherman
retreats

He soon learned the condition of things, and determined to attack alone. Instead of having to contend with the 6000 men under Pemberton and the garrison at Vicksburg, Sherman now found twice that number in front of him, strongly fortified. The attempt, however, resulted in wholesale slaughter: the Confederate loss in killed and wounded was only 187, while that of the Federals was 2000. Sherman now retreated to his former position at the mouth of the Yazoo. The attempt at a combined movement on Vicksburg thus ended in complete failure.

Fort Hin-
deman
captured

General McClelland, as senior officer, superseded Sherman in command on January 4, and at once instituted a movement against Arkansas Post, called by the Confederates Fort Hindeman. The land force was supported by a fleet of eight gunboats carrying sixty-six guns. Fort Hindeman was a strong, four-sided bastion work, built on a bluff twenty-five feet above the river level. It contained a powerful armament of seventeen heavy guns, with a garrison of 5000 men under General Churchill. The artillery of the fort was soon silenced by the gunboats. A charge was ordered, when a white flag was raised over the fort in token of surrender; 5000 prisoners were taken with the guns and supplies.

Meantime plans were being developed for an attack upon Vicksburg. It was necessary to prevent the concentration of a larger Confederate army at that place, and to turn the attention of the enemy in a different direction. Colonel B. H.

Grierson of the Sixth Illinois Cavalry was ordered to take his own and two other regiments, about 1700 men in all, and move south through the State, destroying the various railroads and telegraph lines by sending out detachments from the main body in the smaller places. He carried dismay throughout the entire section of the country he traversed. The most exaggerated rumors were current of his presence in various places at the same time, and Pemberton was obliged to send out expeditions in every direction to intercept the advance of the column. Not one of these succeeded in coming into contact with Grierson, who in sixteen days had ridden entirely through the State of Mississippi, destroyed sixty miles of railway and telegraph with a large amount of military supplies, and made a large capture of horses. More than that, he had distracted the enemy's attention in an extraordinary degree at a most critical moment.

While this raid was in progress, Grant pushed a large force towards Grand Gulf at the mouth of Big Black River, where the bluffs were strongly fortified by a line of earthworks about 1000 yards in length. Here a sharp battle was fought in which the gunboats took part, the garrison retreating in the night after dismounting the guns and blowing up the magazines. Possession was immediately taken, and Grant established his base of supplies at that point. By this movement a position had been gained on the east bank of the river, Pemberton's flank had been turned and his

1863
April-
May

Success-
ful Union
raid
through
Missis-
sippi

Grant
occupies
Grand
Gulf

1863
May

troops scattered. There was now but one thing to do. It was to strike hard and strike quickly, to divide the enemy and beat them in detail. Grant had now 41,000 available men. General Joseph E. Johnston, who had succeeded Pemberton, had for the defense of Vicksburg 50,000 men.

Grant's
energetic
move-
ments

On the 13th of May, Grant entered Jackson, the capital of Mississippi, with Sherman's column, leaving Sherman to destroy the machine shops, arsenal, and other public property, pushing rapidly along the line of railroad towards Vicksburg to prevent a junction between Johnston and Pemberton. The latter had moved out of the city and posted his army behind earthworks on Champion Hills, a high ridge of land running south from the Jackson & Pittsburg Railroad. An attack was made about noon on May 16; and after a fiercely contested battle the Confederates retreated, with heavy loss which included most of their artillery. On May 17 the pursuit was kept up, and the Confederates were overtaken posted on both sides of the Big Black River, near the railroad bridge. After several hours' skirmishing a charge was made, and the works captured with eighteen guns and 1500 prisoners. At daylight on the 18th, Sherman took possession of the forts on Hinds' Bluff, which had been evacuated, and opened communication with the fleet. Later in the day McClermand turned to the left. These three corps now entirely surrounded Vicksburg on the land side, and Pemberton was completely cut off from Johnston. The Union army, which had been re-

Confeder-
ates
driven
into
Vicks-
burg



BATTLE OF GRAND GULF, MISS.

inforced and numbered about 70,000, now sat down to a regular siege which lasted forty-seven days, and was marked by heroic resistance on the one side and heroic pertinacity on the other, to the degree of making it one of the memorable events in the military annals of the world. Gradually the Union lines were narrowed around the doomed town. Ever nearer and nearer the lines of rifle-pits were drawn. Day by day the resources of the Confederates were reduced. But their defenses were strong, and their courage for a long time unabated. General Pemberton hoped and expected that an attack on Grant's rear would be made in such force as to loosen his grip, and to enable the besieged to rise against the besiegers and break through. The Confederates, however, had not sufficient forces for such an enterprise. General Lee in the East had now undertaken the campaign of Gettysburg, and the Confederacy was already strained in every nerve. General Grant had the way open for supplies and reinforcements. The siege was pressed with the utmost vigor, and Pemberton was left to his fate.

Meanwhile, however, two unsuccessful assaults were made on the Confederate works. The first of these occurred on the day after the investment was completed. It was disastrous. The Union army was flung back from the impregnable defenses in the rear of Vicksburg, and great losses were inflicted on them. Grant, however, was undismayed; and still believing that the enemy's line might be broken by assault, renewed the attempt

1863
May

A notable
siege

Pember-
ton hopes
in vain
for relief

Unsuc-
cessful
assaults

1863
May

in a gallant attack on the 22d of May. A furious cannonade was kept up for several hours, and then the divisions of Sherman, McPherson, and McClelland were thrown forward upon the earthworks of the enemy.

Federals
are
repulsed

It was here that General McClelland reported to the commander that he had gained the Confederate intrenchments. General Grant says: "I occupied a position from which I thought I could see as well as he what took place in his front; and I did not see the success he reported. But his request for reinforcements being repeated, I could not ignore it, and sent him Quimby's division. Sherman and McPherson were both ordered to renew their assaults in favor of McClelland. This last attack only served to increase our casualties, without giving any benefit whatever." In these attacks large numbers of the Federal soldiers had got into the low ground intervening, under the enemy's fire, and had to remain in that position until darkness enabled them to retire. The Union losses were very heavy; and General Grant, years afterwards, in composing his *Memoirs*, referred to this assault and to that at Cold Harbor as the two conspicuous mistakes of his military career.

Now it was that the regular siege of Vicksburg was undertaken. Towards the latter part of June, the Confederates, both soldiers and citizens, began to suffer. Houses became untenable. The people sought what refuge they might find. Some actually burrowed in the earth. The garrison was placed on short rations, and then a condition of starvation

ensued. Pemberton held out with a resolution worthy of a better fate. But at length human endurance could go no further. On the 4th of July the white flag was hoisted from the Confederate works, announcing the end. Generals Grant and Pemberton, with three or four attendants each, met between the lines, and the terms of capitulation were quickly named and accepted. Vicksburg was surrendered. General Pemberton and all his forces, 30,000 strong, became prisoners of war.

1863
July

The end
of the
siege

Thousands of small-arms, hundreds of cannon, and all the remaining ammunition and stores of the Confederates, were the other fruits of this great Union victory, by which the prospect of ultimate success of the Confederacy was either destroyed or long postponed; and by which in particular the great central river of the United States was permitted once more to flow unvexed from the confluence of the Missouri to the Gulf.

Trophies
of the
great
Union
victory

As soon as Vicksburg was captured, Sherman started in pursuit of Johnston. The latter had a force of 22,000 men at Jackson. Sherman reached Jackson on the 16th of July, and made preparations to attack in force; but on the night of that day Johnston retreated rapidly to Meridian, 100 miles away.

Sherman
after
Johnston

The siege of Port Hudson, whose defenses were scarcely less strong than those at Vicksburg, was begun by the army under Banks at the same time as that of Vicksburg. It occupied a place on the high bluff at a bend in the river, defended along the water side by three miles of batteries and on

Siege of
Port
Hudson

1863
July

Gardener
sur-
renders

the land side by strong earthworks, rifle-pits, and abatis. While the Union army surrounded these defenses on the land side, Farragut with his gunboats occupied places on the river both above and below the town, where his shells could be thrown into the fort from either direction. Several assaults were made, which were bravely repulsed. The garrison at last was on the verge of starvation, but yet refused to surrender. On the 7th of July the commander, General Gardener, received news of the fall of Vicksburg, and two days later surrendered. More than 6000 prisoners and fifty cannon were captured, besides large numbers of small-arms.

Missis-
sippi now
open to
naviga-
tion

Grant
assumes
command
of all
western
troops

With the fall of Port Hudson was removed the last hindrance to the free navigation of the Mississippi. On the 15th of July the steamboat *Imperial* went from St. Louis to New Orleans, the first boat that had floated over that distance undisturbed for two years. After the fall of Port Hudson and Vicksburg, no serious effort was ever made to again bring the Mississippi within Confederate control or to blockade it against commerce. Union armies which had been concentrating in operations along the Mississippi were now withdrawn for service in other fields. Grant's army was dismembered, the Ninth Corps being sent to Ohio, the Thirteenth to Texas, the Fifteenth and Seventeenth and part of the Sixteenth to Chattanooga. Heron's division was dispatched to Missouri. In October Grant was assigned to the command of all the troops in the West, and ordered to Chattanooga.

THE DAILY CITIZEN.

J. M. SWORDS

PROJ. 1000

VICKSBURG, MISS.

THURSDAY, JULY 2, 1863.

Mr. Cisco was instantly killed on Monday, on Jackson road. Mrs. Cisco a husband is now in Virginia, a member of Moody's artillery, and the death of such a loving, affectionate and dutiful wife will be a loss to him irreparable.

We are ladebied by Major Gillopie for a steak of Confederate beef *alone* meat. We have tried it, and can assure our friends that it is rendered necessary, they need have no scruples at eating the meat. It is sweet, savory and tender and so long as we have a ruble to eat it, our users will be content to submit on it.

John Akew, one of our most esteemed merchant citizens, was wounded severely in the rear of our city a few days since, and breathed his last on Monday. Mr Akew was a young man of strict integrity, great industry, and an honor to his family and friends. He was a member of Cowan's artillery, and by the strict discharge of his duties and his obliging disposition, won the confidence and esteem of his fellow citizens. May the merciful Father of the poor pardon his sins, and grant him a happy resurrection.

... Gen. forces did a little thing or
Thursday afternoon, but the balance of that day
was comparatively quiet. Yesterday morning
very dull, and continued so until early
afternoon, because they were a mile or
two from along the
have not been able
our loss.
of our officers,
more of the enemy, it
Vancouver was not realized by
many soldiers we
citizens who came
the 10th of May 1861

ous Mavis. — In denoting a large number of our space this morning to Federal Intelligence from the Memphis Bulletin of the 21st, I should be remembered that the news, in its original form, is watermarked by the Federal Union of Memphis, who desires to build with the poor Northern, white slaves. The former editors of the Bulletin being rather pro-southernists, were arrested for speaking the truth when truth was unwelcome to Vandalism, and placed in the chains working at Waterson, where they now are. This paper at present is in duress, and edited by a pink nose, staid-minded, and calling Yankee, who is a literal descendant of the Indiana Journal and a brother germain of the Southern Puritanical abolitionists, Kentucky and Ohio (see) — James Browder. — The truth such a character, this paper cannot but be the fact that Gen. Robert E. Lee has given Henry, Milroy & Co one of the best and most complete whippings on record, and that the glorious Union is now exceedingly weak but the knee.

[illegible]

Yonkee News from all Points

PHILADELPHIA, June 21, 2:30, a. m.—
Following is all the news of interest in
Washington Square.

Major Brazell of the United States
received intelligence from a source
this morning, that the rebels in
were advancing on Pittsburg,
national road, leading from Cumberland
and Allegheny Mountains. Their pack-
trashed Grantsville, Md., thirty-eight miles
mountain, Fayette county, Penn., on Wed-
nesday evening last.

It is reported in Washington to-day that
quarters of Hooker's staff were gobbled
by rebels last night in the vicinity of Fairfax.
HARRISBURG, June 20.—Operations were con-
tinued on our side to-day by a portion
of the New York cavalry regiment capturing two
hundred prisoners at McConeysburg, in Pa.

Col. Lawrence, with a portion of the Pennsylvania regiment, (mounted) captured a large number of rebels, who were marauding on the banks of the river.

We build Chambersburg, and the town,
and fortifying the city. Gen. C.
ordered that the place be held.
The Fortifications opposite this city are to
and are considered impregnable.

The rebels are known to be good fighters, and William, for the rebels hold the North and the Potomac river, from Cumberland to Harper's Ferry, from the mountains to the coast.

When they left they threatened to re-
furnish themselves with horses and for-
the rebels have done an immense amount
of damage.

It is thought Gen. Rhodes is opposed to
transport with 20,000 men. The rebel
Rhodes is reported as advancing, but this
is considered doubtful.

Six thousand infantry are reported to be based at Williamsport. It is not believed

The enemy has nearly 6000 infantry in the Potomac, under Gen. Rhodes. 7 regiments of infantry and a squad of cavalry.

sharpshooters and the remainder are engaged between Williamsport and Hagerstown.illery has been sent over, nor have any moved since yesterday morning.

of his command, stationed at ... Lee's army is not in ...

friendly of the city. These will be defended by Union League men, who are being armed by Gen. Seligman. The Union men are confident that the rebels will not be so bold as attempt to raid in that direction. The duty among us are evidently uneasy, and begin to realize that any hostile movement of the rebel army against Baltimore might result disastrously.

A floral special from Monocacy Station left at 10:15 a. m. About 4 o'clock, p. m., the 1st of the 1st Maryland Cavalry, with their painted flags, rode into Frederick, with forty men.

driving out the enemy, killing two and capturing one. No loss on our side. Our cavalry passed through the city, and immediately about noon rebel cavalry re-occupied the town. Rebel cavalry entered Frederick yesterday.

p. m., about 6 o'clock and dashed swiftly through the city, accompanied by four men, some of whom were armed with shotguns. They were seen at the square station, where they had the Irish soldiers, some of whom were in the habit of being a member of the Irish.

... and was closed. ...
... A majority of the ...
... at the ... The ...
... in the ...

The party which entered the city did not number over twenty, and many of these seemed

Pickers were stationed in the outside of the
No one was allowed to leave until about
eight when the crowd all left going west
Midway. The crowd they were in

city again and established pickets in the streets. The telegraph poles were cut down and the wires destroyed. There was supposed to be about thirty rebels in the city this morn. They have no force between Frederick and

Monmouth except a small cavalry camp at M.
dewa. No attempt has been made to cross
the bridge over the Morcomby river, and
the enemy came down at night with
troops of the junction.

The rebels are reported to be fortifying Sugar Mountain. They have in the vicinity of Williamsport about 6000 infantry, 1500 cavalry, and a few pieces of artillery. A squadron of cavalry could undoubtedly capture the entire force.

The Recent Federal Losses at

Wicksburg.

There is an old saying that babies soon come second nature. In the halls of falsehood the Yankees have become so perfect that it is

may be estimated as not only the
the fire nature. Indeed to such an extent

The Recent Federal Losses
Wicksburg.

There is an old saying that habit soon becomes second nature. In the habit of falsehood the Yankees have become so perfect that it is justly estimated as not only their ~~second~~ nature, but their first nature. Indeed to such an extent



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